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1.  Following  the  strong  economic  upturn  in  the  years  1986-90,  when 
average  growth  rates  exceeded 3  per cent,  the  EC  economy  lost momentum  and 
entered  a  period of stagnation  or,  in  some  member  States,  even  recession. 
Overall  economic  growth  fell  to  about  1  per cent in  1992.  Only France  and 
Ireland showed higher growth  than  in 1991. 
2.  This  slowdown  reflected  both  internal  and  external  factors. 
Persistent macroeconomic  imbalances  in certain member  States had an  adverse 
impact  on  currency  markets,  consumer  sentiment  and  investment  decisions. 
The  demand  effects  of  German  unification  initially  helped  to  maintain 
growth  in  Germany  itself and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  in other member  States, 
but its fiscal  and  monetary  consequences  later  imposed  an  additional  brake 
on  the  EC  economies.  Economic  slowdown  in  important  foreign  markets, 
including  most  EFTA  countries,  the  United States  and  Japan,  and  an 
appreciation  of  European  currencies  against  the  dollar  compounded  these 
difficulties,  which  were  not  significantly  counterbalanced  by  improvements 
in other markets. 
3.  The  EC' s  merchandise  trade  deficit  with  all  its  major  partners 
widened  in  1991.  Among  the  member  States,  only  Denmark,  Germany  and 
Ireland  ran  merchandise  trade  surpluses,  and  the  German  surplus  was  much 
reduced from  1990. 
4.  Currency  turmoil  in  the  second  half  of  1992  brought  long  subdued 
macroeconomic  tensions  to  the  surface.  In  mid-September 1992,  the 
United Kingdom  and Italy suspended  the participation of their currencies in 
the  European  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  (ERH)  which,  under  the  Maastricht 
Treaty,  is  intended  to  serve  as  the  basis  for  a  common  EC  currency.  In 
several  other  member  States,  the  defence  of  parities  led  to  continued 
monetary  tightening,  exacerbating  an  already  difficult  environment  for 
long-term investment decisions. C/R11/S/36A 
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5.  The  Communities'  strong  economic  growth  in  the  late  1980s  appears 
to  have  been  stimulated  by  the  Internal  Harket  programme  and  to  have 
minimized  ec~nomic frictions resulting from  the implementation process.  By 
contrast,  the  present  downturn  has  both  reduced  growth  impulses  steJID1ng 
from  the  programme  and  compounded  the  pressures  arising  from  external 
challenges,  such  as  the  transition  in  central  and  eastern  Europe  11nd  the 
former  Soviet  Union  and  the  stalemate  in  the  Uruguay  Round.  This  bas 
increased the risk that more  defensive  trade policies will be followed. 
(2)  Developments  in  the Institutional Framework 
6.  Internal  developments  in  the  EC  - the world's  largest  trading entity 
- cannot  be  separated  from  their effects on  the  international  environment. 
Any  steps  to  "deepen"  or  "widen"  the  Communities,  by  intensifying 
integration among  current members,  or extending its geographical  scope,  are 
bound  to impact on  the multilateral system. 
7.  The  Single European  Act of 1987  provided  the  legal  and  institutional 
framework  for  "deepening"  the EC  integration process,  establishing "an area 
without  internal  frontiers  in  which  the  free  movement  of goods,  persons, 
services  and  capital  is  ensured".  Under  the  Act,  the  scope  of qualified 
(~o-thirds) majority voting  by  members  States  in  the Council  was  extended 
from agricultural and commercial  policy to virtually all issues relating to 
the Internal  Harket.  This  enabled progress  to  be  made  on  deregulating and 
harmonizing national  trade practices. 
8.  At  the  same  time,  partly  prompted  by  the  increasing  pace  of  EC 
integration,  a  growing number of countries in  the European Free Trade Area, 
in  central  and  eastern  Europe  and  the  Hediterranean  basin  have  sought  to 
conclude  new  agreements  with  the  Communities,  with  the  aim  of  securing 
and/or  extending preferential market  access,  albeit with differing  degrees 
of coverage and reciprocity. 
9.  The  Treaty  on  European  Union  (the  Haastricht  Treaty),  signed  in 
February  1992,  but not yet ratified by  all member  States,  aims  to  open new 
areas of integration.  While maintaining existing EEC  policy C/R11/S/36A 
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responsibilities  in  the  field  of  trade,  the  Treaty  seeks  to  extend  the 
scope of Community action,  inter alia,  through  economic  and monetary union, 
including  the  introduction  of a  single  currency  by  1  January  1996  or  1999 
at  the  latest.  The  relevant  decisions  are  to  be  taken  by  the  Council, 
meeting  in  the  composition  of Heads  of State  or Government,  based  on  the 
performance  of each  member  State with  respect  to  four  eligibility criteria 
(price  stability,  fiscal  balance,  exchange  rate  stability within  the  ERH~ 
and  convergence of long  term interest rates).  In  mid-1992,  only France  and 
Luxembourg would have met  the  benchmark values. 
(3)  Trade  Policy Features  and  Trends 
(i)  Harmonization  in  the  Internal  Market 
10.  Over  the  past  two  years,  the  EC  has  remove.d  many  long-standing 
"residual"  national  trade restrictions protecting individual  member  States' 
markets  from  external  supplies,  especially of Asian  or central  and  eastern 
European  origin.  Some  of  these  measures  may  already  have  become  obsolete 
in  the  process  of  internal  and  international  structural  change,  and  the 
abolition  of  others  may  have  been  aided  by  the  generally  favourable 
macroeconomic  climate during  the  second half of the  1980s.  No  decision had 
been  taken,  at  the  time  of  writing,  on  the  treatment  of  remaining 
non-liberalized products,  such  as  footwear,  textiles and  toys,  from  certain 
east European  and Asian countries,  China  and  Cuba. 
11.  The  legal  provisions  of Article  115  of  the  EEC  Treaty  (which  allows 
member  States  to  erect  national  barriers,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Commission,  against indirect deliveries of imported goods)  remain  in force. 
However,  the Single European  Act provides no  scope,  as  from  1  January  1993, 
for any internal  trade measures against  imports  from  external  sources.  The 
number  of  new  Article  115  restrictions  authorized  has  fallen  from  119  in 
1990  to  48  in  1991  and  8  in  1992.  The  single  market  also  implies  that 
substitutes for  internal  border measures,  such  as national registration and 
type  approval  procedures,  will no  longer be available. C/Rl1/Sf36A 
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12.  While  the Communities'  bilateral restraint agreements  on  textiles and 
clothing  under  the  HFA  remain  in  force,  national  import  quotas  within  the 
system were abolished with effect from  1  January  1993.  Although restrained 
suppliers  have  agreed  to  cooperate  to  avoid  sudden  and  prejudicial  changes 
in  traditional  trade  flows,  the  creation  of  a  unified  EC  market  in  the 
sector should  enhance  flexibility for  such  exporters. 
13.  In  certain  sensitive  areas,  EC-wide  arrangements  with  foreign 
suppliers  or  new  Community  restrictions  are  to  replace  a  previous  maze  of 
national restrictions. 
A  "consensus"  with  Japan  on  cars,  containing  regional  market 
forecasts,  is  intended  to  provide  temporary  and  declining 
relief  for  Community  producers,  with  the  objective  of  full 
liberalization  by  the  year  2000.  Open  questions  appear  to 
include  the  allocation  of  Japanese  supplies  among  car 
categories  and  producers;  the  adjustments  required  on  both 
sides  if  demand  forecasts  are  not  fulfilled;  and  the 
application  of  the  consensus  to  new  member  States  joining  the 
EC  before 2000. 
In  the  banana  sector,  a  tariff  quota  system,  with  very  high 
duties  on  over-quota  supplies,  is  due  to  enter  into  force  on 
30 July  1~93.  The  new  system will  apply  to all  member  States, 
including  markets  that  were  previously  completely  open 
(Germany)  or  covered  by  the  Communities'  bound  tariff  of 
20  per cent.  Affected  Latin  American  suppliers  have  invoked 
GATT  consultation  and  dispute  settlement  procedures  and  raised 
the  question  in  the  context  of the  Uruguay  Round.  Pending  the 
implementation  of  the  common  regime,  France  and  the 
United  Kingdom  have  been  granted  new  authorizations  under 
Article 115. '  C/Rl1/Sj36A 
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Under  a  new  market  organization  in  the  fisheries  sector, 
imports  of  canned  tuna  and  sardines  are  subject  to  Community 
quotas  until  end-1996.  These  apparently  substitute  for 
national  restrictions  previously  maintained  by  France  and 
Spain,  although  the  new  quotas,  which  contain  growth  factors, 
set higher  EC-wide  import  levels  than  those  actually  realized 
in  1991. 
Steel  deliveries  from  the  CIS  Republics,  which  previously 
entered  five  member  States  under  national  restrictions,  now 
face  Community  quotas.  Current  proposals  are  for  an  extension 
until  end-1995. 
14.  National  excise  taxes  on  certain  tropical  products  (coffee,  tea, 
cocoa)  are  not  scheduled  for  harmonization.  Five  member  States  maintain 
coffee  taxes  with  ad  valorem  incidences  of  up  to  100  per cent  in  1991. 
Italy quadrupled  its rates  in January  1991,  giving rise  to  protests within 
the  GATT  system. 
15.  Where  common  technical  regulations  exist,  any  EC  or  third  country 
products  meeting  these  requirements  may  circulate  freely within  the  single 
market.  In the absence of common  rules,  goods  qualify for  free  circulation 
throughout  the  EC  whenever  they  conform  to regulations valid in any of the 
member  States.  In  areas  of health  and  safety,  harmonization  of  technical 
rules  or  the  specification  of  essential  common  requirements  has  been 
preferred  to  mutual  recognition.  Implementation  into  national  law  of new 
directives  laying  down  essential  requirements  has,  however,  proved 
difficult,  and  the  establishment  of  supplementary  norms  has  taken  longer 
than  scheduled.  Technical  barriers  may  thus  continue  to  affect  intra-EC 
trade  in  certain  areas,  including machinery,  for  some  time.  By  contrast, 
both  imported  and  EC-produced  motor  vehicles  that  qualify  under 
comprehensive  harmonization  provisions  may  be  traded  among  member  States 
without standard-related impediments  as  from  1  January  1993. C/Rl1/Sj36A 
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16.  National  procurement  entities  are,  in  general,  required  to  apply  EC 
rules  to  all  supplies  worth  more  than  ECU  200,000.  However,  in  the 
"excluded sectors"  (water,  energy,  transport and  telecommunications),  a  new 
EC  Directive sets  the  thresholds  at  ECU  400,000  or,  in  telecommunications, 
at  ECU  600,000.  In  these  sectors  the  Directive  permits  the  rejection  of 
bids  with  a  foreign  content  of  over  50  per cent  from  countries  that  have 
not  agreed  equivalent  access  to  EC  supplies,  and  requires  Community 
preference  to  be given if the price differential is 3  per cent or less. 
17.  Harmonization  of  export-related  policies,  such  as  financing  and 
insurance,  has  not  so  far  gone  beyond  the  stage  of mutual  information  and 
consultation.  Areas  such  as  countertrade also remain  the responsibility of 
individual  member  States.  No  up-to-date  information  on  national  policies 
in  these areas has,  however,  been made  available for this report. 
( ii)  Type  and  incidence of trade  policy instruments 
18.  Abolition  of  national  restrictions  and  harmonization  of  trading 
conditions  among  member  States  have  increased  the  relative  importance  of 
Community  trade  policy  instruments,  in  particular  the  Common  Customs 
Tariff.  In  some  sensitive  areas,  however,  the  tariff appears  to  be  less 
relevant  than  instruments  such as  anti-dumping actions,  bilateral restraint 
agreements,  and  export monitoring or moderation  on  the  part  of competitive 
foreign  suppliers.  In  some  other  areas,  such  as  shipbuilding  and  coal, 
protection  in  certain  member  States  may  rely  heavily  on  production 
subsidies  or  exclusive  supply  contracts  between  domestic  producers  and 
users.  In  addition,  almost  all  major  temperate-zone  agricultural 
commodities,  except  oilseeds,  are  virtually  isolated  from  external 
competition  by  the Communities'  system of variable import levies. 
19.  Due  largely  to  the  ongoing  Uruguay  Round,  no  significant  tariff 
changes  have  been  implemented  in  recent  years.  Almost  all  EC  tariffs  on 
industrial  items  are  bound  in  GATT,  averaging  slightly below  6~ per  cent. 
Significant  tariff  escalation  exists  in  areas  such  as  fish,  tobacco, 
leather,  rubber,  textiles  and  metals.  Further  escalation  may  result  from 
tariff  suspensions  on  basic  inputs  such  as  chemicals  and  microelectronic 
components. 
• C/RH/S/36A 
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20.  Also in view of the unfinished state of the  Uruguay Round,  the  EC  has 
made  no  substantial  changes  to  its  system  of  GSP  preferences.  The 
Commission  admits  that  benefits  under  the  scheme  are  reduced  by 
considerable  administrative  costs,  uncertainties  resulting  from  its 
application and,  in sensitive product  areas,  the  use  of tariff quotas  that 
may  be  exhausted  within  a  few  days.  The  new  "Europe  Agreements"  with 
central  and  eastern  European  countries  are,  moreover,  liable  to  erode  .the 
advantages granted  to other preferred suppliers. 
21.  Apart  from  the  "consensus"  on  motor  vehicles  with  Japan,  no  new 
bilateral  restraint  monitoring  or  moderation  arrangements  have  apparently 
been  concluded  by  the  EC  in  the  past  two  years.  Many  such  arrangements, 
exchanges of letters and  understandings affecting imports of iron  and steel 
products  have  expired,  and  surveillance  of  imports  of  certain  consumer 
electronics  and  machinery  from  Japan  and  Korea  .has  been  terminated. 
However,  in  the  context  of  association  or  cooperation  agreements,  the  EC 
and  its  Mediterranean  partners  have  continued  export  moderation  and 
monitoring arrangements  on  certain sensitive textile and clothing products. 
These  seek  to  prevent  "market  disruption"  and,  thus,  avoid  restrictive 
action by  the Communities  under  the  safeguard provisions of the  agreements. 
22.  Steel  imports,  except  from  EFTA  countries,  are  subject  to 
retrospective  or automatic  prior  surveillance;  and  new  prior  surveillance 
has  recently  been  introduced  on  apples.  While  aimed  at  gathering 
up-to-date  information  on  trade  flows,  such  measures  may  prompt  affected 
exporters  to  exercise  "prudence",  with  a  view  to  avoiding  new  import 
restrictions.  Continued  unilateral  export  monitoring  by  Japan  and  the 
Republic  of  Korea  on  sensitive  items,  such  as  steel  semi -manufactures, 
metal  flatware,  travel  goods,  pottery  and  chinaware,  appears  intended  to 
ensure  undisturbed  access  to  major  export  markets,  including  the 
Communities. 
23.  Subsidies  to  industry  are  granted  mainly  at national  level,  subject 
to  Community  control.  Although  the  level  of such  State  aids  was  lower  in 
the  period  1988  to  1990  than  between  1986  and  1988,  it is unlikely  to have 
declined  further,  given  the  large  amount  of  aid  channelled  into  the  east 
German  economy  (some  ECU  24  billion in 1992)  since unification. C/Rli/S/36A 
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(iii)  Temporary measures 
24.  Anti-dumping  measures,  in  the  form  of duties  or  price  undertakings, 
continue  to  be  the  Communities'  most  frequently  used  trade  remedy 
instruments.  In  September 1992,  over 160  measures were  in force.  A  sunset 
clause  provides  for  their expiry  five  years  after their introduction,  last 
modification  and  confirmation,  unless  affected  parties  invoke  a  review 
procedure.  Since  1985,  over  three-quarters of the measures have expired as 
scheduled. 
25.  Chemicals  and  fertilizers  account  for  about  cwo-fifths  of  all 
anti-dumping  measures,  followed  by  textiles,  base  metals  and  metal 
semi-manufactures.  Such  traditional  industries  may  be  more  vulnerable  to 
alleged  unfair  price  competition  - or  exert  more  pressure 
dynamic  industries  in  earlier  phases  of  product  development. 
than  more 
Structural 
rigidities,  stemming  from  industrial  concentration  in  mature  segments  of 
the  economy,  may  further  increase  the  likelihood  that  low  priced  imports 
are  regarded  as  causing  serious  injury.  In  these  circumstances, 
anti-dumping  action  may  conflict  with  competition  policy  objectives.  A 
recent  case  in  which  the  EC  authorities  intervened  to  restore  competitive 
conditions  concerns  soda-ash,  where  domestic  producers  had  sought  anti-
dumping  protection  to  defend  cartel  rents  against  competing  imports.  The 
companies  involved  were  convicted  under  EC  competition  law  and  the  anti-
dumping  measures  repea)ed in 1990!91. 
26.  In  sectors  regarded  as  central  to  the  development  of new  industries 
in  the  Community  - such  as  electronic  memory  components  - anti-dumping 
actions  were  considered  in  the  "Community  interest".,  being  aimed  at 
restoring  a  "fair"  market  environment  and  reducing  dependence  on  foreign 
supplies.  A  recent  decision  by  one  EC  company  to  develop  a  new  generation 
of memory chips jointly with  a  Japanese  producer and  a  U.S.-based  firm may, 
however,  prompt  discussions  about  the notion of minimum self-sufficiency in 
assessing "Community  interest"  in this field. 
27.  Safeguard  actions  under  Article XIX  of  GATT  are  rarely  used  by  the 
Communities.  Between  January  1991  and  December  1992,  the  EC  took  three 
such  actions,  all  on  food  products;  and  in February  1993,  minimum prices 
• 
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were  introduced  on  imports  of  certain  white  fish.  Germany  continues  to 
invoke  Article XIX  in  connection  with  its  coal  policy;  dating  from  1958, 
this is the longest-standing safeguard action in GATT. 
28.  In  the  period  under  review,  the  EC  has 
provision  under  a  preferential  trade  agreement. 
applied  one  safeguard 
In  the  second  half  of 
1992,  it imposed  selective  import  quotas  on  steel  deliveries  into  France, 
Germany  and Italy.  These  measures,  taken  under  the  "Europe  Agreement" with 
the  then  Czech  and Slovak Federal  Republic,  were  introduced after bilateral 
discussions  on  voluntary  action  had  failed;  they  expired  on 
31  December  1992. 
29.  Recent  proposals  by  the  Commission  aim  to  change  the  procedures  for 
EC  trade  remedy  actions,  by  giving  the  Commission  the  right  to  implement 
measures  unless  disapproved  by  a  qualified  majority  in  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  This  would  lead  to  an  important  change  in  the  institutional 
decision-making  balance,  away  from  the  member  States  towards  the 
Commission.  Currently,  a  qualified majority of the  Council  has  to  approve 
Commission  proposals  for  remedial  actions  including  anti  -dumping  and 
countervailing duties  - in order  to bring  them  into  force. 
30.  While  safeguard  provisions  under  the  Communities'  general  import 
legislation  (Council  Regulation No.  288/82)  are  based on Article XIX of the 
GATT,  the  new  market  organizations  for  fisheries,  tobacco  and  bananas 
contain  less  stringent  constraints  on  EC  action.  In  these  areas,  the  EC 
may  take  emergency action in  the  event of imports  causing or threatening to 
cause  serious  disturbances  which  "may  endanger"  the  objectives  of  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy.  The  Commission  is  empowered  to  introduce  the 
"appropriate  measures"  immediately;  the  Council  would  need  to  achieve  a 
qualified  majority  against  the  Commission  in  order  to  amend  or  revoke  a 
measure. 
(iv)  Trade-related aspects of competition  policy 
31.  The  EEC  Treaty  places  a  general  ban  on  anti-competitive  practices 
affecting trade  between member  States.  The  Commission  has applied  these C/RH/S/36A 
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provisions  to  prevent  private  arrangements  from  substituting  for  formsl 
trade  barriers  and  thereby  thwarting  the  integration  process.  The  use  of 
EC  competition  policy  as  an  instrument  to  support  integration  has  been 
facilitated  by  an  extensive  definition,  developed  in  EC  case  law,  of 
practices  considered  to  affect  trade  between  member  States  and, 
accordingly,  to fall within Community  competence. 
32.  Arrangements  involving EC  or  foreign  Government  authorities,  such  as 
export  restraints  vis-a-vis  the  EC  or  individual  national  markets,  do  not 
infringe  competition  law  if the  companies  involved  remain  within  the  set 
limits.  Export  cartels  among  EC  companies  are  outlawed  if  they  have 
repercussions  on  EC  internal markets. 
33.  The  Commission  may  grant  exemptions  to  competition  law  for  specified 
periods,  for  agreements  between  companies  contributing  to  objectives  such 
as  improving  the  distribution  of  goods  or  promoting  research  and 
development.  General  conditions  for  cooperative  arrangements  deemed 
acceptable have  been  laid  down  in  block  exemptions.  One  of these,  enacted 
in  1985,  covers  supply  contracts  between  producers  and  dealers  of  motor 
vehicles  ensuring  exclusive  territories  within  the  same  franchise  system. 
However,  the  Commission  has  stressed  that  it will  not  tolerate  practices, 
such  as  refusal  of maintenance  services,  aimed  at  deterring  sales  across 
contract territories and  among  member  States. 
34.  Most  functions  of  EC  competition  policy  - developing  rules  and 
guidelines,  policing,  prosecuting,  and  passing  decisions  - are  vested  in 
the Commission.  As  in  the  anti-dumping area,  no  independent institution is 
involved  in  the  investigation and  decision-making  process,  and  there is no 
need  for  the  Commission  as  a  body,  should  its  final  decision  diverge  from 
the  position  taken  by  its  competent  service  (Directorate  General  IV),  to 
make  such deviations  public or to give reasons. 
35.  The  Commission's  r6le  in  competition  policy  extends  to  the  area  of 
State aid.  Under  the EEC  Treaty,  the  Commission  is entrusted  to keep  under 
constant  review  all  subsidy  systems  within  the  Community.  It 
has  the  exclusive competence  to  decide  on  the compatibility of such  systems 
with  the  common  market objectives. CfR11/Sf36A 
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36.  Within  the  European  Economic  Area,  the  participating  EFTA  countries 
are required  to accept  the  "acquis  communautaire"  of EC  rules  and  case  law, 
in  such  areas  as  technical  regulations,  public  procurement,  competition 
policy and  State  aid.  Full  implementation  of  the  "acquis"  in  these  areas 
also  prevents  EEA  members  from  introducing  anti-dumping  or  countervailing 
actions on  each  other's shipments. 
(v)  Sectoral  policy developments 
37.  Reflecting  the  diversity of national  production  structures  and,  as  a 
result,  the  redistributive  effects  associated  with  many  policies,  EC 
decision-making  on  sectoral  issues  tends  to  be  difficult  and  time 
consuming.  The  need  to  agree,  for  any  significant  reforms,  on  complex 
packages  that  cater  to  the  sensitivities of at  least  a  qualified majority 
of member States,  helps  explain  the  longevity of certpin costly programmes, 
such  as  in  agriculture,  as  well  as  the  problems  in  responding  swiftly  to 
external stimuli,  including those arising from  the Uruguay  Round.  However, 
it  also  testifies  to  the  political  momentum  involved  in  pursuing  and 
implementing  the  Internal  Market  programme  and,  more  recently,  passing 
reforms  in the  Common  Agricultural Policy. 
38.  Available  information  suggests  that  the  implementation  of  the 
Internal  Market  programme  has  improved  access,  transparency  and  legal 
security in many  sectors.  Fears  that  the  EC  would  turn more  inward-looking 
do  not  seem  to  have  been  justified,  and  there  is little  evidence  of  any 
major  intensification  of  protective  measures  in  the  industrial  sphere. 
However,  not all measures  have  been  fully  implemented  to  date,  and  many of 
the new regimes  are awaiting their first  tests. 
39.  In  a  number of regulated industries,  the  Community has  taken steps  to 
harmonize  the  regulatory  framework  among  member  States,  ease  entry 
barriers,  and  inject  competition  into hitherto  strictly controlled  areas. 
For  example,  considerable  efforts  have  been  made  to  reduce  distortions 
resulting  from  the  exclusive  position  of  national  telecommunications 
carriers  on  procurement  markets,  and  to  trim  the  coverage  of  their  supply 
monopolies.  In pharmaceuticals,  issues  such as approval  criteria and C/R11/S/36A 
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procedures  and  the  mutual  acceptance  of  tests  have  been  addressed  through 
comprehensive  EC  directives.  A  cormnon  framework  for  product  acceptance, 
applicable  as  from  1995,  should  promote  market  integration  in  important 
areas  and  ease  conditions  for  external  trade.  However,  the  diverse  price 
or  profit  control  mechanisms  operated  by  member  States  and  national 
reimbursement  systems  remain  largely unchanged. 
40.  Host  coal-producing  member  States,  except  Germany,  have  liberalized 
their policies  in  the  sector or  decided  on  majo1  adjustments.  Large  parts 
of  the  German  market  continue  to  be  reserved  for  domestic  production, 
shielded  from  both  intra-EC  and  international  competition  through 
subsidization  and  an  intricate  system  of  exclusive  supply  relations. 
Recent  Commission  proposals  aim  to  establish  a  common  policy  framework  for 
the  sector,  based  on  a  reference  price  mechanism  that  is  intended  to 
reflect  supply  security aspects.  The  Commission  does  not,  however,  regard 
coal  production  as  an  end  in  itself,  irrespective  of  economic  viability, 
and  stresses  that  supply security is also related  to  the  diversification of 
energy  sources. 
41.  In  the  steel  sector,  movement  towards  restoring market mechanisms has 
continued,  as  shown  by  the  expiry of voluntary restraint arrangements  and  a 
tighter  rein  on  subsidies.  However,  with  stronger  import  competition,  a 
dramatic  decline  in  domestic  demand  and  deteriorating  export  markets, 
compounded  by  counteryailing  and  anti-dumping  actions  in  the  United States 
and  Canada,  the  Communities'  resolve  to  defend  these  achievements  is under 
challenge.  Import  surveillance  remains  in  force  and  some  imports  from 
central  European  countries  and  Egypt  have  recently  been  made  subject  to 
anti-dumping duties  or price undertakings. 
42.  Exchange  rate  guarantees  granted  by  the  German  Government  in 
privatizing  Deutsche  Airbus,  together  with  more  general  issues  of 
production  subsidies  for  Airbus,  have  been  a  trade  irritant  between  the 
EC  and  the United States.  A  solution was  found  in  1992  by  the abolition of 
the  exchange  rate  guarantees,  in  the  context  of  the  full  privatization, 
ahead of schedule,  of Deutsche Airbus;  in July 1992,  the United States and 
the  EC  signed  a  bilateral  agreement  specifying disciplines  for  large civil 
aircraft programmes. 
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43.  In Hay  1992,  the  EC  Council  decided  on  a  major overhaul of the Common 
Agricultural Policy.  The  changes  imply a  significant decline,  from  1993/94 
onwards,  in  levels  of  price  support  and,  hence,  the  degree  of  policy 
distortion  particularly  in  the  grain  sector.  Basic  principles  and 
mechanisms  of  the  CAP,  including  the  concept  of  Community  preference  and 
the  variable  levy  system,  remain  intact.  While  the  agreed  price  cuts  may 
contribute  to  containing overproduction  in  the  sectors  concerned,  and  thus 
reduce  the  Communities'  export  push  on  world  markets,  their  significance 
for import  demand  is yet  to  become  clear;  in  1939/90,  EC  self-sufficiency 
in  cereals  stood  at  136  per cent,  more  than  10  percentage  points  higher 
than  in  the  mid-1980s.  Other  supported  areas,  in  particular  milk  and 
sugar,  are largely unaffected by the reform package. 
44.  To  date,  there  has  been  little  change  in  the  intensity  of 
agricultural  protection.  PSE  levels  in  the  order  of 50  per cent for  1990 
and  1991  suggest  that,  on average,  about one-half of EC  farm  income results, 
from  policy intervention.  Assistance is based mainly on  border protection, 
with  variable  levies  insulating  most  internal  prices  from  world  market 
developments.  Over  time,  various  measures  have  been  designed  to  contain 
farm  output,  such  as  producer  quotas,  early  retirement  schemes  and 
extensification  programmes.  Community  expenditure  in  the  sector 
nevertheless  reached  over  ECU  4,100  per  farm  worker  in  1991,  varying  from 
less  than  ECU  3,  000  in  Portugal,  Greece  and  Spain  to  over  ECU  15,000  in 
Belgium.  Additional  payments  are granted  at national  and  regional  levels. 
for  example  on  environmental  grounds,  subject  to  Commission  approval. 
Following  adjustments  in  the  Communities'  agrimonetary  system,  Germany  has 
been  authorized,  since  1984,  to  compensate  its  farmers  for  ensuing  income 
losses;  national  payments  in  this  context  amounted  to  DH  2. 7  billion  in 
both  1991  and  1992. 
45.  With  a  view  to  cushioning  the  impact  of  currency  adjustments  on 
national  farm  incomes,  country- and  product-specific  "green"  exchange rates 
have  been  used  for  more  than  two  decades  to convert  common  ECU  prices into 
national  currencies.  For  certain products  and  countries,  the principle of 
a  single  EC  market,  with  uniform producer prices,  was  thus  more  fictitious 
than  real.  By  contrast,  the  post-1992  agrimonetary  regime  is  essentially 
based on  a  uniform  exchange rate,  corresponding  to  the  ecu  central rate of C/R11/Sf36A 
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the  national  currencies.  For  the  next  two  years,  however,  a.  "sw  i tchover" 
mechanism will  be  retained;  in  the  event of realignments,  the green rates 
will  be  varied  in order  to  avoid  price  decreases  in  the  stronger national 
currencies,  leading  in  turn  to  additional  income  gains  for  farmers  in 
weak-currency  countries.  For  the  time  being,  exchange  rate  adjustments 
among  member  States  will  thus  result  in  complex  accounting  operations  and 
could require significant Community  expenditures. 
(4)  Trade  Policies and Foreign  Trading Partners 
46.  Five  purely  m.f.n.  suppliers,  including  the  other  major  trading 
entities,  account  for  some  27 per cent  of the  Communities'  external  trade. 
Imports  from  all  other  sources  may  qualify,  with  wide  variations  between 
countries  and  sectors,  for  free-trade  area  treatment  or for  contractual  or 
unilateral preferences.  This results in a  complex hierarchy of preferential 
relations,  with  varying  dispute  settlement  provisions,  safeguard  clauses, 
rules of origin,  and  differences  in product  coverage. 
47.  The  conclusion  of  the  Internal  11arket  process  has  encouraged  the 
development  of  overlapping  preferential  trading  systems  within  Europe: 
spreading outward  from  the  EC  to  the European  Economic  Area  agreements with 
EFTA  countries  (except  Switzerland),  the  "Europe  Agreements"  with  central 
and  eastern  European  countries,  and  parallel  free- trade  agreements  among 
the  latter  countries  and  between  them  and  the  EFTA  members.  These  moves 
liberalize  trade  in  many  products  but  create  an  area  of further  departure 
from  the  m.f.n.  system,  both  among  the  signatories  and  towards  third 
countries. 
48.  In  the  event of conflicts,  the Community  and its preferential  trading 
partners  have  usually  sought  to negotiate solutions,  and  to  avoid  invoking 
formal  dispute  settlement  mechanisms  under  their  agreements  or  the  GATT. 
For  more  than  a  decade,  the  Communities'  recourse  to  Article XXIII  of  the 
General  Agreement  has  been  confined  to  disputes  with  its m.f.n.  suppliers, 
in particular the United States. 
49.  The  New  Commercial  Policy Instrument,  whose  inception  in  1984  appears 
to have  been motivated by Section  301  of the U.S.  Trade  Act,  cannot  be  used 
to  enforce unilateral  interpretation of international  law.  Where 
.. C/R11/S/36A 
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international obligations  exist,  as  under  the  GATT,  the  EC  is  committed  by 
the  NCPI  to  respect  the  outcome  of  the  relevant  procedures,  however  long 
these  may  take.  Only  four  investigations  have  been  opened  under  the 
Instrument,  three  in  areas  not  covered  by  the  GATT.  The  Communities' 
resistance  to  internal  pressures  to  sharpen  the  NCPI  with  a  view  to  using 
it  more  actively  or  aggressively,  has  contributed  to  maintaining  the 
integrity of multilateral  dispute  settlement mechanisms. 
50.  Certain  provisions  of the  recent  Europe  Agreements  seem  to  set  a  new 
tone.  While  the  "old"  free  trade  agreements  with  the  EFTA  members 
explicitly  refer  to,  and  reaffirm,  the  obligations  arising  from  other 
international  agreements,  no  comparable  reference  exists  in  the  "new" 
Europe  Agreements,  except  in  the  areas of dumping  and  subsidization.  Thus, 
in  imposing  bilateral  restrictions  on  steel  imports  from  the  Czech  and 
Slovak Federal  Republic  in  1992,  the  EC  used  the  safeguard provisions  under 
the  Agreement  in  a  way  that  seems  to  suggest  that  not  only  bilateral 
preferences  but also  GATT  obligations have  been  suspended. 
51.  Trade  policies  in  any  administration  are  defined  and  implemented 
within  a  field of competing  economic  interests.  The  current  macroeconomic 
problems  and  uncertainties  in  the  Communities,  compounded  by  adjustment 
pressures  stemming  from  the  Internal  Market  programme,  the  "Europe 
Agreements"  and  the  need  to  integrate  the  east  German  economy  fully  with 
the  EC,  may  strengthen  inward  looking  interests.  In  these  circumstances, 
more  leeway  in  decision-making,  possibly  at  the  expense  of  contractual 
obligations,  may  be  seen  as  an  advantage,  enabling policymakers  to  respond 
swiftly and  "pragmatically"  to  challenges.  Without  a  stable  and  effective 
framework  of  multilateral  rules  and  disciplines,  however,  such  decision 
making may  be  vulnerable  to  short-term pressures and vested interests. 
52.  The  present  stalemate  in  the  Uruguay  Round  thus  contains  serious 
risk.  Given  its weight  in,  and  impact on,  the multilateral  trading system, 
the  EC  has  a  major  role  in  preventing  narrowly-defined  regional  and 
sectoral interests  from  gaining  the  upper hand,  and  in bringing about C/RH/Sj36A 
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a  successful  conclusion  to  the  Round.  This  would  consolidate  and 
strengthen  the  Communities'  position  in  the  world  trading  system  and 
contribute greatly  to  the  stability and  development  of international  trade 
relations.  New  multilateral  trading  rules  and  agreements,  as  well  as  the 
significant  improvements  in  market  access,  which  will  come  from  a 
successful  Round,  will both  support European  integration and provide a  firm 
basis for its outward-looking evolution. I.  THE  ECONOMIC  ENVIRONMENT 
(1)  Recent  Economic  Performance 
C/RM/S/36A 
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1.  After  a  five-year period of robust  growth,  the  EC  economy  joined in a 
world-wide  economic  downturn  in  late-1990.  The  preceding  boom  (1986-90) 
had  brought  an  increase  in  the  real  GOP  of  the  Communi ties  of  over 
3  per cent  per  annum  and  a  significant  rise  in  employment,  from 
127  million  in  1986  to  134 million  in  1990.  Unemployment  came  down  from 
10.7 per cent  to  8.3 per cent.  The  economic  environment  thus  proved 
favourable  for  the  implementation of  the  Communities'  1992  Internal  Market 
programme,  launched  in 1987,  while  the  programme,  in turn,  appears  to have 
contributed  to  increasing  the  locational  attractiveness  of  the  EC  for 
expanding industries  and  se1~ices sectors. 
2.  All  member  States,  except  Denmark  and  Greece,  shared  in  the 
Communities'  strong  economic  expansion  in  the  second  half  of  the  1980s. 
Portugal,  Spain  and  Ireland  performed  best,  with  annual
1 
growth  rates  of 
4~ per cent  and  more  between  1986  and  1990  (Chart  I .1).  Though  income 
disparities  within  the  EC  remained  very  high,  more  rapid  growth  in  the 
southern  countries,  except  Greece,  has  contributed  to  narrowing  the  ga~ 
between  these  countries  and  the  central  and  northern  member  States. 
Inflation varied between  some  2  per cent in Germany  and  over  16  per cent in 
Greece. 
1Portuga1  and  Spain  joined the  Community  in  1986. 
2The  coefficient  of  variation  of  national  per  capita  incomes  (standard  deviation  as  a 
percentage  of  the  mean  income)  sank  from  40  per  cent  in  1986  to  35~ per  cent  in  1990.  The 
population-weighted coefficient  came  down  from  30  per  cent  to  25  per  cent. 
Va 1  ued  at  current  prices  and  exchange  rates,  Denmark.' s  per  capita  income  in  1990  was 
four  times  higher  than  those  of  Portugal  and  Greece  (see  Chart  1.1).  In  terms  of  purchasing 
power  parities,  Germany  was  at  the  top  of  ·the  EC  income  1  eague,  with  a  per  capita  income  of 
2~ times  as  high  as  that  of  Greece. C/RM/S/36A 
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Chart 1.1 
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3.  Economic  performance  in  the  period  1990-92  has  shown  considerable 
variations  among  the  member  States  (Chart  I. 2).  For  example,  while  the 
United  Kingdom  registered  a  fall  in  economic  activity  since  the  third 
quarter of  1990,  the  German  economy 3 was,  in 1990  and  1991,  still buoyed by 
the  demand  effects  of  unification.  Between  mid-1990  and  mid-1991,  GDP 
growth  in Germany  exceeded  5  per cent  as  compared with  1~ per  cent  for  the 
EC  as  a  whole  and  a  3~ per cent  decline  in  the  United  Kingdom.  In  the 
second  half  of  1991,  however,  the  German  economy  also  started  flagging, 
adding,  in  turn,  to  the  general  sluggishness  of  economic  activity  in  the 
Community.  Unemployment  rose  again,  exceeding  9~ per cent by mid-1992,  and 
hopes  for  an  early  and  strong  recovery  dimmed  (Table  I. 2).  In  the  third 
quarter of 1992,  GDP  fell in Denmark  and Italy while  the other  EC  economies 
were virtually stagnant. 
3The  Commission  has  estimated  that  the  immediate  demand  effects  resulting  from  German 
unification  have  contributed  half  a  percentage  point  to  the  Communities'  GOP  in  both  1990  and 
1991  (statement  in  the  context  of  this  TPRM  report). 
l. Chart 1.2 
Growth of real  GOP  by member State, 1990-92 
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4.  During  the  period  under  review,  considerable  fiscal  and  monetary 
frictions  have  emerged  in the  Communities.  Fiscal  expansion  in the  context 
of  German  unification,  in  the  autumn  of  1990,  coincidei  with  monetary 
tightening  aimed  at  containing  inflationary  pressures.  The  ensuing 
strains  on  capital  markets  drove  up  real  interest  rates,  which  peaked  in 
Germany  and  France  at5 close  to  6  and  some  7~ pe_r  cent,  respectively,  in 
late 1990  (Chart 1.3).  This,  in turn,  had  a  depressing effect on business 
investment  in  the  course  of  1991/92,  compounding  the  negative  effects  on 
export  competition  of  a  weak  U.S.  dollar  - largely  mirroring  the 
4However,  it  has  become  increasingly  difficult  in  recent  years  to  assess  the  actual 
stance  of  monetary  policy.  Different  aggregates  are  giving  contradictory  signals.  For 
example,  the  broad  aggregate  targeted  by  the  German  Bundesbank,  M3,  has  risen  fast  since 
late-1991,  while  the  growth  of  the  narrower  M1-aggregate  has  fallen  sharply.  ·This  appears  to 
reflect  changes  in  the  structure  of  interest  rates;  the  growth  in  short-term  rates  has 
tended  to  increase  in  particular  the  attractiveness  of certain  deposits  included  in  M3.  Such 
effects  may  have  been  reinforced  by  changes  in  portfolio  patterns  following  the  announced 
introduction  of  a  withholding  tax  on  interest  revenue  in  Germany  (IMF,  1992). 
5Difference  between  the  yields  on  fixed  interest  government  securities  and  the  growth 
in  the  GOP  deflator  over  the  preceding  year.  By  mid-1992,  long-term  real  interest  rates  were 
in  the  order  of  3~  to  4  per  cent  in  Germany  as  against  some  6 per  cent  in  France  and  over 
7  per  cent  in  Italy. C/RM/S/36A 
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transatlantic  gap  in  interest  rates  - and  of  sluggish  demand  on  major 
foreign markets,  notably  the United States  and  the  EFTA  area. 
Chart 1.3 
Real interest rates on government securities in  the EC, 
Japan and the United States, January 1980 - March 1992 • 
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Series B,  various laauea, and OECD (1992), Quarterly  National Accounts, 
No.3. 
5.  Despite  the  diversity  of  monetary  and  fiscal  conditions  throughout 
the  Communities,  the  European  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  remained  stable  for 
almost  five  years,  following  a  major  realignment  in  1987.  However,  in the 
course  of  1992,  tensions  surfaced.  They  were  fuelled,  inter alia,  by 
persistently  high  real  interest  rates  and  political  and  economic 
uncertainties  resulting,  in  particular,  from  the  negative  Danish  vote  on 
the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  June  1992,  large  fiscal  deficits  in  a  number  oS 
member  States,  and  continued  adjustment  problems  in  the  German  economy. 
From  September  1992,  these  tensions  led  to  a  major  upheaval  in  the 
operation  of  the  European  Exchange  Rate  mechanism;  three  member  State 
currencies  were  devalued  within  the  system  and  two  others  were  suspended 
from  participation.  The  upheaval  within  the  ERM  also  had  significant 
effects  on other  European currencies. 
6oevelopments  in  the  ERM  to  date  are  discussed  in  Sections  III .l(i)  and  (ii). C/RM/S/36A 
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6.  According  to  the  Commission's  Annual  Economic  Report  for  1993  r  the 
conditions  for  investment  and  growth  have  since  deteriorated further.  The 
report  points,  in  particular,  to  uncertainties  relating  to  the  ERM;  the 
deadlock  in the  Uruguay  Round;  the  future  course  of the  U.S.  economy;  the 
economic  downturn  in  Japan;  the  difficulties  of  the  reform  process  in 
central  an9  eastern  Europe;  and  the  ethnic  conflict  in  the  former 
Yugoslavia.  The  combination  of  these  factors,  and  the  ensuing  risks  for 
traders  and  investors,  superseded  the  growth  effects  expected  to  result 
from  progressive deregulation and liberalization in the  final stages of the 
Communities'  Internal Market  programme  (Chapter II). 
(2)  Trade  Performance 
7.  Since  1988,  EC  imports  have  grown  considerably  faster  than  exports 
and  the  Communities'  trade  deficit  widened  from  ECU  25.0 billion  to 
ECU  70.5 billion  in  1991  (Chart  I. 4).  As  indicated  above,  the  trends  in 
imports  and  exports  reflect  both  domestic  economic  conditions  within  the 
EC,  exchange  rate  developments  and  the  recent  slack  in export  demand.  The 
deterio~ation was  particularly pronounced  in  trade  with  the  United  States, 
the  single  most  important  partner  (Table AI.2),  where  an  export  surplus  oS 
ECU  3.5 billion in 1988  turned  into  a  deficit of  ECU  20.7 billion in 1991. 
The  bilateral  balance  with  the  EFTA  area  was  negative  for  the  first  time 
ever  in  1991,  while  the  Communities'  deficit  with  Japan  exceeded 
ECU  29~ billion,  up  ~om  ECU  24~ billion  in  1988,  with  a  further 
deterioration  underway.  The  EC  has  also  continued  to  register  a  trade 
deficit  with  developing  countries  as  a  gr.oup.  This  deficit  more  than 
doubled  after  1988  to  reach  ECU  7. 7  billion  in  1991,  including  deficits 
with  the  ACP  countries  and  Latin American  suppliers  of  ECU  3.2 billion and 
ECU  8.4 billion,  respectively,  and  a  surplus  with  Mediterranean  countries 
of  ECU  2.4 billion (Chart  1.5  and  Table AI.4).  Overall,  the  demand  effects 
resulting  from  German  unification  (see  below)  and  an  unfavorable  external 
7EC  Commission  (1993). 
8Imports  from  the  United  States  increased  by  more  than  one-third  after  1988  to  reach 
some  ECU  92  billion  in  1991,  as  compared  with  exports  of  slightly over  ECU  71  billion  in  both 
years.  The  United  States  International  Trade  Commission  has  attributed  this  development  to 
the  depreciation  of  the  dollar,  strong  growth  in  the  EC,  more  favourable  business  conditions 
stemming  from  the  I nterna  1  Market  Programme,  and  improved  manufacturing  competitiveness  of 
U.S.  firms  (USITC,  1992). 
9Between  1988  and  1991,  the  Communities'  imports  from  Japan  increased  by  one-quarter, 
from  ECU  41.6  billion  to  ECU  51.8  billion,  while  exports  grew  by  30  per  cent  to  reach  in  1991 
ECU  22.2  billion.  Between  the  first  six  months  of  1991  and  1992,  shipments  from  Japan  rose 
by  4  per  cent  in  value  while  the  Communities'  supplies  to  Japan  declined  by  6  per  cent. C/RM/S/36A 
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environment  appear  also  to  have  accentuated  the  long-1_'(fiD  tendency  of 
intra-EC trade  to  expand more  rapidly than external  trade. 
8.  The  economic  transition in central  and eastern Europe  was  accompanied 
by  an  intensification of  EC  trade with this area,  starting,  however,  from  a 
low level.  Between  1990  and  1991,  the  Communities'  exports  to  the  "Europe 
Agreement"  countries  (Bulgaria,  Czech  and  Slovak Federal Republic,  Hungary, 
Poland,  Romania)  incre~ied by  30  per cent  in value,  turning  a  small  trade 
deficit  into  surplus.  EC  exports  of  food  and  beverages  developed 
particularly  dynamically  (Table AI. 6) .  By  contrast,  the  EC1fs  running  a 
deficit with  the  successor States of the  former  Soviet Union. 
9.  Given  the  relatively  small  share  of bilateral  trade  with  the  former 
Soviet bloc,  its collapse has  left far less  trace  in the  Communities'  trade 
relations  than  the  process  of  German  unification.  The  ensuing  surge  in 
(east)  German  demand  for  manufactures  not  only  stimulated  imports  into  the 
Community,  but  siphoned  (west)  German  and  other  member  States'  supplies 
into  the  east  German  market.  While  spurring production,  this  also  limited 
the potential for  exports  to  third countries.  In addition,  as  noted above, 
Germany's  external  sector,  like  that  of all  othe~fember States,  suffered 
from  an  unfavourable  international  environment.  From  1990  to  1991, 
Germany's  surplus  slipped  from  ECU  23  billion  to  ECU  6.2 billion  in 
external  trade, 1
~nd from  ECU  24  billion to  no  more  than  ECU  2.6 billion in 
intra  EC  trade. 
10It  may  be  added,  however,  that  abrupt  changes  in  the  value  of  the  Communities' 
external  imports  during  the  1980s,  as  shown  in  Chart  I .4,  mainly  reflect  sharp  commodity 
price  fluctuations,  in  particular  of  oil  imports.  In  real  terms,  extra  and  intra-EC  imports 
have  developed  more  in  line  than  current  value  figures  suggest. 
11An  overview  of  the  content  of  the  Europe  Agreements  is  given  in  Section  II.S{iii). 
12Hembers  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  and  the  Baltic  Republics  combined 
accounted  for  3.5  per  cent  of  the  Communities'  total  external  imports  and  3.3  per  cent  of  its 
exports  in  1991  (Table  Al.2).  Close  to  60  per  cent  of  the  Communities'  imports  from  this 
area  are  fuels. 
13However,  domestic  and  international  developments  are  intertwined.  The  recent  decline 
in  the  U.S.  dollar/OM  exchange  rate  may  be  partly  attributed  to  fiscal  expansion  subsequent 
to  German  unification.  Rapidly  rising  government  deficits,  in  conjunction  with  monetary 
easing  in  the  United  States  and  stabi 1 i ty-consci ous  policies  in  Europe,  drove  German  and 
other  European  interest  rates  far  above  the  U.S.  1 evel.  This,  in  turn,  contributed  to 
strengthening  core  ERH  currencies,  especially the  Deutsche  mark. 
14As  shown  in  Table  A1.1,  Germany's  current  account  surplus  plunged  in  parallel,  from 
4. 9  per  cent  of  GOP  ; n  1989  to  0. 8  per  cent  in  1991  (western  Germany),  whi 1  e  most  other 
member  States  improved  their  position. Chart 1.4 
C/RM/S/36A 
Page  7 
Regional pattern of EC  trade (EC  12),  1958-91 
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Chart 1.5 
EC  external trade by region, 1991 
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10.  While  trade  is  a  central element  to all member  States'  economies,  its 
relative  importance  varies  significantly.  Chart  1.6  gives  an  overview  of 
the  shares  of exports  and  imports  in overall  economi~1ctivity (GOP)  and of 
the  significance  of  external  versus  internal  trade.  Not  surprisingly, 
the  smaller member  States are  generally more  trade-oriented than  the  larger 
countries  among  which,  in turn,  Germany  displays  the  strongest trade  links. 
Germany,  Denmark  apg  Ireland  were  the  only  member  States  to  register  trade 
surpluses  in 1991. 
15The  pattern  presented  in  the  Chart  reflects  not  only  the  degree  of  "o.penness"  of  the 
national  economies,  but  a  variety  of  additional  factors,  including  differences  in  size  and, 
hence,  in  the  individual  member  State's  potential  for  efficient  internal  or  international 
specialization.  Findings  for  smaller  member  Sates  may  be  distorted  by  high  shares  of  transit 
trade  and  re-exports  after  processing.  See  also  EC  Commission  (1992). 
16By  contrast,  in  1990  and  1991,  Greece's  imports  were  almost  1~  times  higher  than 
exports;  the  country's  trade  def1cit  stood  in  the  order  of  18  per  cent  of  GOP  in  both  years. 80 
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Chart 1.6 
Trade  orientation by  member State, 1971  and  1991• 
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11.  The  diversity  of  economic,  geographic  and  climatic  conditions  among 
the  member  States  is  reflected  in  significant  differences  in  their 
commodity  trade  patterns.  For  example,  food  products  are  more  than  twice 
as  high  a  share  in  the  export baskets  of Greece,  De~'rk,  Ireland  and  the 
Netherlands  than  on  average  in  the  EC  (Chart  I. 7);  the  latter  three 
countries,  accompanied by  France,  are  the  only member  States with surpluses 
in this area.  (In view of the  intensity of  EC  farm  support policies,  these 
figures  may,  however,  not  necessarily  be  an  indicator  of  competitive 
strength.)  The  trade  of Germany,  France,  Italy and  the  United Kingdom,  in 
contrast,  is  much  more  strongly  focused  on  manufactures,  particularly 
machinery  and  transport  equipment. 
17The  40  leading  products  in  EC  external  trade are  shown  in  Table  AI.3. C/RM/S/36A 
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Chart 1.7 
Commodity pattern of member States' trade, 1991 
Percentage  share of main product categories in member  States' total 
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12.  The  EC  economy  is  likely  to  remain  fragile  for  some  time.  Risks  and 
uncertainties  result,  in  particular,  from  high  fiscal  deficits  and 
inflation  in  some  member  States,  the  persistence  of  tensions  within  the 
European  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism,  adjustment  problems  in  labour  markets, 
and  the  rapid  downturn  in  key  sectors  such  as  motor  vehicles  and  steel. 
Compounded  by  a  difficult  external  environment,  including  the  unresolved 
Uruguay  Round  and  the  economic  crisis  in  the  CIS  Republics,  these  factors 
may  continue  to  depress  confidence  well  into  1993.  The  Commission  expects 
a  return  to  slightly healthier  growth  rates  in 1994  at  the  earliest.  This 
implies  that,  over  the  corning  mont~~,  unemployment  could  well  reach  again 
its 1985  peak  level  of  11  per cent. 
18 EC  Commission  (1993). C/RM/S/36A 
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II.  TRADE  POLICY  REGIME:  FRAMEWORK  AND  OBJECTIVES 
(1)  Overview 
13.  Over  the  past  two  years,  the  European  Communi ties'  external  and 
internal trade relations have  undergone  rapid changes  related to  three main 
developments:  the  implementation  of  the  Internal  Market  Programme; .  a 
major  reorganization  of  trade  relations  in  Europe  through  new  Association 
Agreements  and  the  forthcoming  European  Economic  Area  (EEA);  and  the 
economic  integration  of  eastern  Germany  into  the  common  market.  In 
addition,  the  Maastricht  Treaty  is  awaiting  ratification  by  all  member 
States  and  the  Community  is preparing for negotiations  on  new  accessions. 
14.  The  Internal Market  programme  has  resulted in tb[ abolition of border 
controls  on  trade  in  goods  between  the  member  States.  The  Agreement  with 
the  EFTA  countries  on  a  European  Economic  Area  (EEA)  will  contribute  to 
intensifying  the  integration of  industrial markets  and  liberalize  trade  in 
services  as  we11
2 
as  the  movement  of  capital  and  persons.  Agriculture 
remains  excluded.  The  as  soc ia  t ion  agreements  ("Europe  Agreements")  with 
Poland,  Hungary,  the  former  Czech  and  Slovak Federal Republic,  Bulgaria and 
Romania  provide  for  progressive  market  opening  for  industrial  products 
within  ten  years,  while  allowing  for  significant  safeguards.  In  order  to 
qualify for  entry  into  the  EC  under  free-trade  conditions,  goods  must  meet 
the  origin  requirements  under  either  the  EEA  Agreement  or  the  individual 
Europe  Agreements;  there  is  no  possibility  of  cumulation  of  processing 
stages between  the  areas. 
(2)  Basic  Institutional and  Legal  Structure 
15.  Since  its entry  into  force  in  1958,  the  EEC  Treaty has  undergone  one 
major  reform,  under  the  Single  European  Act  of  1987.  It  continues  to  be 
complemented  by  the  Treaties  establishing  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community  (ECSC)  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  (Euratom).  ~e 
three Treaties  together  form  the  legal basis of the  European Communities. 
1Implementation  of  the  programme  was  facilitated  by  the  introduction  of  qual;fied-
majority  voting,  instead  of  unanimity,  for  Council  decisions  on  harmonization  issues  in  1987. 
Safeguards  in  the  EEC  Treaty  which  would  in  principle  allow  for  continued  national 
derogations  from  common  requirements,  e.g.  for  environmental  and  health  polfcy  reasons.  have 
had  very  limited  impact  thus  far. 
2As  noted  in  Section  V.2(i}.  an  "evolutionary  clause"  provides  for  regular  reviews  with 
a  view  to  liberalizing agricultural  trade  progressively. 
3see  GATT  (1991)  for  more  details.  Unlike  the  EEC  and  Euratom  Treaties,  which  are  of 
indefinite  duration,  the  ECSC  Treaty  is  due  to  expire  in  2002.  Agreement  has  been  reached 
among  the  Commission  and  the  member  States  to  use  the  flexibility  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  with  a 
(Footnote  Continued} C/RM/S/36A 
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16.  Despite  their differences  in substance,  the Treaties are administered 
by  one  Commission  and  one  Council.  At  the  highest  political level  is  the 
European  Council  consisting  of  the  Heads  of State  or  of Government  of  the 
member  States,  assisted  by  their  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the 
President  and  one  member  of  the  Commission.  The  European  Council  is 
required to meet at least twice  a  year. 
17.  Under  the  EEC  Treaty,  the  Commission  is  the  main  initiator of common 
policies.  It  also  has  considerable  supervisory,  regulatory  and 
decision-making  powers,  which  are  usually  exercised  within  the  limits  of 
Council  regulations  and  decisions.  While  normally  bound  to  decide  on  the 
basis  of  drafts  and  proposals  tabled  by  the  Commission,  the  Council  of 
Ministers has  the  final  say on every  important piece  of  EC  legislation.  No 
substantial  changes  can  occur  without  the  Council's  assent,  which  means 
without  the  approval  of all or,  depending  on  the  issue,  of  a  qualified or 
simple  majority  of  member  States  (Note  II.l).  However,  the  institutional 
framework  normally  affords  the  Commission  certain  leeway  in  deciding  on 
whether,  when  and  on  what  legal  basis  to  refer  issues  under  Community 
competence  to  the  Council. 
18.  Council  decisions  on  commercial  and  agricultural  policy  issues  and 
the  Internal  Market  . are  taken  by  qualified  majority;  proposals  are 
accepted if they muster  at least  54  affirmative  votes.  The  voting weights 
of  member  States  vary  from  two  for  Luxembourg  to  ten  for  France,  Germany, 
Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom.  There  have  been  no  changes  subsequent  to 
German  unification. 
19.  The  European  Parliament has  the  right of censure  over  the  Commission, 
which  must  in that case  resign as  a  body.  The  Parliament must  be  consulted 
in  several  fields  of  Community  activities  and  may  approve 4  reject  or 
propose  amendments  to  Commission  proposals  in  these  fields.  In  other 
areas,  "cooperation"  provisions  enable  Parliament  to  reject  Council 
positions  (which  may  then  be  reaff!rmed  by  the  Council,  but  only 
unanimously),  or  to  propose  amendments.  The  European  Parliament may  also 
refer  back  to  the  Council  any  accession  or  association  agreements  or  any 
trade  agreement of significant importance. 
(Footnote  Continued) 
view  to  gradually  extending  EEC  Treaty  provisions  to  the  coal  and  steel  sectors  (see  also 
Sections  V.3(v)  and(vi)). 
4 They  are:  free  movement  of  goods,  the  common  agricultural  policy,  transport  poHcy, 
legal  dispositions  for  directives  requiring  unanimity  in  the  Council;  research  and 
development  policies;  economic  and  social  affairs;  and  the  environment. 
5The  areas  are:  free  movement  of  labour, 
legislative  prov1s1ons  concern1ng  areas  where 
implementation  of  research  and  development  policies. 
mutual  recognition  of 
a  qualified  majority 
qualifications; 
is  required; C/RM/S/36A 
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20.  Legal  authority  at  Communities'  level  is  exercised  by  the  European 
Court of Justice  (ECJ)  - the highest  Communities'  court  - and  the  Court  of 
First Instance.  The  ECJ  is  empowered  to  judge  the legality of  EC  acts  and 
those  passed  by  national  and  regional  authorities,  in  terms  of  the 
Treaties.  The  Court  of  First  Instance  was  set  up  in  1988  to  improve  the 
operation  of  the  judicial  system  by  relieving  the  Court  of  Justice  from 
cases  which  required  the  close  examination  of  complex  facts,  to  allow  the 
ECJ  "to  concentrate  its  activities  on  ~ts  fundamental  task  of  ensuring 
uniform interpretation of  ~ommunity law". 
21.  The  Community's  main  trade  legislation has  remained  unchanged  since 
the  initial  TPRM  report.  An  overview  of  the  current  system of  import  and 
export  regulations  is  given  in Table AIV.2.  Certain  changes  are  currently 
under  consideration  in  view  of  Internal  Market  requirements  (e.g. 
concerning quotas)  and  the  need  to  streamline  and harmonize  decision-making 
mechanisms  (Section IV.2(v)(f)). 
6council  Decision  No.  88/591. C/RM/S/36A 
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*************************************************************************** 
Note II.l  Decision makiqg in the Council of ninisters 
The  Council  of Ministers  may  take  decisions  either  by  unanimity,  by 
qualified  (two-thirds)  majority  or  by  simple  majority.  There  are  76 
Council  votes  overall;  ten  each  for France,  Germany,  Italy and  the United 
Kingdom;  eight for Spain;  five  each  for Belgium,  Greece,  the  Netherl~ds 
and Portugal;  three  each  for Denmark  and  Ireland;  and  bwo  for  Luxembourg. 
Unanimity  must  be  achieved  in  certain  institutional  areas 
(Article  138  on  Parliamentary  voting  procedures,  Article  201  on  the 
replacement  of  financial  resources  from  member  States  by  the  Communities' 
own  resources,  Article  235  on  the  power  of initiative  of  the  Commission, 
and  Article  237  on  the  admittance  of  new  member  States).  The  unanimity 
rule  also applies  to  "sensitive"  subjects  in  the  diplomatic,  political  and 
social  fields.  Unanimity  is  considered  as  achieved  even  if one  or  more 
member States abstain. 
A  qualified  majority  must  be  obtained  in  many  significant  areas 
including aspects  of  the  Internal  Market,  workers  safety and  health,,  trade 
and  agriculture  policy  questions  and  "new  areas".  A  decision  made  ·on  the 
basis  of  a  Commission  proposal  must  receive  54  out  of  76  votes  to  be 
adopted.  A  Council  decision  based  on  its  own  powers  must,  in  addition, 
receive affirmative votes from  eight member States or more. 
Simple majority voting covers  any area  where  no  specific procedure is 
specified.  In  practice,  its scope  is limited  to Articles  128  (professional 
training),  152  and  213  (commissioning of studies). 
During  the  first  stages  of  EEC  integration,  until  December  1965, 
Council  Decisions  on  most  common  issues,  including  commercial  policy 
matters,  had  to  be  taken  unanimously.  The  partial shift to majority voting 
caused  a  decision  making  crisis  in  1965-66,  hinging  on  the  question  of 
whether  and  to  what  extent  individual  member  States  could  continue  to 
demand  unanimity if "very  important national  interests"  were  at  stake.  An 
agreement  reached  in  1966  (the  Luxembourg  Compromise)  provided  that, 
whenever such  interests were  concerned,  the Council  would  endeavour,  within 
a  reasonable  time,  to reach  solutions which  could  be  adopted by all members 
while  respecting  their  mutual  interests  and  those  of  the  Community.  The 
French  Government  stressed  in  this  context  that,  in  its  view,  the 
discussion  must  be  continued until  unanimous  agreement  was  reached. 
*************************************************************************** C/RM/S/36A 
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(3)  The  Internal Market  Programme 
(i)  Objectives  and  framework 
22.  The  Internal  Market  initiative  was  launched  in  the  mid-1980s  with  a 
view  to  refocusing  and  revitalizing  EC  integration.  The  elements  were  set 
out  if  the  Commission's  White  Paper  on  Completing  the  Internal  Market  of 
1985.  This  identified  a  wide  range  of  barriers  perceived  to  hamper  the 
flow  of  goods,  services,  persons  and  capital  among  member  States,  and 
established a  timetable  for  their abolition by  the  end of 1992. 
23.  In the  area of technical  regulations,  the White  Paper underscored the 
principle  of mutual  recognition  of member  States'  established  legislation. 
Should  common  regulations prove necessary,  these  should,  whenever possible, 
be  limited to defining essential health and safety requirements. 
24.  The  Single  European  Act  (SEA)  of  1987  reinforced  the  Communities' 
legal  and  institutional  framework  in view of the  Internal Market  objective. 
The  SEA  introduced  into  the  EEC  Treaty  the  target  date  of  31  December  992 
for  achieving  "an  area  without  internal  frontiers  in  which  the  free 
movement  of  goods,  persons,  services  and  capital  is  ensured"  (Article  Sa). 
From  that  date,  any  controls  or  penalties  imposed  in  conne1fion  with  the 
crossing of an  internal  frontier would  contravene  the  Treaty. 
25.  The  removal  of internal  controls  also  implies  external  trade effects. 
Under  the  SEA  provisions,  Member  States  will  no  longer  be  able  to  enforce 
at  their  internal  borders  any  national  trade  restrictions  against  third 
countries,  even  though  the  legalfasis  for  such  action  (Article  115  of  the 
EEC  Treaty)  is  still  available.  Moreover,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
regional  supply  targets under  the  MFA  (Section V.3(vii))  or other voluntary 
restraint  arrangements  could  in  future  be  applied  effectively.  To  the 
extent  that  technical  requirements  are  harmonized  and  EC-wide  type  approval 
is  introduced,  internal  substitutes  for  border  measures,  such  as  national 
7EC  Commission  (1985). 
8Ec  Commission  (1992a). 
9Article  115  empowers  the  Commission,  on  the  basis  of  a  request  from  a  member  State,  to 
authorize  the  member  State  to  restrict  internal  trade  flows  in  order  to  defend  national  trade 
policy  measures  against  indirect  imports.  Article  115  can  be  used  only  to  defend  commercial 
pol icy  measures  taken  in  accordance  with  the  EEC  Treaty;  it  has  no  r6le  in  the  context  of 
informal  measures.  The  duration  of  Article  115  restrictions  may  vary  between  two  months  and 
one  year,  depending  on  the  Commission's  decision.  Article  115  is  due  to  be  modified,  but  not 
abolished,  under  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  (see  bel ow).  However,  as  noted  by  the 
Commission,  with  the  harmonization  of  national  import  regimes  (Section  IV.2(ii)),  the  legal 
grounds  for  its  applicatior.  are  bound  to  disappear,  quite  apart  from  the  requirements  of 
Article  8a  of  the  EEC  Treaty. CjRM/S/36A 
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registration procedures,  would  also vanish.  All  this  should contribute  to 
freer  trade  conditions  for  extra-Community  imports  as  well  as  for  goods 
produced within  EC  boundaries. 
26.  The  Single  European Act provides  for qualified majority voting by the 
Council  on  harmonization  issues  (Article  lOOa).  The  Commission  considers 
the shift  to majority voting  one  of the  principal  factors  in advancing  the 
1992  Programme,  in particular in areas  such  as  v~1frinary and phytosanitary 
legislation,  pharmaceuticals  and  motor  vehicles.  (Majority voting  under 
the  relevant provisions of Article  lOOa  does  not extend to sensitive issues 
such  as  fiscal legislation,  on which  unanimity is still required.) 
27.  Provision is made  in the  SEA  for national derogations  from harmonized 
policies  "on  the  grounds  of  major  needs"  in  areas  related  to  national 
security,  culture,  health,  commercial  and  industrial  property 
(Article 100a:4  and  36).  From  the  point  of  view  of  an  integrated  market, 
such  a  provision weakens  the  majority voting principle;  individual  member 
States  may,  on  the  other  hand,  see  it as  an  essential  safeguard  against 
excessive  centralization,  particularly  where  they  maintain  more  stringent 
regulations  than  others.  Such  measures,  which  may  become  permanent 
derogations  from  EC  legislation,  are  subject  to  confirmation  by  the 
Commission  after  verification  that  they  are  not  means  of  8fpitrary 
discrimination  or  disguised  trade  barriers  (Article  100a:4).  The 
Commission has  emphasized  the  exceptional character of any  such exemptions, 
which  would  affect  intra-EC  and  third  country  supplies  equally.  To  date, 
only  one  case  has  been  confirmed by  the  Commission  (Germany's  restrictions 
on  PCBs,  see  (ii) below). 
28.  The  Single  European  Act  also  specifies  that,  in  appropriate  cases, 
harmonization  measures  must  include  a  safeguard  clause  allowing  member 
10According  to  the  Commission,  the  rules  applicable  to  accompanying  pets  are  the  only 
issue  in  the  veterinary  sector  to  remain  unresolved  to  date.  Basic  phytosanitary  rules 
necessary  to  adjust  the  plant  health  regimes  to  the  abolition  of  border  controls,  have  been 
adopted  by  the  Council  and  implementing  measures  are  being  developed.  The  only  important 
phytosanitary  proposal  still  awaiting  adoption  is  considered  by  the  Commission  not  to  affect 
the  suppression  of  border  controls  (it  concerns  the  financing  of  measures  to  control  or 
eradicate  harmful  organisms  and  the  responsibilHy  of  member  States  in  case  they  neglect 
required  inspections). 
Harmonization  issues  relating  to  motor  vehicles  and  pharmaceuticals  are  dealt  with  in 
Sections  V.3(ii)(a)  and  V.3(iv). 
11 In  addition,  Article  118a:3  and  130t  allow  individual  member  States  to  take  more 
stringent  measures  for  the  protection  of  working  conditions  (118a:3)  and  of  the  environment 
(130t).  Such  actions  are  not  subject  to  confirmation,  consultation  or  notification. 
Observers  have  argued  that  whenever  the  focus  of  a  Community  initiative  is  primarily  on 
enabling  the  free  movement  of  goods,  persons,  services  and  capita  1  with  as  few 
standard-related barriers  as  possible,  only  the  more  restrictive  provisions  of  Article  100a:4 
could  provide  legal  cover  for  national  derogations,  regardless  of  any  safety or  environmental 
aspects  that might  be  involved  (Falke  and  Joerges,  1991). C/RM/S/36A 
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States  to  take  provisional  measures  for  health,  safety,  environmental  and 
similar  reasons  (Article  lOOa:S  and  36).  Invocation would be  subject  to  a 
Community  control  procedure.  The  Commission  considers  this  as  a  last line 
of  defence  to  protect  consumers  or  the  environment  from  unsafe  products 
that  do  not  conform  to  EC  technical  specifications  or  that pose  risks  not 
adequately addressed in the directives concerned.  Such provisions are part 
of many  directives  concerning pharmaceuticals  and  food12 in practice,  they 
have  proved most  important  in the pharmaceuticals area. 
29.  Effective  progress  towards  a  single  market  depends  not  only  on  the 
drafting and enacting of new  EC  legislation but,  in many  instances,  also on 
its  incorporation  into  national  law  and  enforcement  by  all member  States. 
This  applies  in  particular  to  initiatives  in  the  area  of  technical 
barriers,  which  are  usually  addressed  by  way  of  Council  directives 
(Note  II.2). 
30.  A  Declaration  annexed  to  the  Single  European  Act  states  that  the 
deadline  of  31  December  1992  for  completing  the  Internal  Market  has  no 
automatic  legal  effect.  However,  this  may  not  deprive  the  date  of  legal 
relevance;  observers  have  argued  that  de. lays  in  ths  harmonization  and 
implementation  process  might  fjad  to  findings  of  "failure  to  act"  under 
Article  175  of the  EEC  Treaty.  A ruling by  the  European  Court of Justice 
in  November  1991  held  that  member  States  which  fail  to  comply  with 
Community  law,  including failure  to  implement  EC  directives,  are liable for 
the  ensuing damages  caused  to  individuals. 
12statement  by  the  Commission  in  the  context  of  this  TPRM  report.  The  Commission  also 
noted  that,  in  most  cases,  only  individual  batches  cf  a  product  we;e  involved  and  that  there 
has  never  been  any  discrimination  between  third country  and  EC  products. 
13schermers  (1991). 
Article  175  entitles member  States  and  Community  institutions  other  than  the  Council  or 
the  Commission,  to  refer  failures  to  act  to  the  Court  of  Justice  with  a  view  to establishing 
an  infringement  of  the  Treaty.  Private  parties  may  then  claim  for  damages  unless  it can  be 
demonstrated  that  (i)  the  postponement  of  measures  was  necessary  in  view  of  overriding  public 
interests  and  (ii)  it  had  been  announced  sufficiently  in  advance  for  legitimate  expectations 
to  be  adapted. C/RM/S/36A 
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*************************************************************************** 
Note II:2  Hierarchy of EC  legal  instruments 
Under  Article  189  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  the  following  hierarchy  of Community 
legislation is established: 
Regulations  are  directly  applicable  and  binding  in  their  entirety  in  all 
member  States.  They  need no  enabling legislation. 
Directives are  binding,  with  regard  to  the  specified results,  on  the member 
States  to  which  they  are  addressed.  In  order  to  become  legally effective, 
national  implementing  legislation is necessary. 
Decisions  are  binding  in  their  entirety  on  the  member  States  or  on  the 
private or legal  persons  to  whom  they are  addressed. 
Recommendations  and  opinions have  no  binding effect. 
*************************************************************************** 
(ii)  Current state of  implementation 
31.  Since  1986,  the  Commission  has  published  annual  progress  reports  on 
the  implementation  of  the  Internal  Market  Programme.  The  most  recent 
report,  reflecting  the  situation  in  mid-1992,  n~ted  that  "the  economic 
framework  for  the  single  market  is  now  in  place".  Operational  rules  in 
the  customs  area  had  been  implemented,  and  no  documents  were  required  to 
accompany  Community  goods  moving  between  the  member  States  or  imports 
released  by  a  member  State  for  free  circulation  within  the  Communities. 
Some  90  per cent  of  the  White  Paper  proposals  had  been  adopted  by  the 
Council  by  mid-August  1992,  as  against  75  per cent  one  year  before. 
Remaining  problems,  according  to  the  report,  were  related to  the  control of 
persons  crossing  frontiers,  aspects  of  indirect  taxation,  industrial 
property,  double  taxation  of  firms  and  company  law.  A  Council  Resolution 
of  7  December  1992  invites  the  Commission  to  propose,  by  the  end  of 
January 1993,  any  practical  arrangements  to  help  ensure  the  smooth  running 
of  the  Single  Market  and  to  £~ke,  if appropriate,  any  initiatives  to  this 
end by  the  end of March  1993. 
32.  Like  its predecessors,  the  Commission's  1992  Report  suggests  that  in 
important  areas  of  standardization  and  public  procurement,_  a  number  of 
member  States has  been unable  to  take  the necessary  implementation measures 
14Ec  Commission  (1992b}. 
15council  Resolution  on  making  the  Single  Market  work  (92/C  334/01}. C/RM/S/36A 
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as  scheduled  (see  also Sections  IV.2(vi)  and  (vii)).  Delays  have  occurred, 
for  ergmple  1  in  the  COntext  of  "new  approach"  directives  in  the  standards 
area.  In  view  of  such  problems,  the  Commission  has  proposed  additional 
transition periods  during  which  manufacturers  may  choose  between  the  "old" 
national  requirements  and  the  new  Community  rules  (Section IV.2(vii), 
Table  IV.6). 
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Chart 11.1 
Implementation of measures for completing the Internal 
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Number of cases 
-
Implementation notified  -
Derogations 
0  Implementation not notified 
p::::;  Not applicable 
OK  F  p  D  GR  NL  UK  IRL  L  E  B 
~:  EC  Commission. 
33.  Reflecting  the  headway  made  in  harmonizing  member  States'  external 
trade  reg1.mes,  in  particular  through  the  abolition  of  national  import 
quotas  (Section IV.2(ii)),  recourse  to  Article  115  has  declined 
progressively  in  recent  years.  In  1991,  48  new  authorizations  were 
granted,  mostly  (32)  for  textile products,  as  against  176  authorizations  in 
1985  and  119  in 1989.  In  1992,  the  number  of new  restrictions  came  down  to 
eight  (three  by  Italy,  two  each  by  Spain  and  France,  and  one  by  the 
United Kingdom). 
16For  example,  in  mid-August  1992,  only  three  member  States  (Denmark,  France  and 
Portugal)  had  notified  the  Commission  of  full  incorporation  into  national  law  of  Directive 
No.  89/336  on  electro-magnetic  compatibility,  which  was  originally  due  to  be  implemented  by 
1  July  1991. C/RM/S/36A 
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34.  Under  the  Act  of  Accession  of  1985,  Spain  and  Portugal  are  required 
to align their tariffs  on  industrial products  with  the  common  trade  regime 
by  end-1992.  Full  market  integration  for  a  range  of  agricultural  and 
fisheries  products  (fresh  fruit  and  vegetables,  vegetable  oils  and  fats, 
sensitive fish  species)  is scheduled  to  take until end-1995. 
35.  In  June  1992,  measures  stricter  than  EC  legislation,  taken  by  a 
member  State  on  environmental  grounds,  were  for  the first time  confirmed by 
the  Commission  under  Article  100a:4  of  the  EEC  Treaty.  Germany  was 
entitled  to  maintain  a  complete  ban  on  the  use  of  PCBs  (polychlorinated 
biphenyls),  introduced  iiJ  December  1989,  despite  the  adoption  of  an  EC 
Directive  in March  1991. 
(4)  The  Treaty on  European Union 
36.  The  Treaty  on  European  Union,  signed  by  the  member  States  in 
February  1992  ("the Maastricht Treaty")  is  intended to  usher  in a  new  phase 
of  European  integration.  While  the  current  EEC  Treaty  is  primarily,  and 
almost  exclusivf~Y,  aimed  at promoting  economic  and  trade  expansion within 
a  common  market  ,  the Maastricht Treaty also  embraces  the  objectives of 
(i)  economic  and  monetary  union,  including  the  introduction  of  a  single 
currency; 
(ii)  the  implementation of a  common  foreign and security policy  (including 
the eventual  framing  of a  common  defence  policy); 
(iii)  the  introduction of common  citizenship;  and 
(iv) 
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the  development  of close cooperation on justice and home  affairs. 
17The  EC  Directive  bans  the  use  of  PCB  with  four  exceptions,  including  wood  preparation 
and  impregnation  of  certain  textiles  (EurOE!·  12  June  1992).  · 
18Pursuant  to  Article  2  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  the  European  Economic  Community  has  as  its 
tasks,  "by  establishing  a  common  market  and  progressively  approximating  the  economic  policies 
of  Member  States,  to  promote  throughout  the  Community  a  harmonious  deve  1  opment  of  economic 
activities,  a  continuous  and  balanced  expansion,  an  increase  in  stability,  an  accelerated 
raising  of  the  standard of  living  and  closer  relations  between  the  States  belonging  to  it". 
19Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom  have  reserved  the  right  not  to  move  automatically, 
once  the  crHeria  are  fulfilled,  to  the  final  stage  of  monetary  union  (introduction  of  one 
common  currency).  The  European  Council  decided  in  December  1992  that  Denmark  would  not 
participate  in  the  single  currency  and  would  retain  its  existing  powers  in  the  field  of 
monetary  policy.  (Decision  of  the  Heads  of  State  and  Government,  meeting  within  the  European 
Council,  concerning  certain  problems  raised  by  Denmark  on  the  Treaty  on  European  Union; 
Qfficial  Journal,  No.  C  348  of  31  December  1992). C/RM/S/36A 
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The  Treaty  is  to  enter  into  force  up~fi  the  deposit  of  the  last  instrument 
of ratification by  a  signatory State. 
37.  The  Union  is  to  be  founded  on  the  European  Communities,  supplemented 
by  additional  policies  and  forms  of  cooperation.  These  include 
inter-Governmental  cooperation  within  the  Council,  for  example,  on  common 
foreign  and  security policy  issues.  In areas  already  covered  by  the  EEC, 
the  Maastricht  Treaty  builds  on  the  "acquis  communautaire",  the  achieved 
degree  of integration and  the existing body  of Community  legislation. 
38.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  does  not  change  the  EEC' s  commercial  policy 
framework  or  its  agricultural  policy  making  (see  also  Chapter  V.2(i)). 
However,  the  Treaty  provides  the  basis  for  a  common  policy  on  development 
cooperation,  complementary  to  member  States'  policies.  It  is  aimed  at 
fostering  (i)  the  sustainable  economic  and  social  development  of  the 
developing  countries,  and  more  particularly  of  the  most  disadvantaged 
countries;  (ii)  the  smooth  and  gradual  integration  of  the  developing 
countries  into  the  world  economy;  and  (iii)  the  campaign  against  poverty 
in the  developing world. 
39.  Under  the  Treaty,  the  Communities'  basic  institutional  structure 
would  remain  unaffected.  The  powers  of  the  European  Parliament  are 
increased;  for  the  first  time,  it  w~~ld  be  empowered  to  disapprove 
Community  legislation in specified areas.  It will also have  the right to 
request  legislative  proposals  from  the  Commission  (the  Commission's 
exclusive  competence  to draft new  EC  law has  remained unchanged),  to set up 
Committees  of  Inquiry  and  to  appoint  an  Ombudsman
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However,  the  Treaty 
does  not  give  it  the  right  to  introduce  bills.  Member  States  are 
required  to  consult  the  Parliament  before  nominating  Commissioners.  The 
President  and  the  Commission  as  a  body  can  only  be  appointed,  by  common 
20All  member  States  but  Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom  had  ratified  the  Treaty  by 
end-1992.  After  having  agreed  on  a  set  of  arrangements  designed  to  meet  concerns  raised  by 
Denmark  (see  above),  the  European  Council  meeting  of  11-12  December  1992  stressed  that  this 
would  enable  "the  Community  to  develop  together,  on  the  basis  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  while 
respecting,  as  the  Treaty  does,  the  identity and  diversity of  Member  States". 
21 Parl iamentary  "co-decision"  under  the  Maastricht  Treaty  extends  to  trade-related 
issues  such  as  the  approximation  of  national  law  in  the  Internal  Market  context 
(Article  lOOa);  EC  initiatives  aimed  at  ensuring  high  levels  of  public  health  and  consumer 
protection  (Articles  129  and  129a);  and  the  setting  up  of  multi annual  framework  programmes 
for  research  and  technological  development  {Article  130i). 
22Normally,  community  legislation  begins  with  the  drafting  of  a  Commission  proposal, 
possibly  initiated  by  the  Council. CjRM/S/36A 
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accord  of2
3 
the  member  States,  after  the  Parliament  has  given  a  vote  of 
approval. 
(5)  EC  Enlargement  and  the  Structure of the  Communities'  External  Trading 
Relations 
(i)  Overview 
40.  The  vast majority  of  the  Communities'  trading partners  qualifies  for 
some  sort  of preferential  treatment.  Among  GATT  contracting parties,  the 
EC  has  no  more  than  a  handful  of  purely  m.f.n.  sup~liers:  the 
United States,  Japan,  Canada,  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  However, 
reflecting both  the  economic  weight  of  these  countries  and  limits  in  the 
coverage  of  the  preferential  trade  schemes,  the  bulk  of  external  supplies 
enters  under  non-preferential  conditions.  Thus,  while  total  imports  from 
developing  countries  other  than  the  Lome  countries  accounted  for  close  to 
30  per cent  of  EC  imports,  only  6  per cent of  the  Communities'  shipments  in 
1991  are  estimated to have  qualified for  GSP  preferences  (Chart 11.2). 
41.  In  1992,  agreement  was  reached  with  EFTA  partners  to  create  the 
European  Economic  Area,  to  replace  the  existing  free  trade  agreements 
between  the  EC  and  individual  EFTA  countries.  New  Association  Agreements 
("Europe  Agreements")  have  been  negotiated  with  the  Czech  and  Slovak 
Federal  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Bulgaria  and  Romania.  The  Europe 
Agreements  will  reinforce  the  multi-layered  network  of  association  and 
other  preferential  agreements  and  arrangements  between  the  EC  and  its 
trading partners  (Table  11.1). 
42.  Five  EFTA  members  and  three  other  European  countries  have  lodged  an 
application  for  EC  membership:  Turkey  (1987),  Austria  (1989),  Cyprus  and 
Malta  (1990),  Sweden  (1991),  Finland,  Switzerland and  Norway  (1992). 
23under  the  EEC  Treaty,  the  Parliament  has  no  influence  on  the  composition  of  the 
Commission. 
24 In  1991,  the  United  States  accounted  for  some  18  per  cent  of  the  Communities' 
external  imports,  followed  by  Japan  (10  per  cent)  and  Canada  (2  per  cent). C/RM/S/36A 
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Chart 11.2 
Treatment of imports, 1991 a 
Per cent 
Other  GSP 
recrprents c 
6.2 
Mediterranean 
countriesb 
7. 1 
\ 
d 
DOM/TOM 
05 
Total imports from aJJ  sources: ECU  497,374 million 
a  Imports receiving m.f.n.  or preferential treatment, by area of origin. 
b  Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,  Malta, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia,  Turkey,  Yugoslavia. 
c  Estimates, excluding products not qualifying for GSP. 
d  French Overseas Departments and Territories. 
s..o.u..r.c..e  : EC  Commission. 
43.  Accession  to  the  Communi ties  by  current  EFTA  countries  would  imply 
their acceptance  of  the  EC's  external  regimes  in  the  tariff and non-tariff 
areas;  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  as  well  as  of  other  issues  not 
already  covered  by  the  EEA  Treaty  (e.g.  regional  and  structural  policy, 
budget  and  finance).  While  adoption  of  the  common  tariff  should,  in 
principle,  enhance  the  flexibility  in  trading  conditions  for  goods  once 
imported  into  the  enlarged Communities,  certain non-tariff issues  may  prove 
far  more  important  from  a  third-country perspective  (e.g.  the  extension of 
the  CAP  to  new  members,  the  question  of  a  common  textiles  and  clothing 
reg1me,  and  the  treatment  of  the  new  members  under  the  Communities' 
bilateral restraint arrangements). 
44.  Each  new  access~ may  require  additional  institutional  adjustments 
and Treaty  amendments.  Under  the  EEC  Treaty,  these  could be  achieved via 
Article  237  (governing  application  and  access1ff  of  new  members)  or,  if 
that  were  considered  too  narrow,  Article  236.  Conditions  and  criteria 
25Ehlermann  (1992) 
26Article  N of  the  Final  Provisions  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  (prospective  successor  to 
(Footnote  Continued) C/RM/S/36A 
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for  accession  to  the  EC  were  set  out  ~  a  report  by  the  Commission  to  the 
European Council  in Lisbon,  June  1992.  The  report  does  not  consider  the 
accession of  EFTA  countries,  which  have  lodged  an  application  to  date,  to 
create unsurmountable  problems.  For other  European countries,  currently in 
economic  transition,  trade  and  cooperation  agreements  of  various  kinds, 
appropriate  to  their situation,  should offer possibilities for  economic  and 
soc~gl improvements  and  the strengthening of political cooperation with the 
EC.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  report  emphasizes  the  need  to  fully 
exploit  "the  dynamic  and evolutionary nature"  of the  Europe  Agreements. 
45.  In  December  1992,  the  European  Council  decided  that  enlargement 
negotiations with Austria,  Finland and  Sweden  should start at the beginning 
of 1993.  They  should be  transformed  into negotiations  under  the  Treaty  on 
European  Union  (Article 0),  once  it entered  into  force,  and  could  only  be 
concluded  after  the  Treaty  had  been  ratified  by  all  member  States.  The 
conditions  of  admission  would  be  based  on  the  acceptance  in  full  of  the 
Treaty  on  European  Union  an~ 9 the  "acquis  communautaire",  subject  to 
possible  transitional measures. 
(ii)  The  European  Economic  Area  (EEA) 
46.  The  EEA  Agreement  aims  to  create  a  "homogenous  European  Economic 
Area"  embracing  the  following  elements:  (i)  the  free  movement  of  goods, 
persons,  services  and capital;  (ii)  the  establishment up  of a  system of 
(Footnote  Continued) 
Article  236  of  the  EEC  Treaty)  provides  that  amendments  to  the  Treaty  can  be  proposed  to  the 
Council  either  by  the  government  of  any  member  State  or  the  Commission.  If  the  Council  gives 
a  favourable  opinion,  an  intergovernmental  conference  shall  be  convened  to  decide,  by  common 
accord,  on  the  amendments.  The  European  Parliament  is  is  to  be  consul ted.  The  amendments 
enter  into force  after  ratification  by  all  member  States. 
Article  0  (corresponding  to  Article  237  of  the  EC  Treaty)  stipulates  that  any  European 
State may  lodge  an  application  for  EC  membership  with  the  Council.  The  latter  is  due  to  act 
unanimously  after  consulting  the  Commission  and  having  received  the  assent  of  the  European 
Parliament.  The  conditions  of  accession  and  any  adjustment  to  the  founding  Treaties  are  to 
be  specified  in  an  agreement  between  the  member  States  and  the  applicant,  to  be  ratified  by 
the  national  Parliaments. 
27These  were  identified  as  (i)  European  identity,  democratic  status,  and  respect  of 
human  rights;  (ii)  acceptance  of  the  Community  system,  the  "acquis  communautaire
11
,  and 
capacity  to  implement  it;  and  (iii)  acceptance  and  implementation  of  a  common  foreign  and 
security policy as  it may  evolve  over  time.  A functioning  and  competitive  market  economy  was 
viewed  as  a  prerequisite for  fulfilling  the  second  criteria. 
28Accordi ng  to  the  Commission,  the  "chance  to  share  more  fully  in. the  benefits  of 
access  to  the  European  market,  and  the  prospect  of  membership,  can  help  to  bring  prosperity 
and  peace"  to a  region  still  suffering  from  poverty,  nationalism and  fear. 
29The  Commission  report  to  the  European  Council  of  June  1992  pointed  to  possible 
adjustment  problems  in  areas  not  covered  by  the  EEA  Agreement  (e.g.  agriculture)  and  to  the 
need  for  the  acceding  countries  to  accept  the  Maastricht  provisions  relating  to  a  common 
foreign  and  security policy. C/RM/S/36A 
Page  26 
competition  rules  that  prevents  market  distortions;  and  (iii) closer 
cooperation  in  areas  such  as  research  and  development,  the  environment, 
education  and  social  policy.  Upon  its  entry  into  force,  originally 
scheduled  for  1  January 1993,  the  Agreement  is  due  to  take  precedence  over 
the  free  3
~rade  agreements  between  the  EC  and  the  individual  EFTA 
countries. 
47.  Under  the  Agreement,  the  EC  and  the  EFTA  countries  would  each retain 
their own  tariffs and non-tariff measures  towards  third parties,  as well  as 
the  current  and  any  future  preferential  arrangements.  ssrict  rules  of 
origin continue  to  govern  the  conditions  for  EC/EFTA  trade;  there  is no 
guarantee  of  free  circulation within  the  EEA  for  goods  imported  into  the 
EFTA  or  the  EC,  as  there  is  within  the. EC.  Agricultural  trade  is  not 
covered by  the  Agreement  (Section V.2(i)). 
48.  On  the  other  hand,  prov1s1ons  exist for  the  harmonization  of  EC  and· 
EFTA  legislation  in  many  trade-related  areas,  including  technical 
regulations,  sanitary  and  phytosan!~ary  issues,  subsidization,  government 
procurement  and  competition policy.  In all these  areas,  the  EFTA  members 
have  agreed  to  accept  the  acguis  communautaire,  i.e.  the  existing body  of 
EC  law,  which  is  specified  in  22  detailed  Annexes.  This  means,  as  an 
example,  that  the  EFTA  countries  are  committed  to  accepting  common  EC 
standards  where  these  exist  and  to  extending  the  principle  of  mutual 
recognition  (developed  in  EC  case  law)  to  the  whole  of  the  EEA  territory. 
This  obligation also holds  for  the  EC  member  states. 
49.  The  institutional  framework  of  the  Agreement  comprises  an  EEA 
Council,  an  EEA  Joint  Committee,  an  EEA  Joint  Parliamentary  Committee  and 
an  EEA  Consultative  Committee  with  representatives  of  social  groups. 
Administration and  implementation  of  the  Agreement  lie in  the  hands  of  the 
Joint  Committee.  Its  decisions  are  taken  by  consensus  between  the  EC 
Commission,  on  the  one  side,  and  the  EFTA  countries  on  the  other  side  (the 
"EFTA  pillar"  speaks  with  one  voice).  The  EEA  Council  is  expected  to 
provide political impetus  and  lay  down  guidelines.  The  EFTA  countries have 
agreed  to establish an  independent  Surveillance Authority and  an  EFTA  Court 
30on  6  December  1992,  the  Swiss  electorate,  in  public  refere.ndum,  voted  against  their 
country's  participation  in  the  EEA.  In  view  of  this,  the  remaining  contracting  parties  will 
convene  a  conference  to  appreciate the  situation. 
31However,  the  EEA  Agreement  would  bring  about  certain  simplifications  of  the  current 
system  of  EC/EFTA  rules  of  origin. 
32 Individual  aspects  of  the  Agreement  are  dealt  with  below  in  their  specific  context 
(anti-dumping  measures  in  Section  IV.2{v)(d},  competition  policy  in  IV.4(i}(c),  State  aid  in 
IV.4(ii)(b),  agriculture  in  V.2(i),  coal  in  V.3(v},  and  dispute  settlement  in  VI.S}. C/RM/S/36A 
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of Justice  in order  to  ensure  consistency of interpretation and application 
on their side. 
50.  New  EC  legislation  in all  areas  covered  by  the  Agreement  shall,  when 
being  prepared  by  the  Commission,  be  subject  to  a  continuous 
information/consultation  process  with  the  EFTA  countries.  At  significant 
stages  of  Community  decision-making,  prior  to  a  formal  decision  by  the. EC 
Council,  consultations  can be  held in the  EEA  Joint Committee  upon request. 
However,  the  Comrnunity  has  retained  its  full  decision-making  autonomy  in 
its internal procedures. 
51.  New  EC  law  is  to  be  incorporated  into  the  Agreement  as  closely  as 
possible  to  the  adoption  by  the  Community  with  a  view  to  ensuring  its 
simultaneous  application.  The  relevant  decision  is  to be  taken by  the  EEA 
Joint  Committee.  Failure  to  do  so,  including  failure  to  agree  on  other 
possibilities  (e. g.  to  recognize  the  equivalence  of  legislation),  could 
ultimately result in suspension of  the  affected parts of  the  Agreement. 
52.  Whenever  EEA  and  EC  rules  are  identical  in substance,  they  are  to be 
interpreted  in  conformity  with  the  case  law  established  by  the  European 
Court  of Justice prior  to  the  date  of  signature.  New  developments  in case 
law  of the  EC  Court  of Justice  and  the  EFTA  Court  are  to  be  reviewed by  the 
EEA  Joint  Committee  which  "shall  act  so  as  to  preserve  the  homogeneous 
interpretation  of  the  Agreement"  (Article  105:2).  Otherwise,  the  general 
dispute  settlement provisions  would  apply  (Section VI.S). 
53.  The  EC  and  the  individual  EFTA  countries  are  entitled  to  take 
safeguard  measures  under  the  Agreement  in  the  event  of  "serious  economic. 
societal  or  environmental  difficulties  of  a  sectoral  or  regional  nature 
liable to  persist"  (Article  112).  The  clause  relates  not  only  to  trade  in 
goods,  but  extends  to  other  areas,  such  as  migration  of workers  or  freedom 
of  establishment,  and  the  range  of  possible  actions  is  not  further 
specified.  The  measures  apply  to  all  other  contracting  parties. 
Proportionate  rebalancing  measures  may  be  taken by  any  other  party  if its 
rights  or  obligations  under  the  Agreement  are  affected.  The  safeguard 
measures  and  any  subsequent  actions must be notified to  the Joint Committee 
where  consul tat  ions  are  to  be  held  with  a  view  to  finding  c·ommonly 
acceptable  solutions.  Actions  for  the  Community  would  be  taken  by  the  EC 
Commission. 
(iii)  The  "Europe  Agreements" 
54.  New  Association  Agreements  with  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Federal 
Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland were  signed  in  December  1991.  They  aim  to 
"establish  free  trade  areas,  in  the  sense  of Article XXIV  of  the  General C/RM/S/36A 
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Agreement,  over  a  maximum  period  of  ten years"  Pending  ratification, 
Interim  Agreements  entered  into  force  on  1  March  1992.  According  to  the 
parties,  these  contain  all  GATT-relevant  trade  provisions  of  the  new 
Agreements. 
55.  The  Europe  Agreements  (EA)  are  considerably  wider  in  coverage  than 
the  Community's  previous  association  agreements,  for  example,  with  Turkey, 
Malta  and  Cyprus  (see  also  Sections  IV.4(i)(b)  and  (c)).  A  clause  in  the 
Preamble  holds  that  the  final  objective  of  the  three  EA  countries  is  to 
become  members  of  the  Community  and  that "this association,  in view  of the 
parties,  will help  to  achieve  this  objective". 
56.  The  Agreements  provide  for  the  immediate  abolition  of  all 
quantitative  restrictions,  except  for  textiles  and  coal,  and  of  EC  import 
tariffs  on  the  bulk  of  industrial  products.  (In  many  areas  commitments 
under  the  Agreements  simply  replace  existing  benefits  previously  granted 
under  GSP.)  A  specified  range  of  products,  largely  identical  with  tho~~ 
usually  excluded  from  GSP,  is  subject  to  longer  implementation  periods. 
The  phasing-in  process  may  be  accelerated  in  view  of  the  general  economic 
and  the  sectoral  situation;  recommendations  to  this  effect  may  be  made  by 
the  Joint  Committees  established  under  the  Agreements  (Article  8  of  the 
Interim Agreements). 
57.  In  the  textiles  area,  provision  J:r:,  made  for  the  phasing  out  of 
tariffs  on  direct  imports.over  six years.  New  protocols  on  quantitative 
33GATT  document  L/6992,  3  Apri 1  1992 
34Tariff  elimination  within  one_tea!  is  foreseen  for  certain mineral  products,  chemical 
elements  and  basic  chemicals,  leather  skins,  ferro-alloys,  unwrought  lead  and  zinc  and  other 
base  metals.  A  f£~!~!!  phasing  out  period  applies  to  certain  ferro-alloys;  unwrought 
aluminium  (in  the  Agreements  with  Hungary  and  Poland)  and  unwrought  lead  and  zinc  (Poland). 
A further  range  of  products  is  scheduled  for  full  liberalisation  after  fiv!_years,  starting 
with  duty-free  annual  tariff  quotas  or  ceilings  which  are  due  to  increase  progressively. 
Products  concerned,  with  variations  between  the  Agreements,  include  chemical  elements, 
organic  chemicals,  fertilizers,  primary  plastics  and  plastic  plates,  rubber  and  rubber 
products,  leather  products,  footwear,  ceramic  and  glass  products,  steel  semi-manufactures,  TV 
tubes,  and  motor  vehicles.  ECSC-products  and  textiles  and  clothing  are  treated  separately 
(see  following  paragraph). 
Cars  produced  in  the  three  east  and  central  European  countries  have  qualified  for  free 
entry  into  the  EC  since  March  1992.  On  the  other  side,  !iun9_!!i:  is  committed  to  open  an 
import  quota  for  EC  passenger  cars  of  50,000  units  per  year  to  be  increased  progressively  by 
an  annual  rate  of  7  per  cent,  and  to  phase  out  its  tariffs  by  1  January  2001.  Any  existing 
quantitative  restrictions  in  the  £!~£L!nd_~lov!~~eral  R~~blic  were  to  be  phased  out 
immediately,  tariffs  over  nine  years.  POlandls  requiredto  arTOw  free  imports  of  cars 
within  a  tariff  quota  of  30,000  units--per- year  (including  5,000  cars  with  catalytic 
equipment),  which  is  to  expand  at  an  annual  rate  of  5  per  cent  or,  for  cars  with  catalyser, 
10  per  cent.  Tariffs,  currently at  35  per  cent,  are  to  be  eliminated  by  1  January  2002.  See 
also  Section  V.3(ii}(a}. 
35Tariffs  on  re-imports  of  products  transformed  under  the  Community's  Outward 
Processing  Traffic  (OPT}  regime  were  eliminated  on  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the 
Agreements. CjRM/S/36A 
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restrictions  are  to  replace  the  existing  bi~ateral  agreements  on  trade  in 
textile  products  which  expired  on  31  December  1992.  The  protocols  are  to 
provide  for  the  elimination  of  quantitative  restrictions  between  the 
parties within half  the  period agreed  in  the  Uruguay  Round,  but  in no  case 
before  1  January  1998.  Quantitative  restrictions  on  ECSC  steel  products 
are  to  be  lifted  immediately,  and  tariffs  over  five  years.  In  the  coal 
sector,  the  EC  is required to phase  out tariffs within one  year,  except for 
shipments  from  Hungary,  Poland  and  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics  into 
Spain  and  Germany  (four  years),  and  to  abolish  quantitative  restrictions. 
The  Agreements  do  not,  however,  affect  the  contractual  relations  between 
coal  producers  and  major  user  industries  in  certain  member  States 
(Section V. 3 (v)).  Their  economic  impact  on  these  EC  markets  - and,  as  a 
consequence,  their benefits  for  the  coal  sectors  of  the  supplier countries 
- are  thus  likely to be  limited. 
58.  The  parties are entitled to  take  safeguard measures  in the  event that 
increased  imports  cause  or  threaten  to  cause  serious  injury  to  competing 
domestic  producers,  or  serious  sectoral disturbances  or  difficulties  which 
could bring  about  a  Sj[ious  deterioration  in  the  economic  situation  of  a 
region  (Article  30).  The  relevant  criteria  ("serious  sectoral 
disturbances"  or  "serious deterioration in the  economic  situation")  and  the 
meaning  of  "region"  (e.g.  EC  member  States,  Departements  or  Bundeslander) 
are  not  defined  in  the  Agreements.  Before  taking  measures,  the  Joint 
Committee  is  to  be  informed  with  a  view  to  finding  a  mutually  acceptable 
solution.  The  same  applies  whenever  a  party  initiates  an  anti-dumping 
investigation.  For  the  purpose  of  establishing  normal  values,  the  EC 
considers  the  three  EA  countries  as  market  economies  in  any  investigations 
opened  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Interim  Agreements.  The 
signatories  have  retained  their  rights  under  Article VI  of  the  General 
Agreement  (see  also  Section IV.3(v)(c)). 
59.  In  the  area  of  agriculture,  the  Agreements  consolidate  the 
preferences  granted so  far under  GSP,  with certain improvements.  Moreover, 
the  EC  is  committed,  on  entry  into  force  of  the  Agreements ,  to  lift  its 
remaining  specific  quantitative  restrictions  under  Regulation  No.  3420/83 
(Section V.2(v)).  A range  of specified farm products  is scheduled for  levy 
or  tariff  reductions.  They  are,  in  general,  subject  to  quotas  or 
36separate  safeguard  prov1s1ons  allow,  in  specified  circumstances,  to  suspend 
concessions  in  view  of  market  disturbances  in  agriculture,  exchange  restrictions  approved  by 
the  IMF  (not  in  the  Agreement  with  Hungary),  balance-of-payments  difficulties,  and  adjustment 
pressures  arising  from  foreign  direct  investment.  In  mid  1992,  each  of  the  Joint  Committees 
under  the  three  Agreements,  decided  to  set  up  contact  groups  for  steel.  The  groups  are 
mandated  in  particular  to  survey  steel  exports  to  the  EC  with  a  view  to  anticipating 
situations that  might  cause  the  Community  to  invoke  the  safeguard  clause. C/RM/S/36A 
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t . t  t .  . 1 .  h .  h  .  f .  3  7  Th  . ff  quan  1  a  1ve  ce1  1ngs,  w  1c  are  to  1ncrease over  1ve years.  e  tar1 
reductions  on  certain  fruit  categories  are  linked  to  minimum  price 
arrangements.  The  Joint  Committees  under  the  Agreements  are  mandated  to 
examine  the  possibility of  granting  further  concessions.  In  the  event  of 
serious  market  disturbances,  a  more  specific  safeguard  procedure  is 
available;  immediate  consultations are  to be held and,  pending  a  solution, 
the  affected party is allowed to  take  the  measures  deemed  necessary. 
60.  Like  the  Communities'  other  preferential  trade  agreements,  the  three 
Europe  Agreements  contain  detailed  rules  of  or1g1n,  based  on  a 
change-of-tariff-heading criterion for  products  not  wholly  produced  in  the 
territory of  the  exporting  party.  Additional  requirements  for  a  range  of 
specified products  are  set  forth  in an  Annex  of  some  40  pages.  According 
to  the  Commission,  the  rules  are  comparable  in  substance  to  those 
applicable  to  imports  from  the  Mediterranean  countries.  Cumulation  of 
origin is admitted within the  "Europe  Agreements"  area;  shipments  from  any 
of  the  three  EA  countries  qualify  for  EC  preferential  treatment  whenever 
the decisive working  and processing stages had been accomplished within one 
of the  countries  or  the  EC.  Cumulation with  other  EC  preferential  trading 
partners  or  country  groups,  including  the  EFTA  members  or  individual 
Mediterranean countries,  is not possible under  current rules. 
61.  The  trade  provisions  of  the  Agreement  are  complemented  by  a  range  of 
measures  designed  to  promote  economic,  monetary  and  industrial cooperation, 
investment,  education and training.  Financial support is granted under  the 
G-24  PHARE  programme  and  through  the  European  Investment  Bank.  This  has 
led observers  to  suggest  that  the  Europe  Agreement  countries  have  probably 
received  m~Se external support  from  the  Community  than any other non-member 
countries. 
37Ec  imports  of  ducks  and  geese  benefit  from  levy  reductions  of  50  per  cent  since  the 
entry  into  force  of  the  Agreements,  subject  to  quotas  which  are  due  to  increase  progressively 
over  five  years.  Prepared  or  preserved  meat  of  swine,  natural  honey,  cut  flowers,  certain 
fruit  and  vegetables,  and  some  additional  products  qualify  for  EC  tariff  reductions  without 
ceilings  (implemented  on  entry  into  force  of  the  Agreements).  A further  range  of  products  is 
due  to  benefit  from  levy  and  duty  reductions  of  60  per  cent,  to  be  phased  in  on  a  "harmonious 
and  reciprocal  basis"  over  three  years  and  subject  to  quota  ceilings  which  will  be  expanded 
over  five  years.  The  product  range  includes,  with  certain  variations  among  the  countries: 
bovine  meat;  meat  of  sheep,  goat  and  swine;  chicken;  turkey;  butter  and  cheese.  Quota 
ceilings  for  butter  in  the  fifth  year,  as  an  example,  are  set  at  1,400  tonnes  in  the 
Agreements  with  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Federal  Republic  and  Poland.  Butter  is  not  covered  by 
the  Agreement  with  Hungary. 
The  increase  in  the  deliveries  of  sheep  and  pi gmeat  from  the  three  countries  is 
destined  for  the  markets  of  other  central  and  eastern  European  countries,  the  supply 
contracts  are  guaranteed  by  the  EC  (~ach!i£hten fur  AuBenhandel,  16  January  1992). 
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62.  Negotiations  on  Europe  Agreements  with Romania  and  Bulgaria have  been 
concluded.  The  Commission  expects  interim  Agreements  to  enter  into  force 
by  mid-1993. 
63.  In  October  1992,  the  Council  adopted  negotiating  briefs  for 
cooperation  agreements  with  members  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent 
States  (CIS).  The  trade  provisions  of  the  agreements  are  envisaged  to  be 
m. f. n.  based,  complemented  by  autonomous  tariff  concessions  in  the  GSP 
context. 
(iv)  Other  trade  arrangements  and preferential  regimes 
64.  All  preferential  schemes  operated  by  the  EC,  with  the  exception  of 
the  GSP,  are  contractual  in  nature;  GSP  preferences  are  autonomous  and 
non-binding.  Some  of  the  agreements  with  Mediterranean countries  go  side 
by  side  with  restraint  arrangements  on  sensitive  textiles  and  clothing 
categories;  the  product  range  varies  among  the  countries  concerned 
(Section V.3(vii)). 
65.  The  Lome  Conventions  (Lome  IV  since  1  March  1990)  provide  a 
comprehensive  framework  for  financial  aid,  technical  cooperation  and  trade 
between  the  EC  and  developing  countries  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  the 
Caribbean  and  the  Pacific  region.  Tariff preferences  under  the  Convention 
are  free  of  quantitative  limits  and  wider  in  their  product  coverage  than 
those  under  any  other  unilateral  EC  scheme.  Guarantees  are  given  for  the 
continuation of preferential benefits  on  bananas  and  preferential  delivery 
quantities  and price  levels are specified for  sugar. 
66.  The  Banana  Protocol  assures  the  ACP  countries of continued advantages 
on their traditional  EC  markets  (e.g.  Cameroon  and  Cote  d'Ivoire in France; 
Belize,  Jamaic~9  Suriname  and  the  Windward  Islands  in  the 
United Kingdom).  The  Sugar  Protocol entitles  18  ACP  suppliers  to  ship up 
to  1.3 million  tonnes  of  cane  sugar  per  annum  to  the  EC  at  the  guaranteed 
Community  price.  The  Protocol  is  of  indeterminate  duration,  regardless  of 
the  timeframe  of the  subsequent  Lome  Conventions  (Lome  IV  is  due  to  expire 
in 2000).  Some  temporary  compensation has  been provided by  the  EC  in  vi~~ 
of the  more  restrictive price policy,  since  the mid-1980s,  in the sector. 
A marketing  premium  of  ECU  30 million  for  a  period of  three  years  (1989/90 
39Article  1  of  the  Protocol  on  Bananas  stipulates  that  "in  respect  of  its  banana 
exports  to  the  Community  markets,  no  ACP  State  shall  be  placed,  as  regards  access  to  its 
traditional  markets  and  its  advantages  on  those  markets,  in  a  less  favourable  situation  than 
in  the  past  or  at  present". 
40EC  sugar  prices  have  remained  largely  unchanged  since  the  mid-1980s  (Chart  V.5). C/RM/S/36A 
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to  1991/92)  is  designed  to  maintain  the  supply  of  ACP  raw  sugar  to  EC 
refineries  and  to  support  adjustments  in the  ACP  economies. 
67.  The  EC  GSP  scheme  ranks  at  the  foot  of  the  Communities'  hierarchy of 
preferences.  It  provides  duty-free  entry  for  a  broad  range  of 
manufactures  and  semi-manufactures  (subject  to  a  safeguard  clause). 
Certain  primary  products  are  excluded,  while  sensitive  categories  are 
submitted41to  quantitative  limits  (ceilings,  reduced-duty  or  duty-free 
amounts).  Iron  and  steel  products  and  textiles  are  treated  under  a 
separate  regulatory  framework;  eligible  supplies  from  beneficiary 
countries  enter  in  general  under  preferential  tariff  quotas  or  duty-free 
ceilings.  The  least developed countries  and,  since  1991,  four  Andean Group 
countries  (Bolivia,  Colombia,  Ecuador  and  Venezuela),  the  CACM  members 
(Costa  Rica,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,4fonduras  and  Nicaragua)  and  Panama 
are,  however,  free  from  such  limits.  Since  the  late  1980s,  imports  of 
.certain  agricultural  products  under  a  common  market  organization  also 
qualify for preferential treatment. 
68.  A  Commission  Communication of 1990 highlighted perceived shortcomings 
of  the  current  GSP  scheme.  It  indicated  uncertainties  ensuing  from  its 
annual  application  and  the  dispro14~rtionate  costs  caused  by  the 
administration  of  ceilings  and  quotas.  Certain  quotas  and  fixed  duty 
free  amounts  were  already  exhausted  within  the  first  days  of  the  year. 
While  noting  that  ceilings  allow  in  principle  for  more  flexibility,  the 
41 While  in  the  case  of  preferential  £~2.l2.~9.~·  m.f.n.  duties  may  be  reintroduced  once 
the  relevant  levels  are  reached,  the  reimposition  of  duties  is  triggered  automatically 
whenever  shipments  are  in  excess  of  fixed  amounts  (i.e.  tariff  quotas).  Depending  on  their 
origin,  individual  products  may  be  subTecr-both-fo ceilings  and  fixed  amounts. 
In  1991,  more  than  70  non-textile  and  non-ECSC  products  from  developing  countries  wete 
affected  by  tariff ceilings  (including  chemicals  and  petrochemicals,  rubber  tyres,  leather 
products,  footwear,  household  articles  of  earthenware,  certain  glassware,  copper  bars, 
microwave  ovens,  certain  media  for  sound  recording,  reception  apparatus  for  radio-telephony, 
TV  receivers,  toys,  textiles  and  clothing).  Close  to  120  items,  more  than  40  of  which  were 
also  subject  to  tariff  ceilings,  carried  fixed  duty-free  amounts  and/or  fixed  reduced-duty 
amounts  with  regard  to  individual  suppliers  or  groups  of  countries. 
Preferences  for  41  non-MFA  textile categories  were  granted  under  fixed  duty-free  quotas 
or  ceilings. 
In  addition,  12  non-sensitive  products  were  made  subject  to  "safeguard"  limitations 
after  individual  suppliers  had  exceeded  a  reference  supply  basis  which,  for  almost  all 
categories,  is  set  at  6  per  cent  of  total  supplies  (Portland  cement,  certain  chemicals  and 
petrochemicals,  copper  bars,  bicycles  and  other cycles). 
Mostly  affected  from  the  introduction  of  country-specific  limitations  on  industrial 
products  (other  than  textiles)  were  shipments  from  China  (92  products),  the  Czech  and  Slovak 
Federal  Republic  (59),  Poland  (47),  Hungary  (39),  Pakistan  (35),  Thailand  (33),  Brazil  (31), 
India  and  Indonesia  (28  each).  (UNClAD,  1992) 
4230  of  the  42  least  developed  countries  also  qualify  for  extended  preferences  under 
the  lome  Convention.  Textile  and  clothing  deliveries  from  some  of  the  Latin  American 
countries  mentioned  above  are  governed  by  bilateral  exchanges  of  letters  (see  also 
Section  V.3(vii)). 
43see  also  GATT  (1991). C/RM/S/36A 
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Communication pointed out  signif~cant planning problems  among  suppliers and 
importers,  since  the  preferences  could  be  suspended  at  any  time  once  the 
threshold  levels  are  reached  (after  consultations  between  the  Commission 
and  member  States).  The  Commission  thus  proposed  developing  a  simplified 
system which,  in principle,  would  be  free  of quantitative  limits  and whose 
coverage  would  remain  stable  over  longer  time  periods.  According  to  the 
Commission,  products  and countries  that cannot be  fitted into  such  a  system 
should not  be  included at all;  the  present  product  range  should,  however, 
be maintained and  improved wherever possible. 
69.  In  late  1990,  the  Council  postponed  its  deliberations  on  this  issue 
until a  later date.  The  established  GSP  system was  thus  carried over  into 
1991,  1992  and  1993  without  substantial  changes,  except  for  its  country 
coverage.  The  Commission  considers  it unlikely  that  major  reforms  can be 
decided  upon  and  implemented  prior  to,  and  independently  from,  a  more 
comprehensive  liberalization  package  which  takes  into  account  the  results 
of the  Uruguay  Round. 
70.  The  suspension of the  Republic  of Korea  from  GSP,  since January 1988, 
was  lifted  on  1  January  1992.  This  move  responded  to  a  change  in  Korean 
legislation  on  the  protection  of  intellectual  property,  which  had  been 
criticized  by  the  EC  for  perceived  discrimination  (Council  Regulation 
No.  3912/87).  Various  other  changes  in  the list of GSP  benefic!tries have 
resulted from  recent  developments  in eastern and central Europe. 
71.  In the  context  of  the  Uruguay  Round,  the  EC  has  made  its concessions 
in  the  area  of  special  and  differential  treatment  of  developing  countries 
contingent  on  the  exclusion 4gf  Hong  Kong,  the  Republic  of  Korea  and 
Singapore  from  such  tre~tment. 
72.  In mid-1992,  the  EC  held  exploratory talks  with  Morocco  with  a  view 
to  concluding  a  "partnership  agreement"  that  would  eventually  lead  to 
bilateral free  trade. 
73.  Negotiations  on  a  free  trade  agreement  with  the  Gulf  Cooperation 
Council,  referred to  in the first TPRM  report,  have  not yet been concluded. 
44In  1992,  Albania,  Croatia,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Mongolia,  Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  the  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  were  included.  As  for  the 
countries  previously  forming  part  of  Yugoslavia,  GSP  cover  is  confined  to  agricultural 
products,  trade  in  industrial  products  is  covered  by  an  autonomous  regime  replacing  the 
earlier  agreement  with  Yugoslavia.  The  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics,  Hungary  and  Poland, 
beneficiaries  in  1991,  no  longer  qualify  since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  (Interim)  Europe 
Agreements  in  March  1992.  The  successor  States  of  the  Soviet  Union  (CIS  Republics)  were 
added  as  from  January  1993. 
45 
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German  Unification 
ANNEX 
74.  Subsequent  to German  unification in October  1990,  a  variety of policy 
initiatives  were  taken  at  EC  and  national  level  to  promote  economic 
restructuring  in  eastern  Germany.  An  EC  framework  for  structural 
assistance  for  the  new  Bundeslander  was  set  up  for  the  period 
1  January 1991  to  31  December  1993.  It is  endowed  with  ECU  3 billion  and 
will  add,  during  that period,  to national  investment  initiatives of almost 
ECU  14 billion.  The  German  Council  of Economic  Advisers has  estimated that 
support  for  business  investment  in eastern Germany,  made  available  through 
various  schemes,  can bring  about  ~uidity effects  of up  to  50  per cent of 
the  purchase cost within one  year. 
75.  Provision has  been  made  in the  context  of  several  EC  policy  schemes, 
including  sector-specific  aid  Directives,  to  accommodate  adjustment 
problems  in  eastern  Germany.  For  example,  certain  temporary  exemptions 
from  "normal"  subsidy  disciplines  are  provided  by  the  Directives  for 
shipbuilding and steel  (Sections V.3(ii)(c)  and V.3(vi)). 
76.  In  December  1990,  the  CONTRACTING  PARTIES  granted  the  EC  a  temporary 
waiver  from  the  m.f.n.  obligations  under  Article I:l  of  the  GATT,  to  run 
until  31  December  1992.  The  waiver  is designed  to  provide  legal  cover  for 
tariff suspensions  on  imports  from  the  former  GDR's  main  trading partners. 
The  suspensions,  aimed at preventing trade  disruptions,  apply  to  industrial 
and  agricultural  products  shipped  from  the  eligible  countries  int~fastern 
Germany.  They  are  subject  to  specified  quantitative  ceilings.  (The 
relevant  Council  Regulation  of  December  1990  (No.  3568/90)  does  not, 
however,  cover  beef  and  live  animals  and  excludes  the  whole  range  of  farm 
products  under  variable  levies,  compensatory  amounts  and  reference  or 
minimum  prices.) 
77.  A  report  by  the  EC  to  the  GATT  Working  Party  on  German  Unification 
indicates  that,  until  mid-1991,  very  limited  use  was  made  of  the  import 
46sachverstandigenrat  zur  Begutachtung  der  gesamtwirtschaftlichen  Entwicklung  (1991}. 
In  late  November  1992,  the  German  Government  announced  a  new  OM  12  billion  aid  package 
for  the  east  German  economy.  Details  are  still  to  be  worked  out.  According  to  the  German 
Minister  of  Finance,  while  the  package  would  require  a  supplementary  budget  in  1993,  H 
should  not  result  in  a  further  increase  in  net  government  borrowing.  The  German  Government 
is  a 1  so  reported  to  consider  preserving  "core  i ndust ri es"  of  the  east  German  economy  which 
cannot  be  privati zed  before  the  end  of  1993,  but  are  supposed  to  have  a  good  chance  of 
survival  after  restructuring  (flna~£l!l Times,  25  November  1992). 
47 See  also  GATT  (1991). • 
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48 
possibilities offered under  the  waiver.  This  was  viewed predominantly as 
a  reflection  of  the  economic  downturn  in  both  the  former  GDR  and  the 
beneficiary economies,  which  were  exposed  to  fundamental  economic  changes. 
48 GATT  document  L/6974,  17  January  1992. C/RM/S/36A 
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III.  TRADE  RELATED  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  MONETARY  AND  FINANCIAL  SPHERE 
(1)  The  Monetary  Environment 
(i)  The  European Monetary  System 
78.  The  European Monetary  System  (EMS)  was  established  in 1978  to  pursue 
three  main  objectives:  (i)  promoting  monetary  stability  in  Europe; 
(ii)  improving  economic  policy  co-operation  between  member  States;  and 
(iii) alliviating  global  monetary  instability  through  a  common  external 
approach:  The  centrepiece  of  the  EMS  is  the  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism 
(ERM).  Within  the  ERM,  exchange  rates  of  participating  :rurrencies  are 
specified  in  relation  to  the  European  Currency  Unit  (ecu).  The  ecu,  in 
turn,  is  defined  in  terms  of  a  currency  bas~et,  made  up  of  specified 
amounts  of the  currency of each  EC  member  State. 
79.  Individual  ERM  currencies  may  fluctuate  within  intervention  bands 
defined  in  terms  of  their  bilateral  ecu  cross-rates.  Whenever  two 
currencies  are  close  to  their  upper  or  lower  intervention  limits,  the 
monetary  authorities  of  the  member  States  involved  are  expected  to  take 
approp4iate  steps,  such  as  intervening  in  the  market  or  adjusting  interest 
rates.  The  intervention  limits  for  the  participating  currencies  are  set 
at +/- 2. 25  per cent,  except  for  the  Spanish  peseta  and  the  Portuguese 
escudo  which  are  allowed  to  fluctuate  by  +/- 6  per  cent.  In  addition  to 
participating  in  the  ERM,  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  have 
pegged  their currencies  informally  to  the  Deutsche  mark. 
80.  Parity  rates  can  be  changed  only  as  a  result  of  a  common  decision-
making  process,  involving  the  Commission,  the  central  banks  and  member 
States'  Finance  Ministers;  the  Ministers  need  to  give  their  unanimous 
1Ec  Commission  (1989). 
The  basic  elements  of  the  EMS  are  specified  in  a  Resolution  of  the  European  Council  of 
5  December  1978.  The  EMS  came  into  operation  on  13  March  1979. 
2currently,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands  and  Portugal  participate  in  the  ERM.  The  United  Kingdom  and  Italy  participated 
until  September  1992. 
3The  largest  components  are  the  Deutsche  mark,  representing  about  30  per  cent  of  the 
basket,  the  French  franc  (20  per  cent),  the  pound  sterling  (12  per  cent),  the  Italian  lira 
and  the  Dutch  guilder  {both  between  9  and  10  per  cent).  The  precise  weights  vary  over  time 
as  a  result  of  exchange  rate  movements. 
4whenever  the  exchange  rate  of  a  currency  exceeds  75  per  cent  of  its  maximum  spread  of 
divergence  against  all  other  participating  currencies  ("divergence  indicator"),  there  is  a 
presumption  that  action  will  be  taken. 
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assent.  After  a  major  realignment  in  1987,  the  eleventh  in the  history of 
ERM,  the  system proved stable until mid-September  1992.5 
81.  The  1978  European  Council  Resolution  establishing  the  EMS  provides 
the  possibility  for  "European  countries  with  particularly  close  economic 
and  financial  ties  with  the  European  Communities"  to  participate.  Such 
participation  should  be  based  on  agreements  between  the  central  banks,  to 
be  communicated  to  the  Council  and  the  Commission.  However,  though  there 
have  been  discussions  abou~ associate  membership,  no  formal  agreement  has 
been  concluded  to  date.  Most  EFTA  countries  have  rather  sought 
unilaterally  to  pursue  a  stable  nominal  exchange  rate  policy with  respect 
to  the  ecu  or  the  Deutsche  mark. 7  Since  July  1976,  the  Austrian schilling 
has  been  tied  to  the  DM;  the  Norwegian  krone  has  been  pegged  to  the  ecu 
since October  1990;  and  in  the  spring of  1991,  Sweden  and  Finland decided 
to  follow  (see,  however,  Section (ii) below).  On  19  June  1992,  the  Cypriot 
pound  was  also  linked to  the  ecu. 
82.  Over  time,  the  ecu  has  become  extensively  used  in  private 
transactions.  However,  it has  a  much  larger  role  in  the  financial  sphere 
than  in  trade  in  goods.  For  example,  some  14  per cent  of  the  Eurobond 
market  is  denominated  in  ecu,  while  it  is  estimated  that  less  than 
1  per cent of member  States'  merchandise  exports  are  invoiced  in ecu.8  The 
recent  currency upheavals  and  the  Danish  rejection of the Maastricht Treaty 
h  d  .  h  f  .  f'  .  1  k  9  may  ave  operate  aga1nst  t  e  use  o  ecu  1n  1nanc1a  mar  ets. 
(ii)  Exchange  rate developments 
83.  Between  mid-1990  and  September  1992,  the  ERM  currencies  displayed  a 
considerable  degree  of  nominal  stability against  each  other.  As  shown  in 
5In  January  1990,  the  Italian  lira  was  devalued  by  3  per  cent  against  the  ecu, 
simultaneously with  its entry  into  the  +/- 2.25  per  cent  fluctuation  band. 
6According  to  the  Commission,  attention  should  be  given  in  this  context  to  (i)  the 
progress  of  the  candidates  as  regards  economic  convergence;  ( i i)  the  ba 1  ance  between  the 
objectives  of  extending  the  EMS  zone  of  monetary  stability  and,  thus,  reinforcing  the 
credibility  of  other  European  countries'  economic  and  monetary  policies  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  need  to  ensure  that  the  stabi 1 i ty  of  the  EMS  is  not  jeopardi sed  in  the  process 
towards  Economic  and  Monetary  Union;  and  (iii)  the  perspective  of  EC  membership  for  the 
country  concerned  which  imp 1  i es,  in  turn,  participation  in  the  preparatory  process  towards 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  -
7switzerland  and  Iceland  appear  to  be  the  only  EFTA  countries  to  have  never  formally 
linked their currencies  to  the  ecu  or  to  an  ERM  currency.  The  Swiss  National  Bank  has  sought 
to  smooth  out  exchange  rate  fluctuations  ~onsidered erratic,  in  particular with  regard  to  the 
OM  and  the  ecu.  See  GATT  (1991b). 
8Situation  in  mid-1991  (EC  Commission,  1991a). 
9Eurostat  (1992). 
• C/RM/S/36A 
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Chart  III .l(A},  the  ecu  rates  of  "narrow  band"  participants  remained 
approximately  within  a  one-per  cent  range  around  their  central  ecu 
parities.  Until August  1992,  the variability of ~onthly exchange  rates did 
not,  in  general,  exceed  0. 5  percentage points.  1  By  contrast,  the  three 
"wider-band"  currencies  - the  pound sterling,  the  Portuguese  escudo  and the 
Spanish  peseta  experienced  both  larger  exchange  rate  changes  and 
variability,  with  monthly  variability  coifficients  amounting  to  1.8, 
1.2 and 1.0 percentage points,  respectively. 
84.  The  Greek  drachma  has  never  participated  in  the  ERM.  Between  1990 
and  mid-1992,  it  depreciated  by  some  10  per  cent  per  year  and  was 
relatively  unstable,  with  the  variability  of  the  monthly  drachmajecu 
exchange  rates  exceeding  6  percentage points.  Its  variations  against  the 
ecu were  comparable with  those  of major  non-EC  currencies. 
85.  Inflation rates  have  varied  significantly among  the  ERM  participants 
(Table  III .1),  implying  that  the  relative  stability  of  nominal  exchange 
rates  w\~hin  the  mechanism  has  been  accompanied  by  considerable  real 
changes. 
10variability  is  defined  as  the  standard  deviation  of  monthly  average  exchange  rates 
vis-a-vis  the  ecu  as  a  percentage  of  the  mean  exchange  rate  (over  the  period  January  1990  to 
June  1992).  Deviating  from  the  general  pattern,  the  Italian  lira  showed  a  variability  of 
0.8  per  cent. 
11The  peseta  tended  close  to  the  cei 1 i ng  of  its  6  per  cent  fluctuation  band  for  two 
years  from  mid-1990.  With  financial  liberalization  (Section  111.3  below),  international 
capital  flows  appear  to  have  responded  massively  to  comparatively  high  short-term  interest 
rates  in  Spain,  intended  to  fight  inflationary  pressures,  as  long  as  the  restrictive  stance 
of monetary  and  fiscal  policies  was  considered  sustainable  and  credible. 
12For  example,  while  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  of  the  Deutsche  mark  fell  by 
1.9  per  cent  between  1991  and  1992  (second  quarter),  the  peseta  and  the  escudo  appreciated  by 
l.l.z  and  11  per  cent,  respectively.  The  lira's  real  effective  rate  remained  stable  over  this 
period  (IMF,  International  Financial  Statistics,  October  1992}. C/RM/S/36A 
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Chart  111.1 
Exchange rate movements within the ERM, 
January 1990 - September 1992 
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~=  IMF,  International Financial  Statistics,  Euroatat, 
and  GATT  Secretariat  estimates. C/RM/S/36A 
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86.  In  the  second  half  of  1992,  the  ERM  currency  grid  came  under 
increased  pressure.  The  impact  of  high  German  interest  rates,  resulting 
from  fiscal  eKpansion  and  monetary  tightening  in  the  Federal  Republic,  and 
the  persistent  gap  in  monetary  and  fiscal  conditions  among  some  member 
States· (Table  III.l)  coincided with  the  asymmetrical  impact  of  a  weakening 
U.S.  dollar  on  the  ERM  participants.  On  16  September  1992,  after  a  period 
of  severe  strains  in  foreign  exchange  markets,  the  pound  sterling ard  the 
Italian  lira  were  suspended  from  the  ERM  and  allowed  to  float. 1  The 
peseta  was  devalued  by  5  per cent  and  later,  on  23  November  1992,  by  an 
additional  6  per cent.  The  second  move  was  par  alle  lled  by  a  6  per cent 
depreciation  of  the  escudo.  The  Irish  Pound,  one  of  the  narrow-band 
participants,  was  devalued by  10  per cent on  30/31 January  1993. 
87.  Among  the  currencies  shadowing  the  ecu,  the  Finnish  markka  was 
devalued  by  approximately  12  per  cent  in  November  1991  before  it  was 
formally  delinked  on  8  September  1992.  The  Swedish  krone  was  delinked  on 
19  November  1992,  after  record  interest  rates  had  proved  insufficient  to 
defend  its parity.  On  10  December  1992,  the  Norwegian krone  was  allowed to 
float. 
88.  Since  1990,  considerable  nominal  exchange  rate  fluctuations  have 
occurred  between  the  ecu,  the  U.S.  dollar  and  the  yen.  As  regards  the 
ecujdollar  exchange  rate,  these  fluctuations  did  not  result  in  a  definite 
trend;  a  13  per  cent  depreciation  of  the  dollar  in  1990  was  reversed  in 
1991  at  the  end  of  the  Gulf  war  (Chart  III. 2).  The  variability  of  the 
ecujdollar  monthly  exchange  rate  reached  nearly  6  per  cent between January 
1990  and  June  1992.  The  nominal  yen  rate  appreciated  considerably against 
the  ecu up  to  the  end of 1991;  it was  over  15  per cent higher  in the  third 
quarter  of  1991  than  in  the  corresponding  period  of  1990.  Monthly 
variability also  exceeped  6  percentage points. 
13A  7  per  cent  devaluation  of  the  lira,  on  14  September  1992,  had  proved  insufficient 
to  restore  confidence.  (Technically,  a  3.5  per  cent  devaluation  by  the  lira  within  the 
parity  grid  was  accompanied  by  a  3.5  per  cent  appreciation  of  the  other  participating 
currencies.) 110 
90 
Chart 111.2 
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Exchange rates of non-ERM currencies vis-a-vis 
the  ecu,  January 1990 - September 1992 
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(2)  The  Agrimonetary  System 
89.  Since  1969,  the  EC  has  operated  a  separate,  and  increasingly 
complicated,  monetary  regime  in  the  agricultural  sector.  The  system  has 
emerged over  time  as  Governments  were  anxious  not  to  confront  their farmers 
with  the  full  price  and  income  impact  of  currency  readjustments.  It 
provided for  country- and,  to  a  varying degree,  product-specific dey!ations 
of agricultural  ("green")  exchange  rates  from  the  market  ecu rates. 
90.  With  the  abolition of border  controls  on  1  January  1993,  the  system 
will  no  longer  be  sustainable.  Any  significant  differences  in  national 
price levels would result in cross-border arbitrage. 
91.  In  December  1992,  the  ~ouncil  adopted  a  Regulation  governing  the 
post-1992  agrimonetary system.  5  While  retaining the principle of a  common 
14The  green  rates  are  used  to  convert  farm  prices,  set  in  ecu,  into  national 
currencies.  See  also  GATT  (1991a). 
15council  Regulation  No.  3813/92. C/RM/S/36A 
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price  level,  to  be  fixed  in  ecu,  it  aims  at  simplifying  the  conversion 
mechanism  and  making  it  more  uniform.  For  the  participants  in  the 
narrow-band  of  the  EMS,  the  future  green  rate  is  set  to  correspond  to  the 
ecu central  rate  of  the  national  currencies.  For  the  other  member  States, 
a  representative  market  rate  is  to  be  used.  A  monitoring  system  is 
designed  to  trigger  adjustments  once  the  monetary  spread between  the  green 
benchmark  rates  of  the  latter  currencies  and  their  actual  market  rates 
exceeds  2  percentage points.  Half  ol
6 
the  excess  is  to  be  removed  on  the 
first  day  of  the  following  month.  However,  the  current  "correcting 
factor"  mechanism  ( "swi  tchover")  will  be  retained  for  another  two  years; 
in  the  event  of  realignments,  the  green  rate  of  the  strongest  currency  or 
currencies  will  be  raised  in  parallel  with  the  ecu  central  rate(s),  thus 
avoiding  price  decreases  in  national  currencies.  One-quarter  of  any 
increase  in  the  correcting factor  is  to  be  dismantled  at  the  beginning  of 
the  following marketing year  through  a  cut  in the  prices fixed  in ecus. 
92.  The  Regulation  makes  prov1s1on  for  compensatory  aid  aimed  at 
cushioning  the  price  impact  of  declining  green  rates  for  non-participants 
in  the  narrow-band  of  the  EMS.  The  payments  will  be  made  in  a  degressive 
way,  co-financed  from  EC  and national  funds. 
(3)  Rules  on Capital Movements  and Current  Payments 
93.  At  the  time  of the  initial TPRM  report,  Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal and 
Spain  operated  certain restrictions  on  irtra-EC  capital  movements;  these 
have  progressively been  reduced in scope.  7  In the  context of the currency 
turmoil  in  September  1992,  Spain,  Ireland  and  Portugal  reintroduced  or 
tightened  certain  restrictions  on  a  temporary  basis  (controls  on  forward 
foreign  exchange  markets  or  short-term  lending  by  domestic  banks  for 
speculative purposes).  The  three countries abolished all exchange  controls 
by  end-1992.  A  recent  Council  Directive  allows  Greece  to  maintain  a 
161n  addition,  any  bilateral  gaps  should  be  limited to  4  points. 
17 In  May  1991,  Greece  fully  liberalized  tourist  expenditure,  the  use  of  credit  cards 
abroad,  the  acquisit~y  residents  of  real  estate  abroad  and  of  foreign  long-term 
securities.  Also  in  May  1991,  Portugal  abolished  all  remaining  restrictions  on  direct 
investments  abroad  by  residents,  real  estate  investments  (inflows  and  outflows)  and  personal 
capital  movements  (inflows  and  outflows).  Spain  terminated  a  non-interest  bearing  compulsory 
deposit  on  financial  credits  obtained  by  residents  from  non-residents  (March  1991)  and 
liberalized  peseta-denominated  credits  granted  by  Spanish  credit  institutions  to  non-
residents  (April  1991).  A more  comprehensive  liberalization  package,  implemented  in  Spain  in 
February  1992,  consisted  of  the  admission  of  domestic  bonds  abroad,  financial  credits 
(inflows  and  outflows),  opening  of  bank  accounts  abroad  by  residents,  and  of  physical 
exportation  of  means  of  payments  of  1  ess  than  Peseta  5 mi 11 ion.  As  from  1 January  1992, 
Ireland  abolished  all  restrictions  on  short-term  Irish  pound  deposits  by  non-residents, 
medium-term  financial  loans  to  non-residents,  and  acquisition  of  foreign  short-term 
securities  by  residents. 
The  EEC  Treaty  provisions  governing  capital  movements  are  presented  in  GATT  (1991a). CfRM/S/36A 
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limited  ran;_e
8 
of  controls  on  short-term  capital  movements  until 
30  June  1994. 
94.  In most  member  States,  import  payments  and  the  use  of export proceeds 
are  unrestricted.  Certain  reporting  requirements  exist  for  statistical 
purposes.  Greece,  Ireland  and  Portugal  have,  however,  maintained  certain 
constraints  on  the  use  of  export  proceeds  since  the  initial  TPRM  repo-rt; 
however,  y~th full  liberalization these have  ceased to apply  in Ireland and 
Portugal. 
95.  The  Treaty  on  European  Union  provides  for  unrestricted  capital 
movements  and  payment  transfers  inside  the  EC  as  well  as  with  third 
countries  as  of  1  January  1994  (Article  73b).  A  derogation  clause  allows 
for  the  continuation  of  existing  restrictions  on  capital  movements  until 
31  December  1995  at  the  latest.  Given  the  liberalization  achieved  in  the 
other  member  States,  the  clause will only apply  to  Greece  (see  above). 
96.  Safeguard  measures  are  available  should capital  movements  with  third 
countries cause  or threaten to  cause  serious difficulties for  the  operation 
of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (Article  73f).  The  decision  would  have  to 
be  taken  by  a  qualified  majority  of  the  Council,  based  on  a  Commission 
proposal  and  after  consultations  with  the  proposed  European  Central  Bank 
(see below).  The  maximum  duration  is  limited  to  six months.  In addition, 
Article  228a  allows  for  the  introduction  of  urgent  measures  for  foreign 
policy and national security reasons. 
97.  Under  the  Treaty on  the  European  Economic  Area  (Section II.5(ii)),  EC 
and  EFTA  members  are  committed  to  removing  all  existing  restrictions  on 
capital  movements  and  on  payments  related  to  the  movements  of  goods, 
persons,  services  and  capital  (Articles  40  and  41).  Safeguard  provisions 
allow  for  countermeasures  in  the  event  of  distortions  resulting  from 
181n  this  context,  the  Directive  (No.  92/122)  refers  to  acquisitions  of  foreign  money 
market  securities  or  funds  of  less  than  one  year  maturity,  current  and  deposit  accounts  held 
abroad,  short-term  financial  loans  and  credits,  personal  loans,  physical  import  and  export  of 
financial  assets,  and  miscellaneous  capital  movements. 
Tab 1 e  AI I I .1  gives  an  overview  of  member  States'  reservations  to  the  OECD  Code  of 
liberalization  of  Capital  Movements  as  at  March  1992.  These  reservations,  which  have  been 
accepted  by  the  DECO  Council,  allow  for  individual  derogations  from  agreed  liberalization 
lists under  the  Code. 
19 IMF  (1992).  In  Greece,  export  proceeds  must  in  general  be  surrendered  within  180 
days  of  the  date  of  shipment  of  the  goods.  Ireland  had  required  exporters  to  obtain  payment 
of  shipments  exceeding  £1r  250  within  six  months  and  to  offer  foreign  currencies  received  to 
an  authorized  bank.  In  Por!.!:!..9.~1.  exporters  were  required  to  sell  to  an  authorized  bank 
export  proceeds  exceeding Esc 1 bi  11 ion  unless  these  were  credited  to  a  foreign  exchange 
account.  Prior  verification  by  the  Banco  de  Portugal  was  needed  for  settlement  periods  or 
prepayments  above  specified thresholds. C/RM/S/36A 
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different  exchange  rules,  disturbances  in 
markets,  distortions  of  competition  after 
balance  of payments  difficulties. 
(4)  Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
the  functioning 
exchange  rate 
of  capital 
changes,  and 
98.  The  United  Kingdom  has  proved  a~articularly attractive  location  for 
foreign direct  investments  in the  EC. 2  During  the  1980s,  it accounted for 
two-fifths  of  total  Community  inward  direct  investment,  clearly 
outdistancing  France  (15~ per  cent~l  Belgium/Luxembourg,  Spain  and  the 
Netherlands  (8  to  8~ per cent each).  Germany  attracted no  more  than  some 
6  per  cent  of  total  EC  inward  investment  in  the  1980s,  down  from  over 
16  per cent  a  decade  before.  In  contrast,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Spain 
managed  to  increase  their  shares  in  EC  inward  investment  by  8  and 
4  percentage points,  respectively. 
99.  The  United  States  is  the  Community's  most  important  third  country 
source  of  foreign  direct  investment.  U.S.  companies  are  estimated,  for 
example,  to  own  over  two-fifths  of the  stock of  inward direct  investment  in 
the  United  Kingdom  and  Belgium/Luxembourg,  and  about  one-third  in  Germany. 
U.S.-owned  investments  play  a  considerably  larger  role  in  the  U.K.  ~conomy 
than  those held by  investors  from  all other member  States  combined. 2  This 
contrasts  conspicuously  to  the  ownership  structure  in  Spain,  Italy  and 
France,  where  other  Community  members  account  for  over half of total direct 
foreign  investment;  the  U.S.  share  in  each  of  three  countries  is 
significantly below  20  per cent.  The  relatively stronger reliance of these 
member  States'  economies  on  internal  rather  than  EC-external  trade 
(Chapter  I)  thus  finds  its counterpart  in  the  investment  sphere.  Japanese 
investments  in  the  EC  gained  momentum  in the  late  1980s,  but Japan's  share 
in  the  total  ~5ock  c;>f  investment  in  all  member  States  still  .remained 
relatively low. 
100.  The  distribution of foreign  inward  investment within the  Community  is 
likely  to  reflect  a  variety  of  factors,  including  geographic  and  cultural 
distance  (language  barriers),  profitability considerations  and  differences 
20The  following  paragraphs  draw  on  EC  Commission  (1991c). 
21 Including  inflows  from  other  member  States. 
22 In  1984,  the  book  va 1 ue  of  U.S. -owned  investment  stocks  represented  4  7  per  cent  of 
tot  a 1  inward  stocks  in  the  United  Kingdom,  as  camp a red  with  26  per  cent  from  other  member 
States. 
23Between  1987  and  1989,  annual  inflows  from  the  United  States  increased  from 
ECU  10  billion  to  ECU  14  billion,  as  compared  with  a  rise  in  Japanese  investment  from 
ECU  5~ billion to  ECU  14~ billion  (excluding  Greece  and  Denmark). C/RM/S/36A 
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in  the  individual  member  States'  policy  approaches.  A  1991  Commission 
report  indicates  particularly  open  policies  towards  foreign  i~vestment  in 
Belgium,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom.  4  Despite 
certain problems  in prominent cases  (Fuji Heavy  Industries  in 1989),  France 
is  considered  to  have  moved  in  a  liberal  direction. 25  As  regards  the  low 
level  of  foreign  investment  in  Germany,  the  report  points,  as  a  possible 
explanation,  to  high  labour  cost  and  to  access  barriers  resulting  from 
intensive  cross-holdings  between  domestic  banks  and  industrial 
conglomerates. 
(5)  Towards  Economic  and Monetary Union  (EMU) 
101.  In  the  Preamble  to  the  Treaty  on  European Union  (Maastricht Treaty), 
the  signatories  express  their  resolve  "to  achieve  the  strengthening  and 
the  convergence  of  their  economies  and  to  establish  an  Economic  and 
Monetary  Union  (EMU)  including,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this 
Treaty,  a  single  and  stable  currency".  The  Treaty  sets  out  conditions  for 
EMU,  the  institutional  framework  and  the criteria for participation. 
(i)  Institutional framework 
102.  Under  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  EMU  is  to  be  implemented  in  three 
stages.  The  first  stage,  up  to  1  January  1994,  comprises  efforts  towards 
closer  economic  and  monetary  cooperation  between  member  States  within  the 
existing  institutional  framework.  The  second  stage  is  designed  to 
reinforce  economic  and  monetary  convergence;  in  particular,  a  European 
Monetary Institute  (EMI)  will come  into operation.  The  Institute,  which is 
scheduled  to  be  replaced  by  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  in  the  third 
stage,  will  ~ave  a  central  role  in  specifying  technical  and  institutional 
provisions.2  Policy  competence  will,  during  this  stage,  remain  with  the 
national authorities. 
24 EC  Commission  (1991c). 
25Direct  investments  by  non-EC  residents  in  existing  French  firms  are  generally  subject 
to  prior  declaration  to  the  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Finance,  except  for  investments  in  real 
estate  and,  if  less  than  F  10  million,  in  hotels,  restaurants,  retail  trade  and  services. 
The  Minister  may  suspend  the  acquisition  within  a  30-day  period.  EC-controlled  companies  are 
obliged  only  to  notify  the  Treasury  of  their  scheduled  participation  in  a  French  company. 
Above  a  certain  threshold,  these  companies  may  be  granted  permanent  EC  stattis,  in  which  case 
they  are  exempt  from  all  declaration  or  notification  requirements.  The  Minhter  of  Economy 
and  Finance  is  empowered  to  prohibit  any  foreign  participation,  regardless  of  nationality,  on 
the  grounds  of  danger  to  public  health,  order,  security  and  national  defence.  (IMF  (1992), 
reflecting  the  situation  as  at  end-1991.) 
26Article  109f  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  requires  the  EMI,  inter alia,  to  strengthen 
cooperation  between  the  national  central  banks;  to  strengthen  the  coordination  of  the  member 
States'  monetary  policies  with  the  aim  of  ensuring  price  stability;  to  monitor  the 
{Footnote  Continued). C/RM/S/36A 
Page  46 
103.  The  Council,  meeting  in  the  composition  of  Heads  of  State  or 
Government,  is  to  decide  no  later  than  31  December  1996  on  whether  a 
majority of member  States fulfils  the necessary conditions  for  the  adoption 
of a  single  currency  (see  following  Section)  and  whether if is appropriate 
to  enter  the  third  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  union.  This  decision 
is  to  be  taken  by  a  qualified majority.  At  the  very  latest,  however,  the 
third  stage  is  to  begin  on  1  January  1999,  on  the  basis  of  the 
participation  of  the  member  States  judged  by  the  C~~ncil,  before 
1  July 1998,  to  meet  the  eligibility criteria at  that  date.  Those  found 
ineligible  are  considered  for  participation at  least  once  every  two  years 
or at  their  own  request.  Formal  reservations have  been  made  by  the United 
Kingdom  and  Denmark,  which  are  committed  only  to  participating  in  the 
second stage.  Denmark  has  reserved  the  right,  in  a  separate  protocol,  not 
to  move  automatically  to  stage  three,  while  the  Un~~ed Kingdom  has  made 
this move  contingent  on  the  assent of its Parliament. 
104.  At  the  beginning  of  the  third stage,  the  ecu is  to  become  a  currency 
in  its  own  right.  The  Council,  by  unanimous  vote  of  the  participating 
member  States,  is  to  adopt  "irrevocably  fixed"  conversion  rates  for  the 
currencies  concerned  as  well  as  the  rate  at  which  the  ecu  will  be 
introduced.  The  Council  will  also  take  the  other  measures  necessary  "for 
(Footnote  Continued) 
functioning  of  the  EMS;  and  to  hold  consultations  on  issues  within  the  competence  of  the 
national  central  banks  and  affecting  the  stability of  monetary  institutions  and  markets.  In 
view  of  the  third  stage,  the  EMI  is  to  prepare  the  instruments  and  procedures  for  a  single 
monetary  policy  and  the  rules  for  operations  of  national  banks  within  the  framework  of  the 
European  System  of  Central  Banks.  The  EMI  shall  specify,  at  the  latest  by  31  December  1996, 
the  regulatory,  organisational  and  logistical  framework  necessary  for  the  European  System  of 
Central  Banks  (see  below)  to  perform  its tasks  in  the  third  stage. 
27Article  109j(3). 
The  Counc i 1  is  to  act  on  the  basis  of  recommendations  by  the  ·Counc i 1  of  Ministers, 
taking  into  account  reports  by  the  Commission  and  the  EMI,  and  the  opinion  of  the  European 
Parliament. 
28Article  109j(4). 
The  specifying  of  a  convergence  process,  with  fixed  deadlines,  has  been  criticized  from 
two  angles.  On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  noted  that  "by  1 ayi ng  down  convergence  criteria 
oriented  to  stability,  yet  at  the  same  time  setting  firm  deadlines,  the  negotiating  parties 
have  combined  two  elements  which  are  dangerously  contradictory.  If,  as  appears  likely,  as 
many  member  States  as  possible  or  indeed  all  of  them  wish  to enter  the  final  phase,  the  firm 
deadline  does  not  increase  the  pressure  to  adjust  but,  if  anything,  actually  relaxes  the 
economic  entry  requirements"  (Jochimsen,  1992).  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that 
attempts  to  qua  1 i fy  for  participation  could  render  exchange  rate  and,  perhaps,  budgetary 
policy  in  some  member  States  too  rigid  in  the  coming  years  (Bank  for  International 
Settlements,  1992). 
29As  noted  in  Section  11.4,  the  European 
would  not  participate  in  the  single  currency. 
In  October  1992,  the  German  Government 
approval  before  moving  to  full  monetary  union. 
saying  that  this  should  not,  however,  amount 
(European  Re£~rt,  10  October  1992). 
Council  decided  in  December  1992  that  Denmark 
indicated  that  it  would  seek  parliamentary 
The  German  Minister  of  Finance  was  quoted  as 
to  a  second  ratification  or  escape  clause. C/RM/S/36A 
Page  47 
the  rapi~0 
introduction  of  the  ecu  as  the  single  currency  of  those  member 
States". 
105.  The  European  System  of  Central  Banks  (ESCB),  comprised  of  the 
national  central  banks  acting  under  the  authority  of  the  European  Central 
Bank  (ECB),  is  to  conduct  monetary  policy  and  foreign  exchange  operations, 
hold  and  manage  official  reserves  of  the  member  States  and  promote  the 
smooth  operation  of  the  payment  systems. 31  The  ECB  is  to  be  prohibited 
from  taking  instruction~ from  any  other body,  including  EC  institutions and 
those  of  member  States.  2  Each  member  State is  required  to  ensure,  by  the 
date  of establishment  of  the  ESCB,  that its national  legislation,  including 
the  statutes  of  its  n~~ional  central  bank,  is  compatible  with  the  Treaty 
and  the  ESCB  Statutes. 
106.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  provides  the  possibility  for  the  ecu  to 
participate  in  formal  exchange  rate  agreements  with  non-Community 
currencies.  The  terms  of  such  agreements  are  to  be  decided  unanimously  by 
the  Council.  Any  subsequent  adjustments  within such  exchange  rate  systems, 
or  the  abandonment  of  the  ecu's participation,  would  need  to  be  approved by 
a  qualified  majority  of  the  Council.  The  relevant  decision-making 
processes  also  involve  the  ECB,  the  Commission  and  the  European 
P  1 .  34  ar  lament. 
107.  Article  104  and  following  provisions  of  the  Treaty  aim  to  strengthen 
budgetary  discipline  among  member  States.  For  example,  the  ECB  and 
national  central  banks  will be  prohibited  from  providing credit  facilities 
to  Governments  or  Community  institutions,  other  than  publicly-owned  credit 
institutions,  and  the  Community  and  member  States  will,  generally,  not  be 
allowed  to  assume  the  financial  obligations  of  other  Governments  or  their 
30Article  1091(4).  The  decision  is  to  be  taken  on  a  proposal  by  the  Commission  and 
after  consulting  the  ECB.  The  wording  of  Article  1091(4)  implies  that,  for  some  time  during 
the  third stage,  national  currencies  may  coexist  with  the  ecu  at  fixed  exchange  rates. 
31Article  105(2)  and  Protocol  on  the  Statute  of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks 
and  of  the  European  Central  Bank. 
32Article  107. 
33Article  108. 
34Article  109:1  requires  the  Council  to  take  its decisions  "after consulting  the  ECB  in 
an  endeavour  to  reach  a  consensus  with  the  objective  of  price  stability"  (Article  109:1). 
This  implies  that  the  Council  is  to  ensure,  in  consultation  with  the  European  Central  Bank. 
that  obligations  resulting  from  an  exchange  rate  agreement  would  not  contravene  monetary 
policy  targets;  the  final  say,  however,  lies  with  the  Council.  The  German  Council  of 
Economic  Advisers  has  voiced  concern  about  this  allocation  of  competence,  stressing  that  the 
fixing  of  exchange  rates  should  be  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the  ECB.  See 
Sachverstandigenrat  zur  Begutachtung  der  gesamtwirtschaftlichen  Entwicklung  (1991). C/RM/S/36A 
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public  institutions  (Article 104b).  Member  States  will  be  required  to 
avoid  "excessive  goverrunent  deficits"  and  the  Commission  wi~\ monitor  the 
budgetary and  government  debt  situation in the  member  States.  In extreme 
cases,  the Treaty provides  for  penalti~g to be  levied against member  States 
failing to correct excessive deficits. 
(ii)  Criteria for participation 
108.  The  guiding principles  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  as  stipulated 
in  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  are  price  stability,  sound  public  finances  and 
monetary  conditions,  and  a  sustainable  balance  of  payments  (Article  3a). 
Against  this  background,  the  Treaty  s~ecifies  several  criteria  for 
participation in stage  three  of the Union:  7 
(i)  High  degree  of price stability 
The  average  rate  of inflation,  measured by  the  consumer price  index, 
must  not  have  exceeded 
11that  of,  at  most,  the  three  best  perf~gming 
member  States"  by  more  than 1.5 per cent  in the preceding year. 
(ii)  No  excessive  government  deficits 
The  ratio  of  planned  or  actual  government  deficit  to  GOP  mus 3
~ not 
have  been decided by  the  Council  to be  "excessive"  (see  above). 
35Article  104c.  Reference  values  of  3  per  cent  of  GOP  for  "planned  or  actual" 
government  deficit  and  60  per  cent  of  GOP  for  total  government  debt  are  established  in  the 
Protocol  on  the  Excessive  Deficit  Procedure. 
36This  would  only  occur  in  the  event  that  a  member  Stated  failed  to  comply  with  a 
decision  by  the  Council  to  give  notice  to  it  to  take  remedi a 1  measures  within  a  specified 
time-limit,  and  after  a  lengthy  procedure  of  Commission/Council  consultations  and 
recommendations. 
37Table  111.1  illustrates  the  performance  of  member  States  in 
criteria  in  1992.  All  criteria  leave  room  for  interpretation  and 
"excessive" deficits. 
relation  to  these 
especially  that  on 
38Article  1  of  the  Protocol  on  the  Convergence  Criteria  (referred  to  in  Article  109j  of 
the Treaty). 
39Government  means  genera  1  government,  i ncl udi ng  centra  1 ,  region  a 1  and  1  ocal 
governments. 
The  existence  of  an  excessive  deficit  would  have  to  be  decided  by  the  Council,  acting 
by  a  qualified  majority  on  a  recommendation  of  the  Commission.  The  Treaty  stipulates  that  a 
deficit  may  not  be  considered  excessive  if  it  has  declined  substantially  and  continuously 
and  has  reached  a  level  close  to  the  reference  value;  or  alternatively,  if  the  excess  has 
only  been  exceptional  and  temporary  and  remained  close  to  the  reference  value.  These 
qualifications  are  not  further  specified. C/RM/S/36A 
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(iii)  Exchange  rate stability 
Participants  must  have  respected  the  normal  fluctuation  margins  of 
the  ERM  without  "severe  tensions"  during  the  preceding  two  years.  In 
particular,  a  member  State  must  not  have  devalued  its  currency's 
bilateral  central  rate  on  its  own  initiative  against  any  other  EC 
currency. 
(iv)  Convergence  of long  term interest rates 
For  at  least  one  year,  the  average  nominal  long-term  interest  rate 
(return  on  government  bonds  or  similar  securities)  must  not  exceed 
"that of,  at  most,  the  three best  performing  member  States  in  terms 
of price stability" by  more  than  2  per cent. 
109.  In  1992,  six  member  States  would  have  satisfied  the  criterion  on 
inflation.  In  four  member  States  the  government  deficit  was  less  than 
3  per cent  of  GDP,  and  in  five  member  States  public  debt  stood  below  the 
60  per cent  benchmark  serving  as  a  criterion  in  the  procedure  concerning 
"excessive  deficits"  (Table  III .1).  The  seven  narrow-band  participants 
would  have  met  the  exchange  rate  criteria  and  eight  member  States  the 
condition on interest rates.  Only  two  countries  - France  and  Luxembourg 
would have  fulfilled all  EMU  benchmark values.  However,  since all criteria 
leave  room  for  interpretation,  in particular that on excessive deficits, it 
is  not  possible  to  pass  on  a  prior  judgement  on  the  member  States 
participating in  stage  three.  Ultimately,  the  decision  is  to  be  taken  by 
the  Heads  of State or  Government. 
(iii)  Objectives  and  expectations 
110.  The  EC  Commission  expects  a  single  currency  to  be  economically 
superior  to  any  fixed  or  quasi-fixed  exchange  rate  system.  In  the 
Commission's  view,  only  a  common  EC  currency  will  be  able  to  eliminate 
transaction  costs,  max~m~ze  the  credibility  of  the  Union,  provide  for 
complete  price  transparency,  exploit  the  economies  of  scale  of  a  large, 
integrated  financial  me~ket  I  and  offer  the  full  advantages  of  a  major 
international currency. 
111.  The  Commission  has  identified  two  types  of  costs  incurred  by  firms 
engaged  in  intra-EC  trade:  the  financial  costs  of  currency  conversion 
(mainly  exchange  rate  costs  and  hedging  costs)  and  the  in-house  costs  in 
40EC  Commission  (1990)  and  Emerson  (1991). C/RM/S/36A 
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companies  required  to  devote  resources  to  foreign-exchange  related 
operations.  These  costs,  and  thus  the  potential  savings  attributable  to 
EMU,  are  estimated  to  range  between  ECU  13  billion  and  tCU  19  billion  (at 
1990  prices),  equivalent  to  0.3  to  0.4 per  cent  of  GOP.  1  With  regard  to 
extra-EC  trade,  the  advantages  of  a  common  currency  are  considered  to  be 
more  limited.  The  Commission  expects  a  wider  use  of  the  ecu  in  extra-EC 
transactions  once  the  Union  is  in  place;  the  reduction  in  transaction 
costs  in  trade with  third countries  should range  between  0.03  and  0.05  per 
cent of GOP. 
112.  From  the  Commission's  perspective,  the  EMU  should  translate  into 
better macro-economic  performance,  including low  an~ stable inflation rates 
and  lesser  fluctuations  in  output  and  employment.  2  Price  discipline  is 
expected to  result  from  the  clear commitment  towards  price stability in the 
statutes  of  the  ESCB.  Positive  growth  and  investment  effects  are 
attributed  to  such  factors  as  (i)  lower  exchange  rate  variability  and 
uncertainty;  through  the  elimination  of  risk  premiwns  these  are  deemed 
likely  to  promote  economic  activity  by  an  accwnulated  5  per cent  of  GOP 
over  the  long  run;  (ii)  changes  in  economic  expectations  and  behaviour 
patterns which  could shift  the  economy  onto  a  higher  performance  path with 
lower  unemployment  levels;  (iii) more  market-oriented  conduct  of  wage 
bargainers  in view  of  a  credible monetary  policy;  and  (iv)  an  absence  of 
shocks  resulting  from  exchange  rate  instability and uncoordinated  monetary 
policy.  Macroeconomic  stability,  in  turn,  should  stimulate  internal  and 
external  trade. 
113.  The  Commission  expects  that,  once  the  EC  is  of  one  public  voice, 
Community  interests  could  be  pursued  more  effectively.  International 
policy  co-ordination would  prove  easier  among  four  rather  than  seven major 
players  (from  G7  to G4);  in the  longer  term,  EMU  could ee  a  building block 
for  "establishing a  balanced  tripolar monetary  regime".  3  Apparently,  the 
Commission  considers  a  system  of  few  large  currency  areas  to  imply  less 
frictions  than  the  present,  more  hegemonic  structure  of  international 
monetary relations. 
41 The  Commission  expects  that  the  benefits  accruing  to  smaller  countries  from  the 
reduction  in  transaction  costs  are  up  to  eight  times  higher  than  in  larger  member  States, 
reflecting  the  greater  share  of  trade  in  total  production  (EC  Commission  1990). 
According  to  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements  (BIS),  such  estimates  should, 
however,  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  any  ensuing  weakening  of  bank  profitability and  the  costs 
and  risks  of  price  rises  and  financial  market  disturbances  resulting  from  the  conversions  to 
a  common  currency  (Bank  for  International  Settlements,  1992). 
42 Ec  Commission  (1990). 
43 Ec  Commission  (1990). C/RM/S/36A 
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114.  Fiscal  policy  competence  would  remain  essentially  with  the  national 
Governments,  subject  to  certain  constraints  (Article  104;  see  above). 
Member  States are  required to  regard their economic  policies as  a  matter of 
common  concern  and  to  coordinate  within  the  Council.  While  the  German 
Council  of  Economic  Advisers  has  in  principle  welcomed  this  "adequate" 
solution  which  "takes  into  account  the  principle  of  subsidiarity",  other 
observers  have  pointed  to  the  absence  of  a  sufficient  basis  for  "true 
coordination",  i.e.  for  mutual  adjustment  processes  th~t  translate  into 
significant modifications  of the participants'  policies.4 
115.  Considering  the  regional  impact  of  EMU,  the  EC  Commission  indicates 
both  opportunities  and  risks,  " ..  with  no  a  priori  balance  of  relative 
advantage  for  the  original  or  newer  member  States".  The  loss  of 
independent  control  over  monetary  policy  would  be  of potential  consequence 
only  for  those  countries  whose  wages  and  prices  adjust  slowly  to  economic 
shocks,  as  they  would  be  unable  to  resort  to  currency  depreciation  to 
.  .  .  45  (0 '1  .  .  .  h  1  f  rega~n  compet~t~veness.  ~  pr~ce  r~ses  m~g t  serve  as  an  examp  e  o 
external  shocks,  which,  reflecting  the  differences  in  economic  structures, 
would have  an  asymmetrical  impact  on  the  member  States.  Under  the  current 
system,  this  could be  accommodated  by way  of currency adjustments.) 
116.  Any  potential  advantages  of  monetary  and  exchange  rate  autonomy  for 
rapid  adjustment  would  have  to  be  set  against  the  possibility  of  policy 
errors.  For  example,  the  foundering  of earlier plans  for  monetary union in 
the  1970s,  frequently  attributed  to  the  differing  effects  of  oil  price 
rises,  could  also  be  ~nterpreted  as  a  result  of  inconsistent  policy 
reactions  at  that  time.  6  Model  simulations  by  the  Commission  seem  to 
suggest  that  the  EC  economy  could  have  worked  out  the  major  shocks  of  the 
past  two  decades  with  less  disturbances  in terms  of  inflation and,  to  so~' 
extent,  real  activity  if it had  operated  within  a  single  currency  area. 
(Individual  member  States  might  draw  different  conclusions,  depending  on 
their  own  macroeconomic  performance  during  this  period.)  The  Commission 
takes  the  view  that  while  "exchange  rate  changes  can  help  for  an  initial 
period  to  protect  employers  from  the  effects  of  an  economic  shock",  this 
44sachverstandigenrat  zur  Begutachtung  der  gesamtwirtschaftlichen  Entwicklung  (1992) 
and  Kenen  (1992). 
45Ec  Commission  (1990). 
46Bank  for  International  Settlements  (1992). 
47 EC  Commission  (1990). C/RM/S/36A 
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could  also  be  "at  the  cost  of  poorer  results  in  terms  of  infla~\on  and 
also,  in the  medium  term,  dissipation of the  employment  gains  too". 
48Ec  Commission  (1990). 
• IV.  TRADE  POLICIES  AND  PRACTICES  BY  MEASURE 
(1)  Overview 
C/RM/S/36A 
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117.  Changes  to  the  European  Communities'  trade  regime  since  1990  have 
been  inspired,  or  required,  by  the  Internal Market  programme,  developments 
in  the  EC' s  relations  with  countries  in  transition  in  east  and  central 
Europe,  the  extension  of  new  preferential  trade  agreements,  and 
developments  in  the  GATT  and  the  Uruguay  Round.  This  chapter  shows  how 
these  changes  have  affected  individual  trade  policy  instruments  and 
provides  an  overview  of  the  application of  such  instruments  over  the  past 
two  years.  It also  focuses  on certain areas  not dealt with  in  the  initial 
TPRM  report,  such as  trade-related aspects  of EC  competition policy. 
118.  Most  reforms  related  to  the  Internal  Market  programme  were  either 
implemented  or  well  advanced,  by  late  1992  (Section II:2(ii)).  The 
programme  is  intended  to  remove  trade barriers  and  reduce  discrepancies  in 
regulations  within  the  EC.  By  doing  so,  it also  has  a  significant  impact 
on  the  Community's  external  trade  relations,  in  particular  on  the  import 
side.  Internal  Market  reforms  fall  into  two  groups:  ( i)  measures  which 
have  an  immediate  impact  on  access,  such  as  the  abolition  or 
"communitization"  of  residual  national  import  quotas,  or  the  treatment of 
external  deliveries  under  the  new  EC  procurement  rules;  and  (ii)  measures 
which,  while  not  directed  at  imports,  can  nevertheless  be  expected 
generally to  change  access  conditions  for external suppliers  as well  as  for 
EC  producers,  such  as  the  recognition  or  harmonization  of  technical 
regulations  among  the  member  States  or  the  abolition  of  internal  border 
controls. 
119.  Lack  of  harmonization  in  national  policies  does  not  imply  that  no 
common  disciplines exist.  Whenever  national regulations  impede  and distort 
internal  trade,  these  can  normally  be  challenged  by  the  affected  p_arties, 
other  member  States  or  Community  institutions  under  EC  law.  In  addition, 
there  are  common  external  commitments,  including  the  Communities'  or 
individual  member  States'  international  obligations,  for  example  under  the 
General Agreement  and  the Tokyo  Round  Agreements  or  in OECD  fora. C/RM/S/36A 
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(2)  Measures  Directly Affecting Imports 
(i)  Tariffs,  import  levies  and  charges 
(a)  General  features 
120.  The  Community's  tariff regime,  including Ihe variable levy mechanism, 
has  remained  virtually  unchanged  since  1990.  Modifications  in  tariff 
rates  and  bindings  on  only  15  tariff  items  were  introduced  in  1991  and 
1992,  following  amendments  made  by  the  Customs  Cooperation  Council  to  the 
Harmonized  System  nomenclature.  Basic  features  of  the  common  customs 
tariff,  as  presented in the first report,  thus  remain: 
(i)  strong.  rel~ance  on  ad  valorem  duties,  with  relatively  few 
exceptl.ons; 
(ii)  low  tariff averages  (7.3 per cent  overall  and  6.4 per cent  for 
industrial products  on  a  simple  average basis); 
(iii)  a  very  high  proportion  of  bound  tariffs  on  industrial  items 
(close  to  100  per cent,  as  compared  with  some  65  per cent  in 
agriculture);  and 
(iv)  significant tariff escalation in  sect~rs such  as  fish,  tobacco, 
leather,  rubber,  textiles and metals. 
121.  Variable  levies  apply  to  about  one-third  of  tariff  lines  on  food 
products.  The  levy system is geared to offset price advantages  of external 
suppliers  and  to  grant  EC  producers  a  "Community  preference"  by  setting 
import  threshold  prices  above  the  domestic  price  level.  No  fundamental 
changes  in the mechanism  are  foreseen under  the  recently agreed farm  reform 
1An  overview  of  average  tariff  rates  and  tariff  ranges,  by  main  categories  of  the  GATT 
Tariff  Study,  is given  in  Table  AIV.l.  For  more  details  see  GATT  (199lb). 
2certain  agriculture-based  products,  such  as  wine  and  spirits,  and  coal  are  subject  to 
specific  duties.  Tobacco,  some  fruit  and  vegetables,  certain  carpets  and  glass  categories, 
and  watches  enter  under  alternate tariffs. 
3For  example,  tariffs  of  11.1  per  cent  on  fresh  fish  ( i ncl udi ng  frozen  and  preserved 
products)  compare  with  20.1  per  cent  on  prepared  or  preserved  fish;  tariffs  of  13  per  cent 
on  unmanufactured  tobacco  with  over  66  per  cent  on  manufactured  products;  and  tariffs  of 
1.2  per  cent  on  unwrought  metals  (copper,  nickel,  lead etc.)  with  6.2  per  cent  on  non-ferrous 
metal  products  (simple  averages). C/RM./S/36A 
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package,  although  the  levels  of  price  support  on  meat  and  grains  are  to 
decline  significantly  (Section V.2).4 
122.  The  Communities'  rules  and procedures  for  customs valuation have also 
remained  unchanged.  To  ensure  uniform  application  of  EC  customs  rules  at 
external  borders,  these  have  recently  been  consolidated  in  the  Community 
Customs  Code. 5  In  addition,  a  common  database  on  tariffs  and  non-tariff 
measures  (TARIC)  has  been set  up,  and  efforts  are  being  made  to  intensify 
administrative cooperation between  the  national  customs  administrations. 
123.  In  1991,  tariff  revenues  contributed  22  per cent  (ECU  12.8 billion) 
to  the  Community  budget.  Agricultural  levies,  including  those  on  sugar, 
accounted  for  a  further  4.8 per cent.  By  contrast,  more  than  half 
(ECU  30. 3  billion)  of  total  EC  revenue  originated  from  value -added  tax. 
These  shares  are  significantly lower  than  in previous years,  reflecting the 
increased  impor.tance  of  the  Communities'  GNP-based  "own  resources",  which 
contributed  some  20  per cent  to  the  1991  budget,  up  from  6~  per cent  two 
years before. 
(b)  Tariff suspensions 
124.  Article  28  of the  EEC  Treaty provides  the  basis  for  autonomous  tariff 
changes  or  suspensions.  Decisions  are  taken  by  the  Council,  by  qualified 
majority  on  the  basis  of  a  Commission  proposal. 6  A  Commission 
Communication  of  September  1989  specifies  that  the  aims  of  tariff 
suspensions  are  to  afford  EC  producers  better  access  to  raw  materials, 
semi-finished  goods  and  components  that  are  not  available  in  the 
Communi ties. 7  Suspensions  may  only  be  granted  in  exceptional  cases  for 
products  incorporating a  higher  degree  of processing or for  finished  goods; 
they  are  thus  essentially employed  to  increase  effective  tariff protection 
for users  of non-EC  inputs. 
125.  Tariff  suspensions  have  been  relatively  frequent  in  areas  such  as 
chemicals  and microelectronics,  accounting each  for  some  550  cases  per year 
4variable  levies  are  operated  an  almost  all  major  temperate-zone  agricultural  products 
grown  within  the  EC,  with  the  exceptions  of  oilseeds  and  potatoes,  and  the  related  processed 
products.  On  wine,  certain  fruit  and  vegetables,  and  fisheries  products,  "countervailing 
charges"  or  "counterva i 1  i ng  taxes"  are  imposed  if suppliers  fai 1  to  comply  with  established 
reference  prices. 
5council  Regulation  No.  2913/92. 
6un1ike  in  other  trade  policy  areas,  such  as  rules  of  origin  and  trade  remedy 
legislation,  there  are  no  implementing  regulations. 
7communication  No.  89/C  235/02. C/RM/S/36A 
Page  56 
and duties  forgone  in the  order of  ECU  600  mijlion,  followed by agriculture 
with  some  20  to  25  cases  and  ECU  20  million.  Overall,  the  revenue  losses 
are  approximately  5  per cent  of  total  duties  collected.  Suspensions  are 
granted  mostly  for  one  year,  or  in  some  cases  for  six  months,  with  the 
possibility of  extension.  Requests  may  be  lodged by,  or  on behalf of,  any 
EC-based processing and manufacturing  company. 
(ii)  Quantitative restrictions 
126.  Many  EC  import  restrictions  on  industrial  products  are  remnants  of 
the  member  States'  reg~mes  from  before  the  founding  of  the  Community. 
Reflecting their origins,  the  restrictions have  traditionally been  applied 
at national  rather  than at  EC  level.  This  implies,  in turn,  that  they are 
unsustainable  within  a  fully  integrated  market.  The  Internal  Market 
process  should  therefore  result  in  either  their  abolition  or  their 
harmonization. 
127.  In  August  1990,  the  member  States,  other  than  Spain  and  Portugal, 
restricted  imports  of  more  than  120  industrial  products  under  Council 
Regulation  No.  288/82  (at  four-digit  tariff line  level).9  As  noted  in the 
first  TPRM  report,  France  (71  cases)  and  Italy  (48)  accounted  for  the 
lion's  share  of  the  measures,  which  often  affected  supplies  from  Japan 
and/or other Asian suppliers. 
128.  Since  then,  the  picture  has  changed  significantly.  In  two  steps 
taken  in  October  1991  and  September  1992  (Council  Regulations  No.  2978/91 
and  2875/92)  the  number  of  restrictions  was  reduced  to  30  for  France  and 
and  19  for  Italy.10  The  remaining measures  focused  on fruit and vegetables 
(including  tomatoes,  grapes,  melons,  apricots,  pineapples  and bananas)  and 
consumer  electronics  (such as  TV  tubes,  TV  receivers  and  radio receivers of 
Japanese  and  other  Asian  origin).  Italian  restrictions  also  covered  a 
variety of  motor  vehicle  categories,  as  well  as  parts  and  components,  from 
8Annual  average  since  January  1988. 
9council  Regulation  No.  288/82  applies  to  imports  from  all  sources  not  considered  as 
State-trading countries  and  covers  all  products,  except  for  MFA  textiles,  ECSC  coal  and  steel 
products  and  agricultural  products  subject  to  a  common  market  organization.  See  Table  AIV.2 
for  an  overview  of  the  Communities'  main  trade  regulations. 
10situation  in  October  1992.  Some  of  the  restrictions  maintained  by  France  and 
enumerated  in  the  Annex  to  Regulation  No.  288/82  were  termed  "quantitative  restrictions 
without  restrictions  on  quantities". C/RM/S/36A 
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Japa~;  apf  France  maintained  restrictions  on  imports  of  canned  tuna  and 
sard~nes. 
129.  The  Communities'  import  regime  towards  the  former  "State-trading 
countries"  has  also  undergone  several  changes.  In  January 1990,  imports 
from  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Federal  Republic,  Poland  and  Hungary  were  freed 
from  all  specific  restrictions  imposed  under  Regulation No.  3420/83,  as 
well  as  from  non-specific  restrictions  under Regulation No.  288/82  (except 
for  trade  with  Spain  and  Portugal)  and,  from  October  1990,  made  eligible 
for  GSP  treatment.  Interim  association  agreements  with  these  countries 
("Europe Agreements")  entered into  force  in March  1992.  On  1  January 1992, 
the  EC  also lifted all specific restrictions and  suspended all non-specific 
restrictions on  imports  from  the  three  Baltic Republics  and  the  CIS  member 
States. 
130.  Overall,  these  changes  have  led  observers  to  conclude  that  "the 
picture  of  the  EC's  ~uantitative protection has  drastically shifted into  a 
liberal  direction". 1  At  the  time  of  writing,  decisions  on  the  future 
common  impolt  regimes  for  a  variety  of  sensitive  products  were  still 
outstanding.  3  Generally,  residual  national  restrictions  listed  in  the 
Annex  to  Regulations  No.  288/82  would  be  abolished  and  the  relevant 
products  fully  liberalized  as  part  of  the  completion  of  the  Internal 
Market.  The  Commission has  indicated that only for  a  "handful"  of products 
would  some  form  of  Community  measures  be  nreded;  details  of  the  measures 
were,  in late 1992,  still under  discussion.  4 
(iii)  Import  controls  and prohibitions 
131.  In May  1992,  the  EC  prohibited all trade with .the  Republics  of Serbia 
and  Montenegro  pursuant  to  United  Nations  resolutions.  A  similar  embargo 
imposed on  Iraq in August  1990  continues  to apply. 
132.  The  suspension  from  free  circulation  of  Krugerrands  and  other  gold 
coins  from  the Republic  of South Africa,  introduced in October  1986  in view 
11The  latter  products  have  since  been  made  subject  to  Community  quotas 
(Section  V.2(x)). 
12costello and  Pelkmans  (1991). 
13In  October  1992,  Spain  maintained  178  and  Portugal  58  restrictions  under  Regulation 
No.  288/82  on  agricultural  and  industrial  products  (all  areas  except  textiles  and  clothing 
and  ECSC  products,  at  four-digit  tariff  line  level).  Some  of  these  measures  were  maintained 
under  the  Act  of  Accession  of  1985,  which  afforded  both  countries  adjustment  periods  for 
their quantitative restrictions  of  between  6 and  10  years,  depending  on  the  product  area. 
14statement  in  early December  1992. CfRM/S/36A 
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of apartheid,  was  lifted in January 1992.  In March  1992,  France  terminated 
an embargo  on  South African coal,  introduced in 1985. 
133.  As  precautionary measures  following  the  outbreak of  cholera  in  1991, 
the  EC  made  shipments  of fishery  products,  fruit  and vegetables  from  Peru, 
Colombia  and  Ecuador  subject  to  specific  export  control  and  certification 
by these countries;15  additional  inspection requirements have been  impo~ed 
on  intra-EC  re-exports.  According  to  the  Commission,  no  other  such 
measures have been  introduced since the initial TPRM  report. 
134.  The  GATT  Secretariat  has  not  received  any  further  information  on 
changes  in  the  Communities •  system  of  import  controls  and  prohibitions, 
e.g.  for  environmental,  health  and  national  security  reasons  over  the past 
two  years. 
(iv)  Emergency  trade measures 
(a)  Safeguard actions under Article XIX  of the  GATT 
135.  Article XIX  actions  by  the  Community  are  relatively  rare,  in 
particular  in  the  industrial  sphere.  The  three  initiatives  taken  since 
1990  concern  processed  agricultural  products  and  Atlantic  salmon 
(Table  IV .1).  In  December  1992,  two  Article  XIX  actions  existed  at  EC 
level,  relating  to  dried  grapes  and  processed  cherries  .16  In  addition, 
coal  imports  into  Germany  were  restricted  under  a  measure  dating  back  to 
1958;  it  is  the  longest-standing  action  taken  by  any  GATT  contracting 
party under Article XIX. 
136.  An  action  on Atlantic  salmon,  from  November  1991  to  May  1992,  mainly 
affected  imports  from  an  EFTA  country,  Norway  (Note  IV.3).  According  to 
the  EC  Commission,  such Article XIX  measures  would still be  possible  under 
the  EEA  Agreement. 
137.  Article XIX  measures  are  only  one  facet of the  EC  system of emergency 
trade  protection.  As  noted  in  the  first  TPRM  report,  in  disclosure 
sessions  following  investigations  under  Council  Regulation No.  288/82,  the 
legal  equivalent  under  EC  law  to  Article XIX,  affected  exporters  are 
15see  GATT  documents  L/6845  and  L/6845/Add.  1,  17  May  and  20  November  1991.  Export 
controls  imposed  by  Colombia  and  Equador  on  fruit  and  vegetables  are  limited  to  supplies  from 
specified  regions  of  origin. 
161n  late  February  1993,  the  EC  invoked  Article  XIX  to  introduce  minimum  import  prices 
for  various  white  fish  categories  (Section  V.2(x)). informed  of  the  Commission's 
according  to  the  Commission, 
f .  d'  17  1n  1ngs. 
find  it  to 
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The  countries  concerned  may, 
their  advantage  to  offer  and 
negotiate  export  restraints.  Certain  such  measures  are  enumerated  in 
Table  IV.2.  The  Commission has  stressed in the  context of this  TPRM  report 
that  this  i~  not  the  Communities'  preferred  outcome  of  safeguard 
d .  lH  procee  1ngs. 
(b)  Selective  import  restrictions 
138.  In  August  1992,  the  Commission  authorized  Germany,  France  and  Italy 
to  impose  quotas  on  imports  of  certain  iron  and  steel  products  from  the 
Czech  and  Slovak  Federal  Republic  (CSFR),  under  the  safeguard  provisions 
of the  Agreement  with  the  CSFR. 19  As  noted  in  Section YI.3,  the  Community 
seems  to  consider  these  provisions  to  allow not  only  for  the  suspension of 
concessions  granted  under  the  Agreement  but  also  of  obligations  under  the 
GATT  (e.g.  Article XIX).  The  measures  lapsed  on  31  December  1992. 
(c)  Restraint arrangements,  export monitoring,  Community  surveillance and 
similar measures 
139.  Table  IV. 2  gives  an  overview  of  additional  trade  measures  known  to 
the  Secretariat  actions  other  than  tariffs,  levies,  quotas,  MFA 
restrictions,  anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy  measures  which  affect~g 
exports  to  or  imports  by  the  Communi ties'  over  the  past  two  years. 
According  to  the  Commission,  the  arrangements  concerning  sheepmeat,  motor 
vehicles  from  Japan  and  textiles  are  the  only  real  examples  of  voluntary 
restraints  or  of  actions  taken  after  discussion  and/or  agreement  between 
17According  to  the  Commission,  this  stage  of  the  investigation  is  aimed  at  guaranteeing 
the  basic  rights  of  parties  involved  in  administrative  procedures. 
18However,  see  GATT  (1991b),  page  100  ff. 
19  Article  30  of  the  Europe  Agreement  (Article  24  of  the  Interim  Agreement)  entitles 
the  affected  party  to  take  "appropriate  measures"  in  the  event  of  increased  quantities  that 
cause  or  threaten  to  cause  serious  injury  or  serious  sectoral  and  regional  problems  (see 
Section  II.S(iii)). 
Recommendation  No.  92/434/ECSC  specifies  annual  import  quotas  for  hot-rolled  coils 
(France,  Germany,  Italy),  cold-rolled  sheets  (France)  and  bars  and  rods  (Germany),  and 
Decision  No.  92/433/EEC  establishes  quotas  for  certain  steel  pipes  (Germany).  According  to 
the  latter  Decision,  Italy  had  also  applied  for  safeguard  measures  on  the  same  products. 
While  refusing  this  application  the  Commission  announced  that  it  would  "closely  monitor" 
import  trends  and,  if necessary,  re-examine  the  situation  on  the  Italian market. 
20Given  the  information  and  definition  problems  involved,  any  such  listing  can  only  be 
tentative.  The  individual  measures  may  differ  widely  with  regard  to  trade  coverage, 
restrictiveness  and  potential  implications  on  third  countries.  Retrospective  Community 
surveillance,  as  an  example,  may  be  considered  a  merely  statistical  exercise  without  an 
impact  on  trade  flows.  However,  as  a  possible  precursor  to  trade  restraints,  it  may  also 
serve  as  a  ~arning  signal  for  the  suppliers  concerned.  In  other  cases,  it  may  used  to 
monitor  compliance  with  price  or  quantitative  undertakings  given. C/RM/S/36A 
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the  Community  and  exporting  countries.  Since  1990,  a  number  of  such 
arrangements  on steel products have  expired. 
140.  In mid-1992,  the  EC  and  Japan  concluded  a  "consensus"  on  exports  of 
cars  and  light  commercial  vehicles  from  Japan  (Section  V.3(ii)).  The 
framework  of  "forecasts"  under  the  consensus  is  designed  to  replace 
existing  national  restrictions  in  several  member  States;  it  is  to  be 
phased out by  the  year  2000. 
141.  The  new  association  agreements  with  central  and  eastern  European 
countries  (Europe  Agreements)  contain provisions  which  may  serve as  a  basis 
for  concerted  trade  actions.  In  sensitive areas  such  as  steel,  the  three 
countries  might  prefer  restricting or  moderating  their  exports  with  a  vi~I 
to  pre-empting  possible  invocations  of  the  safeguard  clause  by  the  EC. 
(Similar  considerations  appear  to  have  prompted  several  Mediterranean 
countries,  years  ago,  to  restrain  their  exports  of  certain  textiles  and 
clothing  categories  to  the  EC  (Table  IV. 2))  However,  as  indicated  in 
Section  (b)  above,  the  CSFR  seems  to  have  declined  to  cooperate  in 
mid-1992. 
142.  Community  surveillance  of  imports  of  certain  machine  tools  and 
electrical  and  electronic  products  from  Japan,  introduced  in  1983  and 
extended  annually  since,  was  discontinued  at  end-1992.  The  measures  were 
originally taken  on  the  grounds  that the  imports  were  "depressing the price 
levels  and  financial  results  of  the  Community  industry  and  thereby 
threatening  to  cause  injury"  (Commission  Regulation  No.  653/83).  The 
Commission  considers  that  such  surveillance  actions  have  no  direct 
implications  for  the  Communities'  trade  relations,  since  they serve  only  to 
collect statistical  information  and  do  not  imply  any  further  obligation on 
the  economic  operator~ concerned. 
143.  Council  Regulation  No.  288/82,  as  amended  by  Regulation No.  1243/86, 
allowed  Belgium,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  to  make  all  imports 
from  Japan  and  Hong  Kong  subject  to  automatic  licensing  or 
import-declaration  formalities  (see  first  TPRM  report).  According  to  the 
Commission,  this authorization is no  longer  in force. 
21 In  mid-July  1992,  the  German  Minister  of  Economics  was  quoted  as  saying,  after  a 
meeting  with  major  steel  producers,  that  he  would  urge  the  east  European  suppliers  in 
bilateral  talks  "to  cease  underpricing".  In  the  event  of  failure,  he  would  take  initiative 
at  EC  level.  (Reportedly,  the  German  producers  had  called  for  an  invocation  of  the  safeguard 
clause  under  the  Europe  Agreement.)  According  to  ~~ll_~!reet_~~~~~~l_I~rO£~·  15  July  1992. 
See  also  Section  V.3(vi). 
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144.  On  20  February  1993,  the  Commission  made  apple  imports  subject  to 
a  priori surveillance  (Commission Regulation No.  384/93).  The  decision was 
taken  because,  given  the  Community's  current  high  production,  "excessive 
imports"  were  deemed  likely  to  cause  serious  market  disturbance  and 
endanger  the  objectives  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (see 
Section V.2(i)).  A  licensing  system  is  designed  to  allow close  monitoring 
of  imports;  licences  are  issued,  with  a  delay  of  five  working  days  after 
application,  subject to  the  lodging of a  security. 22 
145.  In  some  cases,  industry-to-industry  understandings  may  have 
contributed  to  mitigating  import  pressure  and  terminating  anti-dumping 
proceedings.  For  example,  in July 1992,  the  European Confederation of Iron 
and  Steel  Industries  (Eurofer)  withdrew  an  anti-dumping  complaint 
concerning  imports  of  wire-rod  from  five  countries  (Argentina,  Egypt, 
Yugoslavia,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  and  Turkey).  A  Eurofer  spokesman 
indicated  that  the  suppliers  had  agreed  in  contacts  with  Eurofer  to 
exercise  "stricter  market  and  price  disciplines"  (see  also 
Section V.3(vi)). 23 
(v)  Anti-dumping measures 
(a)  Overview of actions 
146.  The  Community  continues  to  make  relatively  frequent  use  of 
anti-dumping  procedures.  Since  the  mid-1980s,  the  number  of  new 
investigations  has  fluctuated  between  20  and  over  40  per  year,  and  the 
measures  in  force  between  207  (1986)  and  139  (1990).  At  mid-1992,  there 
were  144  anti-dumping  measures  in  force  (provisional  and  definitive  duties 
and price undertakings;  Table  IV.3). 
14  7.  Chart  IV. 1  shows  recent  developments  in  the  country  and  product 
profile  of  outstanding  actions.  Overall,  there  appears  to  be  a  slight 
shift in country focus  from  eastern and central  European producers  to Asian 
22until  1991,  the  Community's  apple  imports  from  major  suppliers  were  covered  by 
voluntary  restraint  arrangments.  In  order  to  monitor  compliance  with  agreed  quantities,  the 
EC  already  operated  a  licensing  system  in  1988  (see  OECD,  1991).  In  this  context,  ;t 
suspended  the  issuances  of  licences  for  a  number  of  suppliers  considered  to  have  exceeded  the 
agreed  quantities.  A GATT  Panel,  whose  report  was  adopted  by  the  GATT  Council  in  June  1989, 
found  these  suspensions  inconsistent  with  Articles  X,  XI:1  and  XIII  of  the  General  Agreement 
(BISD,  36th  Supplement,  p.  35). 
23According  to  Nachrichten  fOr  AuBenhandel,  3  September  1992. 
The  Commission  Decision  terminating  the  anti-dumping  proceeding  (No.  92/455/ECSC)  holds 
that  "the  complainant  formally  withdrew  the  complaint  due  to  a  change  of  the 
circumstances  that  had  led  to  the  lodging  of  the  complaint";  there  was  thus  no  reason  to 
continue  the  investigation. C/RM/S/36A 
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suppliers;  new  action has been taken in such areas  as  text~ke products  and 
consumer  electronics  (including accessories  such as  tapes). 
148.  During  the  past  years,  it has  proved  increasingly  difficult  for  the 
Commission's  services  (DG  I)  to  terminate  investigations  within  one  year 
from  initiation,  as  required both by  the  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Code  and by  the 
Communities'  own  legislation.  Of  the  37  investigations  launched  between 
mid-1989  and  mid-1989,  16  required  21  months  or  more  (Table AIV.3). 
However,  efforts have been made  to  speed up  proceedings.  At year-end 1991, 
the  n~ber of  outstanding  investigations  was  lower  than  at  any  time  since 
1987.  Of  the  33  investigations  terminated in 1991,  19  resulted in the  EC 
imposing anti-dumping duties;  a  further  three  led to price undertakings. 
(b)  Legal  and  institutional aspects 
149.  There  have  been  no  changes  to  the  Communi ties'  anti-dumping  and 
anti-subsidy  legislation  (Council  Regulation  No.  2423/88)  since  1990 
(Note  IV .1).  The  Commission  has,  however,  recently  proposed  some 
procedural  reforms  (see  Section  (f)  below). 
150.  Within  the  EC  institutional  framework,  the  Commission  is empowered  to 
initiate  and  carry  out  investigations,  to  decide  on  the  application  of 
provisional  duties  and,  in  certain  circumstances,  to  accept  price 
undertakings.  However,  it  is  for  the  Council  to  pass  the  Regulations, 
prepared by  the  Commission,  laying down  the  final  determination of dumping, 
injury  and  Community  interest  and  imposing  definitive  anti-dumping  duties. 
Representatives  of  member  States,  gathering  in  an  Advisory  Committee,  are 
consulted at  important  stages  of  the  proceedings  (Note  IV.l).  By  bringing 
the views  of member  States  to  the  Commission,  the  Committee  also  serves  to 
anticipate  and  dgfuse  problems  that  might  otherwise  be  expressed  later at 
Council  level.2  The  EC  system  does  not  provide  for  a  separate, 
independent  institution,  comparable  to  the  U.S.  International  Trade 
Commission  or  the  Canadian  International  Trade  Tribunal,  to  carry  out  the 
injury determination. 
24It  needs  to  be  noted,  as  a  general  feature,  that  the  number  of  cases neither  reflects 
the  restrictiveness  of  the  measures  imposed  nor  their  impact  on  profits  and  sales  of  the 
industries  concerned  ( EC  producers,  direct  1  y  affected  suppliers,  and  other  foreign 
producers).  The  mere  existence  of  anti-dumping  1  egi slat  ion  and  its  use  in  prominent  cases 
may  affect  trade  flows  and  investment  decisions  across  a  much  wider  range  of  industries. 
25Ec  Commission  {1992b). 
26steenbergen  ( 1989).  This  contrasts  to  an  observation  that  the  Counci 1  as  a  rule 
limits  itself to  rubber-stamping  Commission  proposals  for  definitive action  (Bellis,  1989). Chart IV.1 
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Product and country-profile of anti-dumping measures 
in  force, February 1990aand March 1992 
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************************************************************************** 
Note IV .1:  Basic elements of EC  anti  -dWIIping legislation  (Coamcil 
Regulation No.  2423/88) 
Anti-dumping  actions  in  the  EC  are  dependent  on:  (i)  the  occurrence 
of dumped  imports;  (ii)  the  existence of injury  (or  threat  thereof)  to  EC 
industry;  (iii)  a  causal  link  between  dumping  and  injury;  and  (iv)  the 
existence of Community  interest calling for intervention. 
An  anti-dumping  complaint  may  be  lodged  by  any  natural  or  legal 
person,  or  by  any  association  representing  a  Community  industry.  It must 
contain  sufficient  evidence  that  the  above  criteria  (i)  to  (iii)  are  met. 
Member  States  in  possession  of  such  evidence  are  required  to  inform  the 
Commission.  On  this  basis,  consultations  are  held  within  an  Advisory 
Committee,  comprising  representatives  of  member  States  under  the 
chairmanship  of  the  Commission.  If the  evidence  is  considered  to Justify 
initiating  a  proceeding,  the  Commission  is  required  to  announce  the 
initiation in  the Official  Journal,  to  inform  the  parties  involved and  the 
exporting country,  and  to  begin  a  Community  wide  investigation.  It should 
normally  be  concluded within  one  year,  either by  termination  or definitive 
action. 
Provisional  duties may  be  imposed by  the Commission  immediately after 
a  preliminary  finding of dumping  and  injury,  unless  a  price  undertaking is 
agreed.  Their  validity  is  limited  to  four  months;  an  extension  of  two 
months  is  possible.  Of  the  Communities'  378  anti-dumping  initiations 
during  the 1980s,  279  resulted in measures  being  taken.  Of  these,  183  were 
price  undertakings;  in  96  cases,  definitive  duties  were  imposed. 
Provisional  duties were  levied in 130  cases. 
The  dumping  margin is defined as  the margin  by which  the normal  value 
of a  product  (e.g.  the domestic market price)  exceeds  the export price.  If 
domestic  market  prices  are  not  available or reliable,  the  normal  value  is 
either  established  as  the  comparable  price  of  like  products  exported  to 
third countries or constructed  by  adding actual  production cost,  including 
overhead  cost,  and  a  "reasonable"  profit margin.  (The  Commission  tends  to 
prefer  the  latter  approach.)  The  amounts  taken  for  overhead  cost  and 
profits are  based on  the  expenses  incurred and  the  profits realized by  the 
producer  or  exporter  on  the  profitable  sales  of  like  products  on  his 
domestic  market  or,  if unavailable,  unreliable or not  suitable for  use,  by 
other producers  or  exporters  on  profitable  sales  of like  products  in  the 
country  of  origin  or  export.  If  neither  approach  can  be  applied,  the 
relevant  expenses  and  profits  are  established  by  reference  to  the  sales 
made  by  the  exporter,  or  by  other  domestic  producers  in  the  same  business 
sector or on  any other reasonable basis. 
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Regulation  No.  2423/88  also  provides  for  the  construction  of  an 
export  price  if,  for  example,  the  price  actually  paid  or  payable  for  the 
product  is  deemed  unreliable.  In  this  case,  the  reference  basis  is  the 
price at which  the  imported product is first resold  to an  independent  buyer 
in  the  EC  or,  if not  applicable,  any  other reasonable  basis.  Allowance is 
to  be  made  for  all costs  incurred  between  importation  and  resale  and  for  a 
reasonable profit margin. 
Dumping  margins  are  calculated  for  each  transaction.  In  averaging 
the  individual  findings,  the  Commission  does  not  count  in  any  transactions 
with an  export  price  above  the normal  value;  these are  treated as if the 
margin was  zero. 
While  Regulation  No.  2423/88  enumerates  criteria  for  examining  the 
existence of injury  (see  main  text),  the  concept  of Community  interest is 
not further specified. 
*************************************************************************** 
151.  Affected  parties  may  refer  decisions  for  legal  scrutiny  to  the 
European  Court  of Justice or,  for  example  in cases  concerning collection of 
duties,  to  national  courts.  While  the  first  anti-dumping  case  was  brought 
before  the  Court  onl2  in  1979,  recent  publications  enumerate  more  than  80 
cases  raised  since.  7  The  Court's  review  is  restricted  to  "manif~~t 
errors"  in the  assessment  of facts  and  compliance  with procedural  rules. 
152.  Under  EC  anti-dumping  law,  duties  must  be  li~ited  to  what  is 
sufficient  to  remove  the  injury suffered by  EC  industry.  9  The  Commission 
estimates  that  in around half of all cases  in which  definitive  duties were 
imposed  between  1  January  1991  and  30  June  1992,  these  were  less  than  the 
full  dumping  margin.  In  addition,  a  public  interest  clause  in Regulation 
No.· 2423/88  requires  the·EC authorities  to  take  action only if it is in .the 
Community  interest.  However,  this interest provision has  rarely led the  EC 
to  refrain  from  measures  once  all  other  conditions  were  met;  ..  one 
investigation  has  been  terminated  since  1990  on  these  grounds  (Atlantic 
27van  Bael  and  Bellis  (1990). 
28Bellis  (1989)  and  Steenbergen  (1989);  see,  however,  Section  (f)  below. 
29This  rule  corresponds  to  a  provision  in  the  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Code,  stipulating  that 
"it  is  desirable"  that  the  duty  be  less  than  the  dumping  margin  if sufficient  to  remove  the 
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Salmon  from  Norway;  see  also  Note  IV.3).  Observers  have  noted that,  as  a 
general  rule,  the  finding  of  dumping,  injury  and  of  a  causal  link prompts 
the  Commission  and  the  Council  to  conc\ude  that  Community  interest  calls 
for  action  (see also Section  (f)  below).  0 
153.  Assessment  of  material  injury  hinges  mainly  on  such  variables  as 
production,  capacity  utilization,  stocks,  sales,  market  shares,  prices, 
costs  and profitability  (as  e~erated in Regulation  No.  2423/88,  based on 
the  GATT  Anti-Dumping  Code).  For  example,  in  a  recent  case  concerning 
audio  cassettes  from  Japan  and  Korea,  the  Council  confirmed  the 
Commission's  provisional  findings  that  the  Community  industry had  suffered 
material  injury  as  evidenced,  in  particular,  by  a  loss  of  market  share, 
price erosion,  insufficient profitability and  employment  losses.  According 
to  the  Council,  the  EC  industry  "was  unable  to  defen~ its  price,  brand 
image  and volume  of sales"  (see  also Section  (f)  below).  2 
154.  Some  consultations  and  disputes  have  emerged  from  the  application of 
EC  anti-dumping  legislation in  the  period under  review  (Section VI.2(ii)). 
In  October  1992,  at  the  request  of  Japan,  a  panel  was  established  under 
Article 15:5  of  the  Code  in  order  to  investigate  various  aspects  of  an 
action  agains~ audio  cassette  tapes  (initiation in 1988,  definitive  duties 
in May  1991).  3 
30sourgeois  (1991).  Van  Bael  and  Bellis  (1990)  note  that  "Community  institutions  have 
more  or  less  equated  the  1nterests  of  the  Community  with  the  interests  of  Co.munity 
producers".  The  Commission  does  not  share  these views. 
31According  to  a  ruling  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice,  this  listing  ts  •rely 
indicathe;  the  Community  authorities  are  free  to  choose  the  most  relevant  factors  as  a 
sufficient  basis  for  judgment  (cases  273/85  and  107/86).  The  Court  also  held  that  it was 
possible  to  hold  a  supplier  responsible  for  injury  caused  by  dumping  even  if  the  resulting 
losses  were  merely  part  of  more  extensive  injury attributable  to other  factors  (see  van  Bael 
and  Bellis,  1990). 
32council  Regulation  No.  1251/91. 
The  Commission  stressed  in  its Annual  Report  on  Anti-Dumping  Activities  (EC  Ca..isston, 
1992b),  that  "the  fall  in  sales  suffered  by  the  Community  industry  was  combined  wtth  the 
phenomenon  that,  through  the effects  of  dumping,  the  consumer  developed  a  lower  perception of 
the  quality  of  Community  products;  indeed,  in  order  to  try  to  counter  the  growing  pressure 
of  dumped  imports,  the  Community  industry  was  obliged  to  lower  its  prices  and  consequently 
and  above  all,  the  costs  of  advertising  and  packaging  its  products."  The  dumping  urgtns 
established  varied  between  zero  and  64. Z per  cent  and  the  dut 1  es  imposed  between  zero  and 
23.4  per  cent.  · 
33The  complaint  by  Japan  includes  the  following  points:  (i)  asymmetrical  ca.parison of 
export  price  and  normal  value;  (ii)  distortions  in  averaging  the  dumping  margins  (counting 
cases  of  transactions  involving  "negative  dumping"  as  if  the  margin  was  zero); 
(iii)  shortcomings  in  determining  injury  and  establishing  a  causal  link with  allegedly duaped 
imports.  (GATT  documents  ADP/79  of  4 June  1992,  ADP/85  and  ADP/85  Add.  1  of  13  and 
21  October  1992;  see  also  Section  Vl.2(ii)). 
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155.  In May  1990,  the  GATT  Council  adopted  a  Panel  report  finding measures 
taken  under  the  Community's  "screwdriver-plant  legislation"  inconsistent 
with  the  General  Agreement. 34  The  EC,  which  disagreed  with  the  Panel's 
interpretation,  considered it essential  that  a  sofution  to  this  problem be 
found  within  the  framework  of  the  Uruguay  Round.  5  No  new  investigations 
under  these  provisions  have  been  launched  since  then.  The  EC  Commission 
confirms  that  the  undertakings  concluded continue  to  apply. 
156.  The  Community's  current  anti-dumping  Regulation  (No.  2423/88)  allows 
for  the  imposition  of  an  additional  anti-dumping  duty  if it is  found  that 
the  original  duty  was  borne,  in  full  or  in  part  1  by  the  exporter.  The 
first four  complaints  under  this  "anti-absorption clause"  were  lodged by  EC 
producers  in  1991.36  In  June  1992 1  the  EC  raised  an  additional 
anti-dumping duty under Article 13:11  on  silicon-metal  from  China,  doubling 
the  level  of  duty  from  ECU  198  to  ECU  396  per  tonne  (Council  Regulation 
No.  1607/92).  Observers  have  considered  this  decision  a  precedent. 37  In 
two  other  cases,  relating  to  compact  disc  players,  a  full  review  was 
initiated. 
157.  Over  the  past  two  years,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  has  given 
several  rulings  on  EC  anti-dumping  procedures  regarded  to  be  of  general 
importance: 
(i)  In  June  1991,  the  Court  annulled  a  Regulation  imposing 
anti-dumping  duties  on  urea  from  Saudi  Arabia,  because  of  a 
lack  of  evidence  that  the  company  affected  had  received  full 
information  from  the  Commission  to  enable  it  effectively  to 
defend  its  interests.  The  ruling  held  1  inter alia  I  that  the 
procedural  rules  did  not  provide  all  the  guarantees  for  the 
protection of  ~~e  individual  which  existed  in certain national 
legal  systems.  However,  since  the  Court  did  not  call  into 
question  the  Commission's  general  approach  ~o  processing  and 
handling  confidential  data,  no  procedural  changes  are 
envisaged. 
34Article  13:10  of  Council  Regulation  No.  2423/88  allows  for  the  extension  of 
anti-dumping  duties  to  products  assembled  in  the  EC  on  the  basis  of  imported  components. 
35GATT  document  L/6676,  16  May  1990. 
36The  cases  concerned  silicon-metal  and  polyolefin  woven  bags  from  the  People's 
Republic  of  China,  and  compact  disc  players  from  Japan  and  the  Republic  of  Korea. 
37see  Europe,  9  July  1992. 
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(ii)  In  November  1991,  the  Court  rejected  a  complaint  by  the 
European  - .Consumers'  Association  (Bureau  Europeen  de 
Consomrnateurs;  BEUC)  which  had  claimed  the  right  to  be  heard 
and  granted  access  to  non-confidential  information  in 
anti-dumping  proceedings.  The  ruling  upheld  the  Commission's 
view,  considering  consumers,  and  organizations  like  BEUC,  not 
to  be  parties  directly  concerned  because  anti-dumping 
activ~gies  were  not  targeted  on  practices  attributable  to 
them. 
(iii)  In  a  more  recent  ruling  (March  1992),  referring  to  a  refund 
proceeding,  the  Court  of  Justice  upheld  the  Commission's 
practice  of  treating  anti-dumping  duties  as  a  cost  element  in 
constructing export prices.40  The  Court  rejected all pleas put 
forward,  including  the  claim  that  the  basic  EC  Regulation  was 
unlawful  because  it infringed Anti-Dumping  Code  provisions.
41 
(c)  Non-market  economies 
158.  On  average,  during  the  1980s,  almost  one-half  of  all  anti-dumping 
initiations  concerned  "non-market  economy  countries".  In  these  cases,  the 
Commission  employed  a  different  approach  to  establishing  normal  values  and 
dumping  margins,  from  that  used  for  other  countries.  Normal  values  were 
estimated  on  the  basis  of  the  actual  price,  or  the  constructed  value  of 
like products  in  a  third country market  economy  (the  reference  country)  or, 
if neither alternative  was  co~sidered adequate,  on  the  price  actually paid 
or  payable  in  the  Community.4  If the  existence  of  dumping  was  confirmed 
39case  170/89,  cited  in  EC  Commission  (1992b). 
This  does  not  affect  the  right  of  consumer  organizations  to  make  own  submissions  in  the 
context  of  an  anti-dumping  investigation. 
40The  Commission  had  deducted  the  anti-dumping  duties  paid  from  the  export  price,  thus 
establishing  a  dumping  margin  higher  than  deemed  justified  by  the  exporters  involved  and 
lowering  the  amount  of  duties  to  be  reimbursed. 
41While  the  Anti-Dumping  Code  stipulates  that,  in  constructing  export  prices, 
"allowance  for  cost,  including  duties  and  taxes,  incurred  between  importation  and  resale  ... 
should  also  be  made",  the  EC  Regulation  specif1es  certain  duties  and  other  costs,  including 
anti-dumping  duties,  for  which  allowance  shall  be  made.  The  Court  considered  the  latter 
provisions  to  be  consistent  with  the  Code  (case  188/82). 
42The  measures  are  taken  pursuant  to  Article  2:5  of  Regulation  No.  2423/88  which  refers 
to  imports  "from  non-market  economy  countries  and,  in  particular,  those  to  which  Regulations 
No.  1765/82  and  1766/82  apply". 
Observers  have  noted  that  in  selecting  a  reference  market  economy,  the  Commission  has 
tried  to  ensure  that  the  like  product  was  produced  there  with  the  same  manufacturing  process 
and  technical  standards  and  on  the  same  scale  as  in  the  non-market  economy  concerned; 
however,  the  brief  reasoning  given  in  individual  cases  did  not  always  make  it  possible  to 
grasp  the  relevant  factors.  The  levels  of  economic  development,  in  terms  of  per  capita 
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by  the  investigation,  the  shipments  concerned  were  often  made  subj  e~t  to 
minimum  import prices  and,  accordingly,  variable  anti-dumping duties.4 
159.  In  September  1992,  twelve  anti-dumping  actions  were  in  force 
concerning  the  three  "Europe  Agreement"  countries;  exports  from  the  Czech 
and  Slovak  Federal  Republic  and  Poland  were  affected  in  five  cases  each, 
and  Hungarian  supplies  in  two  cases.  44  The  product  focus  was  on  basic 
chemicals.  In November  1992,  the  EC  imposed  provis~onal duties  on  certain 
seamless  steel  tubes  from  the  three  countries.4  The  Commission  has 
indicated that  with  the  entry  into  force,  on  1  March  1992,  of  the  Interim 
Agreements,  the  then  CSFR,  Poland  and  Hungary  are  considered  as  market 
economies;  future  anti-dumping  investi~~tions  would  thus  not  normally  be 
based on  the  reference  country approach. 
(d)  The  European  Economic  Area 
160.  The  Agreement  on  the  European  Economic  Area  (Section  II.S(iii)) 
imposes  a  general  ban  on  the  use  of  anti-dumping  and  countervailing 
measures  in intra-area trade.  This  is related to  the  agreed application of 
EC  competition  rules  throughout  the  EEA  terri  tory  (Section  IV. 4 ( i))  and, 
thus,  limited  to  areas  covered  by  the  Agreement  in  which  the  "acquis 
communautaire"  is  fully  implemented.  According  to  the  EC  Commission, 
existing  cases  will  be  examined  individually  against  this  background  once 
the  Agreement  has  entered  into  force.  In  September  1992,  exports  from 
Austria  (2  cases),  Finland  (1),  Iceland  (1),  Norway  (2)  and  Sweden  (2)  were 
b .  t  .  d  .  47  N  .  .  .  .  h  su Jec  to  antl- ump1ng  measures.  o  new  1nvest1gat1on concern1ng  t  ese 
countries  was  underway;  an  investigation  into  Norwegian  salmon  was 
(Footnote  Continued) 
income,  of  most  of  the  reference  countries  had  tended  to  be  substantially  higher  than  those 
of  the  non-market  economies  concerned  (according  to  van  Bael  and  Bellis,  1990). 
43GATT  (1991b). 
44The  most  recent  action  concerned  ferrosilicon  from  Poland.  The  Commission  Regulation 
which  provided  for  the  imposition  of  provisional  anti-dumping  duties  (No.  1808/92  of  30  June 
1992)  held  that  during  the  reference  period  (January  1990  to  March  1991)  Poland  could  not  be 
considered  a  market  economy  country.  The  normal  value  was  based  on  a  constructed  value 
established  by  adding  production  costs  in  Norway  and  a  "reasonable  profit  margin" 
(6  per  cent). 
45The  notice  of  initiation  (December  1991)  held  that  the  allegation of  dumping  is  based 
on  a  comparison  between  export  prices  to  the  EC  and  costs  in  a  reference  country,  for  which 
the  complainant  suggested  Yugoslavia. 
46The  same  applies  to  the  Republics  of  Croatia,  Slovenia,  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  the 
Yugoslav  Republics  of  Macedonia,  Montenegro  and  Serbia.  By  contrast,  the  successor  States  of 
the  former  Soviet  Union  and  the  three  Baltic  Republics  are treated  as  non-market  economies. 
47The  products  concerned  were  urea  and  container  corner  fittings  (Austria),  Diesel 
engines  (Finland,  Sweden),  ferrosilicon  (Iceland,  Norway,  Sweden),  pentaerythritol  (Sweden), 
and  silicon carbide  (Norway). C/RM/S/36A 
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terminated  in March  1991,  for  perceived reasons  of  Community  interest  (see 
above  and Note  IV.3). 
161.  The  EEA  participants  reserve  the  right,  unless  other  solutions  are 
agreed  upon,  to  intervene  in  intra-area  trade  with  a  view  to  avg~ding 
circumvention of anti-dumping measures  aimed against third countries. 
(e)  Review cases 
162.  A  sunset provision in Council Regulation No.  2423/88  provides  for  the 
expiry  of  anti-dumping  or  countervailing  measures  five  ;§ears  after  their 
entry  into  force,  last  modification  or  confirmation.4  The  impending 
expiry is  announced  in  the  Official  Journal  and  made  directly  known  to  the 
Community  industry  concerned.  "Interested  parties"  are  thus  given  an 
opportunity  to  show  that  they  would  or  could  incur  injury again.  In these 
cases,  a  review  is  conducted  (Article  15:3).  However,  since  1985,  more 
than  three-quarters  of  all  measures  have  expired  as  scheduled.  Of  the 
sixteen Article  15  reviews  terminated  between  January  1990  and  June  1992, 
twelve  resulted in new  measures  being  taken by  the  Community  (Table  IV.4). 
163.  Reviews  can  also  be  held  independently  of  such  sunset  situations.
50 
Article 14:1  of  Regulation No.2423j88  requires  reviews  to  be  held,  subject 
to  some  additional  qualifications,  if an  affected party  submits  sufficient 
evidence  of  changed  circumstances.  (While,  in principle,  the  Commission  or 
a  member  State  may  also  take  the  initiative,  such  cases  are  relatively 
rare).  As  shown  in Table  IV.4,  almost  two-thirds  of the Article  14  reviews 
between  January  1990  and  June  1992  - 30  out  of  a  total  of  46  cases  - were 
initiated by  affected exporters.  In a  large majority of cases,  the  reviews 
were  either  terminated  by  the  Community's  revoking  or  reducing  the 
anti-dumping measures  concerned. 
(f)  Anti-dumping,  competition policy and  Community  interest 
164.  Commission  Reports  on  Competition  Policy  recognise  that  anti-dumping 
measures  may  have  a  negative  impact  on competition.  It is held that,  while 
48The  relevant  prov1s1ons  under  Protocol  13  of  the  EEA  Agreement  also  refer  to 
circumvention  of  countervailing  duties  and  measures  against  illicit  commercial  practices 
attributable to  third countries. 
49The  sunset  provision  was  introduced  into  EC  law  in  1984. 
50This  has  been  more  frequently  the  case  in  practice. 
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the  European  industry  has  a  legitimate  right  to  protection  against  unfair 
and illicit practices,  the  intensity and  duration of such gfotection should 
not put  into  question  the  competition rules  of the  Treaty. 
165.  Competition  policy  aspects  are  also  addressed  in  individual  Council 
Regulations  enacting  anti-dumping  measures.  The  Council  and  Commission 
tend  to  presuppose,  as  a  rule,  that  protecting  a  viable  domestic  industry 
from  unfair  competition  is  consonant  with  Community  and  user  interests; 
ensuing  short-term  price  increases  are  considered  likely  to  be  offset  in 
the  longer  run  by  the  advantages,  in  terms  of price,  ~uality and  product 
range,  resulting  from  a  more  competitive  environment. 5  For  example,  in 
the  case  of  audio  cassette  tapes  from  Japan  and  the  Republic  of Korea,  the 
Regulation  imposing  the  provisional  duties  (No.  3262/90)  holds,  among 
other  considerations,  that  "the  elimination  of  unfair  competition  should 
eventually  lead  to  the  strengthening  of  competitive  conditions  and  a 
decrease  in  prices".  No  further  reasoning  is,  however,  given  to  endorse 
this  view.  A  more  recent  Commission  publication  indicates  that  the  main 
aim  of  the  Communities'  action  was  "to  create  the  conditions  to  allow  the 
Community  industry  to  increase  its sale quantities,  through  which  it could 
obtain  economies  of  scale  ~~d reductions  in  cost,  which  in  turn  could  be 
passed on  to  the  consumer". 
166.  Industrial policy considerations  may  come  into play in sectors  deemed 
strategically  important.  Pointing  out  the  importance  of  "a  viable 
Community  DRAM  industry"  to  a  strong  electronics  industry  overall,  the 
Commission  concluded  price  undertakings  with  all  known  Japanese  exporters 
(January 1990).54  The  decision  reflected  the  view  that  "DRAMs  served  as  a 
51 EC  Commission  (1991c). 
52 See,  for  example,  Commission  Regulation  No.  313/92  imposing  a  provisional 
anti-dumping  duty  on  car  radios  (radio-broadcast  receivers  of  a  kind  used  in  motor-vehicles, 
originating  in  South  Korea). 
The  above  Regulation  is  also  interesting  in  view  of  the  definition  used  for  "like 
products".  While  acknowledging  that  car  radios  are  marketed  with  a  wide  range  of  technical 
features,  the  EC  deemed  it  impossible  to  make  a  clear  distinction  between  the  various  models. 
It  expressly  rejected  the  argument  that  the  imports  concerned  were  very  cheap  products, 
inferior  in  quality  to  EC  production,  and  thus  competed  on  different  markets.  Since  the 
models  possessed  basic  common  physical  and  technical  characteristics,  it  was  held  that  they 
were  to  be  treated  as  like  products.  Any  quality  differences  should,  if  necessary,  be  taken 
into  account  when  prices  were  compared.  In  addition,  it  was  noted  that  certain  components 
had  been  designed  and  produced  on  the  basis  of  technologies  similar  to  those  used  by  EC 
producers. 
53Ec  Commission  (1992b). 
54 The  undertakings  are  in  the  form  of  a  minimum  price  system  which  is  adjusted 
quarterly  on  the  basis  of  cost  of  production  data  provided  by  the  Japanese  producers. 
According  to  the  Commission,  the  reference  price  has  in  general  been  somewhat  lower  than 
market  prices  in  the  United  States  and  Japan. C/RM/S/36A 
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technology  driver  for  other  more  complex  semiconductors  which  are  key 
components  ~or  the  data  processing,  telecommunications  and  automotive 
industries".  5  According  to  the  Commission,  the  interests  of  the 
complaining  EC  producers,  who  should be  allowed  to  develop  in a  fair market 
environment,  had  been  weighed  against  those  of  DRAM  users,  who  should  not 
be  unnecessarily hindered.  The  outcome  suggests  that  the  EC  considered it 
necessary to  ensure  a  certain degree  of self-sufficiency in the  sector with 
a  view  to  shielding  the  domestic  industry  from  abusive  supply  and/or 
pricing  practices  abroad.  The  Commission  noted  that  Japanese  producers, 
which  were  generally vertically  integrated,  also  manufactured  end  products 
which  competed  with  EC  production;  the  objective  of  reducing  dependence 
was  therefore  considered  an  essential  aspect. 56  In  March  1993,  fur59er 
price undertakings  were  concluded with  three  Korean producers  of DRAMs. 
167.  In  the  context  of  lodging  an  anti-dumping  complaint,  detailed 
information  must  be  provided  by  the  interested  companies  (e.g.  on  prices, 
sales,  costs  of narrowly defined products)  which would  not normally be  made 
known  among  competing  firms.  It has  been  argued  this  might  pave  the  way 
for cartel-type  forms  of cooperation. 58  Such  cooperation would be  treated, 
however,  like  any  other  cartel.  The  Commission  states  that  sufficient 
evidence  of  such  practices  could  result  in  the  opening  of  anti-trust 
proceedings  under  Article  85:1  of  the  EEC  Treaty  (Section  IV.  4~ i))  and, 
moreover,  in  a  review  of  the  previous  anti-dumping  decision. 5  While 
administrative  procedures  in  the  anti-dumping  and  anti-cartel  areas  are 
independent,  the  Commission  notes  that  the  services  involved  are  in  close 
contact  with  a  view  to  ensuring  consistency  of  their  actions; 
55Ec  Commission  (1991d). 
56Ec  Commission  (199ld). 
current 
The  complaint  had  been  lodged  by  Siemens,  SGS-Thomson  and  the  Scottish  subsidhry  of 
Motorola.  Participants  to  the  price  undertaking  are  Fujitsu,  Hitachi,  NEC,  Matsushita, 
Minebea,  Sanyo,  Sharp,  OKI,  Toshiba,  and  Texas  Instruments  Japan.  In  July  1992,  IBM,  Toshiba 
and  Siemens  agreed  on  an  alliance  to  develop  a  new  generation  of  advanced  memory  chips  (les 
Echos,  15  July  1992.  and  Section  V.3(iii)(b)). 
57commission  Decision  No.  93/157. 
Press  reports  suggest  that  the  EC  action  on  DRAMs  from  Japan  has  not  1  east  benefited 
Korean  suppliers  which  managed  to  increase  their  share  on  the  EC  market  for  4-megabit  DRAMs 
from  slightly  below  5  per  cent  in  1990  to  over  13  per  cent  in  mid-1992.  In  September  1992, 
deliveries  from  three  Korean  suppliers  (Samsung,  Hyundai  and  Goldstar)  were  made  subject  to  a 
provisional  anti-dumping  duty  of  10.1  per  cent  which  were  later  replaced  by  the  price 
undertakings.  (The  weighted  average  dumping  margins  established for  the  three  producers  over 
the  period  1  January  to  31  December  1990  varied  between  18.1  and  122.4  per  cent;  see 
Commission  Regulation  No.  2686/92.)  The  complaint  had  been  lodged  in  1990  by  the  European 
Electronic  Component  Manufacturers  Association  (EECA)  on  behalf  of  Motorola  (UK)  and  Siemens. 
58see  for  example  Schmidt  and  Richard  (1992). 
59As  noted  above,  such  reviews  may  be  held  at  the  request  of  interested  parties,  of  a 
member  State  or  on  the  initiative of  the  Commission. C/RM/S/36A 
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efforts aim at making  these  contacts more  systematic,  while  maintaining- the 
confidentiality requirements  of both procedures. 
168.  An  empirical  study  found  that,  during  the  1980s,  anti-dumping 
measures  were  particularly  frequent  in  product  areas  prone  to 
cartelization.60  This  observation might  indicate business strategies aimed 
at  defending cartel  rents  by  recourse  to  anti-dumping protection  (provided 
that  the  same  compagies  were  involved  in  related  anti-dumping  and 
anti-cartel  actions).  The  coincidence  of  such  cases  in  mature 
industries,  like  basic  chemicals  or  steel,  could,  however,  also  reflect  a 
tendency of  these  industries  to  rely heavily  on  economies  of scale,  with a 
small  number  of large entities in the  sector and relatively low  information 
and  coordination  costs,  including  the  costs  of  forming  and  operating 
cartels.  Maturity,  in  turn,  may  be  accompanied  by  a  lower  pace  of 
.technical  innovation,  stronger  import  pressure  and  increased vulnerability 
to  price  competition  - including  allegedly unfair pricing practices  - from 
suppliers  engaged  in catch-up processes. 
169.  A ruling by  the  European  Court  of Justice  in June  1992,  is  the  first 
case  in  which  the  Court  recognised  that  an  lnJury  determination  andt 
concurrently,  the  imposition  of  anti-dum~ing  measures  might  have  been 
affected  by  restrictive  business  conduct.6  The  complainant,  an  importer 
and  processor  of  calcium-metal,  alleged  that  the  sales  losses  suffered by 
the  only  EC  producer  of  calcium-metal,  Pechiney,  which  had  initiated  the 
case,  resulted  solely  from  its  own  restrictive  marketing  policy,  since it 
60According  to  Messerlin  (1990),  nearly  thirty  of  the  EC  anti-cartel  cases  initiated 
between  1980  and  1989  (some  25  per  cent  of  the  total)  have  dealt  with  products  also  involved 
in  anti-dumping  cases.  However,  according  to  the  Commission,  this  observation  ignores  the 
time  factor  and  the  fact  that,  in  some  instances,  the  anti-dumping  and  competition  cases  were 
as  far  apart  as  ten  years. 
61This  appears  to  have  been  the  case  in  the  EC  soda-ash  industry. 
In  several  proceedings  under  Articles  85  and  86  of  the  EEC  Treaty- concerning  market 
sharing  agreements  and  the  abuse  of  a  dominant  market  position  - the  Commission  found,  among 
various  other  factors,  that  anti-dumping  measures  had  contributed  to  strengthening  the  market 
power  of  the  convicted  EC  companies  (ICI,  Solvay  and  CFK  (a  member  of  the  BASF  group)).  With 
regard  to  ICI,  Commission  Decision  No.  91/300  held  that  the  company  had  enjoyed  a  complete 
monopoly  in  the  UK  market  for  soda-ash  until  the  late  1970s,  shielded  by  a  market-sharing 
arrangement  with  its  major  EC  competitor  (Solvay).  Since  1980,  ICI's  list prices  had  been  up 
to  20  per  cent  higher  than  in  neighbouring  markets.  In  the  early  1980s,  the  company  had 
suffered  from  emerging  import  competition,  mainly  from  the  United  States,  and  a  domestic 
market  slump.  Following  the  introduction  of  anti-dumping  measures  in  1984,  ICI  had 
succeeded,  however,  in  regaining  profitability.  According  to  the  company,  perhaps  half  of 
its profits  had  been  due  to  continued  anti-dumping  protection. 
Under  the  above  Commission  Decision,  ICI  was  imposed  a  fine  of  ECU  10  million  for 
having  abused  its  dominant  position  through  a  variety  of  measures  (rebates,  exclusivity 
contracts  etc.)  aimed  at  excluding  or  severely  limiting  competition.  The  anti-dumping 
measures  had  been  repealed  shortly before,  in  September  1990. C/RM/S/36A 
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63  had  refused  to  supply  the  product.  The  Court  of  Justice  annulled  the 
Council  Regulation  imposing  the  duties  (No.  2808/89),  on  the  grounds  that 
the  Community  institutions  had  failed  to  examine  the  question  whether 
Pechiney itself had contributed to  the  injury and,  more  generally,  that the 
injury determination had not been carried out correctly. 
170.  A  Commission  Decision  of  July  1992  maintained  that  private 
initiatives to counter perceived dumping practices,  such as  collusive price 
fixing,  could  not  justify  an  infringement  of  EC  competition  law 
(Article  85:1  of  the  EEC  Treaty;  see  Note  IV.3  and  Section IV.4(i)).  The 
Decision  related  to  an  informal  price  arrangement  between  Scottish  salmon 
farmers  and  'their  Norwegian  competitors,  concluded  in  parallel  with  the 
lodging  of  an  anti-dumping  complaint  by  the  Scottish  producers.  The 
anti-dumping  investigation  was  terminated  by  the  Commission  in  March  1991 
on  the  grounds  of  "Community  interest"  (see  above);  the  private  price 
arrangement  expired  in October  1991.64 
{g)  Proposed procedural  changes  to  "commercial  defence"  procedures 
171.  Draft  legislation,  proposed  by  the  Commission  in  June  1992,  aims  to 
harmonize  and  streamline  the  procedures  for  EC  trade  remedy  actions, 
including  anti-dumping  and  countervailing  measures,  safeguard  pro~~ction, 
and  actions  taken  under  the  New  Commercial  Policy  Instrument.  The 
changes  are  intended  to  shorten  and  simplify  EC  procedures  for  these 
actions  and  to  take  account  of  the proposed  extension of  competence  of the 
Court  of  First  Instance. 66  The  new  procedures  would  also  increase  the 
63case  C-358/89,  Extramet  Industrie  SA  vs.  Council. 
Extramet's  processing  of  calcium-metal  is  based  on  a  self-developed  and  patented 
technology.  Prior  to  the  anti-dumping  procedure,  Extramet  had  already  lodged  a  complaint 
with  the  French  authorities  about  P~chiney's alleged  abuse  of  a  dominant  market  position.  In 
the  context  of  imposing  the  definitive  anti-dumping  duty  (Council  Regulation  No.  2808/89), 
the  EC  authorities  noted  that  the  purpose  of  anti-dumping  proceedings  was  not,  and  could  not 
be,  "to  condone  or  encourage  restrictive  business  practices".  The  companies  involved  were 
not  deprived  of  their  rights  to  initiate  proceedings  under  Articles  85  or  86  of  the  EEC 
Treaty;  the  outcome  of  such  proceedings  could,  however,  not  be  prejudiced  by  an  anti-dumping 
investigation. 
64As  noted  in  Section  IV.4(i),  arrangements  affecting  exports  to  the  EC,  whether  prices 
or  quantities,  could  be  tolerated  under  EC  competition  law  if  government  authorities  had 
required  companies  to  engage  in  such  practices. 
65Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  on  the  harmonization  and  streamlining  of 
decision-making  procedures  for  Community  instruments  of  commercial  defence  and  modification 
of  the  relevant  Council  Regulations  (SEC(92)  1097  final)  of  30  June  1992. 
66The  Court  of  First  Instance  was  created  in  1988  with  a  view  to  improving  judicial 
protection  through  relieving  the  Court  of  Justice  from  cases  which  required  the  close 
examination  of  complex  facts  and,  thus,  enabling  it  to  "concentrate  its  activities  on  its 
fundament a 1  task  of  ensuring  uniform  interpretation  of  Community  1  aw"  ( Counci 1  Dec hi  on 
(Footnote  Continued) C/RM/S/36A 
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power  of  the  Commission  vis-a-vis  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  the  member 
States,  by  reversing  the  institutional  balance  in  the  decision-making 
process,  including  the  Council. 
172.  In all areas  of  trade-remedy  legislation,  the  decision  on  whether  or 
not  to  apply  a  "commercial  defence"  measure  would  be  taken  by  the 
Commission,  and  can  be  implemented  immediately.  Consultation  is,  at ·the 
same  time,  to  be  undertaken  in  a  management  committee,  composed  of  member 
State  representatives  and  chaired  by  the  Commission.  If  a  qualified 
majority  of  the  Committee  disapproves  the  Commission's  action,  the  matter 
is  referred  to  the  Council,  which  needs  to  have  a  qualified  majority 
against  the  action  in  order  to  overturn  it.  This  reverses  the  present 
situation where  the  Council  is  required  to  approve  Commission  proposals  by 
l 'f' d  .  .  67  a  qua  ~  ~e  maJor~ty. 
173.  Under  the  new  procedures,  the  time  period  between  the  imposition  of 
provisional  and  defin~tive duties  is  expected  to  be  shortened  by  at  least 
one  month.  This,  in  turn,  would  limit  the  possibility that  administrative 
delays,  including  those  resulting  from  the  referral  of provisional  duties 
for  legal  scrutiny  to  the  Court  of First  Instance  and,  eventually,  to  the 
Court  of  Justice,  could  lead  to  the  expiry  of  measures  (the  validity  of 
provisional  duties  is  limited  to  four  or,  in  certain  circumstances,  six 
months). 
(vi)  Countervailing actions 
174.  Countervailing  measures  by  the  EC  are  relatively  rare.  The  only 
action since  1990  concerned  polyester  fibres  and  yarn  from  Turkey  on  which 
provisional  duties  were  imposed  in  May  1991.  The  same  products  were  also 
subject  to  anti-dumping  duties.  According  to  the  Commission,  these 
shipments  had  benefited  from  several  export  and  domestic  subsidies.
68 
In 
September  1991,  the  Commission  accepted  an  undertaking  by  the  Turkish 
Government  to  terminate certain export subsidy  schemes. 
{Footnote  Continued) 
No.  88/591).  The  Council  Decision  setting  up  the  Court  of  First  Instance  (No.  88/591)  in 
1988  held,  among  other  things,  that,  in  the  light  of  experience  and  after  two  years  of 
operation,  the  Counc i 1  waul d  re-examine  a  propos  a 1  made  by  the  Court  of  Justice  to  give  the 
Court  of  First  Instance  jurisdiction  on  measures  of  trade  protection  relating  to  dumping  and 
subsidies.  Reportedly,  in  late  1991,  the  Court  of  Justice  reminded  the  .Council  of  this 
provision. 
67As  noted  below,  similar  decision-making  mechanisms  have  recently  been  introduced  in 
the  banana,  tobacco  and  fisheries  sectors  (Sections  V.2{vii),  (viii)  and  {x)). 
68The  Commission  deemed  the  parallel  application  of  anti-dumping  and  countervailing 
measures  appropriate  since  the  domestic  subsidy  schemes,  including  investment  aid,  had  had  an 
identical  impact  on  both  domestic  and  export  prices  and,  thus,  no  effect  on  the  established 
dumping  margin. C/RM/S/36A 
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(vii)  Government  Procurement 
175.  The  Communities'  overall  framework  of  procurement  rules  for  goods, 
works  and  services  was  completed  in  1992  with  the  adoption  of  the  last 
outstanding Directive  (No.  90/531)  concerning  the  award  of  services  in  the 
"excluded  sectors"  of  water,  energy,  transport  and  telecommunications 
(Table  IV.S).  With  the  entry  into  force  of  this  directive,  the  EC  system 
of  common  procurement  rule~  for  goods  was  scheduled  to  become  fully 
effective on  1  January  1993.  9 
176.  As  in  ehe  standards  area,  some  member  States  have  not  0
et  fully 
implemented  common  procurement  provisions  into  national  law. 7  Recent 
initiatives by  the  Commission  are  aimed at accelerating implementation and, 
once  in  force,  ensuring  uniform  application  of  the  directives  throughout 
the  EC.  Member  States  have  been  urged  to  use  standard  forms  for  tender 
notices  and  a  uniform description of content  (Commission Recommendation No. 
91/561).  The  Commission  carries  out  checks  of  contracts  awarded  in 
connection with  EC  ftructural  funds  and has  launched  a  monitoring exercise 
for  tender notices.  1 
177.  Directive  No.  90/531  is  the  only  EC  directive  to  stipulate 
reciprocity  conditions  for  the  procurement  of  goods.  If  the  originating 
country is not legally committed to ensuring effective market  access  for  EC 
companies,  the  directive  allows  procurement  authoritffs  to  disregard  bids 
with more  than 50  per cent content  from  that country.  Any  such bids must 
be  rejected  if  their  price  advantage  over  equivalent  tenders  from  other 
sources  (EC  member  States  or third countries  ensuring access)  is less  than 
3  per cent.  The  EC  Council has  stated that these provisions may  be revised 
69As  indicated  in  Table  IV.S,  a  transitional  period  is,  however,  provided  for  Spain 
(1  January  1996),  Greece  and  Portugal  (1  July  1997).  See  also  GATT  (199lb)  for  details on  EC 
procurement  rules  and  practices affecting trade  in  goods. 
70tn  December  1992,  transposition  in  the  areas  of  both  supplies  and  works  was  not  fully 
completed  in  Greece  and  Spain.  Portugal  had  not  taken  all  implementation  measures  in  the 
public  works  domain. 
71 Ec  Commission  (199la). 
Meanwhile,  the  French  Ministry  of  Equipment  is  reported  to  have  set  up  a  review  system 
to  monitor  intra-Community  reciprocity  in  public  works  contracts.  It  apparently  includes 
monitoring  of  the  implementation  of  Directive  No.  89/440  by  other  member  States,  preparing  a 
1 i st  of  works  contracts  won  by  French  firms  in  other  member  States  and  vice  versa.  and 
setting  up  a  list  of  EC  call  for  bids,  rejection  of  bids  and  rejection  of  appHcations. 
(European  Report,  16  March  1991). 
72Software  used  in  the  equipment  of  telecommunication  networks  is  considered  as 
products  in  this  connection. 
Contrary  to  the  Directive  on  public  supply  contracts,  which  applies  only  to  pubHc 
entities.  the  "excluded  sectors"  Directive  also  covers  private  companies  granted  exclusive 
rights  by  member  States'  authorities. 
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in  the  light  of  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  on  the  Tokyo  Round 
Agreement  on Government  Procurement. 
178.  The  reciprocity  clause  of  the  "excluded  sectors
11  Directive  and  the 
more  general  issue  of  preferential  procurement  rules  and  practices, 
including  buy  national  requirements  under  U.S.  legislation,  has  developed 
into  a  major  trade  irritant between  the  EC  and  the  United States.  At  the 
time  of writing,  bilateral discussions were still underway. 
179.  The  EC  procurement directives,  as  part of the  "acquis  communautaire", 
will  apply  throughout  the  European  Economic  Area.  Some  technical 
adjustments  have  been  made  in  view  of  institutional  peculiarities  (for 
example,  to  accommodate  the  system  of  turnover  taxation in Liechtenstein), 
and  longer  implementation periods  are  foreseen  for  specified countries  and 
sectors,  but  in  no  case  beyond  1  January  1995.  Since  the  EFTA  countries 
are  permitted,  under  the  EEA  Agreement  (Annex  VI,  Procurement)  to  maintain 
their achieved levels of liberalization towards  third countries,  they would 
not  be  required  to  introduce  or  tighten  reciprocity  provisions  in  their 
11excluded sectors". 
180.  In  early  1992,  the  Communities  submitted  lists  of  procurement 
entities  for  Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal  under  the  GATT  Agreement  on 
Government  Procurementj  with  a  view  to  extending  the  Code's  coverage  to 
these  member  States. 7  Greece  and  Spain  have  meanwhile  been  included; 
Portugal will be  covered soon. 
(viii)  Standards  and other technical  requirements 
181.  Over  the past  two  years,  the  EC  has  continued to  intrQduce  directives 
based.on  its  "new  approach"  to  technical  harmonization  {Table  IV.6).  The 
new  approach,  promulgated  by  a  Council  Resolution  in  May  1985  and 
incorporated  later  in  the  White  Paper  on  Completing  the  Internal  Market, 
confines  EC  legislation  to  laying  down  essential  health  and  safety 
requirements.  These  are  complemented  by  (voluntary)  technic~l 
specifications  to  be  developed  by  European  standards-making  bodies 
(Note  IV.2).  While  non-compliance  with  such  specifications  does  not 
automatically bar a  product  from  free  circulation,  additional certification 
procedures  may  be  requirff  to  prove  its  conformity  with  the  essential 
elements  of  a  directive.  In  several  cases,  implementation  by  member 
73GATT  documents  GPR/63/Add.  1-3  (10  January,  6  February  and  26  June  1992)  and 
GPR/W/112,  13  Hay  1992. 
74c  ,.  ·  h  h  ·  1  d  d  ·  "  h"  d.  t'  b  amp  1 a nee  w1 t  t  e  requ1rements  a i  own  1  n  new  approac  nee  1 ves  can  e 
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States  has  proved  difficult  (see  Section  II.2(ii)).  In  mid-August  1992, 
the  directive  on  toys  was  the  only  one  for  which  all  member  States  had 
notified the  Commission  of  incorporation  into national  law;  and  even this 
75  was  incomplete  in two  cases. 
182.  Harmonization  efforts  have  also  been  continued  by  way  of 
comprehensive  Council  Directives  setting  out  all  relevant  aspects  of  the 
products  concerned  (full  mandatory  harmonization);  member  States  are 
required  to  incorporate  the  directives  by  specified  target  dates.  This 
approach  has  been  used,  in  particular,  in  areas  considered  sensitive  for 
reasons  of h~alth and safety,  such as  pharmaceuticals,  foodstuffs  and motor 
vehicles.  The  latter  sector  is  covered,  with  effect  from  1  January 1993, 
by  a  complete  set of 44  technical directives  (Section V.3(ii)(a)). 
183.  Article  lOOb  of  the  EEC  Treaty  may  be  viewed  as  a  last stage  in  the 
harmonization  process.  The  Article  requires  the  Commission  to  establish 
during  1992,  together  with  each  member  State,  an  inventory  of  legislative 
acts  which  have  not  been  harmonized  despite  their  impact  on  the 
establishment and  functioning of the  common  market.  The  Council would  then 
be  authorized  to  decide,  by  qualified  majority,  that  one  member  State  • s 
provisions  must  be  recognised  as  equivalent  to  those  applied  by  another 
member  State.  However,  the  Commiss~gn  has  not,  to  date,  considered  it 
necessary to  take  such  an initiative. 
184.  National requirements persist in many  fields.  As  a  general rule,  the 
principle  of  mutual  recognition  is  expected  to  ensure  that,
7 
regulatory 
differences within the  EC  do  not  impede  intra-Community  trade.  Whenever 
their  national  regulations  are  deemed  equivalent,  member  States  are 
required to  accept  imports  (of  EC  and  third country products)  produced and 
marketed  in  compliance  with  the  regulations  valid  in  any  other  •ember 
(Footnote  Continued) 
indicated  by  a  "CE"  label.  A  draft  regulation  by  the  Co•ission  (COM(91)145)  a1•s  to 
standardize the  layout  and  the  use  of the  label. 
75Ec  Commission  (1992d). 
76observers  have  expressed  doubts  whether  the  Article,  whose  scope  and  ..  chanics 
remained  open  to  question,  would  prove  workable  in  practice  (Bohan,  1991).  lf  the  Council 
fails  to  pass  a  harmonization  directives  under  Article  lOOa  of  the  Treaty,  it  is  in  fact 
difficult to  see  how  the  procedure  under  lOOb  could  work;  both  approaches  would  be  based  on 
qualified-majority voting.  Article  lOOb  may  thus  be  viewed  as  a  potential  instruMent  for  the 
Commission  to  collect  information,  rather  than  as  an  operational  device  to  enforce 
harmonization. 
77The  European  Court  of  Justice  has  developed  the  principle  in  a  series  of  rulings 
since  the  early  1970s.  It  implies  in  essence,  as  determined  in  the  landmark  case  of  "Cassis 
de  Oijon",  that  differences  in  national  legislation  are  only  allowed  to  impede  intra-EC  trade 
if  their  purpose  "is  in  the  general  interest  and  such  as  to  take  precedence  over  the 
requirements  of  the free  movement  of  goods". C/RM/S/36A 
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State.  Of  more  than  1, 500  cases  involving  technical  barriers 
member  States,  which  were  examined  by  the  Commission  in  1991, 
hundred  are  reported  to  have  been  resolved  by  applying  the 
.  .  .  .  1  78  recogn1t1on pr1nc1p  e. 
between 
several 
mutual 
185.  The  application of harmonized  EC  requirements,  if fully  implemented, 
and/or  the  mutual  recognition principle  are  likely  to  fac1litate  access  to 
the  EC  market  and  to  improve  the  trading  environment  for  both  domestic 
producers  and  exporters  to  the  Community.  Mutual  recognition  may  not, 
however,  always  suffice  to  enable  a  product  to  be  used  effectively. 
Difficulties  may  arise  from  interconnection  into  established  national 
networks  which  incorporate  different  technical  layouts  (e.g.  PAL  and  SECAM 
in  colour  television).  Moreover,  the  question  of  equivalence  of  national 
requirements  involving  health  and  safety  aspects  may  prove  extremely 
sensitive.  (Such  problems,  in  turn,  have  prompted  the  harmonization 
efforts referred to  above.) 
186.  A  crucial  element  in  making  the  "new  approach"  work  is  the 
development  of  common  standards  by  the  European  standards-making 
institutions  CEN,  CENELEC  and  ETSI  (see  Note  IV.2).  Their  activities  are 
based  on  contributions  made  by  national  member  organizations  like  DIN, 
AFNOR  and  BSI.  Agreed  European  standards  (EN)  must  be  implemented  in full 
by all  EC  bodies.  Overall,  some  1,800  European  standards  have  so  far been 
worked  out  by  CEN  and  CENELEC  (Table  IV.7).  In  recent  years,  the 
Commission  expressed  concern  that,  while  the  standardization  work  had 
progressed  satisfactorily  for  the  "new  approach  directives"  on  toys, 
pressure vessels  and  personal  protective  equipment,  progress  had been  less 
important  in other  areas,  including machinery. 79  Observers  have  suggested 
that  a  tendency  to  shift  decision-making  problems  from  the  legislative 
stage  (development  of  the  directive)  to  the  standards-~aking  institutions 
could create  a  "dustbin"  for  thorny political questions.  0 
187.  Under  the  so-called Mutual  Information  Directive  of  1983  (Directive 
No.  83/189) ,  all  new  (mandatory)  technical  regulations  by  member  States 
must be  notified.  During  a  standstill period of  three  months  for  comments 
and  six  months  for  detailed  opinions  if  deemed  necessary,  the  Commission 
78
EC  Commission  (1992e). 
79 Ec  Commission  (1991a  and  1992d). 
80woolcock  et.al.  (1991). C/RM/S/36A 
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and other member  States may  raise objections.81  The  Commission  is entitled 
to  freeze  any national  initiatives in the  area of technical  regulations for 
up  to  one  year  if  an  EC  directive  is  envisaged. 82  CEN  and  CENELEC  are 
informed  of  all  national  standardization  activities  in  their  fields,  and 
the  three main standards  institutions  in the  EC  - DIN,  BSI  and  AFNOR  - hft3e 
established a  tripartite framework  for  information exchange  and  comment. 
81 see  also  GATT  (1991b). 
82Table  AIV.4  consolidates  the  notifications  made  under  the  Mutual  Information 
Directive  for  the  period  1  January  1990  to  31  June  1992.  Apparently,  notification  activities 
have  intensified  considerably  over  time;  the  number  of  regulations  notified  by  member  States 
between  January  1990  and  June  1992  (1,008  cases)  is  almost  as  high  as  during  the  preceding 
6~ years  (1,075  cases  between  1  January  1984  and  31  May  1990). 
83woolcock  et.al.  (1991). C/RM/S/36A 
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*************************************************************************** 
No~e IV.2:  European  s~sndardiza~ion bodies 
The  development  of  European  standards  is  undertaken  in  three 
private-sector  bodies:  CEN  (European  Committee  for  Standardization), 
CENELEC  (European  Committee  for  Electro-technical  Standardization)  or ETSI 
(European  Telecommunications  Standardization  Institute).  CEN  and  CENELEC 
are  common  EC/EFTA  bodies,  ETSI  is open  to  all  interested  parties  located 
within  the  area  of the  European  Conference  of Posts  and  Telecommunications 
Administrations  (CEPT;  for  more  details  see  first  TPRH  report).  The 
decision-making  procedures  are  very  similar  to  qualified-majority  voting 
used by the $C  Council  in  the relevant cases. 
Membership  in  CEN  and  CENELEC  is  confined  to  the  national  standards 
organizations  or  electro-technical  standardization  committees.  As  a 
general  policy,  CENjCENELEC  holds  expert  meetings  with  non-EC  or  EFTA 
organizations if these  are  considered  useful.  In  contrast,  ETSI  is also 
open  to  all  interested  parties  within  the  CEPT  territory  and  may  also 
invite non-European organizations as observers. 
In  June  1991,  CEN  and  the  International  Organization  for 
Standardization  (ISO)  agreed  on  procedures  to  intensify cooperation.  The 
accord  includes  specified  reporting  requirements,  shared  development  of 
draft  standards  in order to avoid duplication of work,  the setting up of of 
a  Coordinating Group  to monitor implementation,  and  provisions  for parallel 
adoption  in  both  fora.  A  similar  arrangement  exists  between  IEC  and 
CENELEC  (Haigh,  1992). 
Comments  received  from  interested parties  on  a  1990  Commission  Green 
Paper  on  the  development  of  European  Standardization  seem  to  suggest,  in 
particular,  that  the  efficiency of CEN  needs  to  be  enhanced and priority be 
given  to  working  out  standards  directly related  to  the  achievement  of  the 
Internal  Harket.  In  addition,  it  has  been  stressed  that  European-level 
associations  should be  entitled to make  direct contributions  to  the work of 
CEN  and  CENELEC  and  that  cooperation  among  the  European  standardization 
bodies,  and  between  them  and  their  international  counterparts,  should  be 
improved  (EC  Commission,  199le). 
An  EC  Council  Resolution  of  June  1992  reiterates,  among  other 
elements,  the  importance  of developing  cohesive  European  Standards  ("based 
on  transparency,  openness,  consensus,  independence of vested interests and 
decision-taking  on  the  basis  of national  representations")  and  confirms 
the  Community's  interest  in  "an  international  standardization  system 
capable of producing  standards  that  are actually  used  by  all  the  partners 
in international  trade and of meeting  the  requirements of Community policy" 
(92/C 173/01). 
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188.  The  Community  has  not  concluded,  to  date,  any  mutual  recognition 
agreements  with  third  countries  on  type  approval  and  certification.  In 
September  1992,  the  EC  Council  approveg  a  Directive  mandating  the 
Commission  to  enter  into  such  negotiations.  4  Under  the  Directive,  the  EC 
is  prepared  to  conclude  agreements  with  interested  countries  on  the 
condition  that  the  competence  of  the  relevant  technical  bodies  in  these 
countries is,  and  remains,  on  a  par with  EC  bodies,  that the  agreements  are 
applied  only  to  the  specified  bodies,  and  that  they  establish  a  balanced 
situation  with  regard  to  the  advantages  derived  by  the  parties  in  all 
matters  relating  to  conformity  assessment  for  the  products  concerned. 
(According  to  Commission  officials,  this  provision is  to be  interpreted in 
terms  of  equivalent  access  opportunities,  rather  than  balanced  trade 
flows.)  Negotiations  would  be  held  only  with  signatories  to  the  Tokyo 
Round  Agreement  on  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade.  At  the  outset,  such 
agreements  would  be  applied  on  a  bilateral  basis  (requiring  a  rules  of 
origin  clause)  with  the  possibility  of  extending  their  coverage  later  to 
additional  countries.  In  specified  circumstances,  the  recognised  foreign 
bodies  would  be  allowed  to  subcontract  to  other bodies,  including  those  in 
third countries,  under  their  own  responsibility.  EC  bodies  would  have  the 
same  right  to  delegate  testing,  including  to  entities  domiciled  in 
countries without  a  mutual  recognition agreement. 
189.  In  April  1990,  the  EC  and  the  EFTA  countries  set  up  the  European 
Organization  for  Testing  and  Certification  (EOTC).  The  organization 
promotes  the  mutual  recognition  of  conformity  assessment  in  non-regulated 
product  areas,  including  agreements  with  third  countries,  and  encourages 
the  use  of  equivalence  criteria.  EOTC  is  due  to  move  from  its  current 
experimental  stage  to full operation by  1  January  1993. 
190.  On  entry into  force  of  the  EEA  Agreement,  the  "acquis  communautaire" 
in  the  standards  area will  become  legally effective  throughout  the  EC/EFTA 
territory.  This  implies  acceptance  by  the  EFTA  countries  of  the  case  law 
previously  developed  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice,  including  the 
principle  of  mutual  recognition.  In  certain  areas,  longer  implementation 
periods  are  foreseen;  with  respect  to  motor  vehicles,  EFTA  countries  are 
entitled  to  apply  their  national  legislation  until  1  January  1995  (e. g. 
with  a  view  to  enforcing  tighter  national  emission  standards).  While 
national  legislation  may  be  maintained  beyond  that  date,  free  circulation 
must  be  admitted  on  the  basis  of the  EC  accord.  From  1  January 1995,  EFTA 
countries will be entitled to grant  EC  type  approval  for motor vehicles. 
84The  first  TPRM  report  provides  an  overview  of  the  main  provisions  and  principles 
governing  type  approval  and  certification  under  EC  directives. 
• • 
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191.  Under  the  Agreement,  EFTA  countries  will  not  be  allowed  to  initiate 
mutual  recognition  agreements  with  third  countries  when  the  use  of  a  mark 
of  conformity  is  provided  for  in  EC  legislation  (i.e.  in  virtually  all 
areas  covered  by  EC  harmonization  directives).  A  Protocol  to  the  EEA 
Agreement  stipulates  that  such  negotiations  will  be  undertaken  by  the 
Communities,  on  the  understanding  that  equivalent  agreements  will  be 
concluded by  EFTA  States  in parallel. 
(ix)  Countertrade 
192.  There  are  no  EC  guidelines,  coordination  or  consultation  activities 
in the  area of countertrade,  and  no  changes  have  been  made  since  the  first 
TPRM  report  with  a  view  to  defining  a  common  or  coordinated policy stance. 
However,  while  there  are  certain  differences  between  the  member  States, 
most  Governments  seem  to  pursue  a  rather cautious  approach,  confining their 
involvement  in countertrade deals  mainly  to military offsets.  Recent press 
reports  indicate  that  barter  trade  with  CIS  members  (Commonwealth  of 
Independent  States)  has  gained  in importance.85 
(x)  Rules  of origin 
193.  No  changes  in  substance  have  been  made  to  the  Communities' 
86  non-preferential rules  of origin over  the past  two  years.  A preferential 
agreement  with  the  Faroe  Islands,  concluded  in  December  1991,  contains 
similar  rules  of  origin  as  those  in  the  EC/EFTA  Agreements. 
87 
However, 
contrary  to  EC/EFTA  trade,  only bilateral cumulation  of origin  is possible 
between  the  EC  and  the  Faroe  Islands  (see  also Table II.l). 
(3)  Measures  Directly Affecting Exports 
(i)  Export promotion 
194.  Current  export  promotion  activities  at  Community  level  are  mainly 
directed  to  the  participation  in  trade  fairs,  the  contracting  of  studies 
and  the  organization  of  seminars  and  conferences.  In  1991,  some 
ECU  2.6 million  were  spent  on  these  purposes.  In  contrast,  Belgium  alone 
used  funds  of  over  ECU  9  million per  year  to  support  its overseas  Chambers 
85Le  Figaro, 
8  July  1992. 
1  November  1991,  Agra  Eur~,  6  March  1992,  and  Financial  Times, 
86For  details  see  GATT  (1991b),  pp.  118-120. 
87The  Faroe  Islands  are  a  self-governing  integral  part  of  Denmark. C/RM/S/36A 
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of Commerce,  trade
8
wissions  abroad  and similar activities during  the  second 
half of the  1980s. 
(ii)  Export  finance  and  insurance 
195.  Article 112  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  requires  member  States 
progressively to harmonize  their export aid schemes  with  a  view  to ensuring 
that  they  do  not  distort  competition  between  EC  companies.  According  to 
Article  113,  their  export  policy  should  be  governed  by  common  principles. 
However,  current  comrni tments  under  EC  law  are  confined  mainly  to  mutual 
information  and  consultation,  pursuant  to  a  1973  Council  Decision 
(No.  73/391).  By  tradition,  and  in  order  to  speed  up  the  flow  of 
information,  this  procedure  also  applies  to  the  member  States'  external 
notification requirements  in  the  OECD,  although  it is  the  EC  as  such  which 
participates  in  the  Arrangement  on  Guidelines  for  Officially  Supported 
Export  Credits. 
196.  The  European  Court  of  Justice  has  held  on  various  occasions  that, 
given  the  interdependence  of  markets,  individual  members'  export  support 
might  distort  intra-EC  competition.  The  Court  has  thus  not  ruled  out  the 
possibility that  the  Commission  should apply  the  general  EEC  rules  on State 
aid  in  this  area  (Articles  92  to  94  of  the  EEC  Treaty;  see 
Section IV.4(ii)(a)  below).  As  shown  in Table  IV.9,  the  share  of  domestic 
State aid devoted  to  trade  or export promotion purposes varies  considerably 
among  the  member  States,  from  nil  to  more  than  10  (France,  Greece)  or  even 
20  per cent  (Ireland). 
(iii)  Export  subsidies 
197.  Export  subsidies. ("refunds")  remain  a  prominent  feature  of the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy.  For details  see  Section V.2(i). 
(iv)  Export  controls  and restrictions 
198.  Under  the  Community's  common  rules  for  exports  (Council 
Regulation  No.  2603/69,  as  amended  by  Regulation No.  3918/91),  Italy  and 
France  are  authorized  to  restrict  their  exports  of  certain  skins  and 
furskins.  In  addition,  all  member  States  are  free,  in  complying  with 
commitments  predating  the  Regulation,  to  participate  in  international 
emergency  systems  designed  to  allocate  their  exports  of petroleum oils and 
gases.  These  measures  are  the  only  exemptions  from  the  principle  of 
88see  GATT  (1991b)  for  more  details.  No  up-dated  information  on  national  policy 
developments  in  these  areas  was  provided  in  the  context  of  this  report. C/RM/S/36A 
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unrestricted trade underlying  the  common  rules.  However,  member  States may 
operate  additional  controls  on  such  grounds  as  national  security  and  the 
preservation of cultural heritage. 
199.  A  Commission  proposal,  tabled  in mid-July  1992,  aims  to  establish  a 
Community  framework  for  the  application  of  export  controls  to  dual  use 
goods  for  the  post  -1992  era.  These  goods,  which  have  both  military_  and 
civilian applications,  are  to  be  specified in a  common  list to  be  approved 
by  all  member  States.  The  national  authorities  would  be  responsible  for 
enforcement  and  the  issuance  of  licences;  th8?  are  free  to  restrict 
further products not figuring on  the  common  list. 
200.  The  Commission  has  also  tabled  two  proposals  aimed  at  harmonizing 
current  controls  on  exports  of national  treasures  and  introducing  a  system 
for  the  return  of  objects  unlawfully  dispatched  to  other  member  States. 
These  are still under  discussion. 
201.  In April  1992,  the  Community  and  the  member  States  decided  to  lift 
the  export  embargo  on oil products  to  South Africa. 
202.  The  GATT  Secretariat  has  not  received  any  further  information  on 
changes  in  the  Communities'  system  of  export  controls  and  restrictions. 
e. g.  for  environmental,  health  and  national  security  reasons,  since  the 
first TPRM  report. 
(4)  Measures  Affecting Production and Trade 
(i)  Competition policy 
(a)  Principles 
203.  EEC  competition policy,  like all other areas  of Community  competence, 
is  based  directly  on  the  Treaty  of  Rome.  Its  principal  focus  is  on 
preventing  private  companies  and  associations,  public  enterprises  and  the 
national  Governments  from  initiating  or  tolerating  practices  liable  to 
distort  markets  and  impede  intra-EC  trade.  Competition  policy  is  thus 
considered  an  instrument  to  advance  and  safeguard  mq0
ket  integration  by 
preserving effective competition within the  Community. 
89wall  Street  Journal  Europe,  16  July  1992. 
90Ehlermann  (1992a  and  1992b). 
The  following  Section  focuses  on  restrictive  private  practices.  Disciplines  affecting 
the  member  States  are  treated  separately;  for  State  trading  activities  (involving  public  or 
privileged enterprises)  see  Section  IV.4(i)(d)  and  for  State  aid  Section  IV.4(ii). C/RM/S/36A 
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204.  Article  85  of  the  EEC  Treaty  prohibits  agreements  and  concerted 
practices  between  enterprises  which  may  affect  trade  between  the  member 
States  and which  are  aimed at,  or result in,  the prevention,  restriction or 
distortion of competition.  Article  86  prohibits,  as  incompatible  with  the 
common  market,  the  abuse  of  a  dominant  mar~it position in so far  as  it may 
affect  trade  between  the  member  States.  Under  the  EEC  Treaty,  the 
Commission's  Directorate  General  on  Competition  Policy  (DG  IV)  deals 
exclusively  with  anti-competitive  practices  and  abuses  of  dominance  whose 
effects  stretch beyond  the  borders  of  one  member  State.  Arrangements  such 
as  price  fixing  ~nd market  sharing may  result in high fines  being levied by 
the  Commission.9 
205.  Anti-competitive  practices  in  the  agricultural  sphere  have  a  special 
status under  the  EEC  Treaty.  Pursuant  to Article 42,  the  competition rules 
apply  to  production  and  trade  in  farm  products  only  to  the  extent 
determined  by  the  Council  within  the  Community's  basic  agricultural  policy 
framework.  A  subsequent  Council  Regulation  (No.  26/62  of  April  1962) 
stipulates,  however,  that  the  EEC  competition  rules  apply  to  the  sector, 
subject to  an exception clause  (Article  2  of the  Regulation)  which provides 
cover  for  agreements  that  form  an  integral  part  of  a  national  market 
organization or  are  necessagj  for  the  attainment  of  the  objectives  of  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy.  This  clause  was  used  for  the  first  time  in 
1987,  concerning potato  marketing  organizations  in France.  In  the  context 
of  a  recent  proceeding  relating  to Atlantic  salmon  (see  Note  IV.3  below), 
the  Commission  decided  that  the  exception  clause  was  not  applicable  for 
91 This  contrasts  with  the  competition  rules  of  the  ECSC  Treaty,  which  impose  a  general 
ban  on  a  11  agreements  between  undertakings  "tending  direct  1  y  or  indirect  1  y  to  prevent, 
restrict  or  distort  normal  competition  within  the  common  market"  (Article  65  (ECSC). 
Article  65  thus  also  applies  to  regional  or  local  cartels  between  producers  and  suppliers  of 
ECSC  products.  The  term  "normal  competition"  has  been  interpreted  by  the  Commission  to  mean 
"competition  unaffected  by  restrictive agreements"  (Commission  Decision  No.  90/417/ECSC). 
Concerted  practices  are  prohibited  sui  generis  under  EC  law,  irrespective  of  the 
existence  of  any  explicit  accord  among  the  participants.  For  example,  the  European  Court  of 
Justice  has  outlawed  as  contravening  EC  competition  rules  any  sort  of  cooseration  between 
enterprises  with  a  view  to  defining  a  common  line  of  action  on  prices  an  eliminattn~  in 
advance  anl  uncertainties  concerning  implementation  (conclusions  of  the  Advocate  Genera  in 
cases  89/8  et.al.,  7 July  1992). 
92Recent  examples  a  total  of  ECU  48  million  in  fines  for  market  sharing  agreements 
concerning  soda-ash  and  a  ECU  75  million  fine  for  the  abuse  of  a  dominant  position  (aseptic 
milk  packaging/Tetrapack).  Six  major  producers  of  stainless  steel  products  were  fined  a 
total  of  ECU  425,000  for  having  cooperated  in  a  voluntary  system  of  delivery  limitations 
between  1986  and  1988  (see  also  Section  V.3(vi)). 
93Regulation  No.  26/62  confers  on  the  Commission  the  exclusive  competence  to  decide 
whether  individual  arrangements,  decisions  and  practices  meet  these  criteria  (after 
consultations  with  member  States  and  having  heard  the  interested parties  as  well  as  any  other 
natural  or  legal  person  considered  competent).  The  Commission's  decision  may  be  referred  to 
the  European  Court  of  Justice  for  legal  review. 
The  exemption  under  Regulation  No.  26/62  does  not  extend  to  practices  banned  under 
Article  86  of  the  EEC  Treaty  (abuse  of  a  dominant  market  position;  see  below). • 
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several  reasons,  including  the  existence  of alternative  remedies  under  EEC 
law  (e.g.  anti-dumping or safeguard actions). 
206.  The  ban on agreements  and  concerted practices under Article  85  of the 
EEC  Treaty  is  not  unqualified.  Exemptions  are  provided  for  agreements, 
decisions  and  practices  which  contribute  to  improving  the  production  or 
distribution  of  goods  or  promoting  technical  or  economic  progress  "whi~g 
allowing consumers  a  fair share of the  resulting benefit"  (Article  85:3). 
Under  Council Regulation No.  17/62,  the  implementing  legislation  for 
Articles  85  and  86,  the  Commission  is mandated  to  declare,  on  application, 
Article 85:1  inapplicable  to  individual  agreements,  decisions  and practices 
for  a  specified  period.  Moreover,  in  "block  exempt ions",  tl:le  Commission· 
has  defined general  conditions  under  which  certain forms  of cooperation are 
deemed  acceptable. 
207.  Block  exemptions  are  granted,  subject  to  certain qualifications,  for 
agreements  aimed  at  rationalizing  and  harmonizing  production  programmes 
(specialization  agreeme~ts)  or  coordinating  research  activities  and  the 
exploitation of results.  5  A further  series  of block  exemptions  relates to 
a  variety of vertical  agreements,  including distribution practices  such  as 
exclusive distribution agreements  granting territorial exclusivity  (without 
impeding  cross-border  sales),  exclusive  purchasing  agreements,  franchising 
agreements,  agreements  on  the  selective  distribution  of  automobiles 
(Section V.3(ii))  as  well  as  patent  licence  and  know  how  licence 
agreements.  A  generpl  exemption  is  provided  for  agreements  of  minor 
i  .  96  econom  c  1mportance. 
94 1n  addition,  Article  85:3  specifies  that  any  such  cooperat1on  must  (i)  not  go  beyond 
what  is  indispensable  to attain  the  obJectives  concerned  and  (ii)  not  afford  part1cipants  the 
possibility  of  eliminating  competit1on  1n  respect  of  a  substantul  part  of  the  product~  in 
question.  For  example,  a  recent  exemption  under  Article 85:3  provides  cover  for  a 
Volkswagen/Ford  joint  venture  to  build  a  multi-purpose  vehicle  in  Setubal  (Portugal).  The 
exemption  is  subject  to  several  conditions,  including  a  proh1bition  on  Ford  to  use  YW  engines 
in  more  than  Z5  per  cent  of  its  vehicles  (Commission  Decision  No.  93/49;  see  also 
Section Y.3(ii)(a)). 
The  sco'e for  authorizations  under  Article  65  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  is  defined  in  narrower 
terms  than  under  the  EEC  Treaty  (authorizations  are  to  be  granted  for  specialization 
agreements,  joint  buying  or  sales  agreements,  and  other  agreements  considered  to  be  strictly 
analoguous  ;n nature). 
95The  block  exemptions  were  intended  to  serve  as  guidelines  for  businesses  and  to spare 
them  the  need  to  notify  types  of  agreements  deemed  to  be  covered  by  Article  85:3  (which.  in 
turn,  helped  reduce  the  workload  on  the  Commission's  services). 
96Agreements  are  exempt  from  the  appl i cat; on  of  Article  85  if  the  aggregate  annual 
turnover  of  the  participants  is  less  ECU  200  million  and  if  the  combined  share  of  the  goods 
and  services  covered  does  not  exceed  5  per  cent  of  the  relevant  EC  market. 
Block  exemptions  also  exist  or  are  currently  being  prepared  in  the  areas  of 
intellectual  property  rights  (for  patent'  licensing  agreements  and  know-how  licenstng 
agreements);  insurance  contracts;  merger  control;  and  air  transportation. C/RM/S/36A 
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208.  Specific  EC  legislation on mergers  and  acqu1s1t1ons  was  introduced in 
1989.  (Such  cases  had  previously  been  treated  directly  under  the  general 
provisions  of  Articles  85  and  86  of  the  EEC  Treaty.)  The  new  Merger 
Control  Regulation  (Council  Regulation  No.  4064/89)  relates  to 
concentrations  with  a  combined  worldwide  turnover  of  more  than 
ECU  5  billion and  an  EC-wide  turnover  of more  than  ECU  250  million of each 
of at least two  of the enterprises  concerned.  Mergers  between enterprises. 
each  of  which  achieves  two-thirds  of  its  turnover  within  the  same  member 
State.  continue  to  be  subject  to  national  competition  laws.  The 
Commission  is  mandated  to  assess  in  advance  all  cases  a~ove  the  thresholds 
and  to judge _their compatibility with  the  common  market.  7 
209.  An  important  feature  of  EC  competition  policy  is  its  focus  on 
inhibiting  vertical  restrictions  aimed  at  insulating  national  markets  by 
preventing  cross-border  sales.  This  reflects  the  Commission's  concern  not 
to  allow  private  business  pra~~ices  to  replace  "official"  trade  barriers 
once  these  have  been  removed.  The  motor  vehicle  sector  and  the  steel 
quota  arrangements  imposed  in  the  early  1980s  may  be  considered  exceptions 
(Section V.3(ii)(a)  and  (vi)).  Referring  to  cartel  practices  at  the  time 
of the  steel quota  system,  a  Commission  Decision  (No.  90/417/ECSC)  stressed 
that  there 
11Was  a  fundamental  difference  between  agreements  between 
(Community)  companies  made  after  consultation  with  the  Commission  and 
designed  essentially  to  make  measures  taken  by  the  Commission  more 
effective  and  easier  to  supervise"  and  other  agreements  made  on  the 
companies  own  initiative  and  designed  not  to  support  existing  measures 
(i.e.  quota  arrangements),  but  to  create additional  restrictions. 
210.  Given  its  basic  legal  commitment  to  prevent  trade  restrictions 
among  member  States  and distortions  of competition within  the  common  market 
97 tn  assessing  individual  cases,  the  Commission  is  to  take  into  account  (i)  the  need  to 
maintain  and  develop  effective  competit1on  and  (ii)  the  market  position  and  the  economic  and 
financial  power  of  the  undertakings  concerned.  In  the  latter  context,  the  Commission  is 
required,  among  other  things,  to  appra1se  the  alternatives  available  to  suppliers  and  users, 
their  access  to  supplies  and  markets,  and  any  legal  or  other  barr1ers  to  entry  (Article  2(1) 
of  Council  Regulation  No.  4064/89). 
98ey  contrast,  the  United  States  Department  of  Trade  considers  such  restrictions  on  1 
case-by-case  bash,  applying  a  "rule  of  reason"  to  vertical  agreements  which  may  generate 
pro-competitive efficiencies.  See  GATT  (1992a},  p.  136. 
In  June  1991,  the  Commission  imposed  a  fine  of  ECU2  million  on  Tost·dba  Europa  GmbH 
(TEG)  for  having  impeded  parallel  trade  within  the  EC.  In  exclusive  distribution  agreements 
with  independent  importers  in  several  member  States,  concluded  between  1975  and  1981,  TEG  had 
included  an  export  prohibition  clause.  The  Commission  found  only  a  small  number  of  cases 
where  this  clause  had  been  put  into  effect.  However,  its  Decision  tie 1  d  that  the  export 
prohibitions  per  se  had  infringed  Article  85:1  of  the  EEC  1reaty;  they  would  have  not 
qualified  for  an  exemption  under  Article  85:3  since  they  d1d  not  appear  "to  be  indispensable 
to  any  improvement  in  distribution"  and  were  "likely  to  be  detrimental  to  consumers". 
(Commission  Decision  No.  91/532).  See  also  Section  V.3(iii){c). 
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- EC  competition  law  does  not  restrict  practices  which  impinge  solely  on 
third  countries.  It  applies, 
9
eowever,  to  export  cartels  if  these  have 
repercussions  on  the  EC  market. 
211.  EC  authorities  also  appear  to  have  refrained  from  acting  against 
export  restraints  imposed  by  third country authorities  on  shipments  to  the 
EC.  Such  restraints  have  been  considered  to  go  beyond  the  scope  of 
Article  85.  A  Commission  Decision  dating  from  1974,  suggests  that  it is 
irrelevant  in  this  connection  whether  or  not  any  such  restrictions  are 
based on an agreement with the  Community;  Article  85  might,  however,  apply 
if addition~l measures  or practices  are  used by  the  companies  concerned or 
if foreign  Government  involvement  is  ~imited to  authorising or  encouraging 
rather than  imposing  the  restraints.10 
212.  In 1985,  the  European  Court  of Justice  ruled  that  sales  at concerted 
prices  within  the  EC  by  extra-Community  suppliers  were  to  be  regarded  as 
restricting  competition within  the  meaning  of Article  85.  The  Court .held 
that  such  action  fell  within  the  CoiDJt· ·:tities'  jurisdiction  because  "the 
decisive  factor  is  where  the  agreement,  d~cisioh or  concerted  practice  is 
implemented  rather  that  where  it  is  fo·  nd".  'fhe  companies  involved  were 
therefore made  subject to  EC  competition law.10 
213.  This  ruling  does  not,  however,  cover  situations  in  which  the 
Commission  or  a  national  government has  initiated self-restraints  in direct 
contacts  with  foreign  industries  (such  as  the  Communities'  current 
arrangement  with  Turkisb  textiles  exporters;  see  Section V.3(vii)).  The 
focus  of  Article  85  on  arrangements  between  undertakings  seems  to  imply 
that such  cases would not  infringe  EC  competition law. 
214.  As  in most  developed market  economies,  there  is  a  constant  tension in 
the  EC  between considerations of competition policy and  those  of industrial 
99severa1  national  competition  laws  allow  in  general  that  such  agreements  may  be  exempt 
in  view  of  competitheness  on  external  markets.  As  noted  in  the  first  TPRM  report,  under 
German  competition  law  export  cartels  must  be  notified  to  the  Federal  Cartel  Office.  While 
they could  be  prohibited  by  the  Federal  Minister  of  Economics,  there  have  been  no  such  cases 
so  far.  Spanish  competition  law  provides  an  exemption  for  export  cartels  in  so  far  as  they 
are  compatible  with  international  treaties.  While  export  cartels  are  not  covered  by  Greek 
legislation,  provision  is  made  to  include  them  by  further  legislative action.  · 
100According  to  Marques  Mendes  (1991)  who,  in  turn,  refers  to  a  Commission  Decision  of 
29  November  1974  (ball  bearings).  , 
101European  Court  of  Justice,  cases  85,  104,  114,  116,  117  and  125  to  129/85 
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102  development.  This  tension  is  reflected  in  statements  and  legal  texts 
which,  on  the  one  hand,  emphasize  the  advantages  of  greater  industrial 
integration for  technological development  or sectoral restructuring and,  on 
the  other,  express  competition  policy  conl~~ns  related  to  any  ensuing 
structural rigidities or market  distortions.  In this  light,  Commission 
reports  on  competition  policy  have  repeatedly  emphasized  the  need  to  set 
limits  on  economic  restructuring  ("for  the  sake  of effective  competition") 
and  to  assign  competition  policy  "a  leading  role  in  safeguarding  a  marf8' 
economy  within  the  framework  of  the  completion  of  the  internal market". 
Such  considerations  also  seem  to  have  guided  a  recent  decision  to  block  a 
proposed  merger  (Aerospatiale-Aleniajde  Havilland),  the  only  such 
h"b"  .  f  .  h  EC  105  pro  1  ltlon so  ar  1n  t  e  . 
215.  There  is  no  independent  "European  Cartel  8tfice"  and  no  such 
blueprint  appears  currently  under  consideration.1  The  Commission's 
Directorate  General  IV  continues  to  be  one  of  the  few  competition 
authorities  in  the  world  which  ts  not  formally  independent  from  the 
executive.  Its  fun.ctions  range  f¥om  developing  rules  and  guidelines  to 
policing  1  prosecuting  and  preparing  the  final  decisions  which  are  then 
taken  by  the  Commission  as  a  body.  All  draft  decisions  on  individual 
cases,  including  .exemptions  undl3r  Article  85: 3  I  are  discussed  with 
representatives  of  member  States  .:.n  an  Advisory  Committee  ·on  Restrictive 
Practices  and Monopolies.  The  same  applies  to  draft regulations  concerning 
block  exemptions. 
102Ehlermann  (1992b). 
According  to  Mr.  Ehlermann,  head  of  the  Commission's  Directorate  on  Competition  Policy 
(DG  IV),  both  approaches  are  complementary;  competition  policy  is  considered  "one  essential 
element  of  industrial  policy  vital  to  wider  EC  industrial  competitiveness". 
103see,  for  example,  the  presentation  by  Marques  Mendes  (1991). 
Article  13-Qf  of  the  EEC  Treaty  stipulates  that  "the  Community's  aim  shall  be  to 
strengthen  the  scientific  and  technological  basis  of  European  industry  and  to  encourage  it to 
become  more  competitive  at  international  level"  (para.  1).  It  further  stipulates  that  "in 
the  achievement  of  these  aims,  spec i a  1  account  sha 11  be  taken  of  the  connection  between  the 
common  research  and  technological  development  effort,  the  establishment  of  the  ;nternal 
market  and  the  implementation  of  common  policies,  particularly  as  regards  competition  and 
trade"  (para.  3). 
104EC  Commission  (1989). 
105The  Commission  has  made  its  approval  of  several  other  mergers  subject  to  the 
abolition  of  certain  structural  links  of  the  participants  with  other  companies.  The  cases 
involved  Alcatel/Telettra,  Magneti  Marelli/CEAC,  Bosch/Varta,  Accor/Wagon-Lits, 
Nestl6/Perrier  and  OuPont/ICI.  In  total,  the  Co!Miission  has  been  notified  of  121  planned 
mergers  since  September  1990  of  which  it  approved  92  without  qualifications; 
15  notifications  were  considered  not  to  fall  within  the  purview  of  EC  legislation  (situation 
in  mid-October  1992).  According  to  Handelsblatt,  15  October  1992. 
106For  more  details  see  Ehlermann  (1992a). 
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Commission officials have  noted that the  institutional links within a 
common  body  contribute  to  avoiding  inconsistencies  in  the  application  of 
different 8olicy  instruments,  for  example,  of  anti-trust  and  anti-dumping 
measures.1  7  On  the  other  hand,  given  the  economic  and  political 
sensitivity of many  areas  of competition policy,  not  least mergers,  it has 
been questioned whether  the present framework  ensures  adt8~ate standards of 
transparency,  political independence  and public control .. 
(b)  Competition policy at national  level 
217.  Articles  85  and  86  are  directly  applicable  in  the  member  States. 
Offended  parties  may  lodge  complaints  before  national  courts  with  the  aim 
of  having  declared  null  and  void  any  infringements.  Howeve~,  this 
procedure  appears  to  have  played  no  substantial  role  so  far. 10  The 
possibilities  of  national  authorities  to  issue  prohibitions  under 
Articles  85  and  86  are  limited  to  cases  in  which  the  Commission  has  not 
initiated the  relevant proceedings. 
218.  Member  States'  own  competition  laws  are  applicable  in parallel  to  EC 
law.  Companies  have  thus  to  comply  with  both  the  EC  and  the  national 
requirements.  A  ruling  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice  has,  however, 
specified that "this parallel application ... can only be  allowed in so far 
as  it  does  not  prejudice  the  uniform  application  throughout  the  common 
market  of  the  Community  rules  on  cartels  and  of  tpf  full  effects  of  the 
measures  adopted  in  implementation of  those  rules".  0  This  means,  on the 
one  hand,  that cartels  infringing Article  85:1  cannot  be  declared valid or 
otherwise  legalized  under  member  States'  national  law  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  cooperation  agreements,  once  exempted  by  the  Commis\\1n  under 
Article 85:3,  cannot be  prohibited by member  States'  authorities. 
107According  to  the  Commission,  it  has  recently  intensified  efforts  to  improve,  as  far 
as  confidentiality  requirements  allow,  cooperation  between  the  anti-dumping  and  anti-trust 
units  (see also  Section  IV.2(iv)(e)). 
108The  President  of  the  German  Federal  Cartel  Office,  Mr.  Wolf,  sees  an  urgent  need  for 
a  European  Cartel  Office  in  order  to  guarantee  transparency  of  competition  policy,  in 
particular  in  the  merger  area.  According  to  Mr.  Wolf,  "merger  control  is  one  of  the  most 
dirigiste  instruments  of  competition  policy ....  Controls  must  ensure  that  its  use  is 
legitimate.  The  rational  behind  a  decision  must  be  made  public."  (Handelsblatt, 
16  September  1992;  translation  by  GATT  Secretariat.) 
109According  to  Marques  Mendes  (1991). 
110case  14/68,  1969  (Wilhelm  vs.  Bundeskartellamt). 
Since  Article  65  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  also  extends  to  regional  or  local  arrangements 
(contrary  to  EEC  legislation),  there  is  much  less  scope  for  the  application  of  national 
cartel  law  if the  companies  involved  produce  or  supply  ECSC  products. 
111The  situation  is  different  in  the  area  of  market  control.  Concentrations  of  a 
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219.  The  Commission  takes  the  view  that  all  practices  liable  to  affect 
intra-EC  trade  are  subject  to  Community  rules.  This  position  is  based  on 
the  case  law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  which  uses  a  wide  definition  of 
"affecting  intra-EC  trade",  covering  actual  or  potential,  direct  or 
indirect trade effects of restrictive business behaviour.  According to the 
Commission,  moreover,  the  national  regimes  have  tended  over  time  to 
converge  with  EC  law  and  practice  w\\~out formal  harmonization  initiatives 
("soft or voluntary harmonization"). 
220.  In  recent  years,  several  meetings  have  been  held  with  national 
competition experts with  a  view  to  intensifying cooperation and encouraging 
the  application  of  EC  law  by  the  member  States.  As  indicated  above,  an 
Advisory  Committee,  comprising experts  from  member  States,  meets  frequently 
to  discuss  preliminary  draft  decisions  on  individual  cases  and  proposed 
legislation. 
(c)  International cooperation 
221.  In  view  of  the  increasing  interdependence  of  national  markets,  the 
Commission  has  stressed  the  need  to  conduct  and  coordinate  competition 
policy  in  an  international  context.  While  its stated first priority is to 
insist  that  existing  competition  laws  are  enforced  effectively  in  the 
markets  of  trading  partners,  the  Commission  favours  the  adoption  of 
adequate  legislation,  ff  necessary,  and  of  international  agreements  to 
facilitate  cooperation.  3  Remedial  action  in  the  event  of  frictions  may 
include  representations  to  the  competition  authorities  of  the  relevant 
jurisdictions,  initiatives  under  the  bilateral  anti-trust  agreement  with 
the  United  States,  or,  in  the  case  of  Japan,  recourse  to  the  mechanisms 
provided under  the  OECD  Recommendation  (see below).  GATT  Articles XXII  and 
XXIII  might  be  invok~d  if  the  neglect  of  competition  rules  results  in 
nullification  or  impairment  of  benefits  accruing  under  the  General 
Agreement. 
(Footnote  Continued) 
Community  dimension  are  under  sole  EC  jurisdiction;  the  competition  rules  of  member  States 
are not  applicable  ("one  stop  shop"  principle). 
112cases  in  point,  referred  to  by  the  Commission,  are  ne~ competition  laws  in  Belgium 
and  Italy and  proposals  currently discussed  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
113A  recent  Commission  report  on  the  electronics  and  information  technology  industry 
notes  that  "if  abuses  and  unfair  practices  can  be  shown  to  exist  (in  this  sector},  pressure 
will  be  brought  to  bear  on  the  relevant  authorities.  Identification of  specific obstacles  to 
fair competition,  followed  by  pressure  on  the  public  authorities  has  brought  positive  results 
in  other  sectors ...  Partly  as  a  reaction  to  international  criticism,  Japanese  competition 
policy  is  being  reformed  and  strengthened.  The  Japanese  and  U.S.  authorities  must  be 
pressurised  to  go  further  in  this  direction  so  as  to  bring  about  a  situation  where  the  main 
international  trading  partners  can  operate  under  roughly  equivalent  competHion  rules".  EC 
Commission  (199lb). C/RM/S/36A 
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222.  The  Commission  considers  the  OECD  Recommendation  concerning  co-
operation  on  restrictive  business  practices,  passed  in  1986,  a  useful 
framework  fff  action  and  seeks,  as  a  rule,  to  conform  with  its 
provisions.  (Formally,  the  member  States  and  not  the  EC  as  such  are 
covered  by  the  Recommendation.)  Since  1990,  the  EC  Commission  also 
participates  fully,  but  without  voting  rights,  in  the  work  of  the  UNCTAD 
Intergovernmental Group  on Restrictive Business  Practices. 
223.  In  September  1991,  a  cooperation  agreement  on  anti-trust  issues  was 
concluded with  the  United  States.  The  agreement  provides  a  framework  for 
information  exchange,  notification,  consultation  and  cooperation 
procedures.  This  includes  cooperation  between  the  EC  Commission  and  the 
competent U.S.  authorities  (Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
and  the  Federal  Trade  Commission)  in cases  where  both  parties  apply  their 
competition rules  to related situations.  Under  the  terms  of the  agreement, 
either  signatory  shall  seek  to  take  into  account  the  other's  principal 
interests,  while  applying  its  own  legislation  and  pursuing  iii  own 
interests  within  its  jurisdiction  (the  principle  of  "comity").  5  In 
addition,  a  "positive  comity"  provision allows  a  party  to notify the  other 
of  anti-competitive  activities  on  that  party's  territory  which  are 
adversely  affecting  its  important  interests.  On  receipt  of  such  a 
notification,  the  competent authorities are  then to  consider whether or not 
to  initiate  enforcement  activities  or  to  expand  ongoing  activities  to  the 
case  concerned.116  Similar agreements  are said to exist between the United 
States  and  Canada,  Australia and Germany. 
224.  Competition  rules  are  also  important  elements  of  the  recently 
concluded  EEA  Agreement  and  the  "Europe  Agreements"  with  the  Czech  and 
Slovak Federal Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland. 
225.  Competition policy  under  the  EEA  Agreement  is  founded  on  EC  and  EFTA 
pillars.  All  practices  liable  to  impinge  on  trade  between  the  EEA 
participants  are  subject  to  rules  similar  in  substance  to  EC  competition 
114EC  Commission  (1992a). 
115Accordingly,  authorities  in  one  jurisdiction  are  expected  to  exercise  restraint  in 
the  application  of  domestic  laws  and  regulations  if  the  positive  aspects  for  its  own 
interests are  likely  to  be  outweighed  by  negative effects  on  important  interests  of the  other 
party. 
116see  also  EC  Commission  (1992a). 
The  agreement  was  signed  by  the  EC  Commission  on  behalf  of  the  Community.  The 
Government  of  France,  considering  that  the  Commission  has  surpassed  its  competence,  has 
brought  the  case  before  the  European  Court  of  Justice  with  the  objective  of  annulment.  The 
Commission  gave  the  view  that  the  complaint  would  not  affect  the  application  of  the 
agreement;  its conclusion  was  fully  covered  by  the  powers  conferred  on  the  Commission  under 
Articles  85  and  86  of  the  EEC  Treaty  (according  to  ~aro,  11  January  1992). C/RM/S/36A 
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law.  Jurisdiction is based  on  the  principle that cases will be  dealt with 
by  the  Commission  if  trf~; between  EC  member  States  is  affected  and,  if 
not,  by  the  EFTA  pillar.  If trade  between~ Community  country  and  an 
EFTA  participant is affected,  the  case will be  treated by  the  Commission if 
two-thirds of the parties'  turnover  in the  EEA  is achieved on  EC  territory, 
otherwise  by  the  EFTA  pillar  (the  EFTA  Surveillance  Authority).  By 
contrast,  all  merger  cases  covered  by  the  relevant  EC  \1~islation will be 
dealt with,  for  the whole  of the  EEA,  by  the  Commission. 
226.  The  competition rules contained in the  Europe  Agreements  (Association 
Agreements  wi~h the  Czech  and  Slovak Federal  Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland) 
extend  to  similar  areas  and  practices,  and  are  to  be  inteffgeted  in  the 
same  way,  as  those  under  the  EEC  and  the  ECSC  Treaties.  The  Joint 
Committees  under  the  Agreements  are  mandated  to  develop  rules  for 
· implementation  within  three  years.  In  the  event  of  friction  (e.g.  the 
occurrence  of  serious  prejudice  to  a  party's  interests  or  material  injury 
to  its  industry)  "appropriate  measures"  may  be  taken  after  consultations 
within the Joint Committee. 
(d)  State monopolies,  Government-owned  enterprises  and  regulated sectors 
227.  Article  37  of  the  EEC  Treaty  requires  the  member  States  to  ensure 
that  State  trading  monopolies,  including  monopolies  delegated  to  third 
parties,  do  not  discriminate  in  intra-EC  trade.  In  addition,  Article  90 
specifies that  the  general  competition rules  of  the  Treaty  apply  to  public 
or  privileged  enterprises  (including  undertakings  which  provide  "services 
of general  economic  interest")  if the application of competition rules  does 
not  contravene  their tasks  (see also  Section V.3(v)).  In this context,  the 
Commission  is entrusted to  add\1~s directives or decisions  to member  States 
in order  to  ensure  compliance.  Recent  Commission  reports  have  stressed 
117Procedures  for  information  exchange,  cooperation  and  consultation  between  both 
"pillars" are laid  down  in  separate  Protocols  (No.  23  and  24)  to the  Agreement.  In  the  event 
of  disputes,  the  standard  dispute  settlement  provisions  under  the  Agreement  would  apply 
(Article 111). 
118If the  thresholds  of  the  EC  Merger  Regulation  are  fulfilled  within  the  EFTA  area 
itself,  the  case  concerned  will  be  dealt  with  by  the  EFTA  pillar  and  possibly  also  by  the 
affected  EC  member  States. 
119In  view  of  such  provisions,  which  go  far  beyond  the  Community's  "traditional"  free 
trade  agreements,  the  EC  Commission  has  portrayed  the  Europe  Agreements  as  an  important  step 
to  1  ntegrate  these  countries  "into  the  future  architecture  of  Europe"  (statement  in  the 
context  of this  TPRM  report). 
120A recent  ruling  by  the  European  Court  of Justice  upheld  a  Commission  Directive  which 
had  banned  exclushe  rights  in  the  area  of  telecommunications  terminal  equipment  (Directive 
No.  88/301).  The  Court  based  its  decision  on  Article 90  in  conjunction  with  Article  30  of 
(Footnote  Continued) CjRM/S/36A 
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the  need  to  open  up  markets  where  competition  between  member  States  is 
considered not  fully  developed,  including  areas  such  as  gas,  electricity, 
telecommunications,  postal  services,  air  and  maritime  transport,  banking, 
.  d  h  d"  .  1  121  1nsurance an  t  e  au 10v1sua  sector. 
228.  The  United  Kingdom  is  the  only  member  State  to.  have  notified  State 
trading  activities  under  Article XVII  of  the  GATT  in  recent  years.  The 
latest  notification,  of  1991,  updates  information  previously  supplied  on 
British Coal  (see first TPRM  report)  and  provi~~s a  revised presentation of 
the activities of the  Potato Marketing Board. 
229.  State  production  monopolies  play  a  dominant  role  in  the  tobacco 
sectors  of  France,  Italy  and  Spain.  Until  recently,  France  maintained 
price  controls  on  tobacco  products;  the  highest  French  administrative 
court  (Conseil  d'Etat)  considered  this  system  to  contravene  EC  law  (see 
Sector  V.2(viii)).  Recent  Commission  Reports  on  Competition  Policy 
indicate  that  certain  headway  has  been  made  in  dismantling  import 
monopolies  for petrol in Greece,  Spain and  Portugal .. 
230.  Deregulation  and privatization initiatives  launched  by  member  States 
since the initial TPRM  review are reported to  include: 
(i)  in  Greece:  public  flotation  of  Government  shares,  via  the 
National  Bank,  in  a  shipyard  and  various  othel
23
companies 
(furniture,  wine  and  spirits,  steel,  printing);  almost 
complete  price liberalization,  including  the  removal  of  all 
existing  price  and  profit  controls,  in  areas  such  as  petrol, 
motor  vehicles,  car  parts,  soaps  and  detergents,  gas, 
agricultural  m~chinery,  sanitary  -ware,  electrical  household 
equipment,  toys,  paper,  sports  wear,  salt,  animal  feed,  dairy 
products,  pasta,  sausages,  beer,  meat  and  non-alcoholic 
beverages  (controls  have,  however,  been  continued  on  certain 
(Footnote  Continued) 
the  Treaty  (prohibition  on  quantitative restrictions  and  measures  of equivalent  effect)  while 
the  Commission  had  also  referred  to  Articles  37,  59  (freedom  to  provide  services)  and  86. 
(For  details  see  Common  Market  Law  Review,  Vol.  28  (1991),  No.4.)  By  a  new  decision  of 
17  November  1992  (cases  271/90,  281/90  and  289/90)  the  Court  upheld  another  Commission 
Directive  which  had  banned  exclusive  rights  in  the  area  of  telecommunication  services.  The 
decision  is  based  again  on  Article  90,  this  time  in  conjunction  with  Articles  59  and  86  of 
the  Treaty. 
121Ec  Commission  (1992a). 
122GATT  document  L/6797/Add.  4,  20  March  1991.  (Notifications  by  other  member  States 
date  back  to  the first  half  of  the  1980s.) 
123Nachrichten  fOr  AuBenhandel,  9  April  1991. C/RM/S/36A 
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varieties  of  white  bread,  infant  food
1 
pharmaceuticals, 
24  fresh and  frozen fruit and vegetables); 
some 
(ii)  in  Italy:  legislation  with  a  view  to  transforming  IRI  (the 
main public  sector holding),  EN!  (the  State oil holding),  ENEL 
(the  national  electricity  concern),  and  INA  (the  national 
insurance  company)  into  joint  stock  companies  under  public 
administratioy
25
(IRI  alone  represents  over  4.5 per cent  of 
Italy's GDP); 
(iii)  in  Portugal:  reprivatization  of  Petrogal  (petrochemicals), 
Siderurgia  Nacional  (steel)  and,  possibly,  privatization  of 
comp~nies in the  chemii~t'  pulp  and paper,  transport,  financial 
and 1nsurance sectors; 
(iv)  in  Germany:  subsequent  to  unification,  a  large-scale 
transformation  of  the  East  German  economy  with  a  view  to 
privatizing,  dissolving  and/or  deregulating State  holdings  and 
industrial  conglomerates;  of  the  West  German  State-owned 
sector,  Deutsche  Lufthansa,  Deutsche  Bundesbahn  (the  German 
railway  monopoly)  and  Deutsche  Bundespost  Telekom  (the  tele-
communications  branch  of  the  federal  postal  service)  have  been 
named  as  candidates  for  full  (Lufthansa)  or  partial 
privatization;127  the  Government's  stake in Deutsche Airbus was 
abandoned  four  years  earlier  than  originally  scheduled  (see 
also Section V.3(ii)(b)). 
231.  The  above  initiatives,  most  of which are still in an embryonic  stage, 
appear not  only driven by  efficiency considerations  and  the  aim  of opening 
and  revitalizing  long-entrenched  markets,  but  also  by  a  need  to  reduce 
budget  deficits  or,  in  the  case  of  Deutsche  Airbus,  to  discard  a  serious 
trade irritant (Section V.3(ii)(b)). 
124Nachrichten  fur  AuBenhandel,  14  March  1992. 
125Nachrichten  fur  AuBenhandel,  4  February  and  3  August  1992. 
126Nachrichten  fur  AuBenhandel,  13  February  1992. 
127International  Herald  Tribune,  22  June  1992. (ii)  Subsidies 
(a)  The  EC  legal framework 
C/RM/S/36A 
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232.  The  EC  Commission  considers  its  control  over  State  aid,  based  on 
Articles  92  and  93  of the  EEC  Treaty,  as  an  integral part of  EC  competition 
policy.  Article  92  prohibits  member  States,  subject  to  specified 
exceptions,  fromifanting State aid which distorts  competition and  affects 
intra-EC  trade.1  Article  93  empowers  the  Commission  to  keep  under 
constant review all aid systems  within  the  Community  and,  as  necessary,  to 
issue  decisions  and  initiate  proceedings  with  the  aim  of  terminating  or 
altering  any  such  systems.  The  Treaty  on  European  Union  leaves  these 
.  .  .  11  h  d -129  prov1s1ons v1rtua  y  unc  ange  . 
233.  Member  States  are  not  allowed  to  put  into  effect  aid  programmes 
without  EC  approval.  A ruling  by  the  European  Court  of Justice,  given  in 
late  1991,  confirms  the  direct  applicability  of  the  relevant  Treaty 
provisions  (Article  93: 3).  Accordingly,  any  affected  party  may  request 
courts  to  declare  illegal  aid  schemes  implemented  without  EC  permission. 
The  Court  also  confirmed  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Commission  to 
decide  on  the  COlJlP.atibility  of  national  aid  programmes  with  the  common 
k  b .  .  r30  mar  et o  JeCt1ves. 
234.  The  EC  rules  on  State  aid  have  also  been  fully  applicable  to  the 
territory of the  former  German  Democratic Republic  since German  unification 
in  October 1990.  (Prior  to  formal  unification,  the  Commission  was  kept 
informed  by  the  German  Government  of  State  aid  granted  in  east  Germany). 
Some  temporary  exceptions  are,  however,  provided under  the  sector-specific 
aid  directives  for  shipbuilding  and  steel  (Sections V.3(ii)(c)  and 
V. 3 (vi)).  The  specific  regional  aid  schemes  for  West  Germany• s  former 
128For  details  see  GATT  (199lb). 
129The  list  of  exceptions  - aid  that  !!!!l  be  considered  compatible· with  the  common 
market  - has  been  prolonged  to  include  the  promotion  of  culture  and  heritage  conservation  to 
an  extent  that  does  not  affect  trading  conditions  and  competition  contrary  to  the  coanon 
interest. 
Article 92.  as  framed  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  would  continue  to  provide  legal  cover 
for  aid  destined  for  regions  affected  by  the  division  of  Germany  "in  so  far  as  such  aid  is 
required  in  order to  compensate  for  the  economic  disadvantages  caused  by  that division". 
130EC  Commission  (1992a). 
A  recent  Commission  Communication  (91/C  273/02)  specifies  guidelines  and  reporting 
requirements  for  any  financial  benefits  granted  to  government-owned  companies  ( i ncl udi ng 
capital  injections,  loans  and  guarantees).  The  Communication  builds  on  Articles  92  and  93  of 
the  EEC  Treaty,  a  previous  Commission  Directive  (No.  80/723)  on  the  transparency of  financial 
relations  between  member  States  and  public  undertakings,  and  the  case  law  developed  by  the 
European  Court  of  Justice. C/RM/S/36A 
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eastern border areas wert  terminated in 1992;  applications  could be  lodged 
until 30  September  1991.  3 
235.  In 1991,  member  States  informed  the  Commission  of a  total of 472  new 
subsidy projects  (excluding agriculture,  fisheries  and transport).  This is 
by far  the highest number  of proposals  ever notified,  up  from  less than 300 
in  1989.  More  than  four-fifths  of  all  cases  were  approved  without 
objections.  In  contrast,  the  Commission  detected  145  cases  where  member 
States  had  failed  to  notify;  of  these,  29  were  deefJ~ to  contravene  the 
relevant Treaty provisions  (Article  92)  in substance. 
(b)  Provisions  in preferential agreements 
236.  The  EEA  Agreement  (Article  61)  extends  the  application of A\)\cle  92 
of  the  EEC  Treaty  to  the  whole  of  the  European  Economic  Area.  The 
review  functions  on  the  EC  side  are  conferred  on  the  Commission,  as 
provided  by  Article  93  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  while  the  EITA  Surveillance 
Authority is  to play  this role  for  the  EITA  pillar  (Section II.5(ii)).  An 
Annex  to  the  Agreement  enumerates  the  relevant pieces  of  EC  legislation to 
be  taken  into  account  in  this  context  (including,  for  example,  the  EC 
frameworks  for sectoral and regional aid);  and  a  PI~~ocol to  the Agreement 
specifies  the procedures for providing information.  If an aid scheme  is 
deemed  to  distort  competition  within  the  EEA,  the  Agreement  foresees  an 
exchange  of  views  between  both  sides  and,  as  necessary,  consultations 
within  the  Joint  Committee.  In  the  absence  of  commonly  acceptable 
solutions,  the  affected party would  be  entitled to  take  measures  to offset 
the resulting distortions of competition. 
131 Investments  in  some  of  the  areas  concerned  continue  to  qualify  for  support,  at 
significantly  lower  subsidy  rates,  under  Germany's  general  regional  SUPROrt  scheme  which  is 
operated  jointly  by  the  Federal  and  lander  Governments  ("Improvement  of  Regional  Economic 
Structures"). 
132The  Commission  notes  that  the  increased  number  of  non-notified  projects  reflects 
both  an  intensification  of  its  monitoring  activities  and  the  granting  of  subsidies  by 
regional  and  local  governments  out  of  non-notified  budget  appropriations  made  in  previous 
years  (EC  Commission,  1992a). 
133However,  the  Agreement  does  not  contain  the  derogation  clause  of  Article 92:2(c)  of 
the  EEC  Treaty,  under  which  aid "shall  be  considered compatible  w;th the  connon  11arket"  in  so 
far  as  it  is  required  to  compensate  for  the  economic  disadvantages  -caused  by  &en~any'  s 
division.  Any  further  recourse  to  this  provision,  e.g.  in  view  of  support  programmes  on  the 
territory of  the  former  GDR,  could  thus  lead  to  a  situation  where  State  aid,  granted  under  a 
mandatory  exemption  from  EEC  law,  infringes  on  the  EEA  Agreement.  However,  the  Connission 
has  indicated  in  the  context  of  this  TPRM  report,  that  it  views  Article  92:2(c)  as  no 
suitable  legal  basis  for  subsidies  paid  in  eastern  Germany.  Until  the  issue  is  finally 
settled,  such  aid  would  be  scrutinized  by  the  Commission  in  accordance  with  the  normal 
criteria for exemptions. 
134The  Commission  considers  its  Surveys  on  State  Aid  (see  below)  an  appropriate  basis 
for  information  exchange  under  the  Agreement. C/RM/S/36A 
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237.  The  Europe  Agreements  provide  that  trade-distorting  subsidies,  like 
other anti-competitive  practici~S are  to be  interpreted in the light of the 
EC  and  ECSC  rules  (see  above).  As  long as  the Joint Committees  have not 
adopted  rules  for  the  implementation  of  the  Agreements  in  this  area,  the 
relevant GATT  Articles  (VI,  XVI  and XXIII)  apply.  Furthermore,  the parties 
are  required  to  respect  GATT  procedures  whenever  they  take  action against 
injurious  practices.  Agriculture  and  fisheries  are  excluded  from  the 
provisions  on State aid. 
(c)  Main  areas  of  EC  and national subsidization 
238.  Slightly more  than half of the  EC  draft budget  for  1993,  amounting to 
ECU  65.7  billion  (commitment  appropriations),  is  reserved  for  agriculture. 
This  share  has  declined  by  almost  30  percentage  points  since  the  late 
1970s,  reflecting mainly  the  expansion of other spending categories,  rather 
than a  reduced financial  impact of  EC  farm policies  (Charts  IV.2  and  IV.3). 
Structural  funds  and  ot~gr  structural  measures  account  for  about 
30  per cent of the budget;1  research spending amounts  to  a  slightly over 
3  per cent  (ECU  2. 1  billion) .  ECU  1. 1  billion  are  destined  for  the  PHARE 
programme  of support  for  the  economic  restructuring  of eastern  and  central 
European countries. 
239.  While  financial  support  for  agriculture  is  granted  mainly  out of the 
Communities'  budget,  subsidies  for  other  sectors,  including  transport, 
mining  and  shipbuilding,  are  granted  exclusively  or  predominantly  by  the . 
member  States.  The  same  holds  for  a  variety  of  "horizontal"  aid  schemes. 
such  as  export  and  trade  promotion  (see  above),  support  for  R&D  and  for 
small  and  medium-sized  enterprises.  On  average,  13  per cent  of  national 
State  aid  is  destined  for  agriculture,  40  per cent  for  the  manufact':lring 
sector,  29  per cent  for  transport  and  18  per cent  for  coal  mining  (even 
though this sector is concentrated in very  few  regions). 
135For  at  least  five  years,  aid  ~ranted  in  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Federal  Republic. 
Hungary  and  Poland  is to  be  assessed  in  the  same  way  as  aid  programmes  destined for  Community 
regions  with  an  abnormally  low  standard of  living  or  serious  unemployment. 
1361n  1988,  the  European  Council  decided  to  double,  in  real  terms,  the  commitment 
appropriations  for  structural  purposes  - predominantly  support  for  backward  regions  - by 
1993.  For  more  information  see  GATT  (199lb). C/RM/S/36A 
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Chart IV.2 
Total EC budget and EC  spending on  agriculture, 1978-93 
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Chart IV.3 
EC  expenditure on agriculture by  category, 1983-92 
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240.  With  the  aim  of  providing  information  and  increasing  transparency, 
the  Commission  issues  surveys  on  State  aid in  the  EC,  by  member  State  and 
main  economic  activities.  The  third  'urvey,  covering  the  period  1988  to 
1990,  has  recently  been  made  public.13  While  indicating high  continuing 
levels  of  national  State  aid  - ECU  89  billion  per  year  across  all member 
States  (2. 2  per cent  of  Community  GDP)  - the  report  indicates  a  decline 
over  time.  In manufacturing,  State aid  came  down  from  4  per  cent  of value 
added in 1986-88  to  3~ per cent in 1988-90. 
241.  The  Community  average,  however,  masks  wide  disparities  among  the 
member  States.  For  example,  the  support  level  in  Italy  {6  per cent  of 
manufacturing ·value  added)  was  found  more  than twice  as  high  as  in Germany 
and  three  times  higher  than  in  the  United  Kingdom. 138  Shipbuilding  alone 
accounted  for  one-quarter  of  national  subsidies  extended  to  manufacturing 
.industry in member  States  between  1988  and  1990.  The  level  of support  for 
the  sector  - some  34  per cent  of  value  added  - has  remained  virtually 
unchanged  since  1986-88;  in  Italy,  the  support  intensity  exceeded 
80  per cent  {Tables  IV.8  and  IV.9). 
(d)  R&D  initiatives 
242.  In  the  late  1980s,  EC  Governments  and  companies  together  accounted 
for  some  28  per cent  of  R&D  expenditure  in  the  OECD  area.  Belgium  and 
Germany  displayed  the  highest  ratio  of  business  to  Government  financing 
(two  to  one  or  higher),  while  Spain,  Italy,  France,  Portugal  ~~d  Greece 
relied more  heavily  on  public  funding  {less  than  one  to  one). 1  Within 
the  public  sphere,  national  Government  expenditure  continues  to  dwarf  the 
Communities'  contribution.  For  example,  R&D  expenditure  by  the  German 
Linder  alone  is  estimated  to  have  reached  DM  9.1 billion  in  1989 
(15  per cent of total  R&D  spending  in Germany),  which  is almost  four  times 
higher  than  annual  funding  under  the  Third  EC  Framework  Programme . for 
Research  and  Development.  Any  national  and  regional  initiatives  must 
undergo  the  EC  notification  and  approval  procedures  (see  above).  The 
concept of subsidiarity  implies  that  Community  research  should be  confined 
137Ec  Commission  (1992c). 
138The  report  indicates  that  the  findings  for  certain  member  States  are  unreliable  or 
distorted  (Greece,  luxembourg  and,  possibly,  Belgium). 
The  figures  for  Germany  relate  to  the  "old"  Federal  Republic  prior  to  unification.  A 
recent  study  suggests  that  federal  government  subsidies,  including  tax  benefits,  to 
industries  in  eastern  Germany  grew  from  OM  11.5 billion  in  1990  to  DM  49.2  billion 
(ECU  24.3  billion)  in  1992  (budget  commitments).  Subsidies  in  the  western  part  of  the 
country  are  estimated  to  have  risen  from  DM  80.9  billion  (1990)  to  DM  86.5  billion  (1992) 
which  is about  3.1  per  cent  of west  German  GOP.  DIW  Wochenbericht,  No.  46,  12  November  1992. 
1390ECD  (1992). C/RM/S/36A 
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to  purposes  where  it  is  deemed  more  efficient  than  national  or  other 
international activities in the public or private sphere. 
243.  The  EC  Framework  Programme  is  designed  to  serve  as  a  catalyser  for 
common  projects.  Community  funding  under  the  programme  is  in  general 
limited to  SO  per cent  of project cost,  contingent  on  the  participation of 
at  least  two  independent  industrial  partners  from  more  that  one  member 
State.  The  programme  is  complemented  by  certain  other  Community  R&D 
projects  with  a  strong  regional  policy  orientation  (S~bDE,  STAR)  as  well 
as by  Europe-wide  initiatives  such  as  EUREKA  and  COST.  4  For  an overview 
see Table  IV.lO. 
244.  Many  of  these  initiatives  are  focused  on  information  and 
communication  technologies.  These  account  for  almost  two-fifths  of 
Community  R&D  funding.  This  has  contributed  to  establishing  a  multi-
layered  system  of  research  cooperation between  European  companies  involved 
in  the  sector.  For  example,  Siemens  is  reported  to  participate  in  more 
than  SO  ESPRIT  initiatives,  allowing  for  research  links  in  areas  like 
(i)  telecommunications  (with CGE-Alcatel,  Telettra,  Rascal,  British Telecom 
and  Telefonica) ;  ( ii) machinery  (with  Bosch,  Comau,  Dornier,  Krupp  f~~ 
Robotiker);  (iii)  computers  (with Bull,  ICL,  Nixdorf,  Digital and  IBM); 
(iv)  automobiles  (with  BMW,  Fiat,  Peugeot,  Renaut~~  Volkswagen);  and 
(v)  chemicals-materials  (with Akzo,  Elf and Hoechst). 
(e)  General  considerations 
24S.  Increased  disciplines  and  transparency  requirements  with  regard  to · 
national  State  aid  may  be  considered  a  necessary  element  of  the  Internal 
Market  programme.  The  removal  of  EC  internal  barriers  may  make  national 
markets  more  vulnerable  to  policy  distortions  emanating  from  other  member 
States;  an  argument  for  effective  central  control.  The  disciplines 
governing  national  State  aid  in  the  EC  are  in  fact  stricter  than  those 
140GATT  (199lb) . 
141 ICL  has  recently  ceased to  participate in  several  JESSI  projects.  (JESSI  is aimed  at 
developing  advanced  semi-conductors.)  Commission  officials  have  denied  newspaper  reports 
which  suggested  that  it  had  been  excluded  on  the  grounds  that  a  Japanese  company,  Fujitsu, 
had  acquired  a  majority  stake  (Journal  of  Commerce,  12  May  1991).  Rather,  other  project 
partners  had  decided,  based  on  strategic,  technological  and  similar considerations,  no  longer 
to  cooperate  with  ICL  in  certain  projects.  The  Comission  has  confirmed  that  Co•unity 
support  is  not  subject  to  ownership  requirements.  Pursuant  to  Article  58  of  the  EEC  Treaty, 
the  principle of  national  treatment  applies  to  subsidiaries of  any  company  established on  the 
territory of  the  Community. 
142oECD  (1992),  based  on  Mytelka  (1990},  "New  modes  of  international  competition:  The 
case of strategic partnering  in  R&D",  Science  and  Public  Policy,  October. C/RM/S/~6A 
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currentlt  imposed,  for  example,  on  the  Canadian  provinces  or  the  Swiss 
cantons. 
43  This  does  not,  however,  imply  that  the  level  of  support  is 
lower  in the  EC. 
246.  Policy  harmonization  or  centralization  would  not  necessarily  result 
in lower  levels of government  involvement overall.  An  additional layer may 
even contribute  to boosting,  rather than containing,  total public  spending. 
Administrations,  whether  in  the  public  or  private  sector,  are  in  general 
interested  to  expand  their  spheres  of  influence  and  to  acquire  new  tasks 
and  financial  responsibilities.  This  tendency  may  be  particularly 
pronounced  at  high  levels  of  government  and  in  the  absence  of  direct 
feedback mechanisms  between  increased spending and  taxation. 
247.  Yet  there  are  countervailing  forces.  If  Community  control  is 
considered  to be  credible  and  effective,  national  subsidy  programmes  would 
no  longer  afford a  competitive  edge  over producers  in other member  States; 
one  traditional motive  behind  such  initiatives would  thus  lose  its appeal. 
EC  programmes,  with  their coordination requirements,.cannot  be  expected  to 
serve  this  purpose.  Given  the  differences  in  economic  structures  and 
development  levels  among  the  member  States,  the  framing  of  common  schemes 
normally  proves  difficult  and  time-cpnsuming  which,  in  turn,  tends  to 
d .  b.  .  .  .  .  .  144  I  h  1  ~scourage  am  ~t~ous  new  ~n~t~at~ves.  t  may,  owever,  a  so  operate 
against swift reforms  of long-established mechanisms. 
(iii)  Taxation policies 
(a)  Value  added taxes 
248.  The  removal  of  EC  internal  frontiers  has  made  the  h~Lmonization of 
indirect  taxes  a  central  issue  in the  Internal Market  programme.  Existing 
VAT  rates  differ  markedly  between  member  States;  for  example,  Denmark 
operated a  value  added  tax at a  standard rate of  25  per cent  on all sales; 
Germany  maintained  two  rates,  7  and 14  per cent;  and  Italy  operated  five 
rates,  from  4  per cent  on  certain  basic  products,  ma~nly  food,  up  to 
143see  GATT  (199la)  and  (1992c). 
1441n  its first  TPRM  report  (page  27/28  of  Volume  II),  the  EC  Commission  stressed that 
trade  policy  decisions  must  take  into  account  the  capacity  of  individual  regions  to  adapt  to 
the  resulting  structural  changes.  When  the  costs  and  benefits  were  divided  between  regions 
within  the  same  member  State,  the  adjustment  process  had  the  same  implications  as  for  any 
other  GATT  contracting  party.  In  other  cases,  however,  where  the  budgetary  and  economic 
balance  within  the  Community  was  altered,  this  could  bring  about  unintended  social  and 
political  implications.  The  freedom  of  choice  in  the  design  of  Community  trade  policy  was 
therefore  limited  by  considerations  to offset  such  implications. C~/S/36A 
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38  per cent  on  specified  lu~ury goods  (e.g.  certain furs,  large  passenger 
145  cars  and pleasure vessels). 
249.  From  1993  onwards,  there  will  be  a  harmonized  system  of value-added 
taxes based  on  minimum  rates.  A  standard VAT  rate  of at least 15 per cent 
applies  throughout  the  Community.  In  addition,  member  States  may  operate 
one  or  two  reduced  rates  of at  least  5  per cent  on  a  specii_ied  range  of 
goods  and  services,  mainly  agricultural  and  food  products.  46  Existing 
rates below  the  5  per cent threshold,  including zero  rates  (for example,  in 
the United Kingdom),  may  be  maintained.147 
250.  VAT  has  so  far  been  levied  in  accordance  with  the  country-of-
destination principle.  This  means  that products  destined for  exportation, 
whether  to  other  member  States  or  third countries,  are  tax  exempt  in  the 
originating  member  State.  As  from  1  January 1993,  a  transitional  regime 
will  make  intra-EC  trade  subject  to  an  accounting  exercise,  based  on 
commercial  records  and  additional  reporting  requirements,  with  a  view  to 
maintaining  the  essence  of  the  principle.  The  arrangement  applies  {at 
least)  until  31  December  1996.  The  Council  is  due  to  decide  before  that 
date  on  a  definitive  reg~me,  including  the  minimum  VAT  rate(s).  The 
decision is  to be  taken unanimously. 
(b)  Excise  taxes 
251.  The  general  principles  governing  excise  duties  in  the  post-1992  era 
are  laid  down  in  a  Council  Directive  of  February  1992  (No.  92/12). 
Harmonized  systems  are  foreseen  for  alcohol  and  alcoholic  beverages, 
manufactured  tobacco  and  mineral  oils.148  Agreement  has  also  been  reached 
on  the  minimum  rates  to  be  applied  from  1  January  1993  or,  in  certain 
cases,  after  an  additional  two-year  transition  ~e~iod  (e. g.  tobacco  in 
Spain  and  mineral  oils  in  Greece  and  Luxembourg).  4  Intra-EC  commercial 
supplies  are  channelled through an  interlinked system of bonded warehouses; 
145situation  in  April  1992. 
146The  definitive  product  list is to  de  decided  upon  before  year-end  1994. 
147About  30  per  cent  of  private  consumption  of  goods  and  services  in  Ireland  and  the 
United  Kingdom  is  estimated to  be  zero  rated  {Bovenberg  and  Horne,  1992). 
148The  minimum  excise  tax  on  wine  was  set  at  zero  {in  Germany,  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal 
and  Greece,  wine  is  not  currently subject  to  excise  taxation). 
149The  Council  is  to  review  the  minimum  rates  every  two  years  (starting  from 
31  December  1994  at  the  latest)  in  the  light,  in  particular,  of  the  objective  of  the  proper 
functioning  of  the  Internal  Market. CfRM/S/36A 
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the  taxes are due  on  delivery to  the  final  customer.  Denmark  is allowed to 
continue certain restrictions and controls. 
252.  Other  national  excise  taxes  (e.g.  on  coffee,  cocoa,  tea,  salt, 
matches,  playing-cards,  automobiles)  are  not  scheduled  for  harmonization. 
Member  States  are  free  in principle  to  maintain  or  introduce  taxes  on all 
products  not subject  to  a  Community  arrangement  under  the  above  Directive. 
However,  this must not result in border formalities  in intra-EC trade. CfRM/S/36A 
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*************************************************************************** 
llote IV  .3:  EC  action on iaports of Atlantic sabmn since J11ZJUB.Z7  1990 
Salmon  imports  into  the  EC  are  subject  to  a  GAT!'  bound  tariff  of 
2  per cent.  The  Community's  main,  almost  exclusive  external  supplier  is 
Norway.  Salmon,  like all  fishery  products,  is not  covered  by  the  current 
free  trade agreement. 
Following  the  collapse of the  Norwegian  m~n~mum price  support  system 
in 1989,  the world market  was  faced  with a  glut of Norwegian  salmon at low 
prices  as  the  fish  farming  industry contracted.  Anti-dumping actions  were 
taken  in 1990  by the EC  and  the United States. 
(i)  Anti-dumping investigation,  2  February  1990-15  March  1991 
In  early 1990,  the  Commission  launched an  anti-dumping investigation, 
following  a  complaint  by  Scottish  and  Irish  producer  associations. 
According  to  the  Notice  of  Initiation  (90/C 25/05),  the  complainants 
claimed  that  imports  from  Norway  had  grown  from  some  21,000  tonnes  in 1986 
to an  estimated  75,000  tonnes  in  1989,  an  import  share  in  an  expanding EC 
market of 71  per cent  (1986/89).  EC  producers were  thus  required to reduce 
their  prices  by  nearly  20  per cent  in  the  second  half  of  1989,  with  a 
significant impact  on profitability. 
The  Commission'~ investigation resulted in a  finding of dumping  (at  a 
margin  of  11.3  per cent),  injury  and  a  causal  link.  However,  the 
Commission  found  that no  action was  needed  for  ~o reasons:  the  Norwegian 
Government had adopted a  series of measures  aimed at restricting the volume 
of  salmon  supplied  to  the  market,  and  the  Norwegian  industry  had  assumed 
the  management  of a  freezing  programme  with  a  view  to  preventing  market 
saturation  by  channelling  supply;  as  a  result,  prices.  had  appreciably· 
increased  from  the  beginning  of  1990  (see  GATT,  1992b).  The  Commission 
expected  the  situation  to  continue,  "given  the  Norwegian  Government's 
stated  wish  to  contribute  to  the  balanced  development  of  fresh  salmon 
exports  to  the  Community  while  respecting  traditional  trade  flows" 
(Commission  Decision No.  91/142). 
(ii)  Private price fixing arrangement,  2  January 1990-2 October 1991 
In  the  same  period,  from  late  December  1989,  associations 
representing Scottish and Norwegian  producers kept  in direct contact with a 
view  to  exchanging  information  on  minimum  prices  and  coordinating  their 
pricing strategy.  The  Norwegian  producers restored minimum  prices as  from 
2  January  1990.  The  Scottish  Salmon  Farmers'  Marketing  Board  noted  that 
this  had  "raised  general  market  price  levels  throughout  the  world";  and CfRM/S/36A 
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the Scottish Associations wrote  to  their members  urging  them  to bring their 
prices  into  line  with  the  new  Norwegian  prices.  However,  on  2  October 
1991,  the Board  informed its members,  as well  as its Norwegian  counterpart, 
that  it  was  not  its  function  to  influence  any  price  decisions;  in 
addition,  it withdrew earlier communications referring to Norwegian  minimum 
prices. 
A  Commission  Decision  of  July 1992  (No.  92/444)  held  that  the 
activities  of  the  two  associations  constituted  an  agreement  within  the 
meaning of Article 85:1  of the EEC  Treaty  (Section  IV.4(i)).  The  agreement 
had  as  its object  and  effect  the  restriction  or  distortion  of competition 
within  the  common  market;  it was  likely  to  have  an  appreciable  effect  in 
particular  on  trade  between  the  continental  and  the  salmon  producing  EC 
member  States.  Though  the  infringement  had  ended,  the  Commission 
considered  it  necessary  to  issue  the  Decision  to  clarify  the  legal 
situation  with  regard  to  the  relationship  between  anti-dumping  and 
anti-trust procedures. 
(iii)  Retrospective Community  surveillance,  1  July  1991-30 April  1993 
Noting  that  the  trend  in  imports  of  Atlantic  salmon  was  liable  to 
cause  serious  disturbances,  the  Commission  introduced retrospective  import 
surveillance  on  1  July 1991.  The  action  was  prolonged  by  subsequent 
regulations  (Commission  Regulations No.  1658/91,  3629/91,  1561!92  and 
3520/92). 
(iv)  Safeguard action  under GATT  Article XIX,  9  November  1991-
31  Hay  1992 
On  9  November  1991,  the  EC  made  imports of fresh  and  frozen  Atlantic 
salmon  from  all  origins  subject  to  minimum  import  prices  (modified  on 
21  November).  Notified as  safeguard  action  under Article XIX,  the  measure 
was  deemed  necessary by  the EC  in view of substantial  impor~s in  the  second 
half  of  1991,  at  abnormally  low  prices,  which  had  caused  the  prices  of 
commercially  similar  domestic  products  on  the  Community  market  to  fall  by 
up  to  25  per cent.  According  to  the  Community's  notification  (GATT 
document  L/6977  of  4  February 1992),  the  situation  had  "caused  serious 
difficulties  for  Community  production  and  would,  if maintained,  aggravate 
the injury caused  to  EC  producers of directly competing products''. 
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V.  TRADE  POLICIES  BY  SECTOR 
(1)  Recent  Policy Trends 
253.  Over  the  past  two  years,  the  Community  has  made  major  efforts  to 
harmonize  its sectoral policy  framework  by  abolishing national  derogations 
and strengthening  commo~ approaches.  In addition,  an ambitious ·farm reform 
package,  focusing  on  cereals,  beef and veal,  is  to  be  implemented  from  the 
1993/94  crop year. 
254.  In  most  cases,  harmonization  appears  to  have  improved  access 
conditions  to  EC  markets  for  industrial  products.  In  important  areas  -
such  as  telecommunications  - technical  trade  barriers  among  member  States 
have  been  removed  or  made  permeable  through  mutual  recognition;  public 
supply  monopolies  have  been  reduced  in  scope;  and  EC-wide  procurement 
markets  are  poised  to  replace  national  "fiefdoms".  Although  market 
unification,  per se,  should  enhance  trading opportunities  for  external  and 
internal  suppliers  alike,  new  Community  preferences  based  on  reciprocity 
provisions have  led to  transatlantic frictions. 
255.  Community-wide  controls  on  imports  have  replaced  a  variety  of 
national  regimes,  ranging  from  liberal  to  restrictive,  for  bananas  and 
canned  tuna.  Passenger  cars  imported  from  Japan  are  subject  to  a  new 
system of market  and  supply forecasts  which  is ultimately aimed at complete 
liberalization,  but currently  involves  a  degree  of trade  management. 
256.  The  recent  evolution of  the  domestic  and  international  economies  has 
increased  adjustment  pressures  on  a  number  of  sensitive sectors,  including 
fisheries,  steel and cars.  Recent  policy changes,  not only  in the  Internal 
Market  context but also in the  framework  of new  association agreements,  are 
about  to  undergo  their  first  tough  tests.  Safeguard  clauses  under  the 
Europe  Agreements,  which  have  already  been  used  to  introduce  bilateral 
restrictions  on  certain  steel  products,  are  available . in  the  event  of 
increased  inmports  causing,  or  threatening  to  case,  serious  injury  or 
serious  sectoral  and  regional  problems.  Specific  safeguard  provisions 
under  the  new  banana,  fisheries  and  tobacco  regimes  may  be  used  to  guard 
against  "serious  market  disturbances";  Commission  initiatives under  these 
provisions  can  be  overturned  only  be  a  qualified  majority  vote  in  the 
Council. 
(2)  Developments  in Agriculture,  Fisheries and Food Production 
CAP  reform 
257.  In  May  1992,  the  EC  Council  of  Ministers  agreed  on  significant 
changes  to  the  operation of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy.  The  decisions C/RM/S/36A 
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focused  on  the  structure  and  levels  of support  for  cereals,  beef  and veal. 
Other  sectors  - including  dairy,  which  is  the  most  highly  assisted  sector 
in  producer  subsidy  equivalent  (PSE)  terms  - are  relatively  unaffected 
(Sections  (i)  - (iii) below). 
258.  The  reforms  resulted  from  a  long  period of political  discussion and 
reflection  regarding  the  domestic  and  international  costs  of  EC  farm 
support.  In  1991,  the  Commission  identified four  deficiencies  in  the  CAP 
system:  (a)  the  stimulus  to  overproduction provided by price  intervention 
and production aids,  and  the  resulting costly buildup  of stocks;  (b)  the 
encouragement  given  by  the  system  to  intensive  production  techniques, 
leading  to  greater  pollution  and  impoverishment  of  land;  (c)  the 
concentration  of  income  support,  through  price  guarantees,  on  larger  and 
more  intensive  farms;  and  (d)  the  very  small  improvement  in  per capita 
purchasing power  of farmers  since  1975,  despite  a  real  increase2of  250  per 
.cent  in  the  Community's  farm  support budget  during  the  period.  From  the 
external  viewpoint,  the  most  obvious  impact  of  the  CAP  has  been  the 
contribution  made  by  EC  production  surpluses  to  the  distortion  of  world 
markets  for  major  commodities  and  the  frictions  set  up  within  the  trading 
system  by  international  competition,  particularly  between  the  EC  and  the 
United States,  in subsidized exporting. 
259.  The  reform package  approved by  the  EC  Council  is to be  applied over a 
three-year period from  1993-94  onward.  With significant price cuts for  the 
cereals and beef and veal sectors,  it departs  from  the previous  trend of EC 
farm  support,  while  maintaining  the  traditional  principles  of  "singl§ 
prices,  Community  preference,  responsibility  and  financial  solidarity". 
The  income  losses  ensuing  from  the  adjustments,  including  set  aside 
requirements,  are  to be  accompanied by  "full and  on-going  compensation ... 
through  c~pensatory  amounts  or  premiums  not  related  to  the  quantities 
produced".  Complementary  initiatives  are  intended  to  stimulate  a  shift 
towards  less  intensive  production  methods,  to  encourage  afforestation and 
early  retirement  of  farmers.  Product-specific  aspects  of  the  reform 
package  are dealt with below. 
11n  recent  years,  self-sufficiency  ratios  reached  136  per  cent  for  common  wheat 
(1989/90)  ~  122  per  cent  for  rye  and  barley  (1989/90) ~  134  per  cent  for  sugar  (1990/91); 
86  per  cent  for  fresh  fruit  and  105  per  cent  for  fresh  vegetables  (1989/90);  125  per cent 
for  wine  (1989/90);  100  per  cent  for  potatoes  (1989/90);  109  per  cent  for  beef  and  veal 
(1990);  104  per  cent  for  pigmeat  (1990);  81  per  cent  for  sheepmeat  and  goatmeat  (1990);  and 
105  per  cent  for  poultrymeut  (1990).  Butter  stocks  stood  at  332,000  tonnes  in  July 1992 
(public  and  private storage),  which  is about  one-fifth of  total  annual  consumption. 
2Ec  Commission  (1991g). 
3Ec  Commission  (1992i). 
4EC  Commission  (1992i). C/RM/S/36A 
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260.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  leaves  the  agricultural  policy  prov1.s1ons  of 
the  EEC  Treaty intact.  Accordingly,  the  CAP  would  continue  to be  based on 
the  five  basic  objectives  written  into  Article  39  of  the  EEC  Treaty: 
increasing agricultural  productivity;  ensuring  a  fair  standard  of  living 
for  the  agricultural  community;  stabilizing  markets;  assur'ing  the 
availability of supplies;  and  "reasonable" prices for consumers.  As  noted 
in  the  first  TPRM  report,  these  objectives  are  also  to  be  seen  in  the 
context  of  the  commercial  policy  aims  set  out  in  Article  110  ·("to 
contribute,  in the  common  interest,  to  the harmonious  development  of world 
trade,  the progressive abolition of5restrictions  on  international trade and 
the  lowering of customs barriers"). 
Levels  of assistance 
261.  ·  In  the  period  since  1990,  up  to  the  recent  reform  package,  EC 
agricultural  policies  remained  largely  unchanged.  Movements  in  farm 
support  were  roughly  in  line,  though  at  a  higher  level,  with  general 
developments  in  the  OECD  area.  After  a  temporary  decline  in  1989,  partly 
reflecting  the  impact  of  drought  on  cereal  prices,  support  regained  its 
1987  level in 1990  and  1991.  Average  net percentage  PSEs  for  the sector as 
a  whole  of  close  to  50 per cent  in  1990  and  1991  indicate  that  about 
one-half  of  EC  farm  revenue  results  from  policy  intervention,  either 
through border restrictions or by financial assistance  (Table V.l). 
262.  Price-based  support  remained,  in  the  period  under  review,  the 
centrepiece  of  the . Common  Agricultural  Policy.  OECD  estimates  for  1990 
show  that  around  65  per cent  of  total  EC  farm  support  was  borne  by 
consumers  through  higher  prices,  shielded  from  international  market 
developments  through  an  intricate  system  of  variable  import  levies  and 
export refunds  (Table V.3).  The  import  threshold prices used as benchmarks 
for  calculating  and  adjusting  the  levies  are  generally  set  above  the 
internal  market  level,  affording  domestic  producers  a  "Community 
preference". 
263.  In  view  of  soaring  production  surpluses  and  budgetary  strains, 
previously  open-ended  aid  mechanisms  have  been  .curbed  over  time  by  a 
variety  of  non-price-related  measures  aimed  at  directly  restricting 
production  levels  (e.g.  a  quota  regime  on  milk). or  the  use  of  inputs 
(retirement  schemes,  set-aside)  and  encouraging  a  shift  towards  more 
51n  addition,  as  noted  in  Section  11.4,  the  Maastricht  Treaty  contains  new  provisions 
on  "Development  Cooperation"  (Title  XVII),  requiring  Community  initiatives  to  complement 
nation  a 1  po 1 i c i es  and  to  foster,  among  other  things,  "the  smooth  and  gradua  1  integration  of 
the  developing  countries  into the  world  economy"  (Article 130u). C/RM/S/36A 
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extensive  farming  and  production  alternatives,  such  as  afforestation. 
Price  policy has  also,  in general,  become  more  prudent;  nominal  producer 
prices for  cereals  fell  by  some  3  per cent between  1985  and  1990,  implying 
a  real decline of about one-quarter. 
264.  However,  there  are  wide  differences  in  the  structure  of  support 
schemes  between product  areas.  For  example,  the  oilseeds  regime,  based  on 
financial  aid,  accounted  for  13  per cent  of  total  EC  expenditure  on 
agriculture  in  1991  (Table V.2).  EC  tobacco  growers  are  also  mainly 
supported through  the budget,  rather than by  trade barriers  (see below). 
265.  The  highest proportion of direct  financial  support  under  the  CAP,  on 
a  per  capita employment  basis,  goes  to  the  smaller northern member  States. 
Belgium,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands  and  Denmark  each  receive  EC  expenditure 
(per  worker)  considerably  above  the  average  (Table  AV .1).  However,  this 
reflects  national  specializations  in  products  for  which  budgetary 
expenditure  is  the  main  means  of  support,  and  gives  no  reliable  indica7ion 
of the overall  impact  of the  CAP  on different regions of the  Community. 
266.  In  addition  to  general  EC  support  mechanisms,  member  States  may 
operate  their  own  schemes,  subject  to  Community  approval.  For  example,  in 
1984,  Germany  was  authorized,  in  the  context  of agri-monetary  adjustmgnts, 
to  grant  compensation  to  farmers  through  the  value  added  tax  system.  In 
6"Set-aside"  programmes  are  mandatory  on  member  States,  but  applied  by  farmers  on  an 
optional  basis.  In  the  1991/92  marketing  year,  an  additional  set-aside  programme  was  offered 
as  a  temporary  supplement  to  the original  five-year  scheme  (GATT  (1991),  page  177).  Eligible 
producers  were  required  to  cease  production  on  at  1 east  15  per  cent  of  the  area  used  for 
crops  in  1990/91.  The  Commission  has  noted  that  only  2  per  cent  of  the  cereals  area  had  been 
set  aside  by  1991,  generally  low-yield  land.  While  the  stabilizer  schemes  for  cereals  and 
onseeds  may  have  halted  the  trend  of  steadily  increasing  production,  the  Commission  has 
recognized  that  they  "do  not  attack  the  underlying  prob  1  em ...  that  support  through  the  EAGGF 
remains  proportionate  to  the  quantity  produced"  and  that  "this  factor  preserves  a  permanent 
incentive  to  greater  production  and  further  intensification."  (EC  Confmission,  1991g).  As 
noted  in  Section  (iii)  below,  the  recent  farm  reform  package  includes  significant  changes  in 
the  conditions for  set-aside. 
Direct  production  limits,  e.g.  the  milk  quota  regime,  are  considered  by  the  Commission 
to  have  in  general  achieved  their objectives.  reflecting the  obligatory nature  of  the  schemes 
and  the  penalties  imposed  on  excess  production. 
7A  comprehensive  analysis  would  have  to  include  the  distributional  impact  of  border 
restrictions  (via  higher  prices)  and  to  consider  whether  support  for  a  small  part  of  the 
population  may  be  treated  as  if  it  had  benefited  a  region  as  a  whole.  Moreover,  in  a 
longer-term  perspective,  the  question  arises  whether  the  resources  devoted  to  agriculture 
could  have  been  used  more  effectively,  for  example  for  promoting  alternative  economic 
activities  in  the  areas  concerned. 
8The  income  loss  to  be  compensated  was  estimated,  in  1984,  to  amount  to  5  per cent  of 
net  production  va 1 ue.  The  scheme  was  ori gina  11 y  scheduled  to  be  phased  out  in  two  steps: 
two  percentage  points  should  be  cut  by  end-1988  and  the  remaining  three  points  in  1991. 
However  fo  11 owing  a  rev  a 1 uat ion  of  the  Deutsche  mark  in  1989.  the  former  component  was 
continued  in  a  modified  form  ("socio-structural  compensation").  Payments  are 
acreage-related,  with  a  minimum  and  maximum  threshold  level  per  farm. CfRM/S/36A 
Page  112 
1991,  such  income  support  comprised  two  elements:  "VAT  compensation"  of 
some  DM  1.6 billion  (ECU  790  million)  and  an  additional  DM  1.1 billion of 
"socio-structural  compensation".  In  1992,  in view  of  perceived  hardships 
resulting  from  the  scheduled phasing-out  of the  VAT  component,  Germany  was 
allowed  to  continue  providing  a  similar  value  of  compensation  on  a 
transitional  basis.  In  the  "old"  German  lAnder,  the  scheme  amounts  in 
practice  to  an  extension  of  the  "socio-structural"  compone~t;  transfers 
per holding  may  vary within  a  range  of  DM  1,500  and 16,000.  They  may  be 
complemented by other payments,  for  example  for  environmental  reasons. 
Trade  in farm products 
267.  While  EC  farm  exports  have  grown  in  parallel with  total  exports  in 
recent  years,  the  share  of  agricultural  products  (including  tropical 
products)  in  imports  has  fallen  ff8m  close  to  16  per cent  in  1986  to 
slightly  over  12  per cent  in  1990.  This  does  not  reflect  changes  in 
competitive  strength.  Many  EC  markets  for  temperate-zone  agricultural 
products  are  virtually  impossible  for  third  countries  to  penetrate  (with 
the  exception  of  oilseeds;  see,  however,  Section  (iv)  below),  and  EC 
exports  of  the  same  products  have  continuously  been  supported  through 
subsidies.  In  the  cereals  sector,  the  EC  has  increased  its  world  market 
share  by  some  5  percentage  points  since  the  early  1980s,  despite  higher 
domestic  production  cost  and  producer  prices  (Charts  V .1  and  V. 2).  EC 
exports currently represent about  one-fifth of world wheat  trade. 
268.  Chart V.3  traces  the  evolution of  EC  export  refunds  for major product 
categories  in  recent_ years.  In  the  1992  budget,  total  refunds  reached 
ECU  9. 7  billion,  as  compared  with  ECU  7. 7  and  10.1 billion  in  1990  and 
1991,  respectively. 
91n  east  Germany  (former  GDR),  payments  are  based  on  labour-input  and  not  subject  to 
ceilings.  In  order  for  the  scheme  to  be  continued  beyond  1992,  new  legislation  would  have  to 
be  passed  and  authorized. 
10setween  1986  and  1990,  the  share  of  agricultural  products  in  total  EC  exports 
fluctuated  between  8.4  and  8.7  per  cent  (8.5  per  cent  in  1990).  The  declining  share  of  farm 
products  among  EC  external  imports  may  be  attributed  partly  to  adverse  price  trends,  for 
example,  for  coffee  and  cocoa  (Table  AV.2}. 
-· Chart V.1 
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World exports of wheat and  wheat flour,  1980-92 
Market shares (per cent) 
50~--------------------------------------------------~ 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
- 1980181  D  1983184  g  1986187  miTID  1989190 
- 1982/83  - 1985/86  - 1988/89  - 1991192 • 
United States  Canada 
•  Including estimates and  forecasts. 
~:  International Wheat  Council. 
Chart V.2 
EC 
Wheat prices in France, Germany, Canada 
and  the United States, 1984/85 - 1990/91• 
US$ per 100kg 
Australia 
24f 
20  ' 
! 
,. .............................  ~  .................. . 
I ><  >E  >E I  ·. · · · · ·  · · · · · --....  ---. ---, 
I  \  r*~~~ 
Fraaoa 
! 
)(  ;, 
16 
Caaada 
8  /II 
Ualtact 8tataa 
1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90  1990/91 
a  Weighted average prices received by  farmers for all  types and all sales. 
b  Excluding deficiency payments. 
SJ:w..!::£1:  Annual ECE/FAO Price Reviews. C/RM/S/36A 
Page  114 
Chart V.3 
Export refunds for cereals, milk and milk products 
and beef, 1986-92 
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Agriculture  in trade  agreements 
269.  The  preferential  trade  agreements  concluded  by  the  Community  do  not 
cover  agricultural  products  fully  (or,  in  some  cases,  at  all).  As  a 
result,  their  share  in  trade  with  preferential  regions  with  similar 
conditions  is  far  lower  than  in  intra-EC  trade.  For  example,  while 
temperate-zone  agricultural  products  represented  8.8 per cent  of  total 
intra-Community  shipments  in  1990,  ·they  accounted  for  no  more  than 
1.2 per cent  of  the  EC  imports1from,  and  3.1 per cent  of  its  exports  to, 
the  EFTA  area  (excluding fish). 
270.  Under  the  EEA  Agreement  (Section II.S(ii)),  the signatories undertake 
"to  continue  their  efforts"  towards  progressive  trad'i2liberalization  and 
regularly  to  review  trade  conditions  in  the  sector.  The  reviews  may 
serve  as  a  basis  for  decisions  on  the  abolition of trade  barriers  "within 
11 1n  1990,  intra-EC  deliveries  of  agricultural  products  worth  ECU  105.4  billion 
compared  with  imports  worth  ECU  1.25  billion from  EFTA  countries  (SITC,  Rev.2,  Section  0  with 
the  exception  of  03  (fish)  and  07  (coffee,  cocoa,  tea,  etc.)). 
12The  fisheries  sector  is  included  in  principle  (subject  to  product-specific  exemptions 
and  phasing-in  periods). 
• C/RM/S/36A 
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the  framework  of  ...  (the  existing)  agricultural  policies  and  taking  into 
account  the  results  of  the  Uruguay  Round".  The  parties  remain  free  to 
operate  compensation  mechanisms  on  processed  agricultural  products  with  a 
view  to offsetting higher input prices resulting from  farm policy measures. 
In parallel with the  EEA  Agreement,  existing bilateral arrangements  between 
the  EC  and  individual  EFrA  countries  on  certain  agricultural  products 
(cheese,  pigmeat,  beef and horticultural products)  were  extended. 
271.  Under  the  Europe  Agreements  with  the  then  Czech  and  Slovak  Federal 
Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland,  the  EC  and  member  States  are  required  to 
eliminate  all  specific  quantitative  restrictions  and. to  gradually  reduce 
tariffs  or  levies  on  a  specified  range  of  fa.rm  products,  subject  to 
quantitative ceilings  (Section II.S(iii)). 
Initiatives with an environmental background 
272.  A number  of initiatives by  the  Community  have  been aimed at promoting 
more  environmentally-friendly  production  methods.  Under  the  current  EC 
framework,  provided by Articles  21  to  24  of Council Regulation No.  2328/91, 
premiums  of  up  to  ECU  150  per  hectare  may  be  granted  with  a  view  to 
offsetting  the  cost  or  revenue  effects  resulting  from  environmental 
constraints.  While  implementation is not obligatory for  the member  States, 
France  (16  programmes),  Italy  (nine  programmes),  Germany  (four),  Ireland 
(two),  the  United  Kingdom  (two),  the  Netherlands,  Denmark  and  Luxembourg 
operated such programmes  under  the  framework  in 1990  and  1991.  In Germany, 
over  2. 5  million  hectares,  more  than  one-fifth  of  the  country's  utilized 
agricultural  area,  are  covered.  The  of~er member  States  combined  account 
for  an additional 1.7 million hectares. 
273.  A  new  Community  aid  scheme  has  recently  been  set  up  with  a  view  to 
promoting  less polluting  farming  practices,  more  extensive  farm  production 
and  the  protection  of  the  countryside.  The  relevant  Council  Regulation 
(No.  2078/92)  circumscribes agricultural· activities deemed· to have positive 
external effects and  mandates ftmber  States to  implement multi-annual  zonal 
programmes  for  this  purpose.  The  new  programme  covers  the  whole  EC 
13A  recent  Council  Directive  (No.  91/676)  requires  member  States  to  designate 
vulnerable  areas  where  pollution  levels  (nitrogen)  exceed  a  specified  EC  threshold  level,  and 
to take  remedial  action.  Compliance  with  the  Community  threshold  must  be  ensured within  four 
years  after notification. 
14Aid  is  to  be  granted,  as  an  example,  to  farmers  who  undertake  (i)  to  reduce 
substantially  the  use  of  fertilizers;  (ii)  to  change  to  more  extensive  forms  of  crop, 
(iii)  to  reduce  the  proportion  of  sheep  and  cattle  per  forage  area;  (iv)  to  use  other 
farming  practices  compatible  with  the  protection  of  the  environment;  (v)  to  ensure  the 
upkeep  of  abandoned  farmland;  (vi)  to  set  aside  land  for  at  least  20  years  with  a  view  to 
using  it  for  environment-related  purposes;  and  (vii)  to  manage  land  for  public  access  or 
(Footnote  Continued} C/RM/S/36A 
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territory,  unlike  the  present  Community  framework  which  is offered only on 
environmentally-sensitive areas. 
274.  Additional  aid  schemes  with  an  environmental  background  have  been 
implemented  in  recent  years  at  the  national  and  sub-national  levels. 
According  to  the  Commission,  in  approving  such  schemes  it has  taken  into 
account  whether  existing  EC  or  national  legislation  already  imposed 
restrictions  on  the  activities  concerned.  Also,  in  view  of  the  Article 
130r:2  of  the  EEC  Treaty  ("polluter-should-pay principle"),  the  Commission 
has  reserr5d  the  right  to  re-examine  programmes  without  a  sunset 
provision. 
Trade  disputes 
275.  Agricultural  issues  have  generated  a  variety  of  trade  disputes 
involving the  European  Communities  (Chapter VI).  Some  major  disputes  - for 
example,  that  on  oilseeds  revolve  around  the  GATT  conformity  of 
established  support  mechanisms;  others  result  from  tf};e  interpretation  and 
application  of  sanitary  and  phytosanitary 
1
7ules.  Certain  sanitary 
problems  have  also  impinged  on  intra-EC  trade. 
(i)  Dairy products 
276.  Dairying 'is  one  of  the  most  highly  protected agricultural  sectors  in 
the  Communities.  It  accounts  for  about  one-fifth  of  current  EC  farm 
(Footnote  Continued} 
leisure  activities.  Maximum  annual  premiums  for  farmers  g1v1ng  one  or  more  of  such 
undertakings,  which  are  not  further  specified  in  the  Regulation,  vary  between  ECU  100  for 
each  livestock  unit  of  an  e~dangered  breed  reared  and  ECU  1,000  per  hectare  of  citrus  fruit 
set  aside  (ECU  250  for ·undertakings  concerning  annual  crops  not  qualifying  for  per  hectare 
premi urns  under  a  common  rna rket  organization).  The  Community  cant ri butes,  depending  on  the 
region,  between  50  and  75  per  cent  to  these  premi urns.  Draft  general  frameworks  are  to  be 
communicated  to  the  Commission  by  30  July  1993.  The  member  States  ar'e  not,  in  principle, 
prevented  from  operating  additional  aid  programmes. 
15Ec  Commission  (1992f). 
The  Commission  has  a 1  so  emphasized,  in  the  context  of  this  TPRM  report,  that  all  EC 
programmes  are  fully  compatible  with  Article  130r:2  of  the  EEC  Treaty.  ·The 
Article  stipulates  that  Community  action  relating  to  the  environment  "shall  be  based  on  the 
principles  that  preventive  action  should  be  taken,  that  environmental  damage  should  as  a 
priority be  rectified at  source,  and  that  the  polluter  should  pay". 
16In  mid-1992,  France  made  all  food  imports  from  Japan  subject  to  controls  for 
radio-activity.  The  move  is  apparently  intended  to match  the  control  requirements  imposed  by 
Japan  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Tchernobyl  nuclear  accident  and  maintained  since  (the  controls 
by  Japan  are  app 11 ed  on  an  m. f. n.  basis).  The  French  Hi ni st  ry  of  1  ndust ry  and  Commerce  was 
quoted  as  saying  that  the  checks  were  of  a  purely  technical  and  preventive  nature,  based  on 
the  same  threshold  levels  as  those  used  by  Japan  (according  to Agra  Europe,  7  August  1992). 
17For  example,  in  late  1991,  France  ordered  its  customs  services  to  "check 
systematically"  all  meat  imports  into  France  (including  intra-EC  deliveries).  According  to 
the  French  Budget  Minister,  M.  Charasse,  the  measures  were  necessary  since  meat  deliveries 
had  been  found  treated with  hormones  (Inte!~~!ion!l_~erald Tribune,  20  September  1991). C/RM/S/36A 
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spending,  and  the  PSE  is  significantly  above  the  Clffrage  (69  per cent  as 
against 49  per cent for all "PSE  products"  in 1991). 
277.  Since  1984,  milk  production  has  been  subject  to  member  State- and 
farm-specific  quotas.  The  sector  is  heavily  dependent  on  small  farms: 
overall,  in  1989,  one-half  of  dairy  holdings  in  the  Communities  had  less 
than  ten  cows.  This  average,  however,  conceals  substantial  variations 
among  member  States,  from  under  8  per cent  in  the  United Kingdom  to  over 
90  per cent  in Portugal.  France  is  the  Community's  largest milk  producer. 
representing  slightly  less  than  one-quarter  of  total  deliveries,  followed 
by Germany  (22  per cent)  and  the United Kingdom  (15  per cent).  The  EC  is a 
major  export~r of dairy products;  in 1991,  its shares  in world exports  of 
butter,  skimmed  milk  poy~er,  whole  milk  powder  and  cheese  varied  between 
30  and over  60  per cent. 
278.  The  recent  farm  reform  package  provides  for  a  cut  of  2  per  cept  in 
overall  quotas  over  marketing  years  1993/4  and 20994/5.  The  guaranteed , 
quantities for  Spain and Italy are  to be  adjusted.  Butter prices will be 
reduced by  5  per  cent  in  the  period.  Overall,  the  reform package  is  thus 
unlikely  to  have  a  profound  impact  on  EC  milk  production  and  the 
Communities'  role  in world  trade.  OECD  estimates  prior  to  the  passage  of 
the  package  expected  EC  production  to  fall  from  some  109  mfllion  tonnes  in 
1990  to 105.6 million tonnes  in 1992  and  the  following years. 
279.  The  EC  has  not,  to  date,  taken  a  final  decision  on  the  approval  of 
yield-enhancing  hormones  in  milk  production.  EC  approval  procedures  for 
Bovine  Somatotrophin  (BST)  are  suspended  until  December  1993  in  order  to 
allow for  an assessment of the hormone's  i~fct on health,  milk quality and 
the  socio-economic  structures  of  farming.  (BST,  a  biotechnology-based 
hormone,  is  reputed to boost a  cow's  milk  output by  up  to  one-quarter).  A 
recent report by  the  Commission  indicates  that the hormone  responds well to 
18EC  expenditure  per  dairy  cow  amounted  to  some  US$330  and  total  support,  in  PSE  ten.s. 
to  US$1, 340. 
19 In  quantity  terms  (source:  GATT,  1992e).  Between  1990  and  1991,  the  EC  share  in 
world  butter  trade  jumped  from  15  to  35  per  cent,  mainly  reflecting  increased  sales  to  the 
CIS  Republics.  EC  butter  production  fe11  from  1.605  million  tonnes  in  1990  to  1.515 million 
tonnes  in  1991;  milk  deliveries  shrank  by  1.9  per  cent  over  the  same  period. 
20No  substantial  changes  are  envisaged  to facilitate  intra-Community  quota  transfers in 
the  light of  the  Internal  Market  objectives  ("an  area without  internal  frontiers  in which  the 
free  movement  of goods,  persons  and  capital  is ensured"). 
Farmers  who  are  changing  holdings  wn 1,  in  future,  be  able  to  transfer  a  11  or  part  of 
their  reference quantity. 
21 The  Community  moratorium  concerning  the  admission  of  SST  was  originally  due  to expire 
on  31  December  1991.  It  was  prolonged  by  Council  Regulation  No.  92/98  for  an  additional  two 
years.·  The  Regulation  requires  the  Commission  to  present  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  a  situation  report  and  proposals  for  future  arrangements  by  1 July  1993. C/RM/S/36A 
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approval  requirements  for  veterinary  medicines  (safety,  quality  and 
efficacy)  while  further  clarification  would  be  needed  to  assess  its 
compatibility· with  the  desired  evolution  of  the  CAP.  Given  the  hostility 
of consumer  organizations,  the  Commission felt that the  introduction of BST 
could cause  a  major  drop  in milk consumption. 
(ii)  Meat 
280.  The  EC  was  the  world's  largest exporter of beef  and pigmeat  in 1991. 
Beef exports  reached 1.244 million tonnes,  some  460,000  tonnes  more  than in 
1990,  whil22exports  of  pigmeat  were  595,000  tonnes,  a  fall  of  10 per cent 
from  1990.  ·  The  OECD  Secretariat has  attributed  the  increase  in  EC  beef 
exports  mainly  to  slackening  domestic  demand  in  the  wake  of  "mad  cow 
disease"  (BSE)  in the United Kingdom  and  gen23al  consumer  concern about  the 
illegal use  of hormones  as  growth promoters;  a  genuine shift of consumer 
preferences  towards  lower-priced  competing  meats  (poultry)  and 
uncertainties  resulting  from  the  recession  may  have  also  played  a  role. 
Export  estimates  for  1992  and  forecasts  for  1993  are,  however, 
significantly below  the  1991  results,  mirroring  in particular  a  sharp  drop 
in import  demand  in the  CIS  Republics. 
281.  Despite  a  recent  decline  in  EC  production  (Chart V.4),  EC  stocks  ~! 
beef  and  veal  are  estimated  to  have  reached  1  million  tonnes  in  1992. 
France,  Germany,  Italy and  the  United  Kingdom  are  the  largest member  State 
producers  in the sector. 
282.  Under  the  Europe  Agreements,  Poland,  Hungary,  and  the  Czech  and 
Slovak  Republics  are  entitled  to  export  to  the  EC,  at  reduced  levies, 
bovine  and certain other meat  categories.  The  relevant quotas ceilings are 
to  be  expanded  over  five  years  (Section II.5(iii));  meat  exports  of  the 
three  countries  to  the  CIS  Republics,  if financed  by  the  EC,  are  to  be 
deducted from  the  agreed quantities.  In addition,  the  Community  has  opened 
a  reduced-levy  quota  of  16,500  head  of  cattle  from  the ·above  countries. 
These  commitments  add  to various  other tariff quotas  the 2
~c has  undertaken 
to operate within its variable levy system in the sector. 
22GATT  (1993a). 
230ECD  (1992a). 
24GATT  (1993a). 
25Tariff  quotas  are  granted,  for  example,  for  53,000  tonnes  of  frozen  beef  ("GATT 
quota"),  34,300  tonnes  of  high-quality  beef  ("Hilton  quota"),  and  49,000  tonnes  of  beef  and 
veal  from  ACP  countries.  In  total,  the  EC  imported  some  455,000  tonnes  of  beef  and  veal  in 
1992  (see  GATT,  1993a). 
• Chart V.4 
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283.  Health  issues  continue  to  affect  trade  relations.  In  1991,  the  EC 
refused  to  admit  offal  from  Argentina  which  was  considered  not  adequately 
tested  for  residues.  Argentina,  in  turn,  banned  cattle,  sheep  and  goat 
deli~gries  from  the  United  Kingdom  with  a  view  to  avoiding  the  spread  of 
BSE.  Shipments  of beef  and  pigmeat  from  the  United  States  halted after 
the  Commission had decided,  in 1990,  to de-list all US  pig and beef plants, 
under  the  Third  Country  Meat  Directive,  for  non-complianc27with  EC  health 
legislation.  This  dispute  appears  to  have  been  resolved.  In  contras~8 
the  trans-Atlantic dispute  over  the  EC  Hormone  Directive has  lingered on. 
26According  to  DECO  (1992a). 
Exports  of  pigs  from  the  Netherlands  and  the  UnHed  Kingdom  suffered  as  a  result  of 
"blue ear disease"  (1991). 
27The  parties  agreed  that  both  the  Community's  Third  Country  Meat  Directive  and 
corresponding  U.S.  requirements  provided  basically  equivalent  safeguards.  A  bilateral 
agreement,  signed  in  October  1992,  specifies  areas  of  common  interpretation,  necessary 
modifications  in  existing  schemes  and  procedures  to  be  used  for  solving  open  issues. 
28GATT  (199la),  page  171,  and  Section  Vl.3.  Since  January  1989,  the  EC  has  maintained 
a  complete  ban  on  hormonal  growth  promoters  which  also  extends  to  third  country  ~eliveries. 
The  United  States,  considering  the  ban  as  scientifically  unfounded  and,  thus,  amounting  to 
an  unjustifiable  trade  barrier,  has  imposed  retaliatory  tariffs  of  100  per  ~ent  which. 
although  reduced  in  scope,  still  apply.  While  the  EC  has  adopted  a  list  of  counter-
retaliations,  it has  not  taken  action. C/RM/S/36A 
Page  120 
284.  While  the  EEA  Agreement  provides,  in principle,  for  the  extension of 
the  Community's  body  of  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  legislation  throughout 
the  EFTA  area,  the  EFTA  countries  are  not  obliged  to  harmonize  their 
legislation with regard to third country  imports. 
285.  The  farm  reform  package  includes  a  15  per cent  reduction  in  the 
intervention price  for  beef,  to  be  phased  in  over  three years  starting in 
July 1993.  The  economic  impact  on  the  sector  may  be  mitigated  to  the 
extent that the  agreed cuts  in cereal prices  (see below)  lead to  lower  feed 
costs.  Total  intervention  purchases  of  beef  are
29
to  be  reduced  from 
750,000  tonnes  in  1993  to  350,000  tonnes  in  1997.  Producer  premiums 
continu30to  be  related to  farm  and herd size based,  however,  on historical 
yields.  The  maximum  density  of  livestock per  hectare  of  forage  area  is 
due  to be  scaled down  between  1993  and  1996. 
286.  The  EC  is  a  net  importer  of  sheepmeat  (260, 000  tonnes  in  1991  and 
1992).  Self-sufficiency  has  increased  from  79  per cent  in  1986  to  some 
83  per cent  in 1991.  Voluntary restraint arrangements  exist with Australia 
and  New  Zealand,  the  major  world  exporters,  as  well  as  with  Argentina, 
Bulgaria
31
the  former  Czech  and  Slovak Federal Republic,  Hungary,  Poland and 
Uruguay.  Shipments  from  these  countries  are  exempt  from  duties,  within 
the  agreed  quantities.  The  Agreement  with  New  Zealand,  covering  an export 
volume  of  205,000  tonnes  per  year,  was  due  to  expire  at year-end  1992;  it 
has  been extended  for  one  year pending  the  conclusion and  implementation of 
the  Uruguay  Round. 
287.  In  the  sheepmeat  sector,  reforms  aim  to  restrict  premiums  to  a 
producer's  reference  flock  (limited  to  500  or,  in  disadvantaged  areas, 
1000  animals  per  farm).  The  transfer  of  premium  rights  between  producers 
and regions  is subject to limitations. 
29 rf  market  prices  in  a  member  State  fall  below  60  per  cent  of  the  intervention  price, 
purchases  are  not  counted  against  these  maximum  quantHies  (safety  net).  Intervention  will 
be  restricted to  good  quality meat. 
3°For  example,  a  special  beef  premium  has  been  set  at  ECU  90,  to  be  paid  twice  in  an 
anima  1 • s  1 i fet  i me,  and  a  suck  1 er  cow  premi urn  at  ECU  70.  ECU  95  and  ECU  120  for  the  years 
1993,  1994  and  1995,  respectively.  The  premiums  are  higher  for  small  and  extensive  holdings, 
with  a  view  to  supporting  farmers  who  cannot  be  expected  to  profit  from  decreasing  cereal 
prices. 
Total  payments  are  subject  to  regional  ceilings  (the  number  of  premiums  paid  in  one  of 
the  years  1990- 1992);  if  exceeded,  the  number  of  animals  eligible  per  producer  is  reduced 
proportionately. 
31 In  addition,  the  EC  concluded  import  arrangements  with  Poland,  Hungary  and  Romania 
during  the  Tokyo  Round,  providing  1 i mi ted  exemptions  from  the  EC  tariff  !1 evy-system  for 
imports  of  live  bovine  animals  for  slaughter  and  beef  for  processing. 
• (iii)  Cereals 
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288.  Favourable  weather  conditions  in  1991  boosted  total  EC  cereal 
production  by  some  6  per cent  over  1990;  durum  wheat  production  rose  by 
32  per cent.  Maximum  Guaranteed Quantities  (MGQs)  for cereals and  oilsee~ 
were  exceeded  and  triggered  the  imposition  of  co-responsibility  levies. 
A  deterioration  of  world  market  conditions  in  the  same  period,  despite 
falling  supplies  from  other  major  producer  regions,  was  attributed by  the 
Commission  mainly  to  conditions  in eastern Europe,  where  excess  quan§!ties 
in certain markets  coincided with severe  solvency problems  elsewhere.  In 
mid-1992,  EC  intervention  stocks  reached  some  27  million tonnes,  their 
highest level ever. 
289.  France  is  by  far  the  Community's  largest  cereals  producer,  with  a 
share  of  more  than  one-third of  EC  output.  Forty-five per cent  of  French 
·production of 60  million  tonnes  in 1991  was  exported,  25  per cent  to  other 
member  States  and  the  remainder  outside  the  Community.  While  a  volume  of 
60  million tonnes,  valued at world market  prices,  would  have  sold at about 
FF  38.4 billion  (ECU  5. 5 billion) ,  actual  revenue  is  estimated  to  have 
reached  some  FF  63  billion  (ECU  9  billion).  Restitutions  paid on  France's 
third-country  exports  amounted  to  FF  10.8 billion,  which  is  about 
175  per cent of the value  of these  shipments  at world market  prices,  while 
price  guarant~ts  on  domestic  and  intra-EC  deliveries  contributed  some 
FF  14 billion. 
290.  A surplus  of cereal  feed  in the  EC  is combined  with entry of cheaper 
substitutes,  such  as  manioc,  corn-gluten  feed,  molasses  and  processing 
revenues,  under  zero-bound  tariffs.  Reflecting  these  market  conditions, 
the  share  of  cereals  in  animal  feed  declined  from  42  per cent  in 1980  to 
some  30  per cent  in  1989  and  1990.  In  this  connection,  the  EC  has 
concluded  several  bilateral  arrangements  with  suppliers  of  cereal 
substitutes;  for details see Table AV.3. 
291.  Price  cuts  for  cereals  agreed  in the  recent  farm  re~orm package  may 
reduce  the  EC  export  surplus  and  make  cereal  feeds  more  attractive. 
Simulations  by  the  Commission  point  to  an  increase  in  cereal  demand  for 
feeding purposes  in the order of 8  to 12  million tonnes per year.  However, 
these estimates are subject to considerable uncertainties,  for  example with 
32For  cereals,  the  MGQ  is currently set at  160  million  tonnes. 
33Ec  Commission  (1992f). 
34According  to  Tribune  de  l'Expansion,  15  October  1992.  World  market  prices  themselves 
are  artificially  depressed  by  subsidized  exports,  not  only  from  the  EC  but  also  from  other 
sources,  including  the  United  States and  Canada  (GATT,  1992a  and  1992b). C/RM/S/36A 
Page  122 
regard to future price  developments  of cereal substitutes and of  EC  cereals 
not  qualifying  under  the  new  intervention rules,  as  well  as  international 
market  developments. 
292.  The  reform package  provides  for  price  cuts  of  29  per cent  over three 
years.  Income  compensatory  payments  are  contingent  on  set-aside  of 
15  per cent  of  arable  land  on  a  rotational  basis  (the  same  field  no  more 
than  once  in  six  years),  with  an  exemption  for  small  holdings  producing 
less  than  92  tonnes  of  cereals  per  year  (equivalent  on  average  to  some 
20  hectares).  Production  in  large-scale  production  areas  (e.g.  Normandy, 
East Anglia,  Schleswig-Holstein)  should  therefore~ more  heavily  affected 
than in areas with a  basis of small-scale farming. 
293.  'While  the  immediate  set-aside  effect  on  the  area  under  cultivation 
may  remain  well  below  15  per cent,  the  reform  package  could  weaken  the 
trend  towards  higher· farm  productivity.  Medium-sized  and  larger  farms, 
which  are  subject  to  set-aside,  tend  to  be  more  productive  than  smaller 
entities.  The  rotational  application  of set-aside,  though  contributing  to 
improving  the  productivity  of  the  area actually  used,  should  also  help  to 
avoid  only  low-yield  land  being  taken  out  of  production.  (Pending  the 
results  of  an  EC-wide  study  by  the  Commission,  the  Council  has  yet· to 
decide  (by  a  qualified majority)  on  a  higher  set-aside  ratio  for  farmers 
opting  for  non-rotational  application.)  -·  Moreover,  parallel  measu~ are 
designed to  encourage  permanent  set-aside  for  environmental  reasons. 
294.  Income  compensation is granted both with regard to  the effects of the 
the  priCJ7  cuts  and  the  set-side  obligation  (based  on  historic  average 
yields).  In  the  former  case,  the  payments  are  due  to  increase 
progressively  from  ECU  25  per  tonne  in  1993/94  to  ECU  45  from  1995/96 
onwards.  A  premium  of  ECU  45  will  also  be  granted,  from  1993/94,  to 
compensate  for  set-aside.  The  size  of  this  premium  suggests  that  the 
income  effects  resulting  from  the  decline  in  production  are  not  fully 
offset  (with  a  possible  impact  on  the  profitability  of.  cereal  farming). 
However,  the  alternative  uses  foreseen  for  set-aside  land  may  provide  new 
sources  of farm  income  (see below). 
35It  has  been  estimated,  for  example,  that  in  the  German  Land  of  Schleswig-Holstein 
set-aside would  be  in  the  order  of  14  per  cent  of  the  agricultural  area  as  against  5  per cent 
in  Baden-Wurttemberg  and  Bavaria  (Koester  and  Cramon-Taubadel,  1992). 
36The  current  five-year  set-aside  programme  (see  GATT,  1991a)  will  no  longer  be  offered 
and  no  co-responsibility levies  will  be  raised during  the  period  1992/93  and  1995/96. 
37The  payments  are  on  a  per  hectare  basis,  taking  into  account  previous  yields  in  a 
region  (1986/87-1990/91).  The  eligible  areas  are  defined  by  member  States,  based  on  the 
average  areas  sown  to  cereals,  oilseeds  and  protein  plants  between  1989  and  1991  plus  the 
land  set  aside  under  a  publicly  funded  scheme  during  that  period.  Member  States  are  free  to 
specify the  reference  areas  either  on  a  regional  basis  or  producer-specific. CfRM/S/36A 
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295.  The  Council  Directive  establishing  the  new  support  mechanism 
(No.  1765/92)  provides  for  the  possibility  of  changing  the  compensatory 
payments  for  the  price  cuts  and  for  set-aside  as  well  as  the  set-aside 
ratio itself "in the  light of developments  in production,  productivity and 
the  markets".  Such  a  decision  would  be  taken  by  a  qualified majority  of 
the  Council. 
2  96.  The  EC  Court  of  Auditors  is  reported  recently  to  have  expressed 
serious  doubts  about  whether  set-aside  and  other  limits  on  farm  inputs 
(premiums  related  to  herd size  etc.)  could be  controlled effectively.  The 
Court  is  qu<?ted  as  stating  that  techniques  such  as  aerial  surveillance 
could  not  compensate  for  the  lack  of  a  reliable  land  register  and  "there 
can  be  no  effective  safgguards  against  overclaims,  double  payments  and 
similar irregularities". 
297.  Set-aside  land  may  be  used  for  growing  a  variety  of  non-food  crops, 
including short rotation forest  trees as well  as potatoes,  certain oilseeds 
and cereals not destined for human  or animal  consumption,  which may  be used 
for  processing  into  ethanol  and  other  fuels.  v·iews  on  the  possible 
production  effects  differ  for  example,  fuel  3
~ubstitutes  may  remain 
uneconomic  in  the  absence  of  further  subsidies  and  uncertainties 
persist with regard to  the  use  of production residues  such  as  oilcake.  The 
Commission  Regulation  providing  for  the  production  alternatives 
(No.  2296/92),  acknowledges  the  need  for  a  further  regulation  to  establish 
details of valuation of by-products,  the methods  of control and transfer of 
set-aside obligations. 
298.  Some  member  States  are  reported  to  have  taken  measures  to  curb 
intensive forms  of farming.  For  example,  Be!~ium has  imposed new  limits on 
the use  of organic  and chemical fertilizers,  and  in 1992,  the  German  Land 
of  Baden-Wurttemberg  enacted  a  programme  ("MEKA")  designed  to  promote  the 
use  of more  extensive  and  environmentally  friendly  produ~tion methods  and 
the  preservation  of  rare  species  of  cows  and  horses.  The  incentives 
granted  under  this  programme  may  reach  a  maximum  of  DM  550  (ECU  270)  per 
hectare  of  farm  land.  Support  under  MEKA,  which  is  open-ended  and 
non-degressive,  is additional  to  other  subsidies  offered  to  German  farmers 
38The  report  had  been  requested  by  the  EC  Counc i 1  with  a  view  to  assessing  the 
Commission  propos  a 1 s.  Core  findings  are  reproduced  in  The  Times,  30  May  1992,  Sunday  Times, 
24  May  1992,  and  Europe,  9/10  June  1992. 
39Agra  Europe,  24  July  1992. 
400ECD  (1992a). C/RM/S/36A 
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through  national  or  Community  mechanisms,  41including 
"socio-structural  income  compensation"  (see above). 
(iv)  Oilseeds 
the  1992 
299.  Contrary  to  most  other  mainstays  of  EC  agriculture,  aid  for  the 
oilseeds  sector relies  almost  exclusively  on  financial  assistance.  Border 
protection  is  negligible;  the  EC  has  zero  tariffs,  bound  in  GATT,  on 
almost all categories of oilseeds  and oilcakes  (Table AIV.l). 
300.  Betwee~ 1985  and  1990,  EC  producers  increased  the  area  destined  for 
oilseeds  by  three-fifths.  In  1990,  their  output  of  rapeseed,  sunflower 
seed and  soybeans  totalled 12  million tonnes,  up  from  6.8 million tonnes  in 
1985.  France  (38  per cent  of  EC  production)  and  Italy  (18  per  cent)  ranked 
first  among  the  member  States  in  1990,  posting  increases  of  more  than 
130  per cent  and  200  per cent,  respectively,  over  their  output  in  1985. 
The  Communities  self-sufficiency  in vegetabJf  oils  and  fats  increased  from 
56  per cent  in 1985  to  65  per cent  in 1989. 
301.  Under  the  "traditional"  EC  oilseeds  regime,  subsidies were  channelled 
to  processors  to  offset  the  price  disadvantage  of  domestic  inputs; 
production in excess  of  MGQs  for  the sector  led  to price  reductions  during 
the  same  marketing  year.  The  subsidy  mechanism  was  challenged  by  the 
United  States  as  contravening  the  national  treatment  obligation  under 
Article III:4  of  the  GATT  and  impa1r1ng  the  benefits  accruing  from 
zero-bound  tariffs.  A  GATT  Panel,  established  in  1988,  upheld  the  U.S. 
complaint  (Section VI.l(i)).  In 1991,  the  EC  adopted a  transitional system 
of  direct  payments  to  producers,  rela~3d  to  the  land  sown,  within  the 
limits  of  Maximum  Guaranteed  Areas.  Despite  these  changes,  the 
41 MEKA  premiums  are  granted  for  (i)  using  green  land  in  sensitive  areas  with  a  view  to 
preventing  erosion,  protecting  groundwater  or  preserving  the  tradition  a 1  1  andscape; 
(ii)  maintaining  and  using  green  land  under  unfavourable  topographical  conditions  or  for 
growing  region-specific,  endangered  species  of  cows  and  horses;  (iii)  not  using 
chemical-synthetical  pesticides  and  fertilizers  for  crop  production;  (iv)  not  using 
growth-accelerators  for  wheat  and  rye;  (v)  maintaining  a  distance  of  at  least  17  em  between 
plant  lines  in  cereal  production;  (vi)  replacing  feed  maize  with  other  feed  crops. 
The  premiums  under  (iv)  and  (vi)  each  amount  to  OM  200  (ECU  98)  per  hectare; 
maintaining  the minimum  distance set  under  (v)  qualifies  for  subsidies  of  OM  120  per  hectare. 
The  continuation  of  traditional  production  methods  in  protected  moist  or  dry  areas 
(Feuchtbiotop/Trockenbiotop)  is  supported,  respectively,  with  OM  300  and  200  per  hectare. 
42 Ec  Commission  (1992f). 
43The  payments  are  specified  on  a  regional  basis,  depending  on  yields  per  hectare  in 
1986-90  and  linked  to  average  world  prices  for  rape,  sunflower  and  soya.  The  average  premium 
was  set  by  the  Council  at  ECU  359  per  hectare  for  1993/94.  As  for  cereals,  payments  are 
contingent  on  set-aside of  15  per  cent  of  eligible arable  land  from  1993/94  onwards. • 
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reconvened panel  found  that the  new  system had  retained essential  featu~s 
of the  former  regime  and,  thus,  continued to  impair  the tariff bindings. 
302.  The  Commission  and  the  U.S.  authorities  4!greed,  in  late 
November  1992,  on  a  solution  to  the  oilseeds  dispute.  At  the  time  of 
completion  of  this  report,  the  draft  agreement  was  still before  the  EC 
Council for approval.  Discussions with interested contracting parties -were 
under way. 
(v)  Potatoes 
303.  The  potato  sector  contributes  some  2~ per cent  to  EC  final 
agricultural output.  Currently,  there  is no  common  market  organization for 
the  sector;  support  is  limited  to  compensatory  aid  for  starch producers, 
aimed  at  offsetting  the  price  gap  with  regard  to  alternative  inputs,  in 
particular  maize.  Total  annual  payments  have  remained  below 
ECU  180 million. 
304.  As  part of the  completion of  the  Internal  Market,  the  Commiss~~ ha~ 
proposed  the  introduction  of  a  market  organization  for  potatoes.  The 
Council has not yet decided on  the draft Regulation. 
305.  Observers have  noted that the most  tangible  import barriers currently 
result from4vhytosanitary requirements;  these would not be  affected by the 
new  regime. 
44 The  panel  noted  that  the  new  mechanism,  too,  involved  a  systematic  offsetting  of  the 
effects of  import  price changes  on  production  levels  (GATT  document,  DS28/R,  31  March  1992). 
45Among  the  main  elements  of  the  draft  agreement  are  prescribed  1  imi ts  on  the  area 
planted  to  oilseeds  in  the  Community.  As  from  1995/96,  it  must  not  exceed  the  average 
achieved  between  1989  and  1991  (5,128,000  hectares)  less  10  per  cent  or,  whenever  higher,  the 
set aside ratio  applied  under  the  new  cereals  regime.  Otherwise,  penalties  would  be  applied. 
In  addition,  the  EC  undertook  to  take  corrective  action  shou 1  d  the  output  of  by-products 
resulting from  the cultivation  of oilseeds  for  industrial  purposes  exceed  1 million  tonnes  of 
soyameal  equivalents  (there  are  no  restrictions  on  the  area  used  for  the  production  of 
oilseeds for  industrial  purposes).  (Inside  U.S.  Trade- Special  Report,  4  December  1992,  and 
European  Report,  5  December  1992.) 
46one  objective  of  the  creation  of  such  an  organization  could  be  to  prevent  grain 
farmers  from  evading  price  cuts  and  set-aside obligations  through  switching  to potatoes,  thus 
depressing  the  market.  The  Commission  has  noted,  in  the  context  of  this  TPRM  report,  that 
its  reflections  were  motivated  by  the  need  to  replace  current  EC  legislation,  wMch  allows 
member  States  to  operate  quant.i tat  i ve  import  restrictions  on  potatoes,  by  a  common  regime 
compatible  with  the  Internal  Market.  In  late  1992,  Germany,  Denmark,  France,  Greece  and 
Ireland  maintained  import  quotas  under  Regulation  No.  288/82  on  potatoes  and  related 
products.  External  protection  at  the  EC  level  is  currently  based  on  unbound  ad  valorem 
duties,  varying  between  9  and  21  per  cent  according  to  use  or  season. 
47Agra  Europe,  8  May  1992. CJRM/S/36A 
Page  126 
(vi)  Sugar 
306.  The  basic  regulatory  framework  governing  EC  sugar  production  has 
remained unchanged  since  the  introduction of  the  first quota  scheme  in the 
late  1960s.  Its  operation  is  based  on  the  tenet  of  "fiscal  neutrality", 
implying that the  funds  used for  the disposal of EC  production surpluses  on 
world markets  are sourced via producer levies  imposed under  a  multi-layered 
system  of delivery quotas,  rather  than  the  EC  budget.  Co~unity producers 
are  able  to  pass  these  costs  on  to  consumers,  since  the  EC  market  k§ 
shielded  from  external  competition  through  a  variable  levy  mechanism. 
Production  quotas,  which  are  not  tradable,  are  largely  concentrated  on  a 
few  enterprises;  some  40  per cent  is  in  the  hands  of  four  companies, 
Ferruzzi,  Tate  & Lyle,  British Sugar,  and  Sudzucke~9  Each  national market 
within the  EC  is dominated by  one  or  two  companies. 
307.  The  EC  Court  of Auditors  has  criticized  the  sugar  support  system  as 
an  "extremely  expensive  mechanism  . . .  far  from  the  principle  of  economy". 
Internal  prices  are  about  twice  the  world  market  level.  The  system  was 
categorized  as  an  instrument  designed  for  satisfying  industrial  and 
national  interests,  rather  than  as  a  means  for  guiding  production. 
According  to  the  Court,  various  adjustments  and  extensions  over  time  had 
resulted  in  the  preservation  an~cflaintenance of vested  interests,  whether 
production was  efficient or not.  Surplus  disposal  has  been made  through 
subsidized  ("producer  financed")  and non-subsidized  exports:  the 1J.C  is  an 
exporting member  of the  International  Sugar Agreement  (Chart V.4). 
308.  While  intervention  prices  in  ECU  have  not  been  changed  since  price 
cuts  of  2  and  0.17 per cent  in 1989/90  and  1990/91,  respectively,  national 
price  levels  have  increased  slightly  (0.3 per cent  in  1991/92).  The 
Commission  has  acknowledged  the  need  to  review  and,  possibly,  adjust  the 
48Imports,  under  quota,  from  ACP  countries  (some  1.3 million  tonnes}  and  Jndh  are 
exempted  from  the  variable  levy. 
49Nob1 e  (1990). 
50The  Commission,  endorsed  by  the  Council,  responded  that  it  failed  to  see  how  the 
present  system  could  depart  from  the  principle  of  economy,  since  the  existing  self-financing 
arrangements  ensured  that  producers  bore  the  full  cost  of  surplus  disposal  (EC  Court  of 
Auditors,  1991). 
51cha rt  V. 4  needs  to  be  interpreted  with  care.  As  noted  by  the  Court  of  Auditors, 
given  the  residual  nature  of  the  world  market  for  many  producers,  price  movements  are  highly 
volatile  and  bear  very  little relationship  to  production  costs.  Only  few  exporters,  such  as 
Australia,  deliberately  produce  for  the  world  market.  The  Court  estimated  that,  in  1988/89, 
the  EC  intervention  price  of  ECU  530  per  tonne  of  white  sugar  compared  with  production  costs 
of  the  most  efficient  international  suppliers  of  between  ECU  185  and  215  per  tonne. .. 
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52 
current  framework  before  the  end  of  the  1992/93  marketing  year.  At  the 
end  of  1992,  the  Commission  proposed  a  one-year  extension  of  the  current 
regime. 
(vii) 
Chart V.S 
Sugar prices and self-sufficiency, 1973/7  4-1991/92 
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~=  GATT Secretariat based on  EC  Commission  (1992f). 
Bananas 
309.  Agreement  on  a  common  banana  reg~me  has  proved  one  of  the  most 
difficult  and  contentious  sector-related  issues  in  the  Internal  Market 
context,  both  among  the  member  States and with affected trading partners. 
310.  Total  EC  banana  consumption  amounted  to  3.68 million  tonnes  in  1991. 
Of  this,  19  per cent  was  domestically  sourced,  16  per cent  came  from  ACP 
countries  and  65  per cent  from  Latin  American  suppliers  (Chart V. 6).  In 
six  member  States  (France,  Greece,  Italy,  Portugal,  Spain  and  the 
United Kingdom),  market  access  in  the  sector  has  traditionally  been 
52 Ec  Commission  (1992f). 
Press  reports  indicate  that  the  Commission  might  seek  to  rna i nta in  as  much  of  the 
current  system  as  possible,  including,  for  example,  the  national  division  of  quotas. 
However,  the  forthcoming  proposal  is  expected  to  allow  some  flexibility  for  quota  transfers 
within  member  States  and  to  pro  vi de  for  price  cuts  in  view  of  deve  1 opments  in  the  cereals 
sector  (Agra  Europe,  24  July  1992). CfRM/S/36A 
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determined  by  national  quota  regimes  rather  than  by  the  Communities' 5
~ATT 
bound tariff of  20  per cent or,  as  in Germany,  by  a  zero-tariff quota. 
Chart V.6 
The EC  banana market by main  supplier regions, 
1980-91 
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a  Including Madeira and the Canaries as from 1986  (accession of Spain 
and Portugal). 
~:  EC  Commission  I  Eurostat. 
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311.  France,  Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom  operated  quantitative 
restrictions  on  "dollar-zone  bananas"  giving  additional  protection  to 
preferenti~!  imports  from  overseas  territories  and  traditional  ACP 
suppliers.  In a  Protocol  to  the  Lome  Conventions,  the  EC  assured the ACP 
countries  of  such  preferential  treatment  and,  under  Lome  IV,  of  its 
continuation  in  the  Internal  Market  context  (Section II.S(iv)).  Greece, 
Portugal  and  Spain  also  used  quantitative restrictions  to protect  domestic 
producers,  e.g.  in  Crete,  Madeira  and  the  Canary  Islands.  Apparently,  a 
20  per cent  tariff preference  over  Latin  American  producers  has  not  been 
sufficient  to  enable  EC  and  ACP  suppliers  to  gain  a  foothold  on  the 
53under  a  Protocol  to  the  EEC  Treaty,  banana  imports  entered  the  German  market 
duty-free  under  a  tariff quota  which  was  adjusted  annually  (982,000  tonnes  in  1991). 
54For  more  details  see  GATT  {199la). 
Two-thirds  of  the  French  market  have  traditionally been  reserved  for  shipments  from  the 
French  Overseas  Departments  and  Territories,  one-third  for  ACP  bananas.  In  early 
December  1992,  France  was  authorized  by  the  Commission  to  limit,  until  end-1992,  its  imports 
from  Cameroon  and  Cote  d'Ivoire  to  their  traditional  levels.  The  measures  were  based  on  the 
Lome  Convention,  Article  177  and  179.  I~!££ean Report,  5  December  1992. C/RM/S/36A 
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remaining non-restricted markets;  their shipments  to  the  Benelux countries, 
Denmark  and Ireland have  remained close  to nil. 
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Chart V.7 
Banana prices and  consumption in  Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France and  Italy, 1991 
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~:  FAO,  Committee on  Commodity Problems (CCP:BA  92/7), September 1992. 
312.  An  EC  Council  Regulation  of  13  February  1993  aims  to  replace  the 
variety  of  national  arrangements  "with  a  balanced  and  flexible  common 
organization of the  market  for  the  banana  sector"  (Regulation  No.  404/93). 
Main  elements  of  the  new  import  regime,  scheduled  to  be  implemented  on 
1  July 1993,  are  duty-free  access  for  traditional  ACP  deliveries  and  a 
tariff  quota  of  2  million  tonnes55  on  third-country  . shipments  and 
non-traditional ACP  supplies  combined.  In-quota  imports  from  ACP  sources 
are duty-free,  while  other external supplies are assessed a  levy of ECU  100 
per  tonne.  Additional  shipments  of  ACP  and  third  country  5J>ananas  are 
subject to  levies  of  750  and  850  ECU  per  tonne,  respectively.  The  quota 
55This  corresponds  approximately  to  the  Community's  average  annual  banana  imports  from 
Latin  American  countries  during  the  period  1989  to  1991.  In  1991,  the  EC  imported  some 
2.38  million  tonnes  from  these  countries. 
56 In  1991,  the  average  import  price  of  bananas  reportedly  amounted  to  503  ECU  per  tonne 
in  Germany  and  424  ECU  per  tonne  in  the  Benelux  countries  (European  Report, 
20  February  1993).  The  ad  valorem  equivalent  of  a  levy  of  850  ECU  per  tonne  would  thus  have 
varied  between  170  and  200  per  cent. C/RM/S/36A 
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volume  is  to  be  expanded  should5 fhe  Community's  annual  market  forecast 
point  to  an  increase  in  demand.  Import  licences  are  allotted  mainly 
among  established importers  of third country or non-traditional ACP  bananas 
(66.5  per cent)  and  companies  hitherto  engaged  ins8marketing  Community 
production or traditional ACP  supplies  (30 per cent). 
313.  While  the  new  Regulation  specifies  the  total  volume  of  traditional 
ACP  deliveries  (857, 700  tonnes  per  year)  and  its  distribution  among  the 
individual  supplying  countries,  no  production  quotas  are  set  for  EC 
bananas.  However,  a  newly  established  income  compensation  scheme  for 
Community  producers  is  limited  to  a  production  total  ~g  854,000  tonnes 
which,  in  turn,  is broken  down  by  main  producer  regions.  The  scheme  is 
designed  to  offset  a  fall  in  annual  market  revenues  (average  production 
income)  below  the  level  achieved  in a  reference  period;  supplementary aid 
will  be  offered  in  regions  with  particularly  low  levels  of  production 
income.  Growers  who  undertake  to  cease  produ~lfon for  at  least  20  years 
qualify for  a  premium of ECU  1,000 per hectare. 
314.  An  emergency  clause  provides  for  "appropriate  measures"  in the  event 
that,  "by  reason  of  imports  or  exports,  the  Community  market 
experiences  or  is  threatened  with  serious  disturbance  which  may  endanger 
the  objectives  set  out  in Article  39  of  the  Treaty"  (i.e.  the  five  basic 
objectives  of  the  CAP).  No  reference  is  m~e in  this  context  to  relevant 
GATT  provisions,  in particular Article XIX. 
315.  The  Commission  is  empowered  to  implement  emergency  measures 
immediately.  In  order  to  amend  or  repeal  them,  the  Council,  which  is 
57The  relevant  decision  is to  be  taken  by  the  Commission.  The  Council  must  be  involved 
if  so  demanded  by  a  qualified  majority  of  member  States  meeting  in  a  newly  established 
Management  Committee  for  Bananas.  In  that  event,  the  Commission  "may"  defer  application  of 
its  decision  for  up  to  one  month.  During  that  period,  the  Council  may  take  a  different 
decision  by  qualified majority. 
58The  remaining  3.5  per  cent  is  made  available  to  operators  who  started marketing  third 
country or  non-traditional  ACP  bananas  from  1992. 
59 under  the  new  regime,  producers •  associations  are  mandated  to  control  supply  and 
regulate  prices  at  the  production  stage  and  provide  technical  assistance  to  their  members. 
Member  States  are  required  to  grant  temporary  support  to  encourage  the  setting  up  and  assist 
the  administrative  operation  of  such  organizations. 
60The  premium  may  be  adjusted  in  view  of  regional  production  conditions.  The 
Commission  may  authorize  member  States  not  to  grant  the  premium  in  regions  where  the 
disappearance  of  bananas  would  have  negative  consequences,  for  example  on  the  environment. 
61Artic1e  XIX  makes  an  emergency  action  conditional  on  imports  entering  "in  such 
increased  quantities  and  under  such  conditions  as  to  cause  or  threaten  serious  injury  to 
domestic  producers  of  like or directly competing  products". • 
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involved  at  the  request  of  any  member  ~~ate,  would  need  to  achieve  a 
qualified majority against the  Commission. 
316.  Pending  implementation  of  the  common  regime,  the  Commission  has 
authorized  France  and  the  United Kingdom,  under  Article  115  of  the  EEC 
Treaty,  to  et*JIDPt  Latin  American  bananas  from  Community  treatment  until 
30  June  1993.  Portugal  and  6
~pain are  allowed  to  maintain  restrictions 
under their Acts  of Accession. 
317.  As  noted  in  Chapter VI,  five  Latin  American  contracting  parties 
(Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Guatemala,  Nicaragua,  Venezuela)  have  taken various 
initiatives  under  the  GATT,  since  June  1992,  challenging  certain  member 
States'  national  banana  policies  and  the  forthcoming  EC  reg1me.  In 
February,  1993,  the  GATT65ouncil established a  Panel  to  examine  the current 
national  import  regimes. 
(viii)  Tobacco 
318.  In  1991,  EC  production  of  leaf  tobacco  - mainly  in  less  developed 
regions  of  Italy,  Spain  and  Greece  totalled  430, 540  tonnes,  up  from 
395,000  in  6
~988.  The  Maximum  Guaranteed  Quantity  was  exceeded  by 
12  per cent.  The  excess  for  the  sector  as  a  whole  masks  much  larger 
overruns  in  individual  categories.  For  example,  the  production  of  two 
oriental  varieties  (Badischer  Geudertheimer  and  Forchheimer  Havanna) 
exceeded  the  guaranteed  quantities  by  more  than  twice  (deliveries  of 
70,600  tonnes  in  1990  compared  with  no  more  than  4,000  tonnes  in  1986). 
The  support  level  for  these  tobaccos,  not  much  demanded  in  the  EC,  has 
apparently  6
~roved  more  attractive  than  the  levies  imposed  on  excess 
production. 
62The  same  decision-making  procedure  has  recent 1  y  been  i nt  reduced  in  the  tobacco  and 
fhheries  sectors;  a  similar  mechanism  is  also  foreseen  in  the  Commission  proposal  of 
June  1992  for  changes  to  the main  EC  trade  remedy  regulations  (Section  IV.2(v)(g)).  However, 
under  this  propos a  1 ,  the  Counc i 1  is  to  be  i nvo 1  ved  on 1  y  if  so  requested  by  a  Management 
Committee  made  up  of  member  State representatives  (qualified majority). 
63commission  Decisions  C(92)  3381  and  C(92)  3382  of  28  December  1992. 
64According  to  Agence  Europe,  5  January  1993. 
65GATT  document  C/M/261,  12  March  1993. 
66The  EC  is  a  net  importer  of  raw  tobacco,  with  a  self-sufficiency  ratio  of  some 
50  per  cent  overall,  and  a  net  exporter  of  manufactured  products. 
67The  current  EC  support  scheme  is  based  on  producer  premiums,  paid  to  processors.  The 
premiums  are  specified  for  34  varieties,  but  not  for  different  quality  grades.  Intervention 
purchases  are  triggered  if the  EC  market  price falls more  than  15  per  cent  below  a  prescribed 
target  price.  Production  in  excess  of  the  stabilizer  levels,  fixed  for  the  different 
varieties,  triggers  price  and  premium  reductions.  They  are  related  to  the  production 
(Footnote  Continued) CfRM/S/36A 
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319.  Main  export  destinations  were  eastern  Europe  and  the  Middle  East. 
With total  EC  exports of raw  tobacco  increasing by  SO  per cent between 1988 
and  1990,  shipments  of dark  air-cured varieties  grew  by  over  110 per cent. 
In  1990,  total  EC  exports  of  raw  tobacco  reached  223,500  tonnes  (including 
70,900  tonnes  of dark air-cured)  as  against  imports  of 463,200  tonnes.  The 
import/export-ratio declined from  2.85  in 1988  to  2.07  in 1990. 
320.  Export  refunds  are  granted,  wit~ 8 considerable  variations  between 
varieties  (from  0.2  to  0.44  ECU/kg).  Total  EC  expenditure  (EAGGF 
guarantee)  in  the  sector  amounted  to  some  ECU  1. 3 billion  in  1992.  It 
coincided with an EC-internal debate  about additional restrictions on sales 
promotion  for  tobacco  products,  possibly  including  a  complete  ban  on  any 
advertisements. 
321.  In the  context of its farm  reform package,  the  EC  decided to overhaul 
the  regulatory  framework  governing  the  sector  (Council  Regulation 
No.  2075/92).  Tobacco  production  will  be  subject  to  a  maximum  global 
guarantee  threshold  of  350,000  tonnes  (370,000  tonnes  in  1993),  which  is 
19  per  cent  (14  per  cent)  less  than  the  1991  harvest.  Intervention  and 
export  refunds  are  to be  abolished.  Main  elements  of the  new  system,  to be 
implemented  with  the  1993  harvest,  are  (i)  a  Community-mandated  system  of 
processing  quotas  which  are  allocated  to  individual  processors  based  on 
their  past  performance  (similar  to  the  sugar  regime);  (ii)  supply 
contracts,  within  the  quota  limits,  between  the  tobacco  growers  and  the 
processors;  (iii)  cul  ti-g~tion  premiums  for  the  growers  to  be  channelled 
through  these  contracts;  and  (iv)  flanking  measures  with  a  view  to  re-
orienting current production patterns. 
(Footnote  Continued) 
overrun,  up  to  a  maximum  price  reduction  of  23  per  cent  for  the  1992  harvest  (15  per  cent  in 
1991). 
According  to  the  Commission,  the  aid  levels  set  for  Badischer  Geudertheimer  and 
Forchheimer  Havanna  reflected  production  cost  and  marketing  conditions.  prevailing  in  their 
traditional  production  areas  in  Germany  and  Northern  France.  However,  they  were  subsequently 
introduced  into  Italy  and  produced  there  at  lower  cost,  with  high  yields  but  and  a  rather  low 
average  quality.  The  stabilizer mechanism  proved  insufficient to  prevent  a  production  boom. 
68At  present,  export  refunds  are  provided  for  the  1988  to  1991  harvests,  varying  from 
ECU  0.20  per  kg  of  Greek  and  Spanish  Virginia  to  ECU  0.44  per  kg  for  some  specialities  of 
which,  according  to  the  Commission,  only  very  small  quantities  are  exported  (e.g.  Round  tip, 
Scafati,  Sumatra  I).  The  Commission  has  noted  that  the  refunds  have  been  reduced 
considerably  since  1990,  in  particular  for  varieties  which  did  not  correspond  to  market 
demand.  Refunds  for  Hybrids  of  Geudertheimer  and  Forchheimer  Havanna  produced  in  Italy  were 
scaled  down  from  ECU  0.34  to  ECU  0.21  per  kg  at  present.  · 
69The  system  is  established  for  the  period  between  the  1993  and  the  1997  harvests.  In 
order  for  tobacco  deliveries  to  qualify  for  the  premi urns,  they  must  ( i)  come  from  the 
production  areas  designated  for  the  variety  concerned;  (ii)  meet  specified  quality 
requirements;  (iii)  be  brought  from  the  producer  to  the  processor  under  a  cultivation 
contract. 
The  premi urns  for  most  varieties  have  been  set  at  ECU  1. 818  per  kg,  wHh  certain 
exceptions  (e.g.  ECU  2.00  for  fired-cured  and  ECU  2.273  for  flue-cured  tobaccos  and  ECU  3.00 
for  Basmas  (per  kg)). 
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322.  The  imposition of quantitative  restrictions  or  charges  equivalent  to 
customs  duties  is  prohibited under  the  new  scheme,  subject  to  a  safeguard 
clause.  It  corresponds  to  the  provisions  foreseen  in  the  banana  sector 
under  Council Regulation No.  404/93  (see  above). 
323.  Under  the  Common  Customs  Tariff,  unmanufactured  tobaccos  bear 
alternate  tariffs  (ad  valorem  tariffs  apply  within  a  range  specified  in 
terms  of  specific  rates).  All  rates  are  GATT  bound.  In 1988,  tariffs  on 
unmanufactured  tobacco  averaged  13  per cent,  as  against  66  per cent  on 
manufactured  products  (simple  averages;  see  first  TPRM  report). 
Cigarettes  are  subject  to  m.f.n.  tariffs  of  90  per cent  or  a  GSP  rate  of 
60  per cent.  National excise  taxes  differ significantly. 
324.  Market  structures  in  t'7Joacco  manufacturing  and  distribution  vary 
widely  among  member  States.  Publicly  owned  monopolies  in  Italy, 
· Portugal,  Spain  and  France  coexist  with  a  privately-structured  industry 
elsewhere  in  the  EC.  France  controls  tobacco  prices  for  perceived social 
and  economic  policy  reasons;  the  national  price  level  is  said to  be  some 
30  per cent below  the  EC  average.  Several  foreign-owned  tobacco  producers 
have,  however,  referred  this  practice  to  the  highest  national 
administrative  court  (Conseil  d'Etat),  alleging that  the  Act permitting it 
contravened  an  EEC  Council  Regulation  of  1972.  Based  on  this  Regulation, 
as  well  as  Articles  30  and  37  of  the  EEC  Treaty  (see  Chapter  IV)  and 
previous  decisions  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice,  the  Conseil  d'Etat 
annulled  the  Ministerial  Decree  prohibiting  the  companies  from  increasing 
prices  (28  February 1992).  The  ruling  is  considered  as  a  landmark 
decision,  expressly  allowing  an  EEC  Regulation,  and  not  only  EEC  Treaty 
provisions,  to  take precedence  over  French national  law. 
(ix)  Coffee,  cocoa and  tea 
325.  Coffee  is by  far  the  Communities'  leading  food  import  (at five-digit 
SITC) ,  accounti'ng  for  about fl per  cent  of  total  imports  _of  food  products 
(ECU  2,422 million)  in  1990.  Cocoa  ranked  seventh,  with  imports  worth 
ECU  937  million. 
326.  Coffee,  cocoa  and  tea  are  subject  to  excise  taxes  in  several  member 
States.  Tax  structures  and  rates  differ  considerably;  all  rates  are 
specific  (Table V .4).  The  products  have  been  excluded  from  tax 
harmonization  in  the  Internal  Market  context,  as  distinct  from  tobacco, 
70Ec  Commission  (199la). 
71Reflecting  international  price  developments,  this  is  considerably  less  than  in 
previous  years  (12  per  cent  in  1979);  Table  AV.2. C/RM/S/36A 
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fuels  and  alcoholic  beverages  for  which  m1n1mum  rates  have  been  set  (with 
effect  from  1  January 1993).  However,  tax  evasion  through  purchases  in 
other member  States can no  longer be  limited through border controls. 
327.  Following  recent  price  declines,  the  incidences  of  internal  taxes 
have  increased  strongly.  For  example,  the  ad  valorem  equivalent  of  the 
German  excise  tax  on  coffee  climbed  from  70 per cent  in  1988  to  over 
110 per cent in 1991.  The  incidence of the Danish tax on cocoa butter rose 
from  one-third  to  over  one-half  over  the  same  period.  Revenues  from  the 
German  coffee  tax  totalled DM  1,928  million in  1990;  the  tea  tax ~elded 
DM  61  million  (ECU  945  million  and  ECU  30 million,  respectively).  The 
taxes  are  on·top of  customs  duties  in  the  order of  13~ per 7
~ent  (coffee), 
2  per cent  (tea),  and  17  per cent  (coffee  and  tea extracts). 
328.  In  January  1991,  Italy  nearly  quadrupled  its  consumption  taxes  on 
coffee  and  coffee  products.  In  the  same  move,  taxes  on  cocoa  beans  and 
cocoa  products  were  increased  sevenfold.  The  tax  incidences  reached 
100 per cent for  raw coffee  and between 40  and  60  per cent for other coffee 
products.  Opinions  on  the effects of these  taxes  on consumption and,  thus, 
on production  and  trade  differ.  The  EC  gave  the view  that  the  Italian tax 
increases  had  remained  far  below  the  rise  in  living  costs  since  the  last 
adjustment  and  that  it  wa74 almost  inconceivable  that  they  could  have 
affected coffee  consumption. 
329.  Current  consumption  patterns  within  the  EC  (Chart V.8)  seem  to 
suggest  that  price  and  tax  differentials  have  no  decisive  impact.  Other 
determinants,  such  as  income  effects  or  national  consumer  preferences, 
appear  to  prevail.  However,  this  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  prices 
(and price changes)  do  not matter at all. 
72 In  contrast,  Germany  has  no  consumption  tax  on  wine,  except  for  sparkling  wine 
(revenue  in  1990:  OM  966  million  (ECU  470  million)).  East  Germany  is  not  included  in  these 
figures. 
73Simp1e  tariff averages  (Table  AIV.1). 
74GATT  document  MTN.SB/17,  19  November  1991. 
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Chart v.a 
Coffee consumption of selected member States, 1991 
EC  average 
12 
0  2  4  6  8  10  1.2 
Kilogrammes of raw coffee per capita 
~:  F.O. Licht, International Coffee Yearbook, 1992. 
330.  Empirical  studies  for  the  OECD  area  and  the  EC  as  a  whole  have 
established  ~ significant negative  correlation between price  movements  and 
consumption  of  coffee,  cocoa  and  tea.  However,  the  demand  response·  was 
found  to be highly inelastic,  with long-term  elasticiti~ between  -0.11 and 
-0.33  for  raw  coffee,_  a~d  -0.33  and  -0.44  for  cocoa.  Accordingly,  on 
average  for  the  EC,  a  change  in  coffee  prices  would  cause  an  opposite 
chang~ . in  the  quanti  ties  demanded  of  up  to  one-third  of  the  percentage 
price  change.  (The  range  of  findings  may  be  .attributed  to  changes  in 
income.and  lifestyle  ov~r time,  the  influence  of  substitnte  products,  and 
differences  .in  the . econometric  app~tfches.)  The  median  of  the  available 
estimates for. tea is  -0.07  ~~r cent. 
75For  raw  coffee  see  Akiyama  and  Duncan  (1982)  and  Behrman  and  Ti nakorn-Ramangkura 
(1978).  For  cocoa  see  Adams  and  Behrmann  (1978)  and  UNCTAD  (1990).  The  OECO,  ;n  the 
context  of its  RUNS  Model,  uses  elasticities  of  -0.33  per  cent  for  coffee  and  -0.44  per  cent 
for  cocoa. 
76
0ECD  (1992c),  and  Behrman  and  Tinakorn-Ramangkura  (1978). C/RM/S/36A 
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(x)  Fisheries 
331.  Article  38  of  the  EEC  Treaty  defines  agriculture  as  including  the 
products  of  fisheries  and  first-stage  processing.  A  common  market 
organization  for  fisheries  was  set  up  in  1970  (Council 
Regulation No.  2142/70)  and  access  to  and  management  of  fishery  resources 
are  regulated  at  Community  level.  On  the  basis  of  Commission  proposals, 
the  "Fisheries  Council"  decides  annually  on  Total  Allowable  Catches,  the 
allocation  among  member  States,  and  conditions  of  resource  access..  With  a 
view  to  developing  and  extending  fishing  opportunities,  the  EC  has 
concluded  23_ bilateral fishing agreements  to date  (Table AV.4). 
332.  While  the  CAP  and  the  CFP  are  committed  to  the  same  objectives  and 
principles  - i.e.  market  unification,  Community  preference,  financial 
solidarity  - there  are  significant differences  in the  range  of trade policy 
instruments  available.  Almost  all  EC  tariffs  on  fish  are  bound  in  GATT; 
m. f. n.  rates  on  fresh  products  average  some  17'7  per cent  as  compared  with 
20  per cent  for  prepared  and  preserved  fish.  In  a  variety  of  cases, 
entry  under  bound  tariffs  is,  under  the  bindings,  subject  to  a  supplier's 
compliance  with  Community  reference  prices  or  other  limits  and  conditions 
"to  be  determined  by  the  competent  authorities".  In  certain  areas, 
including  tuna  and  bonito,  disregard  of the  reference  price  may  result  in 
the  imposition  of  countervailing  charges.  At  the  time  of  the  initial 
report,  Community  tariff protection was  supplemented by national  quotas  on 
canned  tuna  and  ~rdines (France  and  Spain),  and  on  cod  and  various  other 
species  (Spain);  canned  tuna  and  sardines  have  recently  been  made 
subject to Community  quotas  (see below). 
333.  The  GATT  element  in  the  Community's  external  fisheries  regime  helps 
explain,  according  to _the  Commission,  "why  the  market  orga~ation has not 
gone  so  far  off  course  as  certain  agricultural  policies".  Contrary  to 
the  situation  for  many  farm  products,  the  EC  is  a  net  importer  of  fish. 
Its  trade  deficit  in  the  sector  has  widened  from·  ECU  2.66 billion 
(1.26 million tonnes)  in  1985  to  ECU  6.11 billion  (2.33 million80onnes)  in 
1991.  Total  EC  catches  in 1990  amounted to  6.62 million tonnes. 
77TarHfs  are  not  consolidated  on  Atlantic  halibut,  dried;  Atlantic  halibut,  salted 
and  not  dried;  rock  lobster  (tails);  and  prepared or  preserved  anchovies. 
78The  Spanish  quotas  were  covered,  under  EC  law,  by  the Act  of  Accession. 
79Ec  Commission  (1991f). 
80spain  and  Denmark  are  the  dominant  EC  fish  producers,  each  accounting  for  close  to 
20  per  cent  of  total  Community  catches,  followed  by  France  and  the  United  Kingdom  with  about 
12  per  cent  each. C/RM/S/36A 
Page  137 
334.  Community  support  is  currently  provided  for  measures  aimed  at 
improving  processing  and  marketing  in  the  sector.  EC  funds  of 
ECU  156. dl  million  have  been  earmarked  under  the  framework  programme  for 
1991-93;  total Communis!  spending in the  "structures sector"  amounted to 
ECU  360  million  in  1992.  These  funds  complement  initiatives  taken  by 
member  States.  According  to  a  recent  Commission  report,  45  new  national 
aid regimes  in the  fisheries  and  aquaculture  sectors  were  notified in 1991 
(first  10  months).  Of  these,  18  were  approved  without  objections.  The 
Commission notes  further six projects which member  States 8
~ad either failed 
to notify or which had been notified only after adoption. 
335.  In late 1991,  the  Commission  tabled its first extensive report on the 
Common  Fisheries Policy,  tracing policy developments  since  the  introduction 
of a  Community  system for  resource  conservation  an~4
management in 1983  and 
suggesting  guidelines  for  the  period  until  2003.  The  report  gives  a 
bleak picture  of  the  current  situation,  pointing  to  depletion  of  most  EC 
·commercial  stocks,  in  particular  of  round  and  flat  fish;  large  excess 
fleet capacities;  deficiencies in mechanisms  for resource management;  and 
social and  economic vulnerability of the sector.  Following the  report,  and 
in  view  of  overfishing  and  dwindling  catches,  the  Council  adopted  in 
December  1992  a  new  framework  regulation governing  resource  access  and  the 
management  and  monitoring  of  exploitation  activities.  Under  Regulation 
No.  3760/92,  the  Council  is  required  to  set,  until  1  January 1994, 
objectives  and  detailed rules  for  restructuring the  sector  "with  a  view  to 
achieving  a  balance  on  a  sustainable  basis  between  resources  and  their 
exploitation". 
336.  A  Commission  report  on  policy  monitoring  in  the  sector  focuses  in 
particular  on  two  problems  co~sidered to  hamper  effective  action  against 
overfishing:  (i)  insufficient  means . o'5 control  and  (ii)  the  lack  of 
dissuasive  sanctions  at Community  level.  At  present,  member  States have 
the  sole  competence  for  supervising  fishing activities;  the  Commission  is 
allowed only to  check correct application.  The  report calls for  increased 
inspection  powers  for  EC  agents;  an  integrated  control  policy,  covering 
all  aspects  of  the  CFP;  use  of  modern  technologies  (satellite 
81Excluding  expenditure  under  international ·fisheries agreements. 
82This  includes  measures  concerning  fishing  fleets,  processing  and  marketing  measures. 
and  special  actions  in  remote  and  insular  regions.  Expenditure  in  the  processing  ·•nd 
marketing  sector was  about  ECU  81  million  in  1992. 
83Ec  Commission  (1992d}. 
84Ec  Commission  (1991f}. 
85Ec  Commission  (1992g). C/RM/S/36A 
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surveillance,  electronic  data  interchange,  computer  data  bases); 
harmonization  of  sanctions  within  the  Community,  at  a  dissuasive  level; 
and  more  effective  surveil~ce of fishing activities  in EC,  third-country 
and  international  waters.  Recent  infringement  proceedings  concerned 
Spain  (failure to check landing declarations against the data recorded when 
the  fish  were  sold;  refusal  to  cooperate  with  Commission  inspectors), 
France  (failure  to  penalize  breaches  of  the  Community  rules  concerning 
logbooks;  failure  to  observe  deadlines  for  the  notification  of  catches 
subject  to  TACs  or  quotas)  and  Denmark  ~~ational  legislation  contrary  to 
the  Community  rules  concerning logbooks). 
337.  In  late  1992,  the  EC  revised  its  common  market  organization  in  the 
sector.  Basic regulatory provisions  - on marketing standards,  intervention 
principles,  State  aid,  market  access,  and  competition  - are  contained  in 
Council Regulation No.  3759/92. 
338.  Producers•  associations play a  central role  in implementing Community 
internal measures.  They  are  to buy and market  their members'  output,  apply 
production  and  quality  standards,  and  ensure  the  proper  management  of 
authorized  catch  quotas.  Member  States  may  require  independent  producers 
to  respect  the  marketing  and  production  rules  of  organizations  considered 
to  be  representative.  National  assistance  may  be  granted,  subject  to 
specified  ceilings  and  time  limits,  to  stimulate  their  formation  and 
operation. 
339.  For  most  varieties  of  fish,  the  associations  may  fix  m1n1mum  prices 
("withdrawal  prices")  below  which  they  do  not  sell  their  members' 
production.  Any  withdrawals,  and the granting of indemnities  to producers, 
are  to  be  financed  out  of  an  intervention  fund  to  be  sourced  from  sales 
revenues  or  through  a  price  equalization  system.  In  addition,  .. member 
States  are  held  to  support  the  organizations;  assistance  is  related  to 
86The  depletion  of  cod  stocks  in  the  North  Atlantic,  close  to  the  Canadian  200-m;le 
fishing  zone,  has  recently caused  tensions  between  Canada  and  the  EC  (GATT  (1992b),  p.  119). 
The  EC  Comrnhsion  has  chartered  an  inspection  vessel.  In  the  framework  of  the  NAFO 
International  Inspection  and  Control  Scheme,  the  vessel  is  directed  to  be  continuously 
present  in the  area  concerned.  Canada  and  other  NAFO  contracting parties  participate in this 
mutual  inspection  exercise;  the  findings  are  complemented  by  dockside  inspections  within  the 
EC.  The  data  collected  on  the  basis  of  the  Community  scheme  are  being  checked  jointly with 
the  EC  Commission  and  the  Canadian  authorities.  These  checks,  according  to  the  Commission, 
do  not  point  to substantial  discrepancies  between  the  EC  data  and  certain Canadian  esti•ates, 
bearing  in mind  differences  in  the methodological  approaches  used  on  both  sides. 
In  December  1992,  the  EC  and  Canada  initialled  an  agreement  committing  both  sides  to 
complying  with  all  conservation  and  management  decisions,  including  quotas,  taken  by  NAFO  and 
to  ensuring  that  the  quotas  are  respected.  Agreement  was  a  1  so  reached  on  the  use  and 
allocation  of  the  cod  stocks  off  Newfoundland.  (According  to  European  Report, 
23  December  1992.) 
87 EC  Commission  (1992h_). C/RM/S/36A 
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their  sales  and  conditional  on  their  compliance  with  a  Community-wide 
withdrawal  price  which,  in  turn,  is  linked to  ~s"guide price"  to  be  fixed 
annually  by  the  Council  (qualified  majority).  The  products  withdrawn 
must  be  used  for  non-consumptive  or  other  purposes  which  do  not  to 
interfere  with  normal  marketing.  In  addition,  member  States  may  grant 
"carry-over  aid"  in  order  to  support  essential  stabilization  and  storage 
operat~~ns  if  catches  are  not  sold  at  a  specified  Community  selling 
price.  Certain frozen products  may  qualify  for  storage  aid,  up  to  three 
months,  in  the  event  of  their  market  prices  dropping  significantly  below 
the  guide price. 
340.  A  separate  regulatory  system  applies  to  tuna  for  cann~ for  which 
the  Council  is  to  fix  each  year  uniform  EC  producer  prices.  Producers 
qualify  for  compensatory  allowances,  subject  to  various  ceilings,  if  the 
average  EC  selling  price  and  the  free-at-frontier  price  fall  below  a 
specified threshold level  (93  per cent of the producer price). 
341.  Regulation No.  3759/92  is based on  the principle that tariffs are  the 
sole  means  of  external  protection.  However,  for  'the  next  four  years. 
imports  of certain canned sardine  and  tuna varieties have  been made  subject 
to  Community  quotas.  Imports  must  not  exce~ the  volumes  recorded  in 1991 
plus  a  growth  factor of at least 6  per cent.  The  restrictions  imposed  do 
not  apply  to  countries  linked  to  the  EC  by  a  preferential  agreement  (e.g. 
Lome  suppliers)  or  by  an  agreement  covering  these  products.  According  to 
the  Regulation,  temporary  restrictions  are  deemed  necessary  "to  enable  the 
Community processing industry to adjust its production conditions  in such a 
88The  Community  withdrawal  price  for  individual  products  must  not  exceed  90  per  cent  of 
the  quide  price.  The  Council  is  required  to  base  its  price  decision  on  (i)  the  average 
market  price during  the  preceding  three  years  and  (ii)  an  assessment  of  production  and  demand 
prospects.  Account  must  a 1 so  be  taken  of  the  need  to  ( i)  stabi 1 i ze  markets  and  avoid 
surpluses,  (ii)  help  support  producers'  income  and  (iii) consider  consumers'  interests. 
89selling  prices  are  fixed  under  the  same  conditions  as  withdrawal  prices.  Carry-over 
aid must  not  be  granted  for  more  than  6  per  cent  of  the  annual  quantity  put  up  for  sale. 
90The  decision  is  to  be  based  on  similar  economic  criteria  and  social  considerations 
("to  help  support  producers'  incomes")  as  that  on  the  guide  price  for  other  varieties. 
However,  the  Counc i 1  is  not  obliged,  in  this  case,  to  take  account  "of  the  need  to  consider 
consumers'  interests". 
91Alternatively,  whenever  higher,  the  quota  volume  is  to  increase  by  the  growth  rate 
recorded  for  EC  consumption. 
A  supplementary  Commission  Regulation  (No.  3900/92)  sets  an  import  Hmit  of 
2,250  tonnes  for  preserved  sardines  and  of  74,100  tonnes  for  preserved  tuna  in  1993  (both 
categories  are  specified  on  the  basis  of  several  ex-positions  at  eight-digit  tariff  line 
level).  Of  the  total  import  volume,  85  per  cent  is  allocated  to  established  importers,  the 
rest  to  other  companies.  The  quota  appl i cat  i ens  for  preserved  tuna,  1  odged  by  the  second 
group  on  4  and  5  January  1993,  exceeded  by  far  its  15  per  cent  share  in  the  1993  quota.  This 
prompted  the  Commission  on  8  January  1993  to  limit  the  import  authorizations  to  3.61  per  cent 
of  the  quantities  applied  for  during  the  above  two  days  and  to  suspend  the  processing  of  any 
further  applications  (Commission  Regulation  No.  25/93). C/RM/S/36A 
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way  as  to  improve  its  competitive  position  with  regard  to  imports  from 
certain third countries".  (The  Communities'  m.f.n.  tariffs on the products 
concerned vary between  24  and  25  per cent;  GSP  preferences are  confined to 
shipments  from least developed countries which enter duty-free.) 
342.  Referen§2  prices  are  designed  to  prevent  imports  from  causing market 
disturbances.  If significant  quanti  ties  enter  the  EC  market  at  prices 
below  the  reference price,  the  EC  may,  depending  on  the products  concerned, 
either  (i)  revoke  autonomous  tariff  suspensions;  (ii) make  importation 
subject  to  compliance  with  the  reference  price;  or  (iii)  introduce 
countervail~ng charges if these are  compatible with existing GATT  bindings. 
343.  The  Regulation allows  for  emergency measures  under  conditions similar 
to  those  applicable  in  the  banana  and  tobacco  sectors  (see  above).  As  in 
these  areas,  the  Commission  is authorized to  take  the measures  immediately; 
in  order  to  amend  or  repeal  them,  the  Council  would  need  to  achieve  a 
qualified majority against  the  Commission. 
344.  Faced  with  a  glut  of  cheap  imports,  in  early  1993,  the  EC  made  the 
release  for  free  circulation  of  various  fish  categories  subject  to  the 
importers'  compliance  with  specified  reference  prices  (fresh,  chilled  or 
frozen  cod,  coalfish,  haddock,  a  certain  species  of  hake,  monkfish,  and 
Alaska pollack frozen fillets).  The  measures,  ~~tified in March  1993  under 
Article XIX,  are  due  to expire  on  30  June  1993. 
92Regulation  No.  3759/92  provides  that  the  reference  prices  are  to  be  fixed  annually, 
subject  to  the  consulation  procedures  resulting  from  the  Community's  commitments  within  the 
GATT  framework. 
Varying  among  product  categories, 
withdrawal  price;  selling  price;  a 
free-at-frontier  price  in  previous  years; 
processing  costs  taken  into  account. 
the  reference  price  corresponds  either  to  the  EC 
specified  percentage  of  the  guide  price;  the 
or  the  average  reference price  for  fresh  products, 
93The  relevant  Commission  Regulations  (Nos.  420/93  and  529/93)  are  based  on  the 
reference  price  provisions  (Article  22)  of  Council  Regulation  No.  3759/92. C/RM/S/36A 
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*************************************************************************** 
No~e V .1:  lfain :Eea.t:ures of dle EC  CIIDD.ed  tuna  ma.rke~ 
345.  The  EC  is  the  world's  largest  importer  and  consumer  of canned  tuna. 
France,  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  combined  account  for  about 
80  per cent  of  total  Community  imports  (110 ,000  tonnes  in  1990).  The 
German  and U.K.  markets are served mainly by Asian suppliers,  in particular 
Thailand,  the  Philippines  and  Indonesia.  France,  by  contrast,  gets 
three-fifths of its imports  from West  African  countries  (Cote  d'Ivoire and 
Senegal)  whose production is largely in  the hands  of French-owned  companies 
(Peche  et Froid,  Pecheurs  de  France,  and  Saupiquet).  Shipments  from  these 
ACP  sources enter unrestricted and duty-free. 
346.  EC  canned  tuna  production  is  concentrated  in  Italy  (40  per cent), 
Spain  (30)  and  France  (23).  Portugal  accounts for  the rest.  The  industry 
relies heavily on  imports of raw fish. 
347.  The  Italian  canneries  hold  a  strong  position  on  their  home  market; 
imports of canned  tuna,  predominantly from Spain  and Portugal,  cater for no 
more  than  10  per cent  of domestic  consumption.  The  industry is  dominated 
by  six  companies  which  represent  three-quarters  of  total  domestic 
production.  Overall,  the Italian producers are considered technically more 
efficient  than,  for  example,  their  counterparts  in  Spain.  Host  Spanish 
canneries  are  small-sized  family  firms;  there  has  been  almost  no  import 
competition  to  date.  The  French  industry,  made  up  mainly  of  three 
companies  (see  above),  supplies about half of the national market. 
Source:  GLOBEFISH  Highlights No.  4/92;  Josupeit  (199la  and b). 
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(xi)  Beverages  and spirits 
348.  Many  EC  markets  for  food  and  drinks  have  traditionally  been 
compartmentalized,  reflecting  the  impact  of  technical  trade  barriers  as 
well  as  national  consumer  preferences  and  loyalties  (e.g.  in areas  such as 
beer  and wine).  This  has  allowed  domestic  companies  to  occu~ significant 
shares  of  their  individual  member  States'  home  markets.  Expansion 
strategies  in  the  industry have  thus  tended  to  rely  on  the  acquisition of 
established  "champions",  as  exemplified  by  the  recent Nestle/Perrier deal, 
rather than on penetrating markets  from  abroad. 
349.  Adverse  trade effects may  result from  recycling requirements  design§g 
to  combat  packaging  waste  and,  implicitly,  environmental  degradation. 
Access  to  existing  recycling  chains  appears  to  be  difficult  in  certain 
cases  and  the need  for  importers  to  set up  own  systems  could prove  costly. 
(For  example,  a  large  number  of German  producers  of mineral  water  operates 
a  common  system  of  standardized,  refillable  bottles.  The  system, 
administered  by  an  association under  private  law,  is  not  open  to  foreign 
producers  and,  hence,  apparently  constitutes  some  form  of  "closed  shop".) 
In  mid-1992,  the  Commission  presented  a  draft  Council  directive  aimed  at 
defining essential  requirements  for  renewable  and  recoverable  packaging  in 
order  to  avoid  obstacles  to  trade  and  distortions  of  competition 
(92/C  263/01).  The  proposal  specifies  recycling  targets  for  packaging 
waste  and  obliges  member  States,  within  five  years  after  implementation of 
the  Directive,  to  set up  systems  for  returning  and  reusing  or  recovering 
all  used  packaging.  Imported  products  are  to  be  included  on 
non-discriminatory  terms. 
350.  Excise  taxes  on  alcoholic  beverages  vary  extremely  among  the  member 
States.  In  January 1992,  the  relevant  rates  on  spirits  ranged  from  some 
ECU  170  in Greece  to  over  ECU  ~ 6
600 in Ireland and  the  United Kingdom  (per 
hectolitre  of  pure  alcohol).  Harmonization  in  the  Internal  Market 
context centres  on  the setting of minimum  rates  (Section IV.4(iii)(b)). 
94see  EC  Commission  (199lc)  and  (1992d). 
Whi 1  e  EC  breweries  account  for  95  per  cent  of  world  trade  in  beer,  intra-Community 
shipments  represent  no  more  than  4  per  cent  of  total  EC  beer  consumption. 
95Ref1ecting  differences  in  national  regulations,  the  importance  of  refillable  glass 
containers  varies  widely  among  the  member  States;  refillable  bottles  are  currently  used  for 
96  per  cent  of  all  soft  drinks  in  Denmark  and  some  90  per  cent  in  the  Netherlands,  as  against 
14  per  cent  in  the  United  Kingdom  (EC  Commission,  199la). 
96 zn  Denmark,  taxation  comprised  a  basic  excise  tax  of  some  ECU  1,800  per  hectolitre, 
supplemented  by  an  ad  valorem  component  of  37~ per  cent  of  the  wholesale  price  and 
25  per  cent  VAT. (3)  Developments  in Main  Industrial Sectors 
(i)  Basic policy principles 
C/RM/S/36A 
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351.  With  the  removal  of internal trade barriers,  the debate within the  EC 
on  the  need  for  common  or  harmonized  industrial  policies  has  intensified. 
It  reflects  concerns  that  market  opening  may  tend  to  increase  the 
vulnerability of  industries  in one  member  State  to  policy developments  and 
distortions  in  others.  Various  attempts  have  thus  been  made  to  draw  up 
guidelines  for  common  or harmonized policies  towards  industry alongside  the 
Internal Market process  of  intra-Community  trade  liberalization. 
352.  A  Communication  by  the  Commission,  issued  in  November  1990, 
underlined  that  the  enterprise  se,.tor  had  the  main  responsibility  for 
ensuring  industrial competitiveness.  An  open  market  environment,  applied 
to all activities  on  the  same  basis,  was  viewed  "as  the best  guarantee  for 
a  strong  and  competitive  industry".  Within  such  an  environment,  public 
authorities  are  expected  to  act  mainly  as  catalysts  and  pathbreakers  for 
innovation and help  industries  to adjust  to structural change. 
353.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  (Article  3)  extends  the  range  of  Community 
activities,  as  originally  outlined  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  by  explicit 
reference  to  the  strengthening  of  economic  and  social  cohesion,  the 
strengthening  of  the  competitiveness  of  the  Community's  industry,  and  the 
promotion  of  research  and  technological  development.  Common  policies  and 
activities  in  these  areas  are  to  be  devised  and  conducted  in  accordance 
with  the  principle  of  "an  open  market  economy  with  free  competition" 
(Article  3a)  and,  whenever  the  EC  has  no  exclusive  jurisdiction,  with  the 
principle  of  "subsidiarity"  (Article  3b).  The  latter  term  is  further 
specified  as  meaning  that  Community-level  action  should  be  taken  only  if, 
in  view  of  the  scale  or  effects,  the  relevant  objectives  can  be  better 
achieved  at  EC  level  than  by  the  member  States.  EC  initiatives  are 
therefore  to  be  implemented  "in  support  of"  (Article  130: 3)  or 
"complementing"  (Article  130g)  actions  taken by member  States  in pursuit of 
the  Treaty's  objectives  with  regard  to  industry  (Article  130)  and  research 
and  technology  (Article 130g). 
354.  The  specific  industrial  policy  prov1s1ons  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty 
require  the  Community  and  member  States  to  ensure  that  "the  conditions  for 
the  competitiveness  of  the  Community's  industry  exist"  (Article  130). 
Policy action at the  EC  and national levels,  based on  "open and competitive 
markets",  shall aim  to speed up  structural adjustment;  to encourage  a 
1EC  Commission  (1990)  and  GATT  (1991}. C/RM/S/36A 
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favourable  business  environment,  in  particular  for  small  and  medium-sized 
undertakings;  to  encourage  an  environment  favourable  to  business 
cooperation;  and  to  foster  better  industrial  exploitation  of  R&D  and 
innovation policies.  These  provisions  are  not,  however,  to  be  used  as  a 
basis  for  introducing  measures  "which  could  lead  to  a  distortion  of 
competition". 
355.  The  Treaty  does  not  specify  the  relationship  between  industrial 
policy  initiatives  and  competition  policy.  It  leaves  open,  for  example, 
whether distortion of competition  is  to  be  judged  from  an  international or 
EC  internal  perspective  and  whether  structural  adjustment  initiatives, 
necessarily  ·involving  policy  interference  in markets,  would  be  acceptable 
in  sectors  previous!~  free  of  such  intervention  (at  national,  EC  or 
international levels). 
356.  Any  common  industrial policy initiative would have  to be  decided upon 
unanimously  by  the  Council,  on  the  basis  of  a  Commission  proposal.  The 
European  ~arliament  and  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  are  to  be 
consulted.  In  the  sphere  of  R&D,  the  Commission  would  be  empowered,  in 
"close  cooperation with  the  Council",  to  take  "any  useful  initiaiives"  to 
promote  the  coordination  between  national  and  EC  policy  actions.  The  EC 
framework  programmes,  in  which  all  EC  activities  to  promote  R&D  are  set 
out,  would  be  subject  to  unanimous  approval  by  the  Council  and  to 
Parliamentary ·co-decision;  the  Parliaments  may  reject  the  common  position 
reached by  the  Council  and  the  Commissio~. 
357.  Recent  Communications  by  the  Commission  on  sectoral  policy  issues 
have built on  the  November  1990  guidelines as well  as  on Article  130 of the 
2Article  130f  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  sets  the  objectives  of  strengthening  the 
scientific  and  technological  bases  of  EC  industry  and  of  encouraging.  it  to  become  more 
internationally  competitive.  The  Article  does  not  include  a  competition  policy  clause 
similar  to  the  industrial-policy provisions  of Article 130  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  or  to  the 
current  Article  130f,  which  requires  that  "special  account  shall  be  taken  of  the  connection 
between  the  common  research  and  technological  development  effort,  the  establishment  of  the 
internal  market  and  the  implementation  of  common  policies,  particularly  as  regards 
competition  and  trade"  (emphasis  added).  See  also  Section  IV.4(i)(a). 
3The  Economic  and  Social  Committee  is  an  advisory  body  (GATT,  199la,  page  42/43).  Its 
members,  expected  to  represent  the  private  sector  and  the  genera  1  public,  are  appointed  by 
the  Counci 1  in  their  personal  capacity.  For  the  rOle  of  the  European  Parliament  under  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  see also  Section  11.4. 
4Article  130h,  as  foreseen  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  implies  a  certain  shift  of  powers 
towards  the  Commission  (and  the  Council).  Under  current  provisions  member  States,  in  liaison 
with  the  Commission,  are  "to  coordinate  among  themselves  the  policies  and  programmes  carried 
out  at  national  level"  while  the  Commission,  "in  close  contacts  with  the  member  States",  is 
to  take  additional  initiatives to  promote  such  coordination  ~emphasis added). 
51n  this  case,  the  majority  of  the  Parliament's  component  members  would  have  to  cast  a 
negative  vote. C/RM/S/36A 
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Maastricht  Treaty.  For  example,  the  Communication  on  the  motor  vehicle 
industry  stresses  the  need  for  an  EC-wide  approach  by  referring  to  the 
intensity of intra-EC trade,  the  consequent need for  Communi~y coordination 
in  order  to  avoid  trade-distorting  national  initiatives,  and  the 
Community's  responsibility  for  ~ternal trade  policy,  which  could have  an 
impact on the sector as  a  whole. 
(ii)  Transport equipment 
(a)  Motor vehicles 
358.  The  EC  member  States  account jointly for  close  to  40 per cent of the 
world's  motor  vehicle  production  and  consumption.  In  1990,  about 
1. 8  million  people  were  directly  employed  in  the  sector  (Table  AV. 5 (i)). 
Taking into account intersectoral links,  vehicle production is estimated to 
provide for  some  10 per cent of all industrial employment  in the  Community. 
359.  In  the  early  1990s,  Community  member  States  could  be  broadly 
categorized  into  non-producers  with  no  particular  stake  in  the  sector 
(Denmark,  Ireland,  Luxembourg);  producers  and  assemblers  for  which  no 
significant  protection  beyond  the  common  external  tariff  was  reported 
(Belgium,  Germany,  the Netherlands);  and protected markets  (France,  Italy, 
Portugal,  Spain,  the United Kingdom). 
Patterns of border protection 
360.  The  common  external tariff shows  escalation;  it is set at 10  per cent 
for  passenger  cars,  including  station  wagons,  and  4. 9  per cent  for  parts 
for  assembly  operations.  In contrast  to  other  "sensitive"  or  "strategic" 
industries,  the  EC  has  never  taken  anti-dumping  measures  in  the  motor 
vehicle  sector.  Conditions  of  market  access  to  a  number  of member  States 
have,  however,  been  determined  by  a  variety  of  formal  or  informal 
trade-related  measures,  such  as  unilateral  quotas,  trade  restraint 
arrangements,  and  restrictive  standardization  and  car  registration 
procedures  (Table  AV.6).  These  have  been  focused  ap  supplies  from  Japan 
and,  to  some  extent,  from  the  Republic  of  Korea.  Restrictions  under 
Article 115  of the  EEC  Treaty  (Section II.3(i))  or informal substitutes, 
6Ec  Commission  (1992c}. 
7 In  early  1992,  the  Government  of  France  announced  that  it  would  accept  imports  of 
Korean  cars  as  from  mid-year  (Hyundai,  Kia,  Daewoo}.  Newspaper  reports  indicated  that  this 
move  was  made  in  connection  with  a  forthcoming  Korean  procurement  decision  on  high-speed 
trains.  The  Hyunda i  importer,  Sonauto,  reportedly  intended  to  exercise  prudence  and  not  to 
import  more  than  about  5,000  cars  in  1993.  (le  Figaro,  19  June  1992,  and  le Mende, 
22  December  1992.) C/RM/S/36A 
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such  as 
measures 
States. 
Japanese 
industry-to  industry  agreements,  have  served  to  prevent  these 
from  being frustrated through  indirect deliveries via other member 
Chart V. 9  provides  an  overview  of  the  market  shares 
8 
held  by 
suppliers  in individual member  States and  EFTA  countries. 
Chart V.9 
Market share of passenger cars imported from Japan 
in EC  member States and EFTA  countries, 1992 
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~:Marketing Systems/Handalsblatt,  6  January 1993; Tribune  de  l'expanalon. 
8The  picture  presented  in  the  Chart  is  also  reflected  in  the  import  penetration  ratios 
shown  in  Tables  AV.S(i)-(xii).  Accordingly,  the  share  in  domestic  consumption  of  external 
motor  vehicle  supplies  (all  categories  from  all  sources)  is  lowest  in  Spain  with  slightly 
above  2  per  cent,  followed  by  France  and  Italy with  between  3  and  4  per  cent. 
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361.  National  trade  measures  against  third  countries,  while  aimed  at 
protecting  domestic  producers,  also  benefit  other  manufacturers  in  the 
EC/EFTA  area  which  have  free  access  to  the  shielded  markets.  Not 
surprisingly,  intra-EC  imports  have  significantly higher  market  shares  in 
France,  Italy  and  Spain  than  in  Germany  (Tables  AV. 4 ( i)-(xii)).  Rents 
accruing from  protection to domestic  producers  are  thus  likely to have been 
eroded  by  internal  free  trade  in  EC/EFTA  products,  particularly  in models 
which are close substitutes for  third country deliveries. 
362.  In July 1991,  the  EC  and  Japan  reached  a  consensus  on  conditions  for 
imports  of  Japanese  motor  vehicles  (cars,  off-road  vehicles  and  light 
commercial  vehicles)  from  1993  onward,  with  the  expressed  aim  of  "the 
progressive  and  full  liberalization  of  the  EC  import  regime  on  motor 
vehicles  with  avoidance  of  market  disruption  and,  through  an  appropriate 
transitional  period,  to  facilitate  structural  adjustments  that  may  be 
required  of  EC  m~nufacturers  to  achieve  adequate  levels  of  international 
competitiveness".  Under  the  consensus,  the  EC  undertook  to  abolish  all 
national  import  restrictions,  and  not  to  apply  Article  115  to  vehicles 
imported from  Japan,  from  January  1993.  Japan,  in  t~rn,  agreed  to  monitor 
the  growth  of exports of vehicles  to  the  EC  as  a  whole  and  to  the  five  more 
restricted  markets,  on  the  assumption  that  its  shipment  would  reach 
1. 23  miolion  units  in  1999  in  a  total  EC  market  forecast  at  15.1 million 
units.  According  to  the  Commission,  no  reciprocal  commitments, 
undertakings  or  forecasts  have  been  fixed  with  a  view  to  promoting  EC 
shipments  of cars,  car parts or  any  other specified products  to Japan. 
363.  Twice-yearly  bilateral  consultations  between  the  EC  Commission  and 
the  Japanese  authorities  are  to  be  held  concerning  current  export  trends 
and  forecasts  for  the  following  year.  Apparently,  it is  for  the  Japanese 
side  to  ensure  that the  forecasts  are  allocated  among  individual  producers 
and  vehicle  categories.  On  the  EC  side,  an  internal  declaration  by  the 
Commission is said to ascribe  to  EC  suppliers at least one-third of the 
9GATT  document  L/6922,  16  October  1991.  Germany  separately  communicated  its 
reservations  to  the  consensus,  noting  that  its  approval  was  on  condition  that  (i) all 
restrictive  measures  would  expire  on  31  December  1999;  (ii)  EC-wide  monitoring  would  take 
only  the  form  of  a  statist  i ca  1  record  with  regard  to  those  member  States  not  currently 
subject  to  restrictions;  (iii)  Japanese  investment  in  the  relevant  areas  would  not  be 
discriminated  against;  and  (iv)  car  imports  from  third  countries  would  remain  unaffected 
(GATT  document  l/6924,  22  October  1991). 
10Estimated  1999  export  levels  to  the  five  "restricted"  markets  are:  France,  150,000 
units  (5.3  per  cent  of  the  market);  Italy,  138,000  (5.3  per cent);  Spain,  79,000 
(5.4  per  cent);  Portugal,  23,000  (8.4  per cent),;  and  the  United  Kingdom,  190,000 
(7  per  cent  - less  than  the  current  estimated  share  as  quoted  in  Monopolies  and  Mergers 
Commission,  1992).  The  share  of  the  remaining  Communities'  markets  allotted  to  exports  from 
Japan  would  be  12.5  per  cent. 
The  consensus  covers  assembled  vehicles  and  sets  of  car  parts  (ckd-sets)  containing 
more  than  60  per  cent  of  the  value  of  the  components  of  a  car. C/RM/S/36A 
Page  148 
growth  of  the  market  and  to  expect  Japanese  exporters,  in  the  event  of 
unexpected  red~~tions in demand,  to reduce  their shipments  by two-thirds of 
the shortfall. 
364.  Press  reports  appearing  at  the  time  suggested  that,  in view  of  the 
arrangement,  the  EC  Commission and  the  Government  of Japan agreed on demand 
and supply forecasts  for 1992,  under which exports would be  reduced to less 
than  their  level  in  1991  (1.26 million units)  on f.fcount  of  slackening  EC 
demand  and adjustment problems  of the  EC  industry. 
365.  The  consensus  explicitly  excludes  any  restrictions  on  Japanese 
investment ''or  _any  trade  restrictions  on  vehicles  produced  in  Japanese 
brand-name  plants  within  the  Communities.  The  Commission's  "working 
assumption"  is  said  to  have  been  that,  by  1999,  such  plants  ffuld  be 
producing almost  as  many  vehicles as  would be  imported  from  Japan. 
366.  The  consensus  also  includes  an undertaking by  the  EC  to provide for  a 
Community-wide  type  approval  procedure  by  1  January 1993  (see below).  This 
implies  that  national  Governments  may  no  longer  use  standardization  and 
approval  procedures  as  instruments of market  segmentation. 
367.  The  consensus  is  intended  to  supersede  existing  arrangements  at  the 
national  level.  According  to  the  Commission,  it  gives  no  rof~  for 
individual  interpretations or parallel initiatives by member  States.  The 
Commission has  also  confirmed  that no  other measures  exist at EC  level with 
11Monopolies  and  Mergers  Commission  (1992). 
The  treatment  under  the  consensus  of  countries  acceding  to  the  EC  before  1999  appears 
open. 
12Reuters,  24  Apri 1  1992.  Some  observers  note  that  the  EC  and  Japan  have,  in  the 
greatest  discretion,  negotiated  annua  1  supp  1  y  targets  s i nee  1986; ·  in  this  view,  the 
consensus  thus  merely  formalizes  existing practice  (Costello  and  Pelkmans,  1991). 
13Monopolies  and  Mergers  Commission  (1992). 
14Nissan  and  Toyota  were  reported  to  have  given  certain  assurances  with  regard  to their 
future  shipments  into  France  of  cars  produced  by  their  subsidiaries  in  other  member  States. 
In  exchange,  the  companies  have  reportedly  been  allowed  by  the  French  authorities  to  acquire 
the established  networks  for  their cars.  (Tribune  de  l'Expansion,  24  January  1992,  Le  Monde, 
25  January  1992,  and  Les  Echos,  26  January  1992.) 
Both  the  restrictions  operated  by  France  prior  to  the  EC/Japan  consensus  and  the 
forecasts  for  the  French  market  under  the  consensus  have  been  challenged  by  a  group  of 
importers  of  "small  makes"  before  the  European  Court  of  Justice  and  the  Court  of  First 
Instance.  The  plaintiffs  claimed  that  their  access  to  France  has  been  restricted  under  a 
self  -1 i mi tat  ion  arrangement  between  the  1 arge  Japanese  producers,  supported  by  the  French 
administration.  They  criticize,  among  other  things,  that  the  Commission  has  failed  to  give 
legal  reasons  for  an  earlier  refusal  to  condemn  such  practices  under  Article  85  of  the  EEC 
Treaty.  Furthermore,  it  is  argued  that  the  informal  restrictions  on  intra-EC  trade,  not 
covered  by  Article  115  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  run  counter  to  the  ban  under  Article  30  on 
maintaining  quantitative  restrictions  and  measures  with  equivalent  effects  between  member 
States  (Europe,  6  March  1992).  No  ruling  has  been  given  by  year-end  1992. C/RM/S/36A 
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a  view  to  limiting  or  otherwise  influencing  third 1gountry  imports, 
investments  or  R&D  activities within the  Internal Market. 
368.  In  September  1992,  the  Commission  proposed  to  amend  Council 
Regulation  No.  288/82  to  the  effect  that all other restrictions  under  this 
Regulation  on  imports  of motor  vehicles,  including motorbikes  and  trucks, 
be  phased  out  by  end  1992.  In  the  case  of  delay,  the  member  States 
concerned have  been  asked  to  take  unilateral action  in  order not  to  apply 
national restrictions on Japanese cars  and light commercial vehicles beyond 
January 1993. 
Industrial support measures 
369.  Subsidies,  including soft loans  from  State-owned banks  and Government 
capital  injections,  have  lOft¥  been  used  by  member  States  for  promoting 
domestic  vehicle  production.  However,  the  EC  framework  on  State  aid for 
the motor  vehicle  sector,  adopted  in 1989,  obliges  member  States  to notify 
in advance  programme-related  subsidies  of more  than  ECU  12  million and  all 
subsidies  to  the  industry  that are  not  granted  in  the  framework  of  an  aid 
regime  authorized by  the  Commission.  In this connection,  the  EC  Commission 
has  ordered  repayments  of  subsidies  on  va~ifus  occasions,  with  a  view  to 
preventing  internal  market  distortions.  The  only  Community-level 
subsidies  extended  to  the  sector result from  the  operation of EC  horizontal 
support  instruments,  such  as  regional  and  socia~junds or  R&D  programmes, 
which  are equally applicable to other industries. 
15Accordi ng  to  the  Commission,  the  EC  approach  towards  foreign  direct  investment  is 
fundamentally  liberal  and  the  EC  "is  anxious  to  encourage  better  integration  of  such 
production  into  its  economy,  while  abiding  by  its  international  commitments  and  without 
resorting  to  compulsory  local  content  formulae  and  - a  fortiori  - national  content  formulae" 
(statement  in  the  context  of  this  TPRM  report). 
16various  such  initiatives  (FIAT/Alfa  Romeo,  Renault,  Rover)  were  enumerated  in  the 
initial  TPRM  report  (GATT,  1991a). 
17 rn  March  1991,  the  Court  of  Justice  upheld  a  Commission  decision  which  required 
capital  injections  into  Alfa  Romeo,  dating  back  to  1985  and  1986,  to  be  refunded.  The 
Italian  Government  is  reported  to  have  indicated,  however,  that  the  refunds  would  be  made  to 
the  State-owned  IRI  conglomerate  rather  than  to  the  Italian State.  The  issue  was  referred  by 
the  Commission  to the  Court  of  Justice  in  July  1992  (Europe,  5  August  1992). 
18A  Council  Resolution  on  the  motor  vehicle  sector,  issued  in  June  1992 
(No.  92/C  178/03).  emphasizes  the  need  for  policy  initiatives  "with  due  respect  for  the 
principle  of  competition  and  subsidiarity".  Actions  deemed  necessary  by  the  Council  include 
(i)  the  collection  of  information  on  trade  flows  and  market  access  with  a  view  to  preventing 
unfair  trade  practices,  in  accordance  with  GATT  rules;  (ii)  a  thorough  examination  of  the 
system  of  selective  di stri  but ion  in  the  1 i ght  of  the  Treaty,  of  the  interests  at  stake 
(manufacturers,  distributors  and  consumers)  and  of  the  various  EC  policies;  (iii)  regular 
reporting  by  the  Commission  on  improvements  in  competitiveness  and  the  other  objectives 
identif~ed  by  the  Council;  and  (iv)  the  continuation  of  strict aid  controls  in  the  industry 
and,  possibly,  their extension  to  the  component  sector. C/RM/S/36A 
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Distribution practices:  the  "block exemption" 
370.  Certain  distribution  practices  in  the  motor  vehicle  sector  are 
excluded  from  the  application  of  Article  85:1  of  the  EEC  Treaty 
(Section IV .4(i) (a)).  Under  a  block  exemption,  enacted  in  1985  for  a 
ten-year  period,  car  manufacturers  and  importers  may  operate  exclusive 
supply  contracts  with  their  deale1.!fJ  and  protect  them  in  their  contract 
territory  from  competing  agents.  The  exemption,  while  permitting 
restraints on intra-brand competition,  is intended to encourage competition 
between  manufacturers  and  to  ensure  a  reliable  network  of  repair  and 
service  fa~~liti7t>.  Similar  systems  are  said  to  be  used  in  the  United 
States and Japan. 
371.  A  Commission  Notice  interpreting  the  block  exemption  specifies  that 
manufacturers  selling  similar  mass-produced  cars  in  more  than  one  member 
State  are  expected  to  supply,  on  request,  cars  to  their  dealers  in  one 
member  State  with  technical  specifications  that  allow  registration  in 
another  member  State;  not  to  hinder  cross-border  sales  through  measures 
such  as  refusal  of warranty  services  or  excessive  delivery  time;  and  to 
sell  to  intermediaries  acting  on  behalf  of  identified  customers.  The 
Commission  may  withdraw  the  exemption  in  the  event  of  substantial, 
continuing  price  differences  between  member  States  (i.e.  short-term 
differences  of  more  than  18  per cent  or  differences  of  more  than 
12  per cent  for  at  least  one  year).  The  Commission  considers  it  a 
substantial  breach  of  the  exemption  for  a  manufacturer  to  enforce  any 
discipline  aimed  at  deterring  parallel  imports  thro~~h  refusals  of,  or 
obstacles  to,  guarantee  and  free  after  sale  services.  Should  guarantee 
and/or  maintenance  not  be  made  fully available  on  equal  conditions  to  any 
European purchaser  of  such  a  car,  the block exemption would  cease  to  apply 
for  the products of the manufacturer  concerned. 
Price differentials within the  EC 
372.  In  view  of  the  importance  of  the  motor  vehicle  sector  from  both 
trade  and  industrial  policy  perspectives,  several  recent  studies  have 
focused  on  regional  price  differentials,  which  are  considere~ 2
to  be 
indicators of barriers to  trade,  within the  EC  and internationally. 
19commission  Regulation  No.  123/85. 
20Monopolies  and  Mergers  Commission  (1992). 
21confirmed  in  discussion  with  the  Secretariat. 
22such  comparisons  may,  however,  be  affected  by  a  variety  of  factors,  including 
exchange  rate  fluctuations,  technical  constraints  and  differences  in  sales  or  income  taxes 
(Footnote  Continued) C/RM/S/36A 
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373.  A  survey  by  the  U.K.  Monopolies  and  Mergers  Commission  (MMC)  found 
that,  in  1990,  price  levels  in  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  adjusted  for 
tax  differences,  were  generally  lower  than  in  the  United  Kingdom,  Germany 
and  France.  No  significant price  differences  were  discerni~~e between  the 
three  large  markets,  even  for  cars  imported  from  Japan.  The  report 
indicates  that  this  might  reflect  the  operation  of  the  price  equalization 
mechanism  within  a  customs  union,  based  on  the  free  flow  of  intra-area 
production,  investment  and  technology.  The  restrictions  maintained  by 
certain member  States appear,  however,  to have  translated into considerable 
price differentials  for  Japanese  cars  between  the  EC  as  a  whole  and  third 
country markets.  The  MMC  found  a  specified range  of  model  variants  to  be 
28  per cent cheaper  in Japan  a~4
16 per cent  in  the  United  States  than  in 
the  Community  (United  Kingdom).  This  would  imply  that  EC  car  producers 
as  a  group  benefited  from  protection and  consumers  throughout  the  EC  were 
required to foot  the bill. 
374.  A separate report by  the  EC  Commission,  co~~ring seven member  States, 
showed  significant  regional  price  disparities.  As  a  general  feature, 
dealers  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Spain  charged  the  highest  prices, 
contrasting with their Belgian counterparts  who  were  most  frequently  found 
at  the  bottom  of  the  price  league  (Table AV. 7) .  Contrary  to  the  MMC 
report,  the  Commission  study points  to  marked  price variations  for certain 
Japanese  cars,  with  peaks  in Italy  and  Spain,  which  were  not  surveyed  by 
the  MMC.  On  the  whole,  the  study  suggests  that  sale  prices  before  tax 
tended to be highest in markets  characterized by high or variable  tax rates 
and  import  restrictions,  with  Spain  and  Italy  as  leading  examples.  In  a 
number  of  cases,  involving  many  of  the  large  EC  car  producers, 
differentials  continuously  exceeded  the  limits  set  under  the  block 
exemption.  The  Commission  gave  the  view  that,  while  market  partitioning 
under selective distribution systems  might have been a  contributing factor, 
(Footnote  Continued) 
(including,  for  example,  more  or  less  generous  depreciation  allowances  for  company  cars). 
Also,  while  continued  significant  price  differentials  may  be  indicative  of  barriers  to  price 
arbitrage,  not  all  such  barriers are easily amenable  to  remedial  policy action. 
23Monopol i es  and  Mergers  Commission  (1992).  The  findings  were  based  on  actual  sales 
prices,  including  estimated  discounts.  The  MMC  noted· that  its  results  might  have  been 
affected  by  the  absence  of  major  indigenous  car  producers  in  the  two  smaller  member  States 
and  the  existence  of  a  price  control  system  in  Belgium.  Observations  for  individual  car 
types  varied considerably. 
24This  comparison  was  based  on  list prices,  adjusted  for  transport  cost,  differences  in 
taxation etc.  Some  of  the  companies  involved  have  disputed  the  accuracy  of  the  data,  arguing 
that  the  models  chosen  were  not  closely  comparable  and  that  no  adequate  allowance  had  been 
made  made  for  transport  cost.  The  MMC  considers  these  points  not  1  i kel y  to  have  had  a 
significant  impact  on  the  results. 
25EC  Commission  (1992c).  The  comparison  was  based  on  list  prices,  net  of  taxes,  import 
duties,  delivery  and  preparation  costs.  Adjustments  were  made  for  major  differences  in 
equipment,  discounts  to  consumers  and  other financial  benefits. C/RM/S/36A 
Page  152 
26 
there  was  not  sufficient  evidence  that  it had  played  a  decisive  role. 
Commissioner  Sir  Leon  Brittan  is  reported  to  have  announced  a  firm  stance 
by the  Commission against dealers or manufacturers  that deliberately sought 
to  obstruct cross-border ifles as  well  as  national  Governments  which might 
encourage  such practices. 
Technical barriers to  trade 
375.  In March  1992,  the  EC  Internal  Market  Council  agreed  on  a  final  set 
of  three  EC  Directives  on  technical  specwcations  for  motor  vehicles, 
which  had  beep  on  hold  for  some  years.  While  the  new  regulatory 
framework  provides  for  a  uniform  EC  type  approval  system  as  of 
1  January 1993,  manufacturers may  continue  to  opt for national approval for 
new  models  until  31  December  1995;  national  approval  for  existing  models 
is valid until  December  1997.  Under  the  EEA  Agreement,  the  EFTA  countries 
are  not  entitled  to  grant  EC  type  approval  before  1  January 1995 
(Section IV.2(viii)).  "Unofficial"  imports  from,  or  through,  EFTA 
countries  into the  EC  will  thus  continue  to prove difficult for  some  time. 
376.  While  technical  barriers  are  intended  to  disappear,  the  block 
exemption  continues  to  apply  until  June  1995.  In  connection  with  the 
EC-Japan  consensus,  the  Commission  has  indicated  that  selective 
distribution under  the  exemption,  provided it works  in "a  satisfactory  ~~d 
efficient way",  would help  in the  management  of the  transitional period. 
377.  A  Commission  Notice  of  December  1991  (91/C  329/06),  intended  to 
supplement  the  Notice published in conjunction with Regulation No.  123/85 
26Ec  Commission  (1992b)  and  information  provided  in  the  context  of  this  report.  The 
European  car  producers'  association,  ACEA,  has  stated  that  the  Commission's  report  failed  to 
establish a  causal  link  between  the  observed  price pattern  and  selectiv~ car distribution  and 
complained  about  alleged  shortcomings  of  the  study,  including  its  limited  country  coverage 
(European  Report,  9  Hay  1992). 
27 In  order  to  encourage  market  forces  to  close  the  gap  between  car  prices,  the 
Commission  launched  an  initiative  in  Hay  1992  requesting  manufacturers  to  ensure  that  their 
distributors  were  aware  of,  and  acted  in  accordance  with,  the  terms  of  the  block  exemption. 
Furthermore,  they  were  asked  to  publish  price  comparisons  between  member  States  and  to 
conduct  regular  price  analyses  for  the  Commission.  In  December  1992,  the  major  EC  and 
Japanese  car  manufacturers  agreed  to  reassure  their  de a 1  ers  of  their  rights  concerning  the 
sale  of  cars  across  EC  borders.  They  also  agreed  to  publish  detailed  six-monthly  pricing 
data  enabling  customers  to make  a  genuine  comparison  of  prices  among  member  States. 
28The  three  outstanding  directives,  the  only  missing  elements  in  a  system  of  44 
harmonization  directives,  concerned  windscreens,  tyres,  and  masses  and  dimensions  of  motor 
vehicles  of category  M1.  See  also  GATT  (1991a). 
29Et  Commission  (1992c). 
According  to  press  reports,  France,  Italy  and  Spain  have  made  their  approval  to  the 
outstanding  three  "Harmonization  Directives"  contingent  on  the  possibility  of  imposing 
constraints  on  the activities  of  parallel  importers  (see  e.g.  les  Echos,  8  November  1991,  and 
European  Report,  30  October  1991). C/RM/S/36A 
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(see  above),  specifies  the  scope  of admissible  activities of motor vehicle 
intermediaries.  In addition,  certain transparency criteria are  set with  a 
view  to  ensuring  that  consumers  do  not  confuse  intermediaries  (parallel 
traders)  with resellers  (official agents)  and  that  they  are  fully  informed 
of  the  services  provided.  The  Notice  also  prohibits official dealers  from 
granting  any  agent  a  privileged  relationship,  for  example  in  the  form  of 
unusual  discounts.  Annual  sales  to  an  intermediary  of  more  than 
10 per cent  of  a  dealer's  total 3eales  would  create  the  presumption  that 
their relationship is privileged. 
Industrial and regional  change 
378.  Expectations  and concerns  surrounding the  implementation of a  common 
market  regime  appear  to  have  contributed  to  a  series  of  structural, 
financial  and  locational  adjustments  within  the  EC  and  its  adjacent  free 
trade  areas,  involving  EFTA  members,  Hungary,  Poland  and  the  Czech  and 
Slovak Republics.  These  include: 
(i)  the  arrival of new  producers with new  plants  (Toyota,  Honda  and 
Nissan  in3£he  United Kingdom,  Chrysler  in Austria and  Suzuki  in 
Hungary); 
(ii)  new  alliances  and  cooperations  (Renault  and  Volvo;  Volvo  and 
Mitsubishi;  Daihatsu  and  Piaggio;  GM,  Mercedes-Benz,  Peugeot 
and Volkswagen with Polish companies  (FSO,  WZM,  FSC  and  FSR)); 
(iii)  takeovers  or  majority  participations 
(Poland)  and Volkswagen/Skoda); 
(GM/Saab,  Fiat/FSM 
(iv)  a  shift  in  investments  to  low-wage  regions  in  the  Community 
(Volkswagen  in liaison with Ford in Setubal  ~2ortugal) and with 
Suzuki  in Spain;  Ford and Nissan in Spain);  and 
30Th  C  .  .  h  d  h  t  th  b  N  .  . d  d  f  e  omm1ss1on  as  stresse  t  a  e  a  ove  ot1ce  was  cons1  ere  necessary  or 
reasons  of  competition  policy  and  consumer  protection,  irrespective  of  the  arrangement  with 
Japan. 
31While  the  Nissan  plants  in  the  United  Kingdom  are  currently  producing  over  175,000 
cars  a  year  (expected  to  climb  to  270,000  in  1993),  a  Honda  car  plant  started  operation  in 
October  1992  and  a  Toyota  engine  plant  in  September  1992.  Further  projects  in  the  UK  are 
still  under  construction.  The  MMC  expects  the  output  of  Japanese-owned  plants  in  the  United 
Kingdom  to  reach  at  least  550,000  units  by  1995.  Honda  also  holds  a  20  per  cent  stake  in 
Rover. 
32Ford  recently  announced  to  invest  over  US$1  billion  in  Valencia  with  a  view  to 
launching  a  new  generation  of  engines  designed  and  deve 1  oped  for  Ford  by  Yamaha  of  Japan 
(Financial  Times,  7  September  1992). C/RM/S/36A 
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(v)  the  setting  up  new  plants  in  eastern  and  central  Europe  to 
source  existing  production  facilities  within  the  EC  (Ford  and 
General  Motors  in  Hungary  (Szekesfehervff  and  Szentgotthard); 
Ford and,  possibly,  Chrysler in Poland). 
379.  Locational  advantages  resu~ting from  relatively  low  labour costs  and 
favourable  access  to  EC  markets  appear  to  have  been  complemented  by 
financial  benefits  in  certain  cases.  For  example,  the  Ford  Pjtnt  in 
Hungary  is  reported  to  have  been  granted  a  ten-year  tax  exemption.  With 
regard  to  the  new  Chrysler  plant  in Austria,  the  EC  Commission  noted  that 
it had  "informed Austria  that  it believed  the  size  of  the  subsidy  granted 
...  was  unjustifiably high  and  could  distort  trade  and  competition".  ~~ 
subsidies  are  reported  to  amount  to  one-third  of  investment  cost. 
According  to  the  Commission,  the  Chrysler  project  would  not  have  been 
subsidized  were  it  located  in  an  EC  region  with  a  similar  level  of 
development.  In  November  1992,  confronted  with  the  possibility  of  the 
invocation  of  the  safeguard  prov1s1on  of  the  EC/Austria  Free  Trade 
Agreement  and  the  restoration of m.f.n.  tariffs,  Aus~6ia undertook to limit 
subsidies  to 14.4 per cent of total  investment cost. 
380.  International  comparisons  indicate that,  in terms  of production costs 
and  efficiency,  large  segments  of  the  EC  c~  industry  are  trailing behind 
their  main  competitors  abroad  (Table AV.8).  The  perceived  need  to  give 
the  industry  some  breathing  space  in  order  to  catch  up  and  adopt  new 
production38techniques  was  one  important  rationale  behind  the  EC-Japan 
consensus.  Given  the objective of full liberalization by  the  turn of 
33The  Polish  Government  is  reported  to  have  envisaged  dividing  the  tariff  quota  under 
the  Europe  Agreement  (30,000  units;  see  Section  Il.5(iii)  equally  between  Fiat,  General 
Motors  and  Volkswagen  provided  they  invest  at  least  US$50  million  in  Poland.  However, 
following  protests  by  other  EC  car  producers  (and  their  Governments),  the  application  of  the 
relevant  parts  of  the  Agreement  was  suspended  temporarily  (Wall  Street  Journal, 
28  February  1992,  and  le Monde,  29  February  1992).  Agreement  was  finally  reached  that  quota 
entitlements  would  be  distributed  on  a  first-come-first-served  basis  (European  Report~ 
7  November  1992). 
34Bureau  of  National  Affairs,  Eastern  Europe  Reporter,  No.  12,  8  June  1992. 
35Ec  Commission  (1992a),  Europe,  16  July  1992,  and  Reuters,  30  July  1992. 
36Nachrichten  fOr  AuBenhandel,  26  November  1992.  The  Community  market  for 
multi-purpose  veh1cles  is  dominated  by  the  Renault  'Espace',  so  far  the  only  EC  produce  -in 
this  segment,  with  a  market  share  of  close  to  55  per  cent  in  1990. 
37The  individual  observations  behind  the  estimates  presented  in  Table  AV.8  vary  widely. 
The  productivity  gap  between  the  best  and  the  worst  performer  was  found  to  exceed 
140  per  cent,  as  against  96  per  cent  in  Japan. 
38The  Joint  Communication  from  the  European  Communities  and  Japan  (GATT  document  l/6922 
of  16  October  1991)  mentions  as  an  objective  of  the  arrangement  "to  faci 1  i tate  structural 
adjustments  that  may  be  required  of  EC  manufacturers  to  achieve  adequate  levels  of 
(Footnote  Continued) C/RM/Sf36A 
Page  155 
century,  the  Commission  has  called  upon  the  industry  to  invest  more  in 
modernization  and  to  increase  efforts  in  the  areas  of  R&D,  training  and 
retraining.  While  the  completion  of  the  Internal  Market  is  seen  as  the 
best  policy  for  positive  adjustment,  the  Commission  calls  for  additional 
impetus  "to  3ijelp  the  industry  in  its  efforts  to  make  itself  more 
competitive".  Reference  is  made,  in  this  context,  to  the  harmonization 
of  technical  standards  and  the  future  tightening  of  environmental 
regulations;  the  approximation  of  indirect  taxation;  the  importance  of 
fostering business  cooperation;  a  reorientation of R&D  policy with  a  view, 
among  other  things,  to promoting  a  more  rapid transfer of research findings 
into  production;  and  a  reformulation  of  the  EC  approach  towards  training 
and retraining of the  industry's workforce. 
(b)  Shipbuilding 
381.  Ship  production  in  western  Europe,  considered  as  one  region,  ranks 
second worldwide.  Members  of  the Association of West  European Shipbuilders 
(AWES)  currently represent  more  than  one-quarter  of world  ship  completions 
(27~ per cent  in  1991).  Trends  in  orders  point,  however,  to  continued 
adjustment  pressure  on  the  industry.  After  four  years  of  decline,  the 
share  of  western  European  shipbuilders  in  new  orders  reached  just  over 
20  per cent  in  1991,  while  Japa}i(jse  and  Korean  producers  accounted  for 
37  and  19  per  cent,  respectively. 
382.  Shipbuilding  is  one  of  the  most  heavily-supported  segments  of  EC 
manufacturing  industry.  Tariff  protection  is  negligible  (nominal  tariffs 
average  under  2  per cent,  Table  AIV.l)  but  subsidization  - including,  in 
Spain and  Portugal,  restructuring aid authorized  by  the  EC  Commission  - is 
extensive;  in the  period  1988-90,  subsidies  exceeded  33  per cent of value 
added.  Most  heavily-subsidized  were  the  yards  in Portugal  and  Italy,  wiE~ 
support  ratios  in  the  vicinity  of  80  per cent  and  above  (Table  IV. 8). 
Spain and France,  moreover,  completely restrict imports  of a  variety of 
(Footnote  Continued) 
international  competitiveness".  The  EC  Commission,  in  its  recent  Communication  on  the 
European  motor  vehi c 1  e  industry,  has  acknowledged  the  existence  of  an  "enormous  avera  11  gap" 
(EC  Commission,  1992c). 
39EC  Commission  ( 1-992c). 
40 AWES  (1992).  The  comparison  is  based  on  cubic  gross  tonnage  comp 1  eted.  "Western 
Europe"  includes  the  EC  member  States,  Finland,  Norway  and  Sweden.  Among  the  EC  member 
States,  Germany  ranked  first  (4.7  per  cent),  followed  by  Italy  (3.2  per  cent). 
41 The  value  of  assistance  increased  in  Denmark,  Germany,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands  in 
the  period  1989-91  (EC  Commission,  1992j). C/RM/S/36A 
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ship  categories  (sea-going  cruise  ships,  tankers,  ret~igerated vessels  and 
fishing vessels)  under  Council  Regulation No.  288/82. 
383.  In  November  1990,  the  EC  Council  approved  the  seventh  Directive  on 
aid  to  shipbuilding  1  eacrending  a  specific  subsidy  regime  to  the  sector 
until  31  December  1993.  The  Council  considered  that  complete  abolition 
of  aid  was  impossible  in  view  of  the  market  situation  and  the  need  to 
encourage  the  restructuring  of  many  yards.  The  Directive  holds  that  a 
competitive  shipbuilding sector  is  of  "vital interest  to  the  Community  and 
contributes  to  its economic  and social development". 
384.  As  under  the  previous  directives,  the  Commission  is  empowered,  after 
consultations  with  member  States,  to  set  annual  ceilings  for  operating 
assistance.  For  1992  and  1993,  the  general  ceiling  for  subsidies  on  new 
ships  was  set  at  9  per cent  of  the  contract  value  (4.5  per  ~~t for  small 
vessels  and  ship  conversions),  down  from  20  per cent  in 1990.  Subject to 
this  ceiling,  member  States  may  operate  a  wide  variety  of  schemes, 
including  dJsect  aid,  concessional  credits,  credit  guarantees  and  capital 
injecticns.  Investment  aid  may  be  granted if it does  not  contribute  to 
increasing  a  yard's  capacity  or  if  it  is  directly  linked  to  capacity 
reductions  of other yards.  Member  States are  also  allowed  to  grant  support 
for  specified types  of  R&D  and  irreversible plant closures. 
385.  In  the  OECD  context,  the  EC  is  participating  in  negotiations  on  an 
international  agreement  to  reduce  subsidies  and  other  trade  distortions  in 
the  sector.  An  EC  proposal  envisages  the  complete  elimination of subsidies 
for  shipbuilders,  on  condition  that  all  parties  involved  agree  to  remove 
obstacles  to  "normal  competition"  and  that  an  effective  instruwgnt  is 
agreed  which  would  allow  participants  to  combat  unfair  pricing.  The 
proposal  would  imply,  for  example,  the  abolition  of  the  "home-built" 
requirement  of  the  U.S.  Jones  Act,  as  well  as  Japan's  Home  Credit  Schemes, 
42situation  in  October  1992. 
43council  Directive  No.  90/684. 
44see  GATT  (199la).  However,  various  exceptions  to  this  rule  exist.  In  1991,  Spain 
and  Portugal  were  exempted  from  the  aid  ceiling  of  the  seventh ·Directive.  The  need  for 
addi tiona  1  measures  for  East  German  shipyards  was  a 1  so  acknowledged  by  the  Counci 1  and  the 
Commission  in  passing  the  Directive.  A restructuring  plan  for  the  shipyards  in  the  Land  of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  (eastern  Germany),  presented  by  the  German  Government  in  October  1991, 
was  alleged  not  to  involve  subsidies  beyond  the  ceilings  allowed  under  the  Directive  at  that 
date.  In  July  1992,  the  Council  adopted  a  special  aid  scheme  for  east  German  yards,  setting 
an--aid  ceiling  of  36  per  cent,  subject  to  a  capacity  reduction  of  40  per  cent  (Council 
Directive  No.  92/68). 
45An  overview  of  the  situation  in  mid-1988  is  provided  in  GATT  (199la),  Table  V.25. 
46Ec  Commission  (1992d). C/RM/S/36A 
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which  are  considered  by  the  Commission  to  contain  elements  of  indirect 
subsidization to  shipyards. 
(c)  Aircraft 
386.  Government  support  for  the  development,  production  and  sale  of civil 
aircraft  has  continued  to  prove  a  contentious  issue  over  the  past  two 
years.  In this  connection,  two  complaints  were  raised by  the United States 
under  the  Subsidies  Code  concerning,  respectively,  exchange  rate guarantees 
granted  by  the  German  Government  within  its  privatization  programme  for 
MBB-Deutsche  Airbus,  and  the  more  general  issue  of  Airbus  production 
subsidies  (Section VI.(2)(i)). 
387.  In the first case,  the  German  Government  and Daimler-Benz  (the parent 
company  concerned)  recently  negotiated  a  package  deal  including  the 
termination  of  the  exchange  rate  guarantee  scheme  and  the  full 
privatization  of  MBB-Deutsche  Airbus  in  July 1992,  four  years  ahead  of 
schedule.  Daimler-Benz,47which  already  held  80  per cent,  assumed  the 
remainder  free  of charge. 
388.  The  second  case  was  resolved  when,  in  July  1992,  the  EC  and  the 
United  States  signed  a  bilateral  agreement  limi1[.lfg  public  support  for 
"large"  (over  100-seat)  civil aircraft programmes.  Under  the  programme. 
future  production  support  is  are  banned;  disciplines  are  placed  4
~n  the 
granting  of  development  support  and  indirect  Government  support;  and 
transparency  requirements  are  established  covering  all  forms  of  public 
support  for  commercial  aircraft  manufacturers.  Equity  injections must  not 
be  allowed  to  undermine  the  agreement.  Neither  signatory  will  assume 
liability for  loans  granted  by  aircraft  manufacturers  to  airlines,  except 
in the  context  of official export  credit financing  under  the  relevant  OECD 
understanding.  A derogation  clause  allows  for  the  temporary  suspension of 
all  obligations,  except  for  the  limits  on  development  support,  should  a 
significant proportion of  the  civil aircraft industry  of  the  United States 
or  the  EC  member  States  be  in  jeopardy.  The  signatories  agreed  to  work 
towards  a  progressive,  worldwide  reduction of the  role of Government 
47 The  exchange  rate  guarantee  had  cost  the  German  government  OM  580  mi 11 ion  in  1990 
(Financial  Times,  13  July  1992). 
48The  agreement,  as  it stands  now,  covers  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas  on  the  U.S.  side 
and  Airbus  in  the  EC. 
49Wi th  respect  to  direct  support,  the  maxi mum  government  share  of  tot  a 1  development 
cost  has  been  limited  to  33  per cent,  to  be  repaid  within  17  years  from  first  disbursement. 
Indirect  support,  including  benefits  accruing  through  preferential  access  to  military  R&D 
contracts  and  the  NASA's  civilian  research  programmes,  are  limited  to  3  per  cent  of  the 
industry's  commercial  sales  overall  and  to  4  per  cent  of  an  individual  company's  commercial 
sales,  net  of  recoupment. C/RM/S/36A 
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support,  and  to  seek  to  negotiate  a  multilateral  agreement  containing 
similar disciplines with all major  producer countries. 
389.  A  recent  Commission  Communication  notes  that,  despite  adjustment, 
European  aircraft  producers  still  suffer  from  exces~bve  sub-divisions  of 
industry  structures,  including  research  facilities.  This  is  seen  as 
hampering  adjustment  to  a  changed  political  and  economic  environment  with 
greater  competitive  pressures.  The  communication  also  points  to  cost 
disadvantages  associated-with dollar-exchange rate risks  and  fragmented and 
costly  standardization  and  certification  procedures  and  calls  for  more 
efficient  and  targeted  use  of  policies  in  such  areas  as  standardization, 
infrastructure development,  Community  research,  and  competition policy.  A 
feasibility  study  is  being  made  on  an  industry-financed  insurance  or 
guarantee  fund,  to hedge  against excessive  exchange  rate fluctuations. 
(iii)  Electrical  and electronic products 
(a)  Overview 
390.  Trade  policy  trends,  adjustment  pressures  and  challenges  facing  the 
EC  electronics  sector  appear  similar  to  those  in  the  high-volume  car 
industry.  Common  features  include  strong  import  pressure,  mainly  from 
Asian  producers;  gradual  disappearance  of  medium-sized  companies  and  the 
increasing  r6le  of  multinationals;  and  recourse  to  "informal"  trade 
measures  such  as  export  monitoring  by  Japan  and  Korea  on  a  range  of 
consumer  products  (Section  IV.2(iv)(c)  and  Table  IV.2).  In 
telecommunications  (Section  (c)  below),  member  State  markets  for  equipment 
and  services  are  being  opened  progressively  to  competition  from  EC  and 
external  sources  in  the  context  of  the  Internal  Market,  reducing  the  scope 
for  preserving  outlets  for  national  "champions",  and  diminishing  market 
segmentation.  However,  aspects  of procurement  rules  for  telecommunications 
equipment  in  the  EC  and  the  United States  are  the  subject  of  contention 
between  the  two  entities  (Chapter  IV.2(vii)). 
5°For  example,  while  NASA  concentrates  most  civilian  R&D  in  three  research centres,  the 
EC  has  seven  rna in  cent res.  The  corresponding  cost  disadvantage  is  estimated  to  reach  at 
least  at  20  per  cent  (EC  Commission,  1992e). Chart V.10 
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391.  Strategic  initiatives  in  the  electronics  industry  have  long  been 
taken  on  a  European,  or  even  larger,  scale.  Common  European  research 
projects  include  a  variety  of  EUREKA  initiatives  (Section IV.4(ii)(d)), 
while  takeovers  and  mergers  have  occurred  at  a  European  or  world  level. 
The  impact  of  national  trade  restrictions  has  not  been  as  pervasive  as  o·n 
motor  vehicles;  for  example,  external  supplies  occupy  some  43  pe151cent  of 
the  EC  market  for office and  computing machinery  (Table AIV.S(i)). 
392.  The  EC  has  taken  a  number  of anti-dumping  actions  in  the  electronics 
sector  over  time.  Products  affected  range  from  compact  disc  players  to 
small  TV  sets,  from  DRAMs  to  EPROMs  (Section IV.2(v)(e)). 
51There  are  significant  differences  in  the  import  penetration  ratios  between  the  member 
States  (Tables  AV.S(ii)-(xii)).  However,  these  cannot  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  comparative 
market  openness.  Such  elements  as  differences  in  demand  patterns  and  in  the  strength  of 
national  suppliers  may  have  had  a  much  more  important  impact. C/RM/S/36A 
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(b)  Electronic  components 
393.  Semiconductor  production  in  the  EC  trails well  behind  Japan  and  tg2 
United  States,  which  represent  jointly  nine-tenths  of  the  world  market. 
Imports  cater  for  more  than  70  per cent  of  EC  consumption  in  the  sector. 
Most  categories  are  subject  to  an  m.f.n.  tariff of  14 per cent;  however, 
as noted in Section IV.2(i)(b),  tariff suspensions  on.industrial  inputs are 
relatively  frequent.  At  the  same  time,  imports  of  dynamic  random  access 
chips  (DRAMs)  from  Korean  and  Japanese  producers  are  currently  subject  to 
anti-d~~ing  measures  in  the  form  of  price  undertakings  or  definitive 
duties. 
394.  In  the  context  of  this  report,  the  EC  Commission  has  ~~pressed 
concern  about  the  U.S. -Japan  semiconductor  arrangement  of  1991.  While 
the  arrangement  does  not discriminate  formally  against  third countries,  the 
Commission's  misg1v1ngs  hinge  in  particular  on  its  apparent  lack  of 
transparency  and  the  implicit  trend  towards  bilateral  policy-making  in  an 
industrial  sector  of  strategic  technical  and  economic  importance. 
According  to  the  Commission,  both  parties  have  refused  so  far  to  give 
written  assurances  that,  in  connection  with  the  arrangegt5nt,  prices  and 
supplies  on  third-country markets  are not being monitored. 
395.  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  "European  business  cultu~'  may 
discourage  small  companies  and  innovative  newcomers  in  the  sector.  The 
EC  industry  is  largely  dominated  by  long-established  companies  like 
Philips,  Siemens  or  the  publicly-owned  SGS -Thomson  and  Bull,  which  have 
also  been  in  the  forefront  of  Community  developments  in chip  technologies, 
such  as  the  JESSI  (Joint  European  Submicron  Silicon  Initiative)  project.· 
The  Commission  has  noted  that,  while  European  firms  spend  on  average  as 
much  on  R&D  as  Japanese  or U.S.  firms  (some  9~ per cent of their turnover), 
they are  slower  to  launch products.  A  recent  Commission report ascribes  the 
"precarious  situation"  of  the  European  computers,  peripherals  and 
components  industry  to  such  factors  as  the  heritage  of  fragmented national 
markets,  a  shortage  of  high-technology  users,  unfavourable  financing 
52According  to  Commission  estimates,  the  electronics  and  information  technology 
industry currently  accounts  for  some  5  per  cent  of  European  GOP,  as  compared  with  5%  per cent 
in  Japan  and  over  6  per  cent  in  the  United  States  (EC  Commission,  199ld). 
53section  IV.2(v)(f). 
54see  GATT  (1993b). 
55under  the  arrangement,  the  United  States  and  Japan  reserve  their right  to  take  action 
against  "injurious  dumping"  in  third country markets  (GATT,  1993). 
56Financial  Time!_,  29  April  1991  ("National  champions  become  laggards"). C/RM/S/36A 
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conditions,  insufficient  cooperation  am~~g  European  industries  and  users. 
and  a  lack of strategic market planning. 
(c)  Consumer  electronics 
396.  Duties  on  consumer  electronics  remain  relatively  high  within  the 
framework  of  the  Common  Customs  Tariff,  at 14 per cent  in most  cases,  with 
significant escalation between parts  and  assemblies  and  finished  articles. 
Retrospective  Community  surveillance  of  imports  has  long  been  maintained 
vis·a-vis  Japan  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  on  televisions  and  videotape 
recorders  (Table  IV.2).  Anti-dumping  measures  (in the  form  of provisional 
or  final  duties  or  of price  undertakings)  were,  at  mid-September  1992,  in 
force  against  China  and  Hong  Kong  (small  screen  colour  televisions  and 
video  cassettes),  Japan  (CD  players  and  video  cassette  recorders)  and  the 
Republic  of Korea  (car radios,  CD  players,  small  screen colour  televisions, 
·video cassettes and recorders). 
397.  Recent  retail  price  comparisons  point  to  a  high  degree  of  prig§ 
dispersion  among  national  consumer  electronics  markets  within  the  EC. 
Such  findings  may  reflect  not  only  differences  in  retail  structures,  tax 
rates  and  distribution  costs,  but  barriers  to  price  arbitrage,  such  as 
restrict!~ns  by  manufacturers  on  re-exports  from  one  EC  member  State  to 
another.  A study published by  the  Commission  in 1991  suggested that 
57 EC  Commission  (199ld).  The  Community's  trade  policy  approach  towards  the  industry, 
as  presented  in  the  above  document,  centres  on  a  satisfactory  conclusion  of  the  Uruguay  Round 
and  an  effort  to  ensure  "fair conditions  of  competition  and  access  to  third-country markets". 
Where  necessary,  the  EC  would  need  to  resort  to  bilateral  measures  and  fall  back  on  its 
customs  regulations  and  trade  policy  instruments.  International  cooperation  would  be  sought 
in  particular  with  the  EFTA  countries,  central  and  eastern  Europe,  the  United  States  and 
Japan. 
58Financia1  Times,  3  August  1992.  A  survey  conducted  in  March  1992  found  prices  of 
identical  portable  TVs  and  video  cassette  recorders  30  to  40  per  cent  higher  in  Italy  and 
Spain  than  in  Germany  and  the  Netherlands;  Camcorders  in  Italy  were  up  to  45  per cent  more 
expensive  in  Italy  than  in  Germany;  and  the  price  gap  for  identical  tabletop  TVs  between 
Germany  and  Italy exceeded  110  per  cent. 
59As  noted  in  Section  IV.4(i)(a),  Toshiba  Europe  GmbH  was  fined  ECU  2  million,  in  1991, 
for  having  required  independent  importers  in  several  member  States  not  to  re-export  to  other 
parts  of  the  EC. 
In  the  article  noted  above,  a  Philips  spokesman  was  quoted  as  saying  that  if  an 
authorized  Philips  dealer  in  Italy  asked  the  company  to  sell  him  products  from  the 
Netherlands,  he  would  be  referred  to  the  distributor  in  Italy.  Philips  could  not  see  the 
relevance  of  unified  prices  to  the  Internal  Market.  The  EC  Commission  has  indicated  that it 
is  aware  of  this  situation,  and  has  noted  that,  since  Philips  operates,  at  least  partially. 
through  100  per  cent-owned  subsidiaries,  such  practices  raise  the  question  of  "intra 
enterprise  cons  pi racy".  The  European  Court  of  Justice  has  ruled  that  Article  85  of  theffi 
Treaty  (EEC  competition  rules  applying  to  undertakings)  is  not  applicable  to  agreements  or 
concerted  practices  between  a  parent  company  and  its  subsidiary  if "the  undertak~ngs  form  an 
economic  unit  within  which  the  subsidiary  has  no  real  freedom  to  determine  its  course  of 
action  on  the  market,  and  if  the  agreements  or  practices  are  concerned  merely  with  the 
internal  allocation  of  tasks  as  between  the  undertakings"  (case  15/74;  Centrafarm  vs. 
(Footnote  Continued) C/RM/S/36A 
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market  segmentation had contributed,  in the past,  to shielding EC  producers 
from  their  .Japanese  competitors~ 0 which  preferred  to  focus  on  the 
"homogeneous  and  open"  U.S.  market. 
398.  The  development  of high  definition  TV  (HOTV)  in Europe  is  considered 
by  the  Commission  as  crucial  to  core parts  of  the  EC  consumer  electronics 
industry.  An  advanced  system  has  been  under  development  in  the  EUREKA 
framework.  Participants  include  Philips,  Thomson,  NOKIA  and  Bosch 
(Blaupunkt).  The  second  stage  of  the  project  (1990-93)  is  supported  by 
Community  funds  of more  than  ECU  400  million. 
399.  A  recent  Council  Directive  has  established  D2 -MAC  - a  system  not 
compatible with standards  for  HOTV  being developed in the United States and 
Japan,  but  compatible  with  existing  PAL  and  SECAM  systems  used  in  Europe6i 
as  an  intermediate  standard until the  introduction of full  HOTV  (HO-MAC). 
All  new  programmes  and  new  satellites launched after 1  January 1995 will be 
required to use  02-MAC  (16/9  screen format)  in parallel to  the  existing PAL 
and  SECAM  systems.  While  the  EC  Commission  has  reportedly  sought  to 
complement  the  Directive  by  a  binding  commitment  of  equipment  producers, 
broadcasters  and  satellite  operators  to  promote  02-MAC  and,  subsequently, 
HD-MAC,  they finally agreed on  a  declaration of ·intent.  It was  endorsed by 
some  40  companies  and  associations  in  J·une  1992  and  presupposes  tgz 
provision  of  ECU  850  million  through  a  five-year  HDTV  action  plan. 
However,  during  the  period  under  review,  no  such  plan was  agreed  upon  by 
the  member  States.  The  Commission  considered it an  open 6
~uestion whether 
D2-MAC  would  "enable  Europe  to  impose  its own  technology". 
(Footnote  Continued) 
Sterling  Drug).  The  Commission's  view  is  that  use  of  Article  85  cannot  be  excluded  to  the 
extent  that  conduct  goes  beyond  what  may  be  considered  as  "internal  a 11 ocat ion  of  tasks" 
between  the  companies  in  question. 
60Ec  Commission  (1991d). 
61 D2-Mac  has  been  developed  by  Philips  and  Thomson  which  own  all  rights.  Both 
companies  are  reported  to  have  agreed,  in  July  1990,  to  spent  US$3.2  billion  on  joint 
research  into  HDTV.  Thomson  has  been  granted  US$500  mi 11 ion  of  Government  aid  for. th.ese 
purposes  (Herald  Tribune,  8/9  June  1991). 
62Financial  Times,  5  and  16  June  1992. 
63Ec  Commission  (1991a). 
The  French  Deputy  Minister  of  Postal  Services  and  Telecommunications,  M.  ·Jean-Marie 
Rausch,  was  quoted  as  saying  that  "it  is  imperative  to  impose  02-MAC  in  Europe,  even  if  it 
proves  expensive,  since  this  is  the  only  means  of  safeguarding  employment  in  the 
communications  branch"  (Tribune  de  1'  Expansion,  30  August  1991;  translation  by  GATT 
Secretariat). 
.. (d)  Telecommunications 
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400.  Telecommunications  equipment  is  one  the  few  sub-segments  of  the 
electronics  industry in which  the  EC  continues  to  register a  trade  surplus. 
EC  companies,  including Alcatel,  Siemens/GEe,  Bosch  and  Philips,  represent 
close  to  one-third of  total world  production in  the  sector.  Some  elements 
of  the  EC  market  are  highly  compet~§ive,  while  public  procurement  remains 
an  important  aspect  in other areas. 
401.  Tariff  protection  averages  some  7  per cent  (simple  average). 
However,  market  developments  in  the  sector  are  still  although  to  a 
declining  ext.ent  - heavily  influenced  by  the  monopoly  status  of  public 
carriers  in  most  member  States.  National  telecommunications 
administrations  are  estimated ~  be  responsible  for  more  than half  of all 
equipment  purchases  in the  EC. 
402.  The  extent  of  deregulation  in  the  public  carrier  sector  varies 
greatly among  member  States.  In  the  United Kingdom,  the public network was 
opened  to  (initially  duopolistic)  competition  in  1984,  subject  to 
regulation  by  an  independent  regulatory  authority  (Oftel).  The 
Netherlands'  PTT,  formally  independent  since early 1988,  is about  to  face  a 
competing  consortium  in  mobile  communications.  In  Germany,  a  reform 
package  introduced in 1989  provided for  full liberalization of the  terminal 
equipment  market,  free  entry  into  the  value-added  services  sector,  and  the 
institutional  separation  of  operational  and  regulatory  functions.  The 
reforms  did  not  affect  public  network  ownership,  which  is  based  on  the 
German  Constitution,  or  the  monopoly  status  of  simple  voice  transmission. 
Following  German  unification,  however,  the  voice-telephone  monopoly  of 
Deutsche  Bundespost  Telekom  was  suspended  for  three  years  to  allow private 
satellite operators  to  establish links  between  old  and  new  Lander.  France 
created  a  separate  body  for  regulatory  and  long-term  strategic  tasks  in 
1991.  In  early  January  1993,  France  approved  6
~he  establishment  of  an 
independent satellite telecommunications  network. 
403.  The  monopoly  position  of  national  carriers  and,  concurrently,  of 
"court  suppliers"  appears  bound  to  diminish  over  time.  One  determining 
factor  has  been  the  pace  of  technical  change,  notably  the  advent  of  new 
services  and  techniques  (mobile  communications  etc.)  beyond  the  regulatory 
6415  suppliers  account  for  90  per  cent  of  all  sales  within  the  Community.  Of  these, 
five  are  not  located  within  the  Community;  two  (Motorola  and  IBM)  are  non-European  companies 
with  major  productive  capacity within  the  EC.  See  EC  Commission  {199la). 
65Ec  Commission  (1991a). 
66 Finan£l~l_Ilmes,  25  January  1993. C/RM/S/36A 
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competence  and,  perhaps  even more  important,  the  financial possibilities of 
public  administrations.  A  second  element  has  been mounting public  concern 
about  the  capacity  of public  monopolies  to  respond  swiftly  to  a  dynamic, 
increasingly  sophisticated technical  environment,  to  install new  equipment 
and  allow  access  for  new  services  at  reasonable  cost,  and  to  ensure 
continued  compatibility  and  inter-operability  of  their  systems.  And, 
thirdly,  national  regulators have  come  under pressure  from  the  Commission  -
and,  in  certain  cases,  from  trading  partners  to  do  away  with 
long-entrenched  ac%7ss  barriers,  over-regulation,  discriminations  and 
exclusivity  rights.  Such  pressures,  in  turn,  have  been  fuelled  by  the 
need  to  recoup  soaring  development  costs  for  equipment  through  larger 
production  runs,  and  by  the  growth  prospects  of  advanced  technologies  and 
new  services within an  open market  environment. 
404.  At  Community  level,  a  Commission  Directive  on  competition  in  the 
markets  for  telecommunications  services  (No.  90/388)  provides  for  the 
removal  of  all  special  or  exclusive  rights  for  the  provision  of 
telecommunications  services,  other  than  si~e voice  transmission  and  the 
operation  of  the  network  infrastructure.  With  regard  to  satellite 
communications,  a  Commission  Green  Paper  of  November  1990,  confirmed  by  a 
Council  resolution  in  November  1991,  envisages  four  major  changes  in  the 
regulatory environment:  (i)  full liberalization of the earth segment, 
67The  EC  Commission  has  taken  a  leading  role  in  the  process  of  reducing  technical 
barriers  and  obstacles  to  mutual  recognition,  removing  national  procurement  preferences  (see, 
however,  Section  IV.2(vi)  and  opening  hitherto  sheltered  markets  for  advanced  services. 
Major  initiatives  in  this  context  were  the  Commission's  1987  "Green  paper  on  the  development 
of  the  common  market  for  telecommunication  services  and  equipment"  (COM(87)290  final)  and  a 
subsequent  Commission  document  "Imp 1  ement i ng  the  Green  Paper"  ( COM/88/48).  The  Green  Paper 
proposed  the  progressive  liberalization  of  all  terminal  and  equipment  markets;  unrestricted 
supplies  of  value-added  services;  the  complete  separation  of  regulatory  and  operational 
functions;  the  acceptance  of  the  principle  that  tariffs  should  be  responsive  to  cost  trends; 
and  a  balanced  approach  towards  developing  new  services  which  include  remote  regions  (for  an 
overview  see,  for  example,  Ungerer  (1988)). 
The  United  States  has  launched  various  fact-finding  missions  over  recent  years  with  a 
view  to  exploring  market  access  opportunities  at  national  and  Community  level  and, 
apparently,  to  influencing  the  pace  and  direction  of  reforms.  In  April  1991,  the  U.S.  and 
German  authorities  agreed  on  twice-yearly  meetings  to  discuss  regulations  and  questions  of 
modernization  in  the  telecom  sector,  satellite  policy,  technical  standards  and  networks, 
radio  communications  and  issues  related to  HDTV  (Journ!l_£f_Commer£~·  14  April  1991). 
68The  Directive  opens  all  value-added  services  to  competition  and  provides  for  the 
progressive  liberalization  of  communication  services.  The  resale  of  non-voice  services  is 
allowed  from  1  January  1993,  with  a  transition  period  until  1  January  1996  for  member  States 
with  undeveloped  public  data  networks.  The  Directive  does  not  cover  telex,  mobile  radio 
telephony,  paging  and  satellite  services;  and  member  States  are  allowed  to  operate  licensing 
or  declaration  procedures  in  order  to  ensure  compliance  with  certain  "essential  requirements" 
(e.g.  security  of  the  network,  rna i ntenance  of  network  integrity  and  i nter-operabi 1  i ty  of 
services  and  data  protection). 
A  Frame~ork  Directive  on  Open  Network  Provisions  of  June  1990  is  designed  to  lay  the 
ground  for  harmonized  access  conditions  to  the  network  infrastructure  and  certain  services. 
Priority  has  since  been  given  to  develop  implementation  Directives  for  leased  lines,  packet-
and  circuit-switched  data  services,  ISDN,  voice  telephone  service,  telex  service  and  mobile 
services. 
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including  the  abolition  of  all  special  rights;  ( ii)  free  access  to  the 
space  segment  on  a  non-discriminatory,  cost-oriented  basis;  (iii) full 
commercial  freedom  for  space  segment  providers,  including direct  marketing 
of  satellite  capacity;  (iv)  harmonization  measures  in  order  to  allow  for 
the provision and use  of services  Europe-wide. 
405.  In March  1991,  the  European Court of Justice upheld the  competence  of 
the  Commission  to  issue  Directives  under  Article  90: 3  of  the  EEC  Treaty, 
aimed at abolishing the special or exclusive rights of national agencies  to 
import,  market,  install,  or  operate  goods  and  services 
(Section  IV .4(i) (d)).  The  ruling  covers  telecommunications  termin~l 
equipment,  but  may  have  much  wider  implications  for  further  initiatives  to 
terminate  monopoly  rights  in  utilities  sectors,  such  as  mobile  and 
satellites69  equipment  and  services,  postal  services,  energy,  and 
transport.  Directives  concerning  the  satellite  equipment  sector  are 
·currently  being  prepared.  In  the  sphere  of  mobile  communication,  the 
Commission  is  in the  process  of  examining current  trends  in member  States' 
regulatory  framework  and  the  impact  of technical constraints resulting,  for 
example,  from  overlapping  technologies  and  frequencies.  The  existing  EC 
regulatory  system,  as  well  as  any  future  changes,  would  cover  the  whole 
EC/EFTA  area under  the  EEA  Agreement. 
406.  A  variety  of  additional  regulatory  and  institutional  changes  is 
likely  to  affect  access  to  EC  and  national  equipment  markets.  These 
include  full  mutual  recognition  of  type  approvals  for  terminal  equipment 
among  the  member  States  (Directive  No.  91/263);  the  creation ~O a  European 
Telecommunications  Standards  Institute  in  1988  (ETSI);  and,  on 
1  January 1993,  the  entry  into  force  of  the  procurement  Directive  on  the 
"excluded  sectors"  (water,  energy,  transport  and  telecommunications; 
Section IV.2(vii)). 
(iv)  Pharmaceuticals 
General  features 
407.  The  pharmaceuticals  industry  is  one  of  the  mainstays  of  EC 
manufacturing,  with  a  strong  position  on  international  markets. 
Pharmaceuticals  production  in  the  Communities  ranks  first worldwide,  with 
total output of  ECU  52 billion in 1990.  Trade has  continuously been in 
69carpentier  (1992).  Michel  Carpentier  is  Director-General  for  Telecommunications, 
Information  Industry  and  Innovation  in  the  EC  Commission. 
70ETS I  was  intended  to  speed  up  the  estab  1  i shment  of  common  specifications~  however, 
the  standardization  process  continues  to  advance  only  slowly  (Carpentier,  1992~  see  also 
Section  IV.2(viii)). C/RM/S/36A 
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surplus;  net  exports  were  close  to  ECU  5  billion in 1991.  Nominal  tariff 
protection is in the  order of 6  per cent  (simple average). 
408.  The  trade  performance  of  the  sector  may  be  attributed  to  its 
innovative  strength.  The  industry  ranks  top  in  terms  of  research 
intensity;  more  than  10 per cent  of  the  workforce  (450,000  in  1990)  is 
involved  in  R&D  activities.  A  recent  Commission  publication nevertheless 
describes  the  current  situation  as  difficult,  pointing  to  a  diverse 
regulatory  environment,  including  patent  law,  within  the  EC  and  to 
stiffening71international  competition,  mainly  from  U.S.  and  ~apanese 
companies.  As  shown  in  Table  AV. 5(i),  there  are  only  few  sectors  in 
which  the  share  of  intra-EC  trade  in  domestic  consumption  is  lower 
(14.7  per cent  in 1990). 
Market  segmentation 
409.  The  market  for  pharrnaceuticaJn is  cons ide  red  to  be  one  of  the  most 
fragmented  and  regulated  in  the  EC.  For  a  variety of  reasons,  including 
social  and  health  policy  objectives,  market  imperfections  and  budgetary 
constraints,  an  intricate  regulatory  framework  (including  approval 
requirements,  price  controls,  expenditure  controls,  positive  and  negative 
lists  for  prescriptions,  rest7~ctions  on  distribution  and  dispensing) 
influences  supply  and  demand.  The  measures  are  mostly  applied  at 
national rather than at EC  level. 
74 
410.  At  least seven  member  States  operate  direct  price  controls.  Since 
their focus  is on patented drugs,  market disparities are  likely to be 
71 Ec  Commission  (1991a). 
Of  the  12  largest  EC  producers  of  pharmaceuticals,  nine  are  located  in  member  States 
with  more  "liberal"  price  regimes  in  the  sector:  four  in  both  the  United  Kingdom  and 
Germany,  and  one  in  the  Netherlands.  The  three  leading  companies  are  Glaxo  (UK),  Hoechst  and 
Bayer  (Germany). 
72G.  Klepper  (1992). 
73A  Council  Directive  of  December  1988  (No.  89/105)  establishes  a  set  of  common  rules 
and  transparency  requirements  for  member  States  that  operate  price  approval  schemes,  profit 
controls,  or  positive  or  negative  lists  for  purposes  of  the  national  health  insurance 
systems.  While  respecting  the  diversity  of  the  regulatory  systems,  the  Directive  establishes 
timeframes  for  decision-making,  provides  for  the  publication  of  decisions,  and  requires  the 
institution  of  appeals  procedures.  A  Consultative  Committee  is  to  provide  the  Commission 
with  detailed  information  on  the  functioning  of  the  national  systems.  The  Commission  has 
indicated  that,  based  on  the  experience  gained  in  this  context,  it might  eventually  suggest 
new  measures  aimed  at  eliminating  the  negative  effects  these  controls  could  have  on  the 
functioning  of  the  Internal  Market. 
The  Commission  is  in  the  process  of  setting  up  an  EC-wide  data  base  on  pharmaceuticals 
{ECPHIN),  comprising  product  characteristics  and  prices.  It  is  intended  to  be  opened  to  the 
public  after  1995. 
74A  study  by  the  European  Consumers'  Association  (BEUC,  1989)  considered  the  German 
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particularly  pronounced  in  this  segment.  Out  of  patent,  drugs  may  be 
copied  by  generic  manufacturers  which  are  subject  to  "normal"  price  and 
market disciplines  (including the  entry of new  competitors). 
411.  A  price  survey  by  the  European  Consumers'  Association  (BEUC), 
conducted  in  1988,  found  drug  prices  in  Portugal,  Greece  and  Spain 
significantly below  the  EC  average,  while  those  in Germany,  the  Netherlan~~ 
and  Denmark  were  the  highest,  with  an  average  differential  of  2~  times. 
While  such  price  differentials  can  normally  be  expected  to  encourage 
arbitrage  by  independent  agents,  available  studies  suggest  that  parallel 
deliveries  represent  no  more  than  2  per cent  of  the  EC  market  for 
prescription  drugs  (1  per cent  in  Germany,  8  ~gr cent  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  and ·s  to  10  per cent  in the Netherlands).  Not  surprisingly,  the 
trade  flows  originated  mainly  in  "low-price''  EC  member  States,  such  as 
Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Greece  and  Spain. 
412.  According  to  a  1976  ruling  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  and  a 
1982  Commission  communication  on  parallel  imports  of proprietary  medicinal 
products  for  which  marketing  authorizations  have  already  been  granted, 
parallel  im~9rts from  other member  States  do  not  require  separate admission 
procedures.  While  this  appears  to  have  facilitated  market  access,  a 
variet¥8 of  other  technical  barriers  has  continued  to  hamper  intra-EC 
trade.  In addition,  pharmacists  in some  member  States are  reportedly 
(Footnote  Continued) 
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rules  on  drug  pricing  to  be  the  most  liberal  in  the  EC.  However,  the  German  authorities  have 
progressively  introduced,  since  1989,  limits  on  reimbursements  by  sickness  insurances.  Drugs 
are  grouped  according  to  their  active  ingredients,  and  reference  prices  are  set  for  each 
group.  Patients  are  required  to  pay  the  difference  between  reference  and  actual  prices.  The 
range  of  affected  products  has  been  extended  over  time  and  is  expected  finally  to  cover  50  to 
60  per  cent  of  the  market  (REMIT,  1991). 
Price  formation  in  the  United  Kingdom  1s  free  as  long  as  maximum  profit  margins  are  not 
exceeded.  The  system  is  reported  to  be  applied  liberally,  with  a  view  not  to  discouraging 
innovation  (Bundesvereinigung  Deutscher  Apothekerverbande,  1991).  Price  policies  in  Denmark, 
Ireland  and  the  Netherlands  are  also  considered  as  relatively liberal. 
75 BEUC  (1989).  A  sample  of  125  drugs  was  taken;  prices  were  weighted  according  to 
turnover.  The  Federation  of  German  Pharmacists  (Bundesvereinigung  Deutscher 
Apothekerverbande)  has  disputed  the  above  results  for  several  reasons,  including  data 
inaccuracies  and  failure  to  take  into  account  discounts  for  health  insurances  and  differences 
in  value-added  taxation.  The  Federation  also  stressed  the  impact  of  price-containing 
measures,  progressively  introduced  in  Germany  since  1989  (see  footnote  above).  In  early 
1991,  the  BEUC  "drug  basket"  was  estimated  to  be  no  more  than  10  per  cent  more  expenshe  in 
Germany  than  on  average  in  the  EC  (Diener  and  Sitzius-Zehender,  1991). 
76REMIT  (1991). 
77case  104-75  (Collection  1976,  p.  613)  and  Official  Journal  Cl15  of  6  May  1982. 
78The  Netherlands  operates  a  simplified  registration  procedure  for  imports  of  drugs 
with  the  same  chemica 1  components  and  dosage.  The  United  Kingdom's  "Product  licence  -
Parallel  Import"  procedure  is  reported  to  facilitate  registration  of  parallel  imports  from 
other  member  States  (but  not  from  third  countries)  if  their  therapeutic  quality  is  identical 
to  a  product  already  registered  in  the  U.K.  (Klepper,  1992).  However,  the  issuance  of  the 
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reluctant  to  dispense  parallel  imports,  possibly  because  of  the  structure 
of  incentives  provided  under  medical  reimbursement  schemes  (such  as  the 
fixed  percentage  mark-ups  applied  in  Germany).  Further  impediments  to 
parallel  trade  result  from  the  need  to  change  packings,  labels  andjor 
product  information.  In certain cases,  wholesalers  have  been pressured  by 
their  own  associat~s,  competitors  or  manufacturers  not  to  purchase  from 
parallel  importers. 
413.  Recent  initiatives  by  member  States  may  assist  in  encouraging 
parallel  trade.  For  example,  Germany  has  laid  down  official  requirements 
compelling  pharmacies  in certain  circumstances  to  dispense  cheaper  imports 
if a  range  o~ conditions  is met.  Urged  by  the  Commission,  Germany  is also 
reported  recently  to  have  removed  administrative  import  barriers.  Since 
December  1992,  importers  of products  already cleared for  sale  in Germany  no 
longer  have  to  produce  a  document  confi85ing  anew  that  the  legal 
requirements  for  marketing  are  actually  met.  The  Netherlands  has  made 
dispens~yg of parallel  imports  more  attractive  through  modifying  the  sales 
margin.  These  measures  appear  to  improve  access  conditions  for  both  EC 
and  third country products  which  are  in free  circulation in a  member  State. 
414.  Attempts  have  been made  since  the  mid-1960s  to  ensure  coordination of 
national  registration  of  pharmaceuticals  among  the  member  States.  A 
European  Committee  for  Proprietary  Medical  Products  (CPMP)  and  for 
Veterinary  Medicinal  Products  (CVMP)  have  been  establis~ with  a  view  to 
narrowing  divergencies  in  national  admission  procedures.  The  Committees 
may  be  requested by  any  member  State  or  the  Commission  to  give  an  advisory 
opinion  on  individual  cases  (the  final  decision  lies,  however,  with  the 
member  States).  In the  fields  of biotechnological  and  other high-technology 
products,  national  authorities must  consult systematically in the 
(Footnote  Continued) 
1 i cence  is  said  to  take  19  months  in  genera  1,  as  against  three  months  in  the  Netherlands 
(REMIT,  1991).  In  1989,  Germany's  Federal  Administrative  Court  (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) 
ruled  that  products  can  be  considered  as  identical  only  if  they  carry  identical  names; 
"Methotrexat"  (Germany)  and  "Methotrexate"  (Italy)  were  therefore  viewed  as  dissimilar  and 
the  latter was  required  to  undergo  the  full  licensing  procedure. 
79REMIT  (1991). 
In  August  1992,  Germany's  Federal  Cartel  Office  (Bundeskartellamt)  prohibited  the  three 
leading  wholesalers  in  the  sector  from  further  denying  Eurim-Pharm.  the  country's  largest 
parallel  importer  of  drugs,  access  to  pharmacies  (~~~~~urch~~-~~l!~~2·  24  August  1992). 
80f~!££~~~-g~E2~!·  9  January  1993,  and  ~~£~~l£~!~~-fQ~-~~~~~~~~~~l·  12  January  1993. 
81 REMIT  (1991). 
82Both  Comm1ttees  are  expected  to  act  as  scientific  bodies.  They  are  composed  of 
experts  from  the  national  health  administrations  and  the  Commission.  Contrary  to  the  CPMP, 
the  CVMP  may  grant  observer  status  to  industry  and  user  representatives. C/RM/S/36A 
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83 
Committees  before  granting,  refusing or withdrawing access  to  the  market. 
In other areas,  a  multi-country  registration procedure  entitles  a  supplier 
which has  obtained  access  to  one  member  State,  to  request  an  extension  to 
others.  The§C  are  required  "to  take  due  account"  of  the  initial 
registration.  However,  this  approach,  which  may  be  considered  a  soft 
(voluntary)  variant of ~  mutual  recognition principle,  has  apparently not 
proved  very  effective.  About  360  pharmaceuticals,  including  55  bio-
technological products,  have  so  far undergone  these  procedures. 
415.  Member  States are  required to process applications within a  period of 
120  days.  In  exceptional  cases,  this  may  be  extended  by  90  days  (not 
including  delays  caused  by  additional  requests  for  information).  Charges 
for  processing  applications  are  set  at  the  national  level.  New 
applications  from  third country suppliers  for  product admission are  treated 
like any  application from  EC  producers.  Tests  conducted abroad that comply 
. with  EC  requirements  are  acceptable  to  the  Community.  Any  subsequent 
imports  are  required  to  conform  to  the  same  criteria as  EC  products  (with 
regard to manufacturing practices,  production controls etc.). 
The  post-1992  framework 
416.  New  legislation,  approved  in  principle  by  the  Council  in 
November  1992,  is designed to provide  for  harmonized  and partly centralized 
EC  admission  procedures.  As  from  1995,  three  different  avenues  to  product 
registration will be  available:  (i)  a  centralized  Community  procedure  for 
certain  new  products,  valid  in  all  12  member  States;  (ii) decentralized 
national authorization for  the majority of products,  with  the  obligation of 
mutual  recognition;  and  (iii)  national  registration  valid  only  in  the 
issuing  member  State.  The  EC-wide  approach  would  be  compulsory  for 
biotechnology-based medicines  and  for veterinary medicines  used  to  increase 
productivity.  Other  innovative  products  and  active  ingredients  may  be 
submitted either to  centralized or decentralized procedure. 
417.  Requests  for  product  admission  would  in  future  be  lodged  directly 
with  a  European Agency  for Assessing Medicines,  building on  the  CPMP  and 
83council  Directive  No.  87/22. 
84council  Directives  Nos.  65/65  (medicines  for  human  use)  and  81/852  (veterinary  use). 
If  a  new  product  is  essentially  similar  to  a  drug  authorized  and  marketed  for  a  certain 
period  (six  or  ten  years),  the  applicant  may  be  exempt  from  the  need  to  provide  the  results 
of  pharmacological,  toxical  or  clinical  tests. 
85Reportedly,  the  system  has  been  plagued  by  long  delays  and  the  fact  that  national 
regulatory  agencies  have  rejected  most  applications  they  received  from  importers  (Belgium, 
Italy,  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom  are  said  to  have  objected  to more  than 
85  per  cent  of  the  applications.  Financial  Times,  11  March  1991). C/RM/S/36A 
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CVMP.  The  Agency's  decisions  would  subsequently  become  binding  throu§g 
Commission  Decisions,  if  no  objections  are  raised  within  30  days. 
Whenever  an  application concerns  more  than  one  member  State,  the  new  rules 
provide  for bilateral conciliation  and,  ultimately,  binding arbitration  in 
the  event  of disputes.  The  European Agency  would  also  coordinate national 
surveillance  activities  on  product  safety,  inspections  and  laboratory 
controls.  Like  its predecessors,  the  agency would  focus  exclusively on  the 
three  traditional  admission criteria of quality,  efficacy  and  safety;  any 
further considerations  - for  example,  the  impact  of veterinary medicines  on 
agricultural  structures  - would  be  brought  to  bear  by  the  Commission  or, 
finally,  the  Council. 
418.  Basic  regulatory  issues  in  the  sector  (approval  criteria  and 
procedures,  procedures  for  marketing  authorization  and  manufacturing 
controls,  recognition of te87s)  have  been addressed by  way  of harmonization 
regulations  and directives.  They  are 8
~omplemented by  guidelines  for  good 
manufacturing  and  laboratory  testing.  Medicines  for  both  human  and 
veterinary  use  are  subject  to  similar  criteria  and  requirements.  The 
preference  for  mandatory  harmonization  in  this  sector  reflects  the  view 
that,  given  the  health  and  safety  problems  involved,  "new  approach" 
directives,  let  alone  the  mutual  recognition  principle,  would  not  prove  a 
reliable basis  for market  integration  (Section IV.3(viii)). 
861n  the  event  of  major  objections,  the  Commission  would  decide  in  consultations  with 
an  regulatory  Committee,  made  up  of  representatives  of  member  States.  The  decision  could  be 
referred  to  the  Council. 
87These  texts  have  been  published  by  the  Office  for  Official  Publications  of  the 
European  Communities  under  the  title  "The  Rules  governing  Medicinal  Products  in  the  European 
Community"  (luxembourg,  1991). 
88see,  for  example,  N.  Bohan  (1991). 
As  stated  by  the  Commission,  analytical,  pharma-toxical  tests  and  clinical  tests 
carried  out  within  a  member  State  in  conformity  with  EC  rules  are  to  be  accepted  by  all  other 
member  States.  The  same  applies  to  product  controls.  Mandated  by  the  Council  to  up-date  the 
EC  technical  testing  requirements,  the  Commission  has  issued  a  variety  of  Oirecthes  in 
recent  years,  for  example,  with  a  view  (i)  establishing  principles  and  guidelines  for  good 
manufacturing  practices;  (ii)  up-dating  and  extending  the  requirements  for  analytical, 
toxical  and  clinical  tests  of  medicines,  vaccines,  blood  derivatives  and 
radi o-pharmaceut i ca 1  s;  (iii)  estab  1 i shi ng  compa rab 1  e  criteria  for  veterinary  medicines  and 
vaccines;  and  (iv)  specifying  maximum  residue  levels  for  veterinary  medicines  in  food 
products. 
A  further  set  of  four  Council  Directives,  issued  in  1992,  is  aimed  at  (i)  imposing 
controls  on  distribution  channels  with  a  view,  in  particular,  to  facilitating  the  withdrawal 
of  defective  products;  (ii)  harmonizing  prescription  requirements;  (iii)  stipulating  common 
rules  for  product  information  (concerning  labels  and  product  descriptions);  and 
(iv)  regulating  advertisement  destined  for  the  public  and,  separately,  the  health  profession. International cooperation 
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419.  The  EC,  Japan  and  the  United  States  have  agreed  to  exchange  for 
comment  all  new  regulatory  proposals  and  technical  guidelines.  In  the 
framework  of harmonization conferences  called  ICH  (International Conference 
for Harmonization),  the  three  regions  have  agreed on  conducting a  five-year 
programme  of  international  harmonization  of  their  respective  testing 
requirements.  Third  countries  are  informed,  and  invited  to  comment,  via 
the  World  Health  Organisation.  (According  to  the  Commission,  contacts  and 
conferences  involving  experts  from  the  EC,  Japan  and  the  United  States are 
open  in  principle  to  third  country  inputs  via  the  WHO).  Pursuant  to  the 
EEA  Agreement,  the  "acquis  cornmunautaire"  in  this  area  is  due  to  be 
extended  to  all  EFTA  countries.  In  view  of  the  present  degree  of 
harmonization,  the  Commission  expects  that  the  Agreement will not result in 
major  changes. 
(v)  Coal 
Developments  in production and  trade 
420.  The  contribution  of  coal  to  the  Community's  energy  consumption  has 
declined  slowly  over  time,  from  23  per cent  in  1980  to  20.3  per cent  in 
1992  (EC  12)89  EC  production  and,  in particular,  employment  in  the  sector 
have  shrunk.  Total  EC  hard  coal  output  stood at  some  200  million  tonnes 
in. 1992,  as  against  about  190 million  tonnes  of  lignite  and  peat;  this 
compares  with  some  260 gttJ-llion  tonnes  of  hard  coal  ten  years  previously 
(see  Chart  V .11  below).  The  only  member  States  with  significant  ha9~ 
coal  production  are  the  United  Kingdom,  Germany,  Spain  and  France. 
Lignite production is concentrated in Germany,  Greece  and  Spain. 
421.  The  decline  in output has  been  accompanied  by  increased  imports  over 
time.  Total  Community  hard  coal  imports  are  estimated  at  some 
130 million tonnes  in  1992,  as  against  slightly over  100  million tonnes  in 
1989.  The  United  States  was  the  most  important  supplier  of  hard  coal  in 
1992  (40  per cent),  followed by  South Africa  (20  per cent),  Australia 
89 The  members  of  underground  mine  staff  in  the  Community  ( EC  12)  was  ha 1  ved  from 
1.1  million  to  some  550,000  during  the  1960s.  By  the  end  of  the  1980s,  it  had  fallen  to 
about  200,000.  The  decline  was  particularly pronounced  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
90Excluding  east  Germany. 
91Production  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  due  to  decline  rapidly  under  a  programme 
announced  in  October  1992. C/RM/S/36A 
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(16  per cent)  9fnd 
insignificant. 
Colombia  (8  per cent).  Imports  of  lignite  are 
422.  Germany  is  the  only  member  State  to  impose  ta~~ffs  on  external  hard 
coal  imports,  based  on  a  derogation  granted  in  1958.  However,  the  level 
of protection  - specific  duties  of  DM  6  per  tonne  - is  insignificant when 
compared  with  other  forms  of  national  support,  including  direct 
subsidization and exclusive supply contracts between domestic  producers  and 
major user  industries. 
The  EC  regulatory environment 
423.  Government  involvement  has  had  a  long  tradition  in  the  coal  sector, 
which  once  was  considered  one  of  the  pillars  of western  Europe's  economy. 
This  is  reflected  in  the  specific  legal  framework  created  for  the  coal  and 
steel  industry  in  the  early  1950s  under  the  ECSC  Treaty.  However,  though 
the Treaty  prohibits  the  extension of  State aid  to  the  sector  (see  below), 
this  has  not  prevented  the  establishment,  in  some  member  States,  of 
generous  s~~port programmes  with  a  view  to  cushioning  mounting  adjustment 
pressures.  Overall,  the  Commission  authorized  member  States  to  extend 
more  than  ECU  70 billion of  subsidies  to  coal  production  between  1965  and 
1990.  In  recent  years,  the  Commission  has  placed  increasing  emphasis  on 
effective  subsidy  disciplines;  not  least  with  a  view  to  reducing 
distortions  between  member  States  and  spill-over effects  on  the  market  for 
electricity. 
424.  The  current  regulatory  framework  for  State  aid  to  the  EC  coal 
industry  stipulates  that,  to  be  considered  compatible  with  the  proper 
functioning  of  the  common  market,  support  must  be  devoted  to  at  least  one 
of  the  following  objectives:  ( i)  improving  the  competitiveness  of  the 
industry  and,  thus,·  helping  to  ensure  greater  security  of  supply; 
(ii)  creating new  capacity,  provided that this  is economically viable;  and 
92Lignite  is  generally  used  for  direct  consumption  in  nearby  power  plants. 
93Italy  operates  tariffs  on  coke  and,  along  with  Greece  and  France,  on  lignite;  the 
rates  do  not  exceed  5  per  cent. 
94Article  4(c)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  imposes  an  unqualified  ban  on  "subsidies  or  aids 
granted  by  States,  or  special  charges  imposed  by  States,  in  any  form  whatsoever"  for  ECSC 
coal  and  steel  products.  However,  as  noted  by  the  Commission,  "the  need  to  grant  such  aid 
has  been  recognized  and  the  granting  of  aid  has  been  made  possible  by  the  adoption  of 
ECSC  Decisions  giving  the  Commission  the  right  to  authorize  aid  and  subsidies  designed  to 
bring  the  level  of  production  into  line  with  the  scope  for  restructuring  the  mining  industry 
while  avoiding  social  problems"  (EC  Commission,  199le).  The  Decisions  were  taken,  with  the 
unanimous  assent  of  the  Council,  pursuant  to  Article  95  of  the  ECSC  Treaty.  The  Article 
refers  to  "all  cases  not  provided  for  in  this  Treaty  where  it  becomes  apparent  that  a 
decision  or  recommendation  of  the  High  Authority  is  necessary  to  obtain  ...  one  of  the 
objectives  of  the  Community  ...  ". C/RM/S/36A 
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(iii)  solvi.gl§  social  and  regional  problems  stemming  from  developments  in 
the  sector.  The  Decision is applicable until year-end 1993. 
National  coal policies 
425.  Reflecting its continued high level of subsidized production,  Germany 
accounted for  nine-tenths  of  the  coal  subsidies  extended  in  the  EC  in 1991 
(Table V.6).  The  current cost of production in the  Saar region  (DM  280  per 
tonne)  is  reported  to  b~ 6 some  7  5  per cent  higher  than  in  the  adjacent 
Lorraine  mines  in  France.  Estimates  by  the  International  Energy  Agency 
suggest that  total  support  to  Germany's  uneconomic  hard  coal  mines,  in PSE 
terms,  rose  by  some  60  per cent  ~7tween 1986  and  1988  to  reach  its current 
level  of  some  US$100  per  tonne.  The  IEA  considered  a  continuation  of 
this  trend difficult to  justify in view of  the  need  to  rationalize lignite 
production  in  east  Germany.  In  contrast,  west  German  lignite  production 
(110  million  tonnes  in  1992)  is 9fonsidered  by  the  lEA  to  be  fully 
competitive without public support. 
426.  Lignite  was  the  former  GDR' s  only  indigenous  energy  source.  Its 
domestic  market  shrank  from  250  million  tonnes  in  1990  to  168  million 
tonnes  in  1991,  reflecting  the  impact  of  price  liberalization  and  market 
opening,  privatization  of  the  energy  sector,  introduction  of  stricter 
environmental  standards  and  the  collapse of the  coal-chemical  industry.  In 
July  1992,  the  Commission  approved  subsidies  of  DM  600  million 
(ECU  290  million)  for  the  construction  of  a  large  lignite-fuelled  power 
station  (total  project  cost  amounts  to  DM  2.7 billion).  The  aid  is 
destined  to  cover  some  of  the  additional  cost  incurred  by  using  lignite 
rather  than  hard  coal.  It was  deemed  justified by  the  Commission  in view 
of the  demand  effects,  which would facilitate reclamation work  in East 
95commission  Decision  No.  2064/86/ECSC.  The  Commission  has  noted  that,  over  the  past 
three  years,  its  decisions  on  State  aid  have  stressed  the  temporary  nature  of  all  such  aid; 
the  decisions  have  also  expressed  the  greatest  reservation  about  measures  which  hampered  the 
return  to  long  term  viability of  the  industry,  jeopardized  progress  towards  the  completion  of 
the  I nterna  1  Market  for  energy,  or  ran  counter  to  a  more  efficient  a  11 ocat ion  of  resources 
and  the  degressivity  of  cost  and  aid.  Recognizing  the  strategic  rOle  of  EC  coal  within  a 
Community  policy  for  security  of  supplies,  the  Commission  considers  it  as  economically 
justifiable,  within  reasonable  limits,  that  this contribution  be  remunerated. 
96soddeutsche  Zeitung,  29  September  1992.  See  also  Chart  V.12. 
97The  lEA  estimates  are  in  constant  1990  U.S.  dollars.  The  PSE  approach  used  for  coal 
is  similar  to  that  applied  to  agriculture  (Section  V.2(i));  attempts  have  been  made  to 
exclude  assistance  not  destined  for  current  production.  The  German  Government  has  disputed 
the  accuracy  of the estimates. 
98 IEA  (1991). 
The  German  Minister  of  Economics  was  quoted  as  saying  that  East  German  lignite  would 
have  to  compete  without  subsidization  with  imported  hard  coal  and  nuclear  energy.  At  the 
same  time,  he  rejected  any  plans  to  impose  additional  charges,  for  example  an  energy  or 
carbon  tax,  on  the  use  of  lignite.  See  Frankfurter Alli!meine  Zeitung,  12  June  1992. C/RM/S/36A 
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99 
Germany's  old lignite mines,  and  the  technological spin-offs.  In return, 
the  German  Government  is  reported  to  have  undertaken  not  to  promote 
further,  directly  or  indirectly,  the  use  of00lignite  for  electricity 
generation  in preference  to  alternative  fuels.  The  east  German  market 
is free  from  import barriBis  on hard coal and of substitute mechanisms  like 
the  "coal penny"  scheme. 
427.  The  "coal  penny",  a  general  levy  on  electricity  bills  in  western 
Germany,  is  designed  to  source  a  compensation  fund  for  electricity 
producers,  offsetting f~t of  the  cost  disadvantage  resulting  from  the use 
of domestic hard coal.  The  levy  ,  at a  rate of 7.75 per cent,  generated 
funds  of some  DM  5.3 billion  (ECU  2.6 billion)  in 1992.  In addition,  under 
the  "Huttenvertrag",  German  steel mills are  required to rely exclusively on 
domestic coal,  supplied at subsidized prices which  are  fixed  somewhat  above 
the world  market  level,  but  far  below  German  production cost.  The  Federal 
Republic  has  invoked  Article XIX  of  the  GATT  since  1958  to  provi1u3legal 
cover  for  a  complex  quota  system designed to  flank  the  coal  regime. 
99The  decision  was  based  on  Article  92  of  the  EEC  Treaty  (lignite  is  not  covered  by  the 
ECSC  Treaty). 
100  Europe,  5  August  1992. 
101 IEA  (1992). 
102of  Germany's  total  hard  coal  production  of  72.5  million  tonnes  in  1992,  some 
40  million  tonnes  were  used  for  electricity  generation.  The  compensation  fund· covers  a 
volume  of  34~ million  tonnes  of  EC  coal.  The  contractual  framework  with  the  electricity 
producers  is  due  to  expire  in  1995. 
Observers  have  discussed  whether  the  member  States'  energy  sectors,  encompassing  coal 
producers  and  electricity  plants,  might  be  exempted  from  Community  disciplines.  This  could 
be  the  case  if energy  production  fe  11  within  the  meaning  of  Article 90:2  of  the  EEC  Treaty. 
(The  Articlestipulates  that  companies  entrusted  with  the  operation  of  services  of  general 
economic  interest  would  be  subject  to  EEC  competition  rules  only  insofar  as  their  application 
does  "not  obstruct  the  performance,  in  law  or  in  fact,  of  the  particular  tasks  assigned  to 
(the  companies)".)  However,  the  case  law  hitherto  established  by  the  European  Court  of 
Justice  suggested  that  reference  to  such  "particular  tasks"  in  pursuit  of  energy  policy 
objectives  would  be  deemed  insufficient  to  protect  national  State  aid  for  coal  producers, 
whether  granted  directly  or  via  levy  mechanisms,  from  the  strict  ban  under  ArTicle  4(c)  of 
the  ECSC  Treaty.  In  addition,  Article  90:2  would  cease  to  apply  in  any  case  once  agreement 
has  been  reached  on  a  comprehensive  EC  approach  towards  energy,  which  included  security 
aspects.  Social  or  regional  policy  considerations  would  also  fail  to  provide  cover  for 
uncoordinated  subsidization  and  similar measures  at  national  level,  despite  a  long  history  of 
government  interference  in  the  sector  (Leisner,  1990). 
103GATT  documents  L/855,  18  September  1958,  and  L/920,  19  November  1958.  The  quotas 
apply  to  non-ECSC  and  non-EFTA  deliveries.  Direct  shipments  from  the  "Europe  Agreement" 
countries  are  currently  covered  (see  below). Chart V.11 
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428.  In  March  1989,  the  Commission  authorized  the  continuation  of  aid 
under  the  "coal  penny"  mechanism,  in view  of  social  and  regional  problems 
seen  as  likely  to  result  from  immediate  termination  of  support.  However, 
the  Commission  Decision  held  that  "the  automatic  granting  of  aid  to  the 
volumes  of  coal  produced  ...  has  the  effect  of  stimulating  investment  to 
maintain  capacities  with  no  guarantee  of  economic  viability  in  the  long 
term".  Germany  was  required  to  submit  a  plan  for  the  restructuriy~4 
modernization and streamlining of its industry before  30  September  1989. 
No  final  agreement  has  been  reached  to  date,  since  the  German  proposals, 
which  relied  exclusively  on  the  tightening  of  existing  production  limits 
rather  than  on  the  introduction  of  subsidy  ceilings,  were  deemed  as  not 
addressing  the  issue  by  the  Commission.  However,  in  late  November  1992, 
the  Commission  authorized  the  granting  of  more  than  DM  11 billion  of 
assis£6~ce  to  German  mines  under  the  "coal  penny"  mechanism  in  1991  and 
1992.  In  December  1992,  the  granting  of  some  DM  5  billion  was 
authorized for  1993. 
429.  While  the  United Kingdom  operates  no  formal  support  schemes, 
Government  contracts  between  British  Coal  (BCC)  and  the  electricity 
generators  (in England,  National  P~~{ and  PowerGen)  ensure  a  premium price 
for  domestic  coal  production.  The  contracts,  covering  over 
three-quarters  of  BCC's  output,  are  due  to  expire  in March  1993.  The  power 
generators  would  then be  free  to  use  coal  from  any  source,  or  other  fuels 
such  as  gas,  for  power  generation.  Imported  coal  currently  caters  for 
slightly more  than one-tenth of domestic  consumption.  Sharp  fluctuations 
104commission  Decision  No.  89/296/ECSC. 
As  a  result  of  the  coal  round  discussion  (Kohlerunde  1991),  the  German  Government  and 
the  domestic  coal  industry ·agreed  to  scale  down  German  hard  coal  production  from  its current 
level  of  over  70  million  tonnes  to  50  million  tonnes  by  2000. 
105The  relevant  Commission  Decision  (No.  93/66/ECSC)  held  that  this  did  not  prejudge 
the  compatibility  of  the  basic  contract  ("Jahrhundertvertrag")  with  the  EEC  and  the  ECSC 
Treaties.  The  Commission  also  reiterated  its  view  that  the  relevant  German  legislation  did 
not  further  the  objective  of  improving  competitiveness  or  creating  new  capacities  that  are 
economically  viable  (laid  down  in  Decision  No.  2064/86/ECSC)  and,  moreover,  that  it  was  not 
primarily  aimed  at  resolving  social  and  regional  problems  connected  with  changes  in  the  coal 
industry. 
1D 6In  1991,  following  a  complaint  by  associations  representing  small  mines  and  opencast 
operators  in  the  U.K.,  the  EC  Commission  issued  a  Decision  maintaining  that  National  Power 
and  PowerGen  combined  had  a  dominant  position  as  coal  users  for  electricity  production.  The 
Decision  recalled  the  prohibition,  under  Articles  63  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  and  86  of  the  EEC 
Treaty,  to  exploit  dominant  market  positions  and  to  discriminate  between  suppliers.  It  held 
that  the  proposed  contracts  between  the  electricity  generators  and  the  two  groups  of 
suppliers  - BCC  on  the  one  hand,  and  small  and  opencast  mines  on  the  other  hand- constituted 
an  illegal  discrimination. 
The  U.K.  authorities  subsequently  proposed  new  conditions,  including  price 
(20  per  cent)  and  an  undertaking  by  the  electricity  generators  to  purchase 
quantities  from  the  small  and  opencast  mines.  While  the  Commission  considered  this 
applicable  as  of  1  March  1990,  as  sufficient,  the  National  Association  of  Opencast 
brought  the  case  before  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (EC  Commission,  1992d). 
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in PSE  levels between 1989  (US$92  per  tonne),  1990  (US$24)  and  1991  (US$22) 
are  said  to  reflect1
c~rants  extended  to  cover  write-downs  of  assets  and 
pension  obligations.  Following  the  financial  restructuring  of  British 
Coal  in  1990,  the  United  Kingdom  is  reported  to  have  since  granted  no  aid 
in favour  of current production. 
430.  Under  Spain's  "New  Contract  System  for  Thermal  Coal"  (Nueva  Sistema 
de  Contratacion  de  Carb6n  Termico;  NSCCT),  members  of  the  national 
association of electricity producers  (UNESA)  are contractually committed to 
purchasing  their  coal  input  from  domestic  mines.  Compensato.ry  payments, 
collected through  a  levy  on electricity tariffs,  are  designed  to offset the 
ensuing  cost 4isadvantage.  Under  the  contracting  system,  the  eligible  coal 
companies  are  to  submit  regular  reviews  of  their  strategy  plans,  aimed  at 
adjusting  production  capacities  to  anticipated  demand  and  demonstrating 
continued  economic  viability.  Additional  protection  is  provided  through 
long-term  agreem~tg;  between  the  Government  and  the  publicly-owned  coal 
company  (HUNOSA). 
431.  A multi-stage  restructuring plan for  the  private hard  coal  industry. 
issued  in  late  1990,  includes  the  partial  or  complete  closure  of  mines 
classified  as  non-viable  and  the  reorganization  of  the  system  of 
compensat~ 0
~  payments.  The  State-owned  mines  are  to  be  restructured  in 
parallel.  The  lEA  estimates  that  implementation  of  the  restructuring 
plans haf10ed  to  an  increase  in  PSEs  from  US$33  per  tonne  in 1990  to  US$52 
in 1991. 
432.  France  and  Belgium  have  implemented  in  recent  years  far-reaching 
restructuring,  rationalization  or  modernization  programmes  with  a  view  to 
reducing  produ<J.1\on  and  support;  the  last  Belgian  mine  was  closed  in 
September  1992.  Portugal  launched a  restructuring plan in 1991, 
107IEA  (1991). 
108state-owned  mines  account  for  slight  1  y  more  than  two-fifths  of  total  workforce  t n 
the  sector  (41,700  in  1990). 
109IEA  (1991  and  1992).  The  lEA  has  complimented  the  Spanish  authorities  for  their 
"necessary and  courageous  decision"  to start a  basic  restructuring of  the  industry. 
110IEA  ( 1992). 
111France  operates  no  restrictions  or  taxes  on  coal  imports  which,  overall,  cater  for 
two-thirds  of  tot  a 1  domestic  consumption.  French  co  a 1  has,  however,  a  guaranteed  market  in 
electricity  generation.  The  national  electricity  producer  (EDF)  is  contractually  committed 
to  using  2  million  tonnes  of  domestic  production  per  annum  (1987-1992),  which  is  about 
one-quarter  of  its  total  requirements.  The  supplies  are  at  market  prices.  In  addition,  a 
heating facility  in  the  Paris  region  provides  a  contractually  guaranteed outlet  for  coal  from 
the  Lorraine bassin.  According  to  lEA  (1992). C/RM/S/36A 
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providing  for  the  gradual  phasing  out  of  assistance. 
scheduled for  closure in 1995. 
The  last  mine  is 
433.  Under  the  Europe  Agreement,  the  three  central  and  east  European 
countries  are  required,  upon  entry  into  force  of  the  Agreement,  to 
terminate  any quantitative restrictions and measures  with equivalent effect 
operating  on  their  coal  imports  from  the  EC.  The  Community,  in contrast, 
is  obliged  to  abolish  existing  quantitative  restrictions  within  one  year, 
except  for  Germany  and  Spain,  which  are  given  four  years.  There  are  no 
obligations  on  the  EC  member  States  to  terminate  "measures  having 
equivalent effect"  and,  thus,  to  do  away  with the  subsidies  and exclusivity 
contracts that determine  access  to  large  segments  of  the market. 
434.  The  EEA  Agreement  with  the  EFTA  counties  would  a\\~w both parties  to 
continue their existing non-tariff barriers  on  imports. 
Proposed  changes 
435.  Current  discussions  within  the  Commission  appear  to  revolve  around 
the  development  of  a  common  policy  approach  towards  the  sector,  with  the 
objectives of securing a  reliable supply basis,  reducing  EC  internal market 
distortions  without  creating  social  disruptions,  and  limiting  the 
environmental  impact  of  the  use  of  fossil  fuels.  A  recent  Commission 
report stressed that  "only production which  is competitive  in the  long  term 
is desirable"  and  that security of supply also  involved the diversification 
of  energy  sources;  producing  coal,  irres~I3tive  of  economic  viability, 
could  not  be  considered  an  end  in  itself.  The  Commission  also  noted 
that  world  market  prices  were  subject  to  various  distortions  and  did  not 
reflect security aspects.  A future  aid system  for  coal  could be based on  a 
common  ECU  reference price  incorporating a  security premium.  Support under 
such  a  system would  cover  the  difference  between  current  import  prices  and 
the  reference  price  lf~ith  additional  adjustment  aid  paid  during  a 
transitional  period).  The  new  system  would  have  to  be  approved 
unanimously by  the  member  States. 
112A  separate  Protocol  to  the  Agreement  provides  for  the  phasing  out  of  export 
restrictions  and  measures  having  equivalent  effect,  and  of  customs  duties  and  charges  (rather 
than  "measures")  having  equivalent  effect. 
113Ec  Commission  (1991e). 
114Press  reports  suggest  that  the  Commission  proposes  taking  the  average  EC  cost  of 
production  in  1992  as  a  benchmark  for  support.  Aid  to  mines  producing  at  higher  cost  would 
be  linked  to  restructuring  measures.  In  1998,  the  reference  price  would  be  adjusted  to  the 
new  average  level  of  production  costs,  and  any  additional  support  would  be  conditioned  on 
closures.  The  system  as  proposed  waul d  expire  in  2002.  <.t~ropean  Report,  11  November  1992 
and  Fran~fur!~~-~ll2~~~l~~~l!~~g.  16  November  1992). C/RM/S/36A 
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436.  Given  the current pattern of production and  support within the  EC  and 
worldwide,  any  liberalization  of  the  national  coal  regimes  is  likely  to 
benefit third country suppliers. 
(vi)  Steel 
437.  The  situation in the  EC  steel industry has  changed markedly since  the 
initial TPRM  report.  The  recovery  of  the  late  1980llSvaporated  and  the  EC 
steel  market  has  become  increasingly  oversupplied.  This  reflects,  in 
particular,  the  world-wide  recession  and  the  intensification  of 
competition,  including  from  central  and  eastern  European  sources  seeking 
new markets. 
438.  A  Commission  Communication  of  1992  gave  a  muted  assessment  of  the 
current  situation  of  the  sector  and  its  medium-term  prospects.  Further 
significant  restructuring  was  seen  as  inevitable;  industry
11
EGstimates  of 
the  possible  employment  effects  are  in  the  order  of  50,000.  Referring 
to  its  Co~ication  on  Industrial  Policy  in  an  Open  and  Competitive 
Environment  ,  the  Commission  has  reiterated that  the  companies  concerned 
had  the  primary  role  in taking  decisions,  in respect  of  competition rules, 
on  capacity  reductions.  Any  support  extended  would  be  placed  firmly  in 
this  context. 
439.  In July  1992,  all  iron  and  steel  products  covered  by  the  ECSC  Treaty 
were  made  subject  to  retrospective  Community  surveillance,  with  "the 
purpose  of monitoring  trends  in current  imports  and swiftly identifying any 
adverse  effects  on  the  Community  industry  concerned"  (Commission  Decision 
No.  1856/92/ECSC).  The  Decision,  which  exempts  imports  from  EFTA 
countries,  was  extended  in  December  1992  for  one  year.  A  range  of primary 
and  semi -manu[ff tured  products  from  non-EFTA  sources  is  subject  to  prior 
surveillance.  In  August  1992,  at  the  request  of  Germany,  France  and 
Italy,  the  EC  imposed  unilateral  quotas  on  certain  imports  from  the  CSFR 
(steel pipes  and bars  and  rods  into  Germany;  cold-rolled sheets  into 
115 EC  crude  stee  1  production  was  some  132. 5  mi 11 ion  tonnes  in  1992,  down  by 
3.6  per  cent  from  1991  (-5.7  per  cent  in  Germany  which  represents  some  30  per  cent  of  total 
EC  output).  The  decline  has  accelerated  significantly  since  early  1992.  (Source:  Europe, 
23  January  1993.} 
116EC  Commission  (1992k).  In  this context,  the  Commission  also expressed  its  readiness 
"to  take  all  necessary  steps  to  persuade  the  countries  liable  to  cause  commercial  exports  to 
refrain  from  destabilizing  trade  by  charging  abnormal  prices  or  increasing  exports 
excessively at  a  time  when  the  Community  industry  is  confronted  with  serious difficulties". 
117 EC  Commission  (1990). 
118commission  Recommendation  No.  3772/92/ECSC.  Before  December  1991,  prior 
surveillance  was  coupled  with  price monitoring  on  imports  from  specified  sources. CfRM/S/36A 
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France;  hot-rolled  coils  into  Germany,  Italy  and  France).  In  the 
Internal  Market  context,  various  national  restrictions  affi'2oing  imports 
from  the  CIS  Regulations  were  replaced  by  Community  quotas.  According 
to  the  Commission,  no  steel  imports  (ECSC  products)  were,  in  late  1992, 
subject  to  Vft~ntary  restraint  arrangements  or  similar  bilateral 
understandings. 
440.  On  25  February  1993,  the  EC  Council  approved  new  conclusions  for  the 
restructuring  of  the  Communities'  steel  industry.  These  involve  a 
programme  of  "definitive  capacity  reductions"  to  be  formulated  by  the 
industry by  September  1993,  phased until  the  end  of  1994  "or,  if justified 
grounds  exist,  until  the  end  of  1995".  Additional  financial  support  from 
the  Community  budget  for  displaced  workers  is  envisaged  to  soften  the 
impact  of  unemployment  resulting  from  plant  closures;  funds  may  also  be 
provided  for  industrial  conversion.  Such  measures  must  respect  the 
Community's  steel  aid  regime  (see  below)  and  are  conditional  on  the  timely 
definition  of  the  capacity  reduction  programme.  (The  programme  is  to  be 
based  on  quarterly  "indications"  by  the  Commission,  on  a  product basis,  of 
production and deliveries  in the  Community.) 
441.  Measures  relating to  imports  introduced  in support  of  the  steel plan 
include  the  extension  of  prior  and  ex post  surveillance  on  imports;  the 
updating  of  basic  import  prices  at  regular  intervals;  negotiations  on 
shipments  of  sensitive  products  with  central  and  eastern  European 
countries,  if  warranted  by  the  export  conditions  during  the  period  in 
question,  "whereby  gradual  access  may  be  gained  to  the  Community  market by 
fixing  appropriate  tariff  quotas  for  the  period  1993  to  1995";  and 
proposed  extension  to  1994  and  1995  of  the  quota  system  established  for 
imports  from  the  CIS  Republics. 
119Apparently  the  Czech  and  Slovak  authorities  had  resisted  appeals  to  cease  alleged 
"under-pricing"  and  to  moderate  or  redirect  their  exports  (see  also  Section  IV.2{iv)(b)). 
The  measures  were  taken  under  the  general  safeguard  provision  of  the  Europe  Agreement;  the 
Commission  has  stated it  would  review  the  situation at  their expiration  on  31  December  1992. 
Between  January  and  Apri 1  1992,  imports  into  the  EC  market  from  the  then  Czech  and 
Slovak  Federal  Republic  were  126  per  cent  higher  than  a  year  previously  {according  to 
Eurofer). 
12°For  many  years,  certain  supplies  from  Bulgaria,  Romania  and  the  former  Soviet  Union 
entered  five  member  States  (Germany,  Ita  1 y  and  the  Benelux  countries)  under  autonomous 
quotas.  The  EC-wide  restrictions,  as  from  1  January  1993,  are  based  on  the  1991  trade  levels 
plus  a  certain  growth  factor.  The  measures  applicable  to  Bulgaria  and  Romania  are  due  to  end 
with  the  entry  into  force  of  interim association  agreements  (Europe  Agreements). 
121While  the  Republic  of  Korea  has  continued  to  moderate  its  exports  towards  the  EC 
(Table  IV.2),  the  GATT  Secretariat  has  no  information  pointing  to  any  involvement  of  the  EC 
authorities. 
• C/RM/S/36A 
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442.  According  to  the  Commission,  Sttfi  aid  to  the  sector  was  virtually 
phased  out  by  the  end  of  the  1980s.  A  new  sectoral  support  regime~ 
introduced in 1991,  continued  the  granting of aid in the period  1992-96  to 
four  broad  subject  areas:  research  and  development,  environmental 
protection,  partial  or  total  cessation  of  production,
1
tpd  investments  in 
certain EC  regions  (Greece,  Portugal  and east Germany).  All other forms 
of  aid  were  prohibited.  Provisions  relating  to  research  and  development 
were  brought  into  line  with  those  of  the  general  EEC  framework  in  this 
field.  The  EEA  Agreement  is  due  f~4 extend  these  rules,  like  the  ECSC 
competition rules,  to  the  EFTA  area. 
443.  The  Commission  has  1
~gtphasized  that,  following  the  restructuring  of 
the  industry'in the  1980s  ,  infringements of ECSC  competition rules would 
no  longer be  tolerated;  any  cases would be  treated under  EEC  law.  In June 
1990,  six major  producers  of stainless steel products  were  fined  a  total of 
. ECU  425,000  for  having  participatef2
6
in  a  voluntary  system  of  delivery 
limitations  between  1986  and  1988.  Within  the  new  plan  for  industry 
restructuring,  the  Council  has  agreed  that  the  Commission  will  examine, 
rapidly and  in accordance  with  the  EC  competition rules,  any  agreements  on 
specialization,  concentrations  or  certain  joint  ventures  making  for  the 
rationalization  of  production.  The  agreements,  to  be  submitted  by  the 
companies,  should  facilitate  a  lasting  reorganization  of  the  industrial 
structures of the  sector. 
444.  Steel  plants  in  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands  have  been  partially 
exempted,  in conformity with  ECSC  rules,  from  the  impact  of national carbon 
taxes.  The  taxes  are  intended  to  protect  the  envirollff7lt  by  reducing 
carbon  dioxide  emissions  and  improving  energy  efficiency.  According  to 
122Ec  Commission  (1992j). 
123commission  Decision  No.  3855/91/ECSC.  Aid  for  the  Portuguese  industry  is  limited to 
small- and  medium-sized  enterprises.  like  for  Greece,  the  Decision  stipulates  that  support 
must  not  result  in  capacity  expansions.  Support  for  east  German  plants  must  be  accompanied 
by  a  reduction  in  the  over  a  11  production  capacity  on  the  territory  of  the  former  GDR. 
Regional  investment  aid  is  confined  to  aid  granted  under  generally  available  schemes  and  •ay 
be  granted  only  until  end-1994. 
124see  also  Section  IV.4(i)(c). 
125The  anti-crisis  r6gime  introduced  in  the  early  1980s  was  based  on  the  Commission's 
fixing  of  production  targets  for  individual  product  categories  on  a  quarterly  basis.  Each 
undertaking  was  allotted a  compulsory  quota  for  its  intra-EC  deliveries. 
126EC  Commission  (1991c). 
127The  tax  was  introduced  in  the  Netherlands  on  1 July  1992  and  is  scheduled  for 
introduction  in  Denmark.  The  Commission  decided  to  consider  the  relief  measures,  which  are 
not  confined  to  the  steel  industry,  as  compatible  with  the  common  market  with  a  view  to 
(Footnote  Continued) C/RM/S/36A 
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the  Commission,  the  firms  concerned  would  otherwise  be  handicapped 
vis-a-vis  external  competitors  not  facing  such  taxes,  while  the  relief 
provided  would  make  it  easier  for  other  member  States  to  adopt  similar 
measures. 
445.  The  Communities'  export  restraint  agreement  with  the  United  States, 
limiting  EC  exports  to  7  per cent  of  U.S.  consumption,  expired  in  March 
1992.  According  to  the  Commission,  there  are  currently no  understandings, 
arrangements  or  restrictions  on  EC  steel  shipments.  Negotiations  on  a 
Multilateral Steel  Agreement  under  the  aus~s of the  GATT  came  to  a  halt 
in March  1992,  but have  since been resumed. 
446.  New  anti-dumping  initiatives,  affecting both  imports  into and expoi2§ 
from  the  EC,  are  additional  indicators  of  increasing  market  tensions. 
EC  imports  of  seamless  steel  tubes  from  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Federal 
Republic,  Poland,  Hungary  and  Croatia  are  currently  s~~ect to  provisional 
anti-dumping duties of between 10.8  and  30.4 per cent.  A further  recent 
Community  action concerns  ferrosilicon 1
~om Poland  (price  undertaking)  and 
Egypt  (definitive duty of 32  per cent). 
447.  In  mid-1992,  U.S.  producers  filed  84  anti-dumping  and  anti  -subsidy 
complaints  against  exporters  of  certain  carbon  steel  products  in 
21  countries,  including seven  EC  member  States.  The  complaints  resulted in 
the  imposition  of  provisional  countervailing  duties  of  up  to  59  per  cent 
(Footnote  Continued) 
1 i mit i ng  the  tax  burden  on  heavy  energy  consumers.  Both  countries  have  been  requested  to 
notify  any  amendment  to  the  relief  measure  which  is  1 ikely  to  have  effects  on  the  steel 
industry.  Such  notifications  would  be  examined  under  Decision  No.  3855/91/ECSC. 
128The  proposed  Agreement  is  intended  to  eliminate  tariffs  and  non-tariff  barriers  and 
to  discipline  the  use  of  subsidies  and  countervailing  measures,  after  the  expiry  of  the 
United  States'  system  of  bilateral  restraint  arrangements  in  the  sector.  Disagreement  in  the 
following  areas  was  reported  to  have  caused  major  problems:  (i)  treatment  of,  and  possible 
safeguards  against  support  for  R&D,  plant  closure,  environmental  protection,  and  worker 
assistance;  (ii)  admissible  countervailing  measures  until  full  implementation  of  the 
agreement;  (iii}  stricter disciplines  on  the  use  of  anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy  measures. 
(See  also  U.S.  Mission  Daily  Bulletin,  Geneva,  26  March  1992.) 
129The  measures  are  in  addition  to  the  common  external  tariff  which 
3~ per  cent  on  unworked  steel  and  5~ per  cent  on  semi-manufactures  (Table  IV.l}. 
averages 
130section  IV.2(v)(c).  The  duties  on  shipments  from  the  single  Croatian  producer  have 
been  suspended  in  view  of  present  supply  problems. 
131aoth  the  price  undertaking  and  the  duties  entered  into  force  in  mid-December  1992 
(Commission  Decision  No.  92/572  and  Council  Regulation  No.  3642/92). 
In  September  1992,  producers  of  wire-rod  in  five  countries  (Argentina,  Egypt, 
Yugoslavia,  Trinidad  and  Tobago  and  Turkey)  were  reported  to  have  agreed  with  the  European 
steel  industry  to  exercise  stricter  market  and  price  discipline  (Eurofer,  cited  in 
Nachrichten  fur  AuBenhandel,  3  September  1992).  The  industry  association  subsequently 
withdrew  an  anti-dumping  complaint,  prompting  the  Commission  to  terminate  the  outstanding 
investigation  (Section  IV.2(iv}(c}). 
, C/RM/S/36A 
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(30  November  1992)  and  provisional  anti-dumping  duties  of  up  to 
109  per cent  (27  January 1993)  on  shipments  from  EC  plants.  The  measures 
are  estimated  to  cover  50  per cent  of  the  Communit\3~'  total steel exports 
to  the United States  (4.29 million tonnes  in 1991).  In January  1993,  EC 
producers  were  further  affected  when  Canada  aSffised  preliminary 
anti-dumping  duties  on  certain  carbon  steel  supplies.  The  Council  of 
Ministers,  in adopting  the  new  steel plan in February  1993,  stated that it 
would  "use  its  best  endeavours  in  the  appropriate  bodies,  including  on  a 
bilateral  basis,  to  avoid  definitive  adoption  of  the  excessive  and 
unjustified trade measures  recently taken by  the  United States". 
(vii)  Textiles  and clothing 
448.  Over  the  period  1980-1991,  the  U.S.  dollar value  of  the  Communities' 
external  imports  of  clothing  grew  at  an  annual  rate  of  close  to 
12  per cent.  This  was  considerably  more  rapidly  than  the  expansion  of 
intra  EC  trade  (8  per cent).  By  contrast,  extra- and  intra- supplies  of 
textiles  increased  almost  in  parallel,  at  about  6  per cent  per  annum. 
Import  developments  between  1989  and  1991  were  spectacular,  in  particular 
in  clothing  where  external  if~Rrts  grew  at  a  rate  of  26~ per cent  and 
internal trade at 19  per cent. 
449.  As  in most  industrial countries,  EC  border protection for  the  textile 
and  clothing sector  continues  to  combine  relatively high  tariffs  (compared 
to  other  sectors)  with  bilateral  restrictive  agreements  with  developing 
countries.  The  simple  average  tariff  on  textiles  and  clothing  taken 
together  is  10  per cent  (Table  AIV .1).  For  textiles,  m. f. n.  rates  vary 
between  3  per cent  (fibre  and  waste)  and  11  per cent  (fabrics);  for 
clothing,  the  average  is  13  per cent,  with  a  range  of  0  to  14  per cent.  In 
addition,  various  anti-dumping  actions  are  in  f~sce  affecting  imports  of 
cotton and polyester yarns  and polyester fibres. 
132 European  Report,  30  January  1993. 
133The  Canadian  measures  focus  on  U.S.  supplies.  They  are estimated  to  cover  shipments 
of  some  90,000  tonnes  {1991)  from  other  sources,  including  France,  Germany,  Italy  and  the 
United  Kingdon  (Nachrichten  fur  AuBenhandel,  3  February  1993). 
134The  corresponding  rates  for  textiles  are  11  per  cent  (external  imports)  and 
9  per  cent  (internal  shipments). 
135The  EC  is  currently  applytng  anti-dumping  duties  on  cotton  yarn  from  Brazil  and 
Turkey;  polyester  yarn  from  China,  India,  Indonesia,  Taiwan  and  Turkey;  and  polyester 
synthetic  fibres  from  India  and  the  Republic  of  Korea. C/RM/S/36A 
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450.  Agreements  concluded by  the  EC  under  the Multifibre Arrangement  (MFA) 
are  complemented  by  export 131fstraint  arrangements  with  Egypt,  Malta, 
Morocco,  Tunisia  and  Turkey.  Supplies  under  the  MFA  agreements,  from 
China  and  from  non-MFA  developing  countries  represented  two-thirds  of  the 
Commuy~5ies'  textiles  and  three-quarters  of  its  clothing  imports  in 
1991.  In  the  case  of  Hong  Kong,  the  single  most  important  supplier  of 
clothing  (Chart V.13),  the  restrictiveness of  the  restraints in a  number  of 
member  St\W  has  been  equated  with  tariffs  of  some  13  to  15 per cent 
(1980-89). 
136The  EC  has  concluded  bilateral  restraint  agreements  under  MFA  IV  with  Argentina, 
Bangladesh,  Brazil,  China,  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Federal  Republic,  Hong  Kong,  Hungary,  India, 
Indonesia,  the  Republic  of  Korea,  Macao,  Malaysia,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland, 
Romania,  Singapore,  Sri  Kanka,  and  Thailand.  (Supplies  from  Bangladesh  have  never  been  made 
subject  to  restrictions.)  Textile  agreements  with  Uruguay  and  an  exchange  of  letters,  in  the 
MFA  context,  with  Colombia,  Guatemala  and  Mexico  are  without  restraint  levels.  Deliveries 
from  certain  non-MFA  participants  are  governed  by  an  exchange  of  letters  (Bolivia,  Chile, 
Costa  Rica,  Cuba,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Paraguay,  Venezuela). 
137Main  elements  of  the  Communities  bilateral  MFA  agreements  are  presented  in  GATT 
(1991a). 
138The  estimates  for  four  member  States  (Denmark,  France,  Germany,  and  the 
United  Kingdom)  are  based  on  quota  prices  in  Hong  Kong  for  the  six  largest  MFA  commodity 
categories.  The  tariff  equivalents  were  found  to  vary  significantly  between  the  member 
States  and  over  time.  The  combined  effect  of  quanti t i at i ve  restrictions  and  tariffs  is 
estimated  to  have  reached  33  per  cent  on  average  between  1980  to  1989  (Hamilton,  1990). Chart V.13 
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•  SITC,  Rev.2,  Dlvltlona 88  Ctextllel)  and  84  (clothing).  Tha  definition  11  allghtly  wider 
than  that  u1ed  by  the  GATT  Textile• Committee. 
b  Including  the  former  GDR. 
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451.  The  perceived vulnerability of the  sectors,  and  the  general  level of 
trade  barriers  to  "low  cost"  suppliers,  is  also  reflected  in .their 
treatment  under  some  of  the  EC  preferential  trade  agreements.  As  noted 
above  (Section I I . 5 (iii)  ) ,  the  Europe  Agreements  provide  a  considerably 
longer  implementation  pel~~d  for  these  areas  than  for  almost  all  other 
manufacturing  industries.  In  the  context of  the  association  agreements 
with Mediterranean countries,  sensitive  textiles  and  clothing products  are 
closely  monitored  and  moderated  on  a  voluntary  basis;  alternatively,  if 
import  surges  lead  to  market 1
~sruption,  the  EC  may  invoke  the  safeguard 
provisions of the  agreements. 
452.  The  Communities'  current  trade relations  with  the  12  CIS  members  are 
based  de  facto  on  the  former  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  (see  fii!£ 
TPRM  report);  imports  of  all  significant  products  are  restricted. 
Imports  from  the  three  Baltic  Republics  and  direct  shipments  from  Albania 
are  currently  free  of  quantitative  limits,  although  l!2me  categories 
supplied from  the Baltic republics  are under  surveillance. 
453.  GSP 
duty-free 
imports  may  enter  duty-free 
ceilings  (Section II.5(iv)). 
under  tariff  quotas  or 
While  m.f.n.  rates 
under 
apply 
1391n  1991,  the  three  Europe  Agreement  countries  combined  accounted  for  some  3  per  cent 
of  the  Communities'  imports  of  textiles and  clothing.  Phasing-in  of  the  Agreements  is  due  to 
start  on  1  January  1993.  Until  then,  shipments  from  these  countries,  as  well  as  from 
Bulgaria  and  Romania,  are  governed  by  MFA  bilateral  agreements  (Bulgaria:  MFA-type 
agreement),  while  a  range  of  non-MFA  products  is  subject  to  quantitative  restrictions  under 
Regulation  No.  288/82. 
Outward  processing  traffic  may  qualify  for  the  tariff  concessions  under  the  Europe 
Agreements  if  the  products  concerned  originate  in  the  three  participating  countries.  This 
means  that  no  provision  is  made  for  the  cumulation  of  origin  status  with  the  EFTA  countries 
or  any  other  preferent  i a 1  trading  partners.  Products  processed  in  Hungary  from  textiles 
originating  in  the  EFTA  area  would  thus  not  normally  qualify  for  duty-free  entry  into  the  EC. 
Under  certain  conditions,  diagonal  cumulation  of  origin  is  possible  among  the  Europe 
Agreement  countries  and  the  EC. 
140see  Section  IV.2(iv)(c)  and  GATT  (199la). 
Accardi ng  to  the  EC  Commission,  in  the  case  of  Turkey,  two  separate  arrangements  have 
been  agreed  with  the  exporters'  associations;  the  Turkish  Government  ensures  admintstrative 
cooperation.  On  the  EC  side,  the  relevant  products  are  subject  to  import  surveillance.  A 
regional  breakdown  (by  member  State)  was,  up  to  1992,  communicated  by  the  EC  Commission  to 
the  authorities  of  the  supplying  countries.  Since  1  January  1993,  no  such  regional  breakdown 
exists. 
Following  the  suspension  of  the  cooperation  agreement  with  Yugoslavia,  imports  from 
eligible  ex-Yugoslavian  territories  enter  under  autonomous  regimes  which,  overall,  provide 
for  the  same  quantitative  framework  as  the  suspended  agreement. 
141The  Community  intends  to  replace  the  bilateral  textile  agreement  wHh  the  former 
USSR  by  new  agreements  with all  relevant  Republics  exporting  textiles  and  clothing. 
142The  Communities'  trade  regimes  with  China,  the  Democratic  People's  Republic  of 
Korea,  Mongolia  and  Vietnam  have  remained  unchanged  since  the  initial  TPRM  report:  shipments 
from  the  latter three  countries  are  subject  to  autonomous  quotas  under  Regulation  No.  3420/83 
(established  on  an  annual  basis);  most  imports  from  China  (textile  categories  1  to  114)  are 
covered  by  a  bilateral  agreement,  the  remaining  categories  are  under  unilateral  restrictions. 
Autonomous  restrictions are  also  imposed  on  all  supplies  from  Taiwan. C/RM/S/36A 
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automatically  once  a  tariff  quota  is  exhausted,  the  Commission  may  take 
such  a  decision  in  the  case  of  duty-free  ceilings.  (GSP  preferences  are 
available  to  all  least  developed  countries  and  to  countries  that  have 
signed  bilateral  arrangements  under  the  MFA  or  assumed  equivalent 
obligations vis-a-vis  the  EC.) 
454.  Import  quotas  under  the  MFA  have  in  general  been  negotiated  for  the 
EC  as  a  whole.  Their  division  among  the  member  States  was  subsequently 
arranged  under  a  specific  allocation  mechanism  whose  restrictiveness  has 
been  rett~ed  over  time  following  a  ruling  by  the  European  Court  of 
Justice.  The  share  of  regional  quotas  or  ceilings  which  can  be 
transferred ,automatically  to  other  member  States  was  increased  from  16  to 
40  per cent  {n 1992,  with additional  transfers available  on  the approval of 
the  Commission.  In  parallel,  the  application  of  Article 115  to  tef~~les 
and  clothing  declined  from  48  authorizations  in  1990  to  32  in  1991.  No 
further  Article  115  restrictions  on  textiles  and  clothing  were  authorized 
in 1992. 
455.  As  of  1  January  1993,  each  member  State  is  entitled  to  issue  import 
authorizations  valid  for  the  entire  EC  market,  and  all  regional  quotas  or 
ceilings  have  been  eliminated.  Community  surveillance  will  be  ensured 
through  a  computer  link between  the  Commission  and  the  competent  national 
bodies.  While,  in the  event of regional  disturbances,  the  EC  might  seek  to 
negotiate  certain  supply  patterns  with  third  countries,  it can  no  lonf~s 
operate internal border controls  to  ensure  compliance  (Section II.3(i)). 
456.  In  recent  reports  on  the  textiles  and  clothing  sectors,  the 
Commission  has  voiced  serious  concern  about  continued  disparities  between 
the  member  States,  in  terms  of  productivity,  creativity,  and  growth  and 
trade  performance  in  the  industry.  Overall,  the  volume  of  EC  textile 
production shrank by close  to  5  per cent between  1989  and  1991;  and output 
in  the  clothing  sector  declined  by  2. 2  per cent.  Employment  tended  to 
143GATT  (1991a),  p.  194. 
144The  restrictions  were  used  by  France  (22  cases  in  1990  as  against  3  in  1991),  Spain 
(11/17),  Italy  (10/10),  Ireland  (5/1)  and  the  United  Kingdom  (0/1). 
145The  text  i 1 e  agreement  envisaged  under  the  Draft  Fi na 1  Act  of  the  Uruguay  Round 
provides  for  "transitional  safeguards"  which,  in  the  case  of  a  customs  union,  could  be 
invoked  either  for  the  whole  of  the  terri tory  or  on  beha 1f  of  a  member  State  (Article 6, 
p.  0.11).  In  the  latter event,  all  requirements  for  the  determination  of  serious  damage,  or 
actual  threat  thereof,  are to  be  based  on  the conditions existing  in  that  member  State. 
Recent  amendments  to  the  Community's  MFA  bilateral  agreements  stipulate  that  the 
quantitative  limits  under  the  agreements  will  not  be  broken  into  regional  shares.  The 
signatories  undertake  to  cooperate  in  order  to  prevent  sudden  and  prejudicial  changes  in 
traditional  trade  flows  resulting  in  regional  concentration  of  direct  imports.  In  the  event 
of  such  changes,  the  Community  is  entitled  to  request  consultations  in  order  to  find  a 
satisfactory solution. C/RM/S/36A 
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decrease  even  f~:-ter,  reflecting  rationalization  efforts  in  the  industry 
and  the  disappearance  of  low-productivity  companies  and workplaces.  While 
noting  that  companies  themselves  must  take  the  "prime  initiative  and 
responsibility"  in  the  adjustment  process,  the  Commission  gave  the  view 
that  soluti9_~t  would  involve  government  intervention  and  heavy  public 
expenditure. 
457 ..  A  new  joint Community/member  States aid programme  (RETEX)  is intended 
to  promote  sectoral  and  regional  adjustment  in  disadvantaged  "textile 
regions"  (e.g.  in Greece,  Portugal  and Spain).  The  programme,  endowed with 
EC  funds  of  ECU  500  million  for  the  period  1993  to  1997,  provides  support 
for  know-how ,,transfer,  commercial  information,  training,  audit,  and  anti-
pollution measures.  It is not  targeted at  specific  industrial  activities. 
An  additional  national  aid  scheme  for  "problem  regions"  in  Spain  was 
approved  in  July  1992.  According  to  the  Commission,  no  sector-specific 
initiatives are  currently in force  or under  consideration. 
458.  Since  1977,  the  synthetic  fibres  sector  has  been  subject  to  a 
specific aid control  system,  banning all  types  of subsidies which result in 
capacity  expansion.  Following  several  prolongations,  the  system  was 
strengthened and  extended  in late  1992  for  an additional  two  years. 
(viii)  Leather  and  footwear 
459.  The  EC  leather  and  footwear  industry  displays  considerable  regional 
concentration,  with  Italy  accounting  for  close  to  38  per cent  of  total  EC 
shoe  production  in  1991,  followed  by  Spain  (19  per cent)  and  Fran~e 
(16  per cent).  Like  textiles  and  clothing,  the  industry  has  long  been 
under  strong  import  pressure.  Imports  into  the  EC  as  a  whole  grew  by 
25  per  cent  in  1991  and  EC  producers  suffered  a  drop  in market  share  from 
63  to  54  per cent  (in· quantity  terms).  Employment  declined  in all  member 
States  except  Portugal  from  1989  to  1991,  with  variations  between  some 
8  per  ce~~ 7 
in  France  and  Italy  to  over  24  per  cent  in  the  United 
Kingdom. 
460.  The  common  external  tariff  on  footwear  varies  between  4.6  and 
20  per cent,  with  a  simple m.f.n.  average  of 11.7 per  cent.  Beach slippers 
from  China  enter  under  anti-dumping  duties.  Imports  from  the  Republic  of 
146Ec  Commission  (1991b). 
147overall,  Italian  producers  appear  to  have  fared  best  over  longer  periods  in  the 
past:  a  decline  in  Italian  production  of  some  11  per  cent,  in  volume  terms,  between  1980  and 
1991  compares  with  a  reduction  of  17  per  cent  in  France,  19~ per  cent  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  39  per  cent  in  Germany.  However,  since  1985  production  has  shrunk  more  rapidly  in  Italy 
(23  per  cent)  than  in  most  other  regions.  Portugal  was  the  only  country  to  expand  production 
(by  more  than  half  between  1986  and  1991). 
• C/RM/S/36A 
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Korea  and  Taiwan  were,  until  end-1992,  subject  to  an  EC-wide  restraint 
arrangemen£48  complemented  by  prior  import  surveillance  introduced  in 
July 1990.  All  other  footwear  imports  into  the  EC  were  under 
retrospective  surveillance.  Member  States  with  significant  own  shoe 
production operated a  variety of additional measures,  such  as  restrictions 
against  imports  from  former  State  trading  countries;  bilateral  quotas 
(Ireland  on  rubber  footwear);  and  export  restraints  both  at  government 
level  (Chinese  exports  of  slippers  and  sandals  to  France)  and  by  industry 
associations  (exports  from  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Federal  Republic  and 
Romania  to  the United Kingdom,  Korean  shipments  to  Ireland). 
461.  Trade  initiatives  in  the  sector  since  1990  have  focused  on 
harmonizing ,. and  liberalizing  the  import  regime  for  east  and  central 
European  suppliers.  Quotas  on  imports  from  the  Soviet  Union  were  removed 
in  August  1991,  and  this  treatment  has  been  extended  to  the  successor 
States.  As  from  1  January 1992,  all  specific  (selective)  restrictions  on 
shoe  exports  from  Albania  and  the  Baltic Republics  were  lifted and specific 
restrictions  suspended.  (Imports  from  Bulgaria,  the  Czech  and  Slovak 
Federal  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland  and  Romania  were  liberalized in 1990  and 
1991.)  Shipments  from  remaining  State  trading  countries  China,  the 
Democratic  People's  Republic  of  Korea,  Mongolia  and  Vietnam  - continue  to 
be  subject  to  a  variety  of national  restrictions.  Between  1990  and  1991, 
China,  the  Communities'  most  important  supplier,  nevertheless  managed  to 
increase its market  share  from  11  to  15  per cent overall. 
462.  On  23  March  1992,  France  informed  the  Commission  of  its decision  to 
impose  quotas  on  shoe  imports  from  China  for  one  year.  Reportedly,  the 
Commission  has  warned  the  French  authorities  that  the  move  - a  safeguard 
action  under  Council  Regulation  No.  342£4~3  - was  liable  to  affect  the 
proper  functioning  of  the  common  market.  In  August  1992,  the  EC  made 
slippers  and  other  indoor  footwear  from  China  subject  to  prior  Community 
surveillance  (Commission  Regulation  No.  2327/92).  During  the  second  half 
of  1992,  the  EC  embarked  on  a  general  re-evaluation  of  all  expiring 
surveillance measures  in conjunction with  a  review of national restrictions 
which  would  be  incompatible  with  the  Internal  Market.  In  this  context, 
given  the  strong  import  pressure  from  China  which  was  considered  a  matter 
of urgency,  the  Commission  proposed  imposing  quantitative  restrictions  on 
selected Chinese  shoe  products.  At  the  time  of  completion of  this report, 
the  final decision was  not available. 
148The  EC-wide  arrangement  replaced  an  arrangement,  negotiated  by  the  EC  in  1988,  which 
was  limited to  the  French  and  Italian market. 
149According  to  Les  Echos  (15  June  1992).  The  restrictions  announced  by  France 
concerned  leather  shoes  (3.146  million  pairs),  sports  shoes  (23.310  million),  and  slippers 
(24.730  million). CfRM/S/36A 
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VI.  TRADE  DISPUTES  AND  CONSULTATIONS 
(1)  Dispute  Settlement under  the General Agreement 
463.  From  1980  to  1992,  the  EC  was  the  target  of  30  complaints  Bfd  the 
initiator  of  25  complaints  raised  under  Article XXIII  of  GATT.  The 
United States  launched 11  of the  complaints brought against the  Communities 
and was  the object of 14  of the  EC  initiatives during that period.  Between 
January  1991  and  December  1992,  six  of  the  nine  Article XXIII  cases 
involving  the  EC  were  either  raised  by  or  directed  against  the  United 
States.  As  in previous  years,  a  majority  of  the  disputes  revolved  around 
agricultural or  food products. 
(i)  Disputes  concerning  EC  policies 
(a)  Requests  for  Panels under Article XXIII:2 
464.  Over  the  past  two  years,  until  December  1992,  four  complaints  were 
made  under  Ar~icle XXIII:2  with  a  view  to referring  EC  policies  to  a  panel 
(Table VI.l).  In  three  of  these  cases,  panel  proceedings  were  not 
initiated.  In  the  fourth  case,  a  previously  established  panel  met  ·to 
reconsider  the  application of its recommendations. 
EC  payments  and subsidies  to processors  and producers  of oilseeds 
and related animal-feed proteins 
465.  Upholding  the  U.S.  complaint,  the  reconvened  panel  recommended  that 
the  Community  act  expeditiously  to  eliminate  the  continued  impairment  of 
tariff  concessions,  either  by  modifying  its  new  fupport  scheme  or  by 
renegotiating  its  concessions  under  Article XXVIII.  In  the  event  of  no 
action being  taken  expeditiously,  the  panel  concluded  that  the  CONTRACTING 
1complaints  under  Article  XXIII:l  subsequently  submitted  to  a  panel  under 
Article  XXIII:2  are  only  counted  once.  In  certain  cases,  the  same  subject  matter  has 
prompted  two  or  more  contracting  parties  to  raise  each  a  complaint  (e.g.  EC  import 
restrictions  on  apples  were  challenged  separately  by  New  Zealand,  Chile  and  the  United  States 
in  1988).  In  one  case,  Article XXIII:l  consultations  invo1ved  recourse  to  arbitration 
(exports  of  Canadian  grains;  see  GATT,  1991). 
2Article XXIII  of  the  General  Agreement  provides  procedures  for  bilateral  consultations 
(para.  1)  and  for  dispute  settlement  through  panels,  working  parties  etc.  {para.  2)  whenever 
a  contracting  party  considers  that  benefits  accruing  to  it  under  the  Agreement  are  being 
nullified  or  impaired  as  a  result  of  (a)  the  failure  of  another  contracting  party  to  carry 
out  its  GATT  obligations,  (b)  the  application  by  another  party of  any  measure,  whether  or  not 
in  conflict with  the  Agreement,  or  (c)  the  existence  of  any  other  situation. 
3The  original  panel,  whose  report  was  adopted  in  January  1990,  found  that  the 
Community's  support  scheme  for  oilseeds  (Section  V.2(iv))  impaired  the  benefits  which  would 
be  expected  to  accrue  to  the  United  States  from  zero  tariff bindings  and  recommended  that  the 
measures  be  brought  into conformity  with  the  General  Agreement  (see  GATT,  1991).  At  the  GATT 
Footnote  Continued 
• 
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PARTIES,  if  so  requested  by  the  United  States,  should  consider  further 
action  under  Article XXIII:2.  In  June  1992,  the  GATT  Council  authorized 
the  EC  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  its  principal  suppliers  under 
Article XXVIII:4.  As  no  agreement  was  reached on  the  amount  of the  damages 
caused  by  the  EC  support  regime,  the  United  States  subsequently  requested 
the  establishment  of an arbitral body,  while  the  EC  proposed  referring the 
issue  to  the  CONTRACTING  PARTIES,  possibly assisted by  a  small  independent 
group  (September 1992).  Neither action was  agreed.  At  the  Council meeting 
of  4  and  5  November  1992,  the  United  States  requested  authorization  to 
suspend  concessions.  However,  no  consensus  emerged  and  the  United  States 
subsequently  announced  the  unilateral  suspension of  concessions,  should  no 
solution be  found by  5  December  1992. 
466.  On  3  December  1992,  the  delegation  of  the  European  Communities 
informed  the  CONTRACTING  PARTIES  that  both  parties  had  agreed  on  a 
compromise  which  enabled  the  EC  to4 put  an  end  to  the  Article  XXVIII: 4 
negotiations  with  the  United States.  In the  light of  these  developments, 
the  EC  intended  to  pursue  the  consultations  and  negotiations  under 
Article XXVIII  with other contracting parties;  they 'should be  concluded as 
far as possible before mid-December. 
Restrictions  on  imports  of pork and beef under Third-Country Meat 
Directive 
467.  In July  1991,  the  United  States  informed  the  GATT  Council  that,  due 
to  the  operation  of  the  Communities'  Third  Country  Meat  Directive,  its 
exports  to  the  EC  of  beef,  pork  and  lamb  had  come  to  a  halt 
(Section V.2(ii)).  While  the United States called for  the  establishment of 
a  new  Panel  to  look  into  the  issue,  the  EC  gave  the  view  that  ongoing 
bilateral5 consultations  were  likely  to  produce  a  mutually  satisfactory 
solution.  The  issue  has  not  been  raised  again  in  subsequent  Council 
meetings. 
Footnote  Continued 
Council  meeting  in  January  1990,  the  EC  stated  that  it  would  engage  in  the  process  for 
complying  with  the  panel  recommendations  in  the  context  of  implementation  of  the  results  of 
the  Uruguay  Round.  A new  EC  support  scheme  for  the  oilseeds  sector,  introduced  in  mid-1991, 
substituted  direct  payments  to  farmers,  on  a  per  hectare  basis,  for  the  subsidies  previously 
granted  via  the  processors  (Section  V.2(iv)). 
4GATT  document  SR.48/2,  5  January  1992. 
5A Panel  had  already  been  established  in  December  1987  to  examine  the  United  States' 
concern  about  the  Directive.  It  never  met  because  a  bilateral  agreement  between  the  parties 
had  allowed  for  the  continuation  of  trade. CfRM/S/36A 
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Trade  measures  taken for non-economic  reasons 
468.  In  March  1992,  the  GATT  Council  established  a  Panel  to  examine  the 
effects  of  economic  sanctions  by  the  Communities  against  Yugoslavia. 
However,  in  June  1992,  the  Council  agreed  that  the  representative  of  the 
Federal  Republ~  of  Yugoslavia  should  refrain  from  participating  in  the 
Council's work. 
Negotiating rights of Argentina in connection with  the 
renegotiation of the·Ec concessions  on oilseeds 
469.  Subsequent  to  Argentina's  request  for  a  Panel  (September  1992),  the 
EC  agreed to  accept Argentina's status  as  a  principal supplier. 
(b)  Consultations 
470.  In  September  1991,  the  United  States  called  for  consultations  under 
Article XXIII:l with  regard to  trade restrictions considered to result from 
the  Communities'  unilateral  redefinition  of  corn  gluten  feed.  In  June 
1992,  five  Latin  American  countries  (Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Guatemala, 
Nicaragua,  Venezuela)  requested consultations under Article XXII  concerning 
policies  of  certain  EC  member  States  on  banana  imparts  and  the  proposed 
unified  EC  banana  regime  (see  Section V.2(vii)).  Noting  that  the 
consultations  had  not  led  to  a  mutually  acceptable  solution,  the  five 
countries  requested  the  GATT  Director  General,  in  September  1992,  to  offer 
his  good  offices  with  a  view  to  solving  the  dispute  over  the  measures 
maintained by  s8me  member  States.  However,  no  solution was  reached in this 
context either. 
6The  decision  was  taken  with  a  view  to  allowing  the  Council  to  consider  what  entity 
should  succeed  the  former  Socialist  Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia  in  the  GATT  (GATT 
document  C/H/257,  10  July  1992). 
7GATT  Article  XXII  enables  a  contracting  party  to  request  consultations  with  other 
contracting  parties  with  respect  to  any  matter  affecting  the  operation  of  the  General 
Agreement,  whether  or  not  it is  in  conformity  with  the  Agreement. 
8The  request  for  good  offices  was  made  pursuant  to  the  1966  Decision  on  the  procedures 
under  Article XXIII  (BISD,  14th  Supplement,  p.  18  ff).  The  Decision  provides  that,  ;t 
consultations  between  a  less-developed  and  a  developed  contracting  party  fail,  the  former 
party  may  refer  the  matter  to  the  Director  General  who,  acting  ex  officio,  may  use  his  good 
offices  with  a  view  to  facilitating  a  solution.  See  also  GATT  document  0532/6, 
16  February  1993,  with  the  Director  General's  report  on  the  outcome  of  the  procedure. 
Pursuant  to  paragraph  5  of  the  1966  Decision,  which  requires  the  GATT  Counci 1  to 
proceed  to  establish  a  Panel  upon  receipt  of  the  report,  a  Panel  was  set  up,  in  principle,  in 
February  1993  (GATT  document  C/H/261,  12  March  1993). 
In  early  1993,  the  five  Latin  American  countries  also  requested  consultations  with  the 
EC  under  Article  XXII:1  concerning  the  decision  of  the  EC  Council  on  a  common  market 
organization  for  bananas  (GATT  document  0538/1,  8  February  1993)  and,  subsequently,  the 
Council  Regulation  establishing  the  market  organization  (0538/5,  12  March  1993). (c)  Further  issues 
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471.  In  some  cases,  Council  members  have  voiced  concern  about  EC  policies 
without  invoking GATT  dispute settlement provisions.  In March  1991,  Brazil 
raised  the  question  of  the  modification  of  the  Communities'  tariff 
concessions  on  baler  twine  and  other  sisal  processed  products;  it 
considered  that  the  changes  did  not  conform  to  the  procedures  established 
under  GATT  Articles II  and  XXVIII.  At  the  July  1991  meeting,  the 
Philippines  requested  consultations  in  view  of  adverse  trade  effects  it 
considered  to  result  from  an  EC  Directive  (No.  90/612)  which  had  changed 
the  purity  criterion  for  carrageenan.  In  September  1992,  in  a 
Communication·  to  the  Council,  Australia  complained  about  the  adverse 
consequences  for  the  multilateral  trading  system  of  the  wheat  export 
subsidies  granted  by  the  United  States  and  the  EC;  Australia's  view, 
. reiterated at the  meeting  of  ~e CONTRACTING  PARTIES  in December  1992,  was 
shared by several delegations. 
472.  A  Panel  report  examining  the  EC  anti-dumping  policy  with  re&fod  to 
parts  and  components  was  adopted  by  the  GATT  Council  in  May  1990.  In 
this context,  the Community  made  changes  to its legislation contingent on a 
satisfactory  result  of  the  Uruguay  Round  which  would  allow  it  to  combat 
circumvention  (see  Section IV. a(v) (a)  and  GATT,  1991).  The  EC  confirmed 
its position at the  November  1991  Counci\fession,  in  response  to  a  demand 
by Japan to  implement  the  report quickly. 
(ii)  Initiatives by  the  EC 
(a)  Request  for  Panel under Article XXIII:2 
473.  During  the  period  January 1991  to  December  1992,  the  EC  and  the 
Netherlands  on  behalf  of .the  Netherlands  Antilles  pursued  one  case  under 
Article  XXIII  which  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  a  Panel.  It 
concerned: 
9 
GATT  documents  L/7076,  16  September  1992,  C/M/259,  27  October  1992,  SR.48/2, 
5  January  1993. 
10 
GATT  document  L/6657,  22  March  1990. 
11 
GATT  document  C/M/253,  28  November  1991. C/RM/S/36A 
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U.S.  restrictions  on  imports  of tuna 
474.  The  subject  matter  of  the  case,  import  restrictions  under  the  U.S. 
Marine  '~al Protection Act,  was  examined by a  previous  Panel  requested by 
Mexico.  The  panel  report  has  since  been  discussed  at  several  GATT 
Council  sessions,  but  has  not  been  adopted  as  the  United  States  has  not 
agreed.  In  view  of  this,  the  complainants  pointed  to  continued 
nullification  or  impairment  of  trade  resulting  from  a  secondary  import 
embargo  operated  by  the  United  States  on  "intermediary  countries"  such  as 
France,  Italy,  Spain,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Netherlands  Antilles. 
After  con~~ltations  had  failed,  the  GATT  Council  set  up  a  panel  in 
July 1992.  · 
(b)  Consultations 
475.  Recent  EC  requests  for  consultations under Article XXIII:l relate to 
U.S.  harbour  maintenance  fees  (February  1992),  certain  U.S.  taxes  on 
automobiles  (May  1992)  and  a  countervailing  duty  action by Argentina  on  EC 
dairy  products  (December  1992).  The  EC  considered  the harbour  maintenance 
fees,  based  on  the  value  and  not  volume  or weight  of  goods,  to  be  similar 
to  the  U.S.  Customs  user  fee  ~ch  a  previous  Panel  had  found  inconsistent 
with Article VIII  of the  GATT.  As  to  the  automobile  taxes,  the  Community 
complaine~ 5
about discriminations  considered  to  contravene Article III:2  of 
the  GATT.  The  investigation prompting Argentina's recent  introduction of 
countervailing  duties  on  EC  dairy  products  is  considered  by  the  Community 
not  to  have  been  carried  out  in  conformity  with  GATT  Article  VI;  for 
example,  the  relevant  Argentinian  Resolution  had  given  no  evide.pce  of 
material  injury being caused or threatened to  the  domestic  industry. 
(2)  Issues  Raised under Tokyo  Round  Agreements 
476.  From  January 1991  to December  1992,  the  EC  was  involved in nine cases 
(panels  and  requests  for  conciliation  or  consultation)  brought  under  the 
Tokyo  Round  Agreements.  Of  these,  five  concerned the Subsidies  Code,  three 
the  Anti-Dumping  Code  and  one  the  Code  on  Government  Procurement 
(Table VI.2). 
12GATT  document  DS21/R,  3  September  1991.  See  also  GATT  (1992a),  p.  235. 
13GATT  document  C/M/258,  4  August  1992. 
14GATT  (1991). 
15In  March  1993,  the  EC  requested  the  establishment  of  a  Panel  (OS31/2,  12  March  1993). 
16GATT  document  DS35/l,  7  December  1992. (i)  Subsidies  Code 
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477.  A  complaint  by  the  United  States  about  the  German  exchange  rate 
guarantee  scheme  for  Deutsche Airbus  resulted in a  lengthy debate,  in 1991, 
about  the  appropriate  forum.  While  the  EC  wished  to  have  the  dispute 
considered  under  the  Civil Aircraft  Agreement,  the  United  States  chose  to 
submit  this  complaint  under  the  dispute  settlement  prov1s1ons  of  the 
Subsidies  Code;  the  i'sue of  "forum  shopping"  was  also  raised in the  GATT 
Council  (April  1991).  A  Panel,  finally  established  under  the  Subsidies 
Code,  submitted  its  report  in April  1992.  However,  the  EC  disagreed  with 
the panel's  reasoning,  in particular its view  on  the  applicability of  Code 
provisions  to,trade  bel~een the  member  States,  and  did  not  concur  in  the 
adoption of  the  report.  The  German  Government nevertheless  suspended its 
guarantee  scheme  retroactively  from  15  January 1992  and,  in  mid-July, 
announced  its abolition.  Deutsche  Airbus  has  since  been  fully  privatized 
(Section IV.3(ii)(b)). 
478. 
1991, 
A  second,  broader  complaint  by  the  United  States,  also  raised  in 
related  to  subsidies  for  the  production  of ·new  models  of  Airbus 
aircraft.  Consultations  under  the  Code,  carried  out  over  several  months, 
finally resulted,  in April  1992,  in a  bilateral agreement  specifying limits 
on public support  for  large civil aircraft  (Section V.3(ii)(c)). 
479.  In  November  1992,  the  EC  requested  the  establishment  of  a  panel  to 
examine  the  imposition  by  Australia  of  countervailing  duties  on  glace 
cherries  from  France  and  Italy.  The  finding  of  injury  which  gave  rise  to 
the  duties,  under  the  Australian  Customs  Amendment  Act  1991,  is  considered 
by  the  EC  to be  based  on  a  definition of  like products  not  consistent with 
the  Code.  Australia's  Customs  Amendment  Act  had  already been the object of 
conciliation,  at the  request of the  EC,  in July 1992. 
480.  In July  and  October  1992,  the  EC  requested  conciliation with  regard 
to  a  countervailing duty proceeding by Brazil  on milk powder.  According to 
the  EC,  Brazil had failed to notify it of the  opening of the  proceeding,  to 
17From  the  Communities'  point  of  view,  the  Subsidies  Code  provided  an  inadequate  and 
incomplete  legal  basis.  According  to  the  EC,  the  scheme  in  question  was  not  a  subsidy  since 
it  entailed  no  cost  for  the  government;  any  intervention  in  the  event  of  exchange  rate 
losses  not  being  offset  by  the  industry  would  be  temporary  and  partial.  In  contrast,  the 
United  States  considered  the  Subsidies  Code  the  appropriate  forum  to  de  a 1  with  the  mass he 
level  of  export  subsidies  at  issue;  there  was  no  sectoral  exemption  from  the  Code,  and  it 
was  not  for  the  defending  party  to  choose  a  forum  considered  more  convenient  (GATT  documents 
SCM/M/45,  11  April  1990  and  C/M/249,  22  May  1991). 
18The  panel  considered  the  inputs  delivered  by  Deutsche  Airbus  (Germany)  to  Airbus 
lndustrie  (France)  as  exports  and  concluded  that  the  guarantee  scheme  constituted  an  export 
subsidy,  covered  by  the  illustrative  list  of  prohibited  subsidies  annexed  to  the  Subsidhs 
Code.  The  report  recommended  that  the  scheme  be  brought  into  conformity  with  the  relevant 
provisions  (Article  9)  of  the  Code. C/RM/S/36A 
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carry  out  an  investigation prior  to  the  imposition  of  provisional  duties, 
and  to  provide  ev\~nce that  the  Code  requirements  for  taking  provisional 
measures  were  met. 
481.  Four  Panel  reports  un~  the  Code  involving  the  EC  have  been awaiting 
adoption  for  several  years.  No  headway  has  been  made  since  the  initial 
TPRM  report. 
(ii)  Anti-Dumping  Code 
482.  Since  January  1991,  EC  measures  have  drawn  two  requests  for 
consultations  and  one  request  for  a  Panel  under  the  Anti-Dumping  Code. 
Japan  has  challenged  various  aspects  underlying  an  action  against  audio 
tapes  and  cassettes,  on  which  definitive  duties  were  applied  by  the  EC  in 
May  1991.  Issues  at  stake  are  the  Community's  practice  of  calculating 
dumping  margins  and  the  approaches  used  to  determine  the  causation  of 
injury  and  to  define  the  relevant  market  segment.  A  panel  was  set  up  in 
October  1992. 
483.  Consultations  were  requested  by  Brazil,  in  September  1991,  with 
regard  to  the  Community's  initiation of  an  anti-dumping  proceeding  against 
cotton  yarn  and  by  Japan,  in  April  1992,  conce2ying  the  treatment  of 
anti-dumping duties  as  a  cost  in refund procedures. 
(iii)  Government  Procurement  Code 
484.  In  mid-1991,  the  EC  called  for  consultations,  and  subsequently  for 
the  establishment  of  a  Panel,  concerning  the  procurement  of  a  multibeam 
sonar  mapping  system  by  the  U.S.  National  Science  Foundation.  The  panel 
report  was  considered  by  the  Committee  in  May  and  October  1992;  it  is 
still pending as  the United States has  not  concurred in its adoption. 
19The  EC  has  meanwhlle  made  a  request  for  a  Panel  under  Article  17:2  of  the  Code 
{SCM/155,  5  January  1993). 
20Two  panels  examining  EC  export  subsidies  (on  wheat  flour  and  on  pasta  products)  had 
been  initiated  by  the  United  States;  the  reports  were  completed  in  1983.  The  Community  had 
raised  two  complaints  concerning  the  definition  of  affected  industries  used  by  the 
United  States  {panel  report  of  March  1986)  and  Canada  (October  1987).  See  GATT  (1991). 
21Article  16  of  Council  Regulation  No.  2423/88  entitles  an  importer  to  duty  refunds 
when  he  can  show  that  the  duty  collected  exceeded  the  actual  dumping  margin.  Japan  disputed 
the  practice,  in  this  context,  to  deduct  the  anti-dumping  duties  paid  as  a  cost  when 
constructed  export  prices  were  taken  (this  is  the  case  whenever  no  actual  prices  are 
available  or  when  those  available  are  deemed  unreliable,  for  example,  because  exporter  and 
importer  are  related).  See  GATT  document  ADP/78,  21  April  1992. 
• I 
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(3)  Dispute  Settlement in the  Context of Preferential Trade Agreements 
485.  While  dispute  settlement  provisions  form  an  integral  part  of  the 
Communities'  various  trade  and  cooperation  agreements,  the  EC  and  its 
preferential  trading  partners  have,  in  general,  preferred  political, 
negotiated  solutions  in  the  event  of  frictions.  Recourse  to  the  formal 
consultation,  dispute  settlement  and  safeguard  mechanisms  under  the 
agreements,  let  alone  to  the  GATT,  has  been  relatively  rare.  The  EC  has 
raised  only  two  cases  under  Article XXIII  of  GATT  involving  preferenti'~ 
trading partners,  and  it has  never  been  the  target  of  such  initiatives. 
(Yugoslavia  invoked  Article XXIII  in  March  1992  only  after  the  EC  had 
suspended  the  Association  Agreement  and  imposed  an  embargo.)  This 
contrasts  with  the  approach  taken  by  the  United  States  and  Canada  which, 
despite  their  Free  Trade  Ag23ement,  have  continued  to  resort  to  GATT 
dispute  settlement mechanisms. 
486.  The  Preamble  to  the  Europe  Agreements  between  the  EC  and  the  Czech 
and  Slovak  Federal  Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland  expressly  confirms  the 
commitment  of  the  parties  "to  free  trade  and,  in particular,  to  compliance 
with  the  rights  and  obligations  arising  out  of  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade".  In  the  area  of  dumping  and  subsidization,  the 
Agreements  specify that remedial  actions must  comply with the  relevant GATT 
rules;  this  seems  to  imply  that  disputes  in  this  area  can  be  brought  to 
the  GATT.  In contrast,  no  such provision exists  for  safeguards  cases.  The 
safeguard  measures  recently  taken  on  steel  imports  from  the  CSFR  suggest 
that,  in  the  Community's  view,  the  Agreements  not  only  allow  for  the 
suspension of trade preferences but also of obligations under  the  GATT. 
487.  Disputes  over  the  interpretation  and  application  of  the  Europe 
Agreements  may  be  referred  to  the  Joint  Committees  established  under  the 
Agreements  which  "may  settle  the  dispute  by  means  of  a  decision".  If no 
solution  has  been  reached  in  the  Committees,  either  party  may  invoke  an 
arbitration procedure.  In this event,  three arbitrators  - one  appointed by 
22 In  1982,  a  Panel  under  Article XXIII:2  was  established  at  the  request  of  the  EC  to 
examine  measures  alleged  to  affect  imports  of  parts  of  footwear  into  Finland.  Also  in  1982, 
the  EC  requested Article XXIII:1  consultations  with  Switzerland  concerning  a  safeguard  action 
on  table  grapes.  Both  issues  have  not  been  pursued  further. 
In  1989,  Austria  requested  consultations  under  Article XXII  concerning  restrictions 
which  Germany  had  imposed  on  the  circulation  of  Austrian  lorries.  Apparently,  a  solution 
could  be  found  in  this  context.  (Unlike  the  GATT,  the  EC/Austria  free  trade  agreement  does 
not  contain  provisions  concerning  freedom  of transit.) 
23The  general  dispute  settlement  provisions  under  Chapter  18  of  the  Canada-US  Free 
Trade  agreement  a  11 ow  the  camp 1  a in i ng  party  to  choose  the  forum  whenever  a  dispute  arises 
under  both  the  FTA  and  the  GATT  and  related  agreements.  Once  the  decision  has  been  taken, 
the  procedure  initiated  is  to  be  pursued  to  the  exclusion  of  possible alternatives.  Disputes 
revolv~ng around  anti-dumping  or  countervailing measures  are  to  be  referred  to  an  independent 
binational  panel  under  Chapter  19  of  the  FTA.  For  more  details  see  GATT  (1992a  and  1992b). C/RM/S/36A 
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each party and  one by  the Joint Committee  - are  to decide by majority vote. 
The  decision must be  implemented. 
488.  The  Preamble  to  the  current  EC/EFTA  Free  Trade  Agreements  specifies 
that  no  provision  of  the  Agreements  "may  be  interpreted  as  exempting  the 
contracting  parties  from  the  obligations  under  other  international 
agreements".  The  prospective  successor  Agreement  on  the  European  Economic 
Area  does not contain a  similar clause.  This  may  be  viewed as  a  reflection 
of the specific legal and institutional structure of the  EEA,  in particular 
the  extension,  in  th~ areas  covered,  of  "the  acquis  communautaire"  to  the 
EFTA  countries  (Section II.S(ii)). 
489.  The  EEA  Agreement  provides  for  dispute  settlement  within  its  own 
institutional  framework  and,  by  agreement,  within  the  EC  judicial  system. 
The  signatories  may  refer  a  case  to  the  European  Court  of  Justice  if  no 
solution  has  been  found  in  the  EEA  Joint  Committee.  This  possibility 
exists  in all areas  where  the Agreement  is identical in  s~ctance to  EEC  or 
ECSC  Treaty  provisions  and  to  secondary  EC  legislation.  If  the  Joint 
Committee  has  failed  to  settle  a  dispute  within  six  months  or  if,  within 
this period,  the parties  have  not  decided to  involve  the  ECJ,  the  affected 
party  may  take  ~feguard measures  in  order  to  remedy  possible  imbalances 
within  the  EEA.  Alternatively,  as  noted  in  Section II.S(ii},  the  Joint 
Committee  may  examine  further  possibilities,  including  a  decision  on  the 
equivalence of legislation or,  after an additional  time  limit,  the  relevant 
parts of the Agreement  may  be  regarded as  suspended. 
490.  Disputes  over  the  scope  or duration of safeguard measures  or over  the 
.proportionality  of  rebalancing  measures  can  be  referr~i  to  binding 
arbitration if the Joint Committee  has  not  found  a  solution. 
24The  Agreement,  as  originally  negotiated,  foresaw  the  creation  of  a  common  judicial 
body,  composed  of  representatives  of  EC  and  EFTA  countries.  However,  in  a  Declaratory 
Opinion,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  gave  the  view  that  the  existence  of  such  a  parallel 
body  would  undermine  its  authority  in  carrying  out  its  mandate.  The  relevant  provisions  of 
the  Agreement  were  subsequently  renegotiated. 
While  the  Agreement  provides  for  the  creation  of  an  EFTA  Court,  it  limits  the 
competence  of  the  Court,  in  particular  to  (i}  EFTA  surveillance  actions;  (ii}  appeals 
against  decisions  initiated  by  the  EFTA  Surveillance  Authority  in  the  area  of  competition; 
and  (iii)  dispute  settlement  among  the  EFTA  States. 
25A  similar  safeguard  provision  in  the  EC/EFTA  free  trade  agreements  has  never  been 
used.  A recent  dispute  over  minivans  from  Austria  was  finally  solved  without  the  EC  taking 
measures.  The  action  would  have  been  based  on  Article  27:3  of  the  Agreement,  which  allows  a 
contracting  party,  subject  to  certain  procedural  requirements,  to  take  any  safeguard  measure 
considered  necessary  to  dea 1  with  "serious  di ffi cult i es"  resulting  from  a  practice  by  the 
other  party.  Particular  reference  is  made  in  this  context  to  the  withdrawal  of  tariff 
concessions.  (Section  V:3(ii)(a}). 
26 1n  this  case,  each  party  is  entitled  to  appoint  one  arbitrator.  The  two  arbitrators 
are  then  to  nominate  an  umpire  by  consensus.  In  the  event  of  disagreement,  the  umpire  is  to 
be  chosen  from  a  list of  seven  persons  established  by  the  EEA  Joint  Committee. (4)  Other Approaches 
(i)  Unilateral actions against the  EC 
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491.  In  response  to  the  Community's  implementation  of  its Animal  Hormone 
Directive,  the United States has  maintained,  since  ~ly  1989,  retaliatory 
measures  under  Section 301  of the Trade Act  of 1974.  The  measures,  which 
are  intended·to  match  the  trade  losses  experienced  by  U.S.  meat  exporters 
as  a  result of  the  Hormone  Directive,  were  imposed  after  the  parties h!i 
failed  to  agree  on  the  appropriate  GATT  forum  for  dispute  settlement. 
The  EC  Council  has  approved,  but  not  yet  implemented,  a  list  of 
countermeasures. 
492.  In  addition,  the  United  States  has  threatened  to  take  sanctions  in 
response  to  the  reciprocity  provisions  contained  in  an  EC  procurement 
directive  (Section V.3(iii)(d))  and,  more  recently,  in  the  context  of  the 
oilseeds dispute  (see  above). 
(ii)  EC  actions under  the  "New  Commercial  Pol1cy  Instrument" 
493.  Observers  have  suggested  that  the  creation  of  the  "New  Commercial 
Policy  Instrument"  of  1984  (Council  Regulation  No.  2641/84)  was  motivated 
by unilateral U.S.  actions  a~~inst the  EC  and  the perceived need  to have  a 
mechanism  for  counteraction.  However,  before  taking  measures  under  the 
NCPI,  the  Community  is  obliged  to  await  the  termination  of  any  relevant 
consultation  and  dispute  settlement  procedures  under  international 
obligations  (including  the  GATT)  and  to  take  the  results  into  account. 
Disagreement  over  the  setting  up  of  a  GATT  panel  or  the  adoption  of  panel 
reports  wo~ not,  thus,  allow  the  EC  to  act  unilaterally  under  this 
instrument. 
494.  The  NCPI  has  been  used  sparingly  since  its  inception  in  1984.  Of 
the  six  complaints  officially  lodged,  four  resulted  in  an  investigation. 
The  focus  was  on  issues  involving  intellectual  property  aspects.  Cases 
27This  is the  only  current  case  of  retaliation  under  Section  301. 
28see  GATT  (1991). 
29schonefeld  (1992). 
As  noted  in  the first  TPRM  report,  the  NCPI  establishes  a  procedural  framework  allowing 
the  EC  (i)  to  respond  to  any  illicit commercial  practices and  to  remove  the  injury  or  (ii)  to 
exercise  the  Community's  rights  with  regard  to  third  countries'  commercial  practices. 
Proceedings  may  be  initiated either  by  an  industry which  considers  itself injured  as  a  result 
of  illicit  commercial  practices  abroad  or  by  a  member  State.  After  consultations  with 
representatives  of  member  States  in  an  Advisory  Committee,  the  Commission  decides  on  the 
opening  of  an  investigation.  The  decision  is  published  in  the  Official  Journal. 
30However,  the  EEC  Treaty  does  not,  in  principle,  prevent  the  Council  from  enacting 
unilateral  measures  against  GATT  contracting  parties  in  areas  covered  by  the  GATT. C,IRM/S/36A 
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accepted  for  investigation  since  the  initial  TPRM  report  concern  port 
charges  in  Japan  on  cargoes  and  shipping  companies 31(February 1991)  and 
pirated  sound  recordings  in  Thailand  (July 1991).  According  to  a 
Commission  Decision  of  March  1992  (No.  92/169),  Japan  has  given  formal 
assurances,  in  the  context  of  bilateral  consultations,  that  the  port 
charges would be  discontinued after 31  March  1992.  The  procedure under  the 
NCPI  was  subsequently  suspended.  In  contrast,  no  decision  has  yet  been 
taken in the  context of the allegedly pirated sound recordings  in Thailand. 
31The  first  case  accepted  under  the  NCPI  (1986)  revolved  around  a  patent  dispute  in  the 
area  of  a rami d  fibres,  i nvol vi ng  a  European  company  which  was  affected  by  actions  on  patent 
infringement  under  Section  337  of  the  U.S.  Tariff  Act  of  1930.  The  Commission's  examination 
confirmed  the  company's  complaint  that  Section  337  resulted  in  a  denial  of  national  treatment 
contrary  to  Article  III  of  the  GATT.  Accordingly,  there  was  "sufficient  evidence  of  an 
illicit  commercial  practice  and  resultant  threat  of  injury  to  warrant  a  request  for  a 
consultation  and  dispute  settlement  procedure  pursuant  to  GATT  Article XXIII".  A  subsequent 
GATT  Panel  found  the  U.S.  measures  inconsistent  with  Article  111.4;  the  report  was  adopted 
in  November  1989.  The  United  States  has  linked  the  implementation  to  the  outcome  of  the 
Uruguay  Round  in  the  relevant  area.  The  EC  raised  this  issue  several  times  in  the  GATT 
Council,  reiterating  its  interest  in  speedy  implementation  of  the  Panel's  recommendations 
(see,  e.g.,  GATT  document  C/M/249,  22  May  1991). 
The  second  investigation  under  the  Instrument  concerned  unauthorized  sound  recordings 
in  Indonesia  (1987);  it  was  terminated  following  a  change  in  intellectual  property 
protection  in  Indonesia. 
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